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AN IMPRESSIONISTIC SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS
by
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AN IMPRESSIONISTIC SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Colonel Jordan -

I am deeply sensible of the splendid introduction that you have made. It certainly gives me great pleasure to again be with you.

Last year, I think you recall as I imagine many of you that I am addressing were here last year, I gave you substantially the same talk that I have given for many years before the Naval War College at Newport; a talk that varies, of course, because all my talks are more or less extemporaneous, from year to year according to developments but which is concerned with a fairly specific topic - the race factor in world affairs. Today, in this extremely troubled and changing time, I suggested to Colonel Jordan that, instead of repeating that talk which you have in transcript, I thought perhaps it would be more useful and I believe certainly more interesting to you gentlemen for me to speak on a more general theme, which may be called "High Lights on World Affairs". That is, frankly, my views on outstanding aspects of the present world situation. They will be frankly my views, and they will not attempt to be exhaustive. What I am trying to do is to give you a more or less possibly provocative survey which may awaken discussion. I hope there will be plenty of discussion after my more or less informal remarks, and the more people who disagree with me the better because that is the way we can develop a real meeting of minds and come to some constructive results.

I have been trying to see the world as a whole and study world affairs in their broadest aspects for something like a quarter of a century. Although I am perhaps best known to the general public for my books on racial matters or concerned with the factor of race, that is merely one phase of the field that I have tried to cover. I really started out as a pretty technical student of world politics. Early realizing the importance of the racial factor and the fact that it was neglected in considerations of the time, neglected or deliberately underestimated, I did a great deal of work along that line. However, I have also tried to follow economic factors, psychological, sociological factors, and as the years have gone on I have tried to get a larger and larger synthesis. It is a result of that quarter century of constant attention to the world situation as a whole that I am giving you these high lights on what I deem to be the world situation.

Last year, as you remember, I discussed as one of the outstanding factors the effect of modern science on the racial factor in world affairs, and I pointed out that modern science and invention had increased the importance of this factor for two main reasons: In the first place, the fact that the marvelous development of modern science and invention had effectively shrunk the planet in size and in that way had brought into effective contact racial groups that two or three generations before had had no effective contact, might have had practically no knowledge of one another; but having been brought into effective contact it produced for the most part more friction than understanding and aroused more problems than it solved, because when unlike peoples are thrown together the result is very often a fight; therefore, the immensely intensified frictions and rivalries, etc. The second factor, of course, is that the increasing knowledge of the true nature of race by these modern sciences: biology, anthropology, etc., had important results such as we have had in our immigration laws, about which "Reforging America" tells; Asiatic exclusion laws and all those things, and of course the question of the Negro in this country. All those things have been intensified by the scientific knowledge of race, which had in large part validated and put on a scientific basis matters which were considered in former times mere prejudices, the prejudice against the intermarriage of races, the effect of the competition of races, different living standards such as the Chinese and Whites, etc., things which formerly were considered unfounded prejudices were now found to have a very scientific basis. That is merely one aspect. I shall go on from that and I shall not touch the racial situation again. I merely wanted to point out the connection between last year's talk and this year's talk.

We will start today from the same consideration of the effects of modern science and invention upon the world situation. We have here a very interesting dilemma. We have on the one hand a planet which is not merely being effectively shrunk in size but which is becoming more and more interdependent economically; where there are the effects of conflict, whether economic or military, whether you have war in the formal sense of the term or whether you have these economic struggles, which are really economic wars, which we have had since the great Armageddon. We have those conflicts, more and more destructive in character; and theoretically there is more and more reason why there should be an increasing measure of international cooperation. But, on the other hand, you have the fact that

this is a world of sovereign states, universally dominated by national self interest, in the immediate sense of the word. Those two principles produce some very disturbing results, and it is because today the thinking of our idealistic, forward-looking minority has not taken sufficiently into consideration the facts of the case and has not properly instructed the public as to the nature of the measures that must be taken and the sacrifices that must be paid to insure a larger measure of economic international cooperation, not merely economic but political also, in the larger sense, that we have had, to my mind, the disappointing, disillusioning unrealities that have prevailed in world affairs since the time of the great war. We have been living, to my mind, largely in a world of illusions. That is not merely a thought I have come to in recent years. I have consistently maintained from the very day that the peace conference adjourned and those various treaties came forth that the whole post-war world was built on rotten foundations and that the League of Nations, being inextricably tied up with those settlements, was also built on rotten foundations. In fact, the League itself as a functioning organization, outside of its technical aspects, was an attempt to validate and in a sense to sanctify a status quo which was unsound - unsound politically, unsound psychologically; unsound economically perhaps most of all. One of the most powerful factors that has been pretty well debunked in the course of the last twenty years is that inevitable emotional reaction which follows every great war. After every great war you have fundamentally the same psychology - that this has been a terrible thing, that it must not happen again. People revolt against the idea of another great war; but because their reaction is purely emotional, because they are not willing to implement their emotion by constructive measures to solve the problems, which the peace treaties have left unsolved, and the new problems which will arise, they do not get anywhere. That emotion is just simply a sterile thing; in fact, it is worse than a sterile thing because that emotion sanctifies the new setup of the peace treaties and thus tends to lend a moral emphasis to what essentially is not moral at all but is simply a practical matter, because if we regard peace in its proper perspective peace is not something static. Real peace is a constant process of readjustment, including an open-minded willingness to change. That is the attitude that deals with problems constantly and attempts to solve them or compromise them or minimize them as they arise. Any such attempt, such as after the great war, the Congress of Vienna, etc., to freeze the situation, then sanctify it, and then say: "Now, this is the thing" - that inevitably sows the seeds of other

wars in the future.

To show you how history repeats itself, I have here a little bronze metal that was struck in England on March 31, 1814. I have seen it since childhood because it was one of those things in the family bricabrac. I do not know how it ever came into the family, but I have certainly meditated upon it many times the last twenty years. (I will pass it around so you may see it.) It says: "The Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, the Marquess Wellington, and Prince Schwartzemberg", who was the Generalissimo of the Austrian Army; and around the top of this it says: "We conquer to set free." On the other side we have a little sketch of Napoleon seated backward on a jackass with a halter around his neck. The other end of the halter is held by the devil, leading him off, not to hell, for it says "To Elba", and also "inseparable friends". Now if that is not the same psychology that we got in 1918 in the peace conference, with "Hang the Kaiser", and the talk about a new time, all the business about a new order and self determination of peoples and all the rest of it - we conquer to set free, to make the world safe for democracy; never again, no more war; all that sort of thing! That was the same spirit, you see, but as I say it was just as much a predominantly emotional thing as the spirit that existed at the close of the Napoleonic wars. I believe it was destined to be even more sterile because, to my mind, the peace settlements made after the great war were worse than the peace settlements made at the Congress of Vienna. They were worse in a number of ways. In the first place, they were, I think, more faulty politically because the splitting up of Central Europe into a number of small nationalities was against the whole tendency of the times, which is of course toward the integration of larger and larger units, especially in the economic sense. I will come to the economic part later on, but certainly some of the political divisions were assured trouble. For example, we have Czechoslovakia - politically that is a monstrosity. It is a gendarme of the victorious powers set in the middle of Europe. As you doubtless know, both Masaryk and Benes, the Czech leaders, were very dubious about taking in all these peoples but they were practically forced to do so. I have had talks with Benes, and he said very frankly a good many years ago: "After all, we are a miniature Austria and unless we can solve our minority problems we will suffer Austria's fate." I think that both Masaryk and Benes would have gone much further than they did in reconciling their minorities while there was time if it had not been for the extreme nationalism and chauvinism of the Czechs people.

They had a very difficult time. There were certain parties that were much more nationalistic and wanted to dragoon and persecute the minorities, and Masaryk and Benes had to fight a continuous fight against those people. I think they have probably done the best they could. They have had a very tough job, and in a large sense the job was wished upon them by the fact that they were compelled to take these territories, some of which they did not wish to take. Of course, things like the Polish corridor and the upper Silesian business, etc., have made it certain that Germany, for one, would never rest content with her post-war boundaries; that it was a position which Germany would be sure to try to regain at the proper time.

Psychologically I think the peace treaties were very bad because of the way in which they insulted the vanquished. In Vienna, and so far as I know in nearly every other peace conference in modern times, the vanquished were given the diplomatic honors of war - that is, they were at least allowed to appear as full-fledged members of the peace conference and have their say; sit around the table and at least talk thing out. As you know, none of the defeated powers were allowed to appear at Versailles, not merely Germany but also the remains of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, etc. They were not allowed to appear. The peace treaty was drafted in their absence, and they were put under pressure of a hunger blockade, threatened with annihilation, and compelled to sign on the dotted line. That is all they were supposed to do. In common law, if you hold a pistol to a man's head and make him sign a check for a million dollars, that check is no good, and a contract extorted under duress is void. That is, of course, the way all the defeated powers felt, not merely Germany but Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey - the treaties were null and void in morals because they were under pressure. Germany's colonies were taken away from her, with the clause in the peace treaty saying that this was done because the Germans were unfit to hold colonies. That injected needlessly a moral element into the situation. As I see it, the Germans sooner or later will demand at least one token colony to salvage their self respect. Those things made it certain that this terrific inferiority complex which was being built up would be inevitably used by any leader who catered to it and proposed to cure it, and it would have to be cured by a violent reaction on another extreme. In politics as in physics action and reaction are equal and opposite in direction, so there was bound to be a terrific, violent, militaristic, aggressive comeback from purely psychological reasons. In addition, consider what was done economically. There was the splitting

up of this whole central European area, particularly Austria-Hungary, which, whatever its political shortcomings, was certainly a well integrated, natural economic unit; further integrated by the development of modern railroads, canals, banking systems, etc. Besides the splitting up of that unit into self-governing, independent units, there was the fact that these political frontiers were also high tariff walls; which, to make it still worse, were not normal tariff walls but were deliberate fences to ruin the other fellow, to put economic pressure on him, to break his will. That has been the fact with regard to the little entente nations and Hungary. They have deliberately tried during the course of years to make tariffs which would strangle Hungary and break her will to existence so that she would no longer have the spirit to demand a revision of the treaty some day against which she so bitterly protests. That thing has been economically absolutely ruinous. It has condemned the whole of Central Europe to either stagnation or decline.

There are appalling conditions down there in Central Europe. In some countries the peasantry, I understand, is so poor they can not afford a box of matches; they have had to go back to primitive methods of flint and steel in order to make a light. With peoples reduced to that level, you can see the appalling consequence of these economic consequences of the peace. You can see there again why any plan which will improve economic conditions on such a low level will tend to receive the support of the suffering peoples concerned. That is one of the underlying reasons why this German drive today down through Central Europe is meeting with such tremendous success - the peoples are so impoverished that they are willing to allow themselves to go on a barter basis and to take German goods in return for their raw materials because no other country has been able to come effectively to their assistance.

The French, of course, after the war were able to subsidize these new nations: Jugoslavia, Roumania, Czechoslovakia; having military subsidies to keep their armies going and to keep them diplomatically in line, but they were not able to do anything for the peoples so the peoples became more and more impoverished. Then France, largely because of her foreign policy, overstrained herself financially and got into the difficulties which she has today. One of the reasons why the whole French system in Central Europe collapsed was because it was built on unsound foundations, and you can not go along with those things. The more you try to put them off,

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the more you try to blink them, the worse the results are going to be. You are simply flying in the face of unrealities.

Another psychological miscalculation was that people allowed themselves to be bemused by war propaganda. That is all very well, I thoroughly approve of war propaganda. You have got to distort things and you have got, frankly, to lie about things in a good many cases in order to keep up the spirit of your country and try to demoralize the enemy. That is all right in war, but true statesmanship always makes a clear distinction between the unrealities of war propaganda and the diplomacy which is necessary in the peace conference period after the war setup. We allowed ourselves to be thoroughly bemused by the idea that there was something uniquely vicious about Germany, that the Germans were a special breed of cat; they had special ambitions and were especially dangerous and if they were thoroughly attended to, disarmed and kept down, the world would go along all right. That would cut out the cancer. Well, of course that was absolutely unreal because history shows that any nation, where it is in a sufficiently difficult condition, always becomes aggressive and always becomes militaristic and always develops this psychology. There is a very interesting parallel to be drawn. I often think of what might have happened in our own country if right after the Revolutionary War things had gone a little differently than they did. I was impressed with that because of my research on the revolt of the blacks and Mulattoes in the French part of Santo Domingo; and then subsequently Napoleon's expedition, when he got a temporary peace with England. Napoleon had vast schemes. He very seriously had the idea of building up a great colonial empire in the new world; and, as you know, he had gotten virtually the whole of this tract west of the Mississippi (indicating position on map). He sent over to Santo Domingo, next to his own army, the finest army that the French Republic had produced, the veterans of the Army of the Rhine, who of course were rather disaffected toward Napoleon. He could not count on them so he sent them over here to do this particular job, and they did the job. The idea that the historians give you that the blacks successfully opposed Napoleon's regulars was bunk. Inside of two weeks they had licked the black army. What stopped them was the yellow fever. He then purposely sent over inferior troops because he knew the yellow fever would get them.

When things were in this muddled condition there came the break with England; the French troops were cut off, finally surrendered to the English, and the whole thing was lost. As you know, Napoleon wanted New Orleans and the rest of this country. Well, Napoleon was lured to the adventure in Spain. When he deposed the royal family and put his brother in as king of Spain it caused revolt and you had anarchy in Spain, which meant no troops, no assistance, nothing could be given in this huge Spanish empire. They were left on their own, and their own governors could not maintain themselves against revolutionary forces which otherwise might not have come to a head for a very long time, perhaps sporadically. The whole of the Spanish Empire in America, as a matter of fact, was pretty strong. Even under these conditions, it took twenty years for the insurgents to emancipate themselves from Spain, which shows that if there never had been this business and the hand of Spain had remained firm, her colonial empire would have existed for a much longer time. Imagine that the peace with England had been permanent; imagine that Napoleon's army, after cleaning up the Negroes in Haiti, had gone on substantially undiminished in numbers, had come here and landed in New Orleans, had garrisoned the Mississippi Valley! Napoleon also had the idea of sending fifty to a hundred thousand colonists out there, which he could have very easily done. Supposing we had had France solidly established here in the Mississippi Valley; and a fairly solidly Spanish empire in existence here (indicating position on map). Of course, in that case Portugal would still have had the empire here. In that case England could never have disinterested herself in the new world. She would have been compelled to take a major interest here. Instead of developing Australia, New Zealand, etc., she undoubtedly would have blocked the French and Spaniards by keeping a very tight hold on Canada and the West Indies and we would have been blocked in this territory here with our dream of expansion which even then was very well defined. As you know, the first thing the Continental Congress did was to draw out a plan of treaties looking toward westward expansion to the Pacific. That was our line of policy; we would have attempted to realize what we felt was our destiny, and we would have had three empires to beat on the way. Do you suppose we would have been a very particularly amiable or particularly pacific Nation? Don't you suppose we would have developed a militaristic and aggressive and unpleasant and bellicose psychology? I am quite sure we would, because we are no different from other people. I give that just as an example to show you what I

consider might have been had circumstances been different, had we not had the most amazing run of luck by the automatic elimination of one empire after another that barred our way.

But here we are. The Hun has been, as we think, thoroughly put in his place, the cancer has been cut out, and the world is going to be made safe for democracy; it is going ahead. What happened? You shortly had two members of the grand alliance, Italy and Japan, displaying exactly the same Hunnish symptoms and you had other nations, such as Poland, that showed by its aggression against Lithuania and by its attitude toward other neighbors that it only lacked the power to also act in similar fashion. The Germans, of course, always nursed their dream of a revival of their power and a desire to get back their position in the world. In other words, when you have nations as different as Germany, Italy, Japan and would-be aspirants like Poland, etc., differing in every way; when you see them exhibiting exactly the same traits and exactly the same policies, you see that you are not dealing with a peculiar manifestation but with a trend common to human nature which will inevitably tend to display itself whenever the circumstances exist which tend to produce those phenomena. And, those phenomena can be grouped, as I see it at any rate, more and more upon the thesis so well elaborated by Frank Simonds and Brooks Emery, between the haves and the have-nots. That you are familiar with, so I will not go into it. It simply means that you have this clash between the powers who possess the greater share of the good things of this world and those who do not and who find themselves with expanding populations and with a very difficult economic position. Therefore, you get the phenomena that you do get in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and in Japan, which is becoming more and more totalitarian in character; you have the various provocative policies of these various peoples against the haves and their determination to make their way peacefully if they can or with a minimum of violence, but if they can not, then by violence, to be frank about it. That, of course, aroused all this idealistic feeling that reached its maximum, as it always does, immediately after the war. You can break down that emotion, you can analyze it and break it down to several factors which have no necessary relation to one another. In the first place, there is a mere emotional revolt against war and the desire for peace, which, as I say, comes into being after every great war and persists for perhaps ten years or more as a substantial factor, but which is an emotional factor and which is therefore sterile because it does not get you

anywhere, does not do anything to solve the problems which will make the next war. However, it is there and it influences millions of people to look upon any disturbance of the status quo as something immoral and something which is reprehensible in character regardless of what the change is. There is a desire for peace, this idea of static peace; therefore, you have the selfish interests of the victors who inevitably rationalize their interests by thinking that this settlement is the moral one. You have the legalistic treaties assigned. They are the law of the world -- "this must be a world of law, etc. The alternative is a world of force". "Peace is inseparable, if it is broken in one place it is broken in every other; and if the treaties are not fully observed you have a reign of lawlessness and anarchy ". That in part, of course, is undoubtedly true. I am not arguing, you understand, for or against anybody. I am not arguing in favor of the have-nots nor am I decrying the haves. I am simply saying that this is the sort of world we live in, and if you want to get out of this vicious circle you have got radically to change your thinking. You have got to realize that if you want to take advantage of the developments of modern science and invention and if you want to bring about this increasing trend toward economic cooperation and collaboration you have got to take certain measures, you have got to modify certain ideas, you have got to pay certain prices for it, and there is no use kidding yourselves the way a large part of the world has been kidding itself by all these rationalizations. As I say, you have this moralistic attitude on the one hand and you have an equally moralistic attitude on the other, because do not think these nations, Japan, Italy, Germany, think all this is just propaganda put out by cynical dictators with their tongues in their cheeks, and that the stupid people are forced to swallow it, dare not voice their resentment. The average Japanese, Italian thinks this is right because he sees no tolerable future for himself and his children unless his position is bettered in the world; therefore, he also rationalizes his emotions and dignifies his selfish interests by moralistic considerations, and he works up an ideology which is just as sincere and just as moralistic in character as the various conceptions of the haves. So you get more and more of a situation where you get a clash, not merely of interests but of ideologies, and if that goes sufficiently far you get a terrific situation. You are liable to have a war which will be fought by the peoples sincerely on both sides for what they consider to be highly moral grounds; and that, of course, is the worst sort of a war -- then you have a real war.

I was very pessimistic about three months ago. I felt more and more pessimistic. I did not see any hope to avoid a general war of that character in the near future, but, gentlemen, my opinion has entirely changed. I have had a ray of hope ever since the coming into power of Chamberlain, ever since Chamberlain took the stand he did and they got rid of Anthony Eden. Anthony Eden is a very estimable young man. He represents, probably better than anybody else, the moralistic conceptions, and believes them, I believe, sincerely - all this post-war idealism which has grown up on the side of the haves. He quite rightly dislikes and detests these totalitarian governments, because none of us like them, and he distrusts them. His attitude was that they could not be dealt with, they could not even be negotiated with unless they gave guarantees, which would draw some of their fangs. That was all right from his standpoint, but certainly if you take an attitude like that you can not negotiate with those people. Having taken the attitude that he did, you could not expect either Hitler or Mussolini, for example, to say nothing of the Japanese, to sit down and confer with him because they are creatures of prestige and before they could even sit down with him they would have had to have done things which he demanded which would have largely discredited them in the eyes of their own people. Eden and his party said: "We want a negotiation." As a matter of fact, they did not. If they knew what they were talking about, the logical end of that attitude was a policy of force, either economic, political, military, or all three. In the last analysis probably it would have ended in war. I have no objection to a policy of force provided you have the force, but Eden and his crowd clearly did not have the force. I can not understand today, except the bemusement of people by following this false ideology not based on facts, how he could have considered such a policy as a present possibility, because where was his force? If you were challenged to block Germany and Italy you would have had to have more than Britain to help you. You would have had to have an alliance ready for aggressive action, in the first place economic and probably ultimately military as well. Where was your alliance? With the resources of the British Secret Service at his command I can not conceive how Eden could have possibly thought that France was in any condition to be an effective ally for aggressive action. Russia was not in condition. I can not figure out what is exactly happening in Russia. I think it is probably the inevitable breakdown of this essentially destructive Bolshevik doctrine of universal suspicion and hatred and violence carried on not merely as between peoples but within peoples; this extermination of

whole classes. That thing, having destroyed their ideological enemies, I think they are beginning to feed on themselves. It is the thing that Danton warned of during his trial when he said: "Take care, citizens, the revolution, like Saturn, is devouring its own children." I think today of the snake swallowing its own tail. I think Russia is out. Then, of course, this whole development, this mechanistic development is superficial. I am a layman, I am talking to military men, and I may be quite wrong. I think if Russia should start an offensive war with its wonderful outlay of tanks, airplanes, etc., that within a month they would be less fighting the enemy than fighting their own machines. At any rate, Russia was not to be depended on. It was perfectly clear that the United States was not to be depended on for any degree of action. Where was his force?

On the other hand, Chamberlain thinks what I personally (and it is just my idea - I am not trying to sell you this idea; it is an idea I have had all these years and I may be quite wrong) sincerely believe, and I have felt this ever since the war, that the only way you are going to get anywhere is to recognize realities and to deal with these things on a basis of realities and not mix up ideologies and interests. Chamberlain has back of him the City of London. The City is very old and very wise. It has dealt with all sorts of people successfully, and purely on a factual basis. The City does not give a damn when it deals with the King of the Cannibal Islands what the King of the Cannibal Islands does provided he does not add British subjects to his menu and provided he has a certain regard for British goods. If those requirements are observed by the King of the Cannibal Islands, that is all the City cares about, and it does business quite successfully and is quite ready to have its representative sit down and talk with the King of the Cannibal Islands without bringing in any question of dietary ideologies one way or the other. That is exactly the attitude of Chamberlain. He says: "We may not like these governments but they are there." In another speech he said: "Unless we try to understand the mentality of our opponents we will never get anywhere." The whole attitude of the Chamberlain policy has been that they recognize that these have-not powers are determined to do things and go places, and they actually have gone places; but fortunately they have not gone places which as yet vitally menaced any part of the British Empire; therefore,

Chamberlain is disposed to attempt to channelize their energies and let them go places which will not make it absolutely necessary for Britain immediately to stop them. Personally I think there is a great deal to be said for that, living in the world in which we are today, not the world perhaps that we would like to have but the world actually in which we exist. Merely to say that these people ought to stay at home and keep the peace does not get you very far.

What is back of the rape of Ethiopia, so called? Back of that action of Italy was the finest series of double-crosses that I think modern diplomacy can show. Let us see the history back of that. When the great war broke out in 1914 Italy was allied to Germany and Austria Hungary. She immediately double-crossed her allies, but at least she had the virtue of frankness. She did not attempt to idealize her action; she was not doing it for civilization or democracy or rights of small nations, she frankly said: "We are guided by sacred interest." That was her attitude; she frankly was in the market for the best deal if she were to abandon neutrality. Both sides courted her; and, as you know, the British and the French offered her vastly more than the central powers so ultimately she came in on their side, and she came in with secret treaties which were good stiff ones. The Italians came into the war, sacrificed over a half million men and nearly bankrupt themselves in the process. They did not do very good fighting but they lost the men, so at least they paid in gold and blood their side of the bargain. When the peace conference assembled they demanded that the bond be paid. You know perfectly well what happened. France had no desire to see such a powerful Italy, she was bent on erecting a group of satellite nations and she was particularly keen on having a strong Yugoslavia. So Clemenceau very cleverly propounded to the idealistic President Wilson, with his self determination of nations, the enormous crime of having Dalmatia with ninety-six per cent Jugoslavs and only four per cent Italians assigned to Italy. "It is a monstrous crime", said Clemenceau, and President Wilson agreed. President Wilson was excited about this thing and he said he would never agree, so that part of the secret treaties must be abolished. Of course Italy claimed from France and England that they observe the bond. England and France said: "What can you do? After all, the savior of the world, Mr. Wilson, insists upon this." The Italians said this: "If you are not going to keep your word we are going to break this party up and there is not going to be a peace conference." They packed

up and went home, but the peace conference went right on. After some months the Italians decided they better come back. There was in the secret treaty a statement which said that besides a good slice of Turkey they were to get, in case the German colonial empire was conquered, either part of it or equivalent indemnities in Africa. When they came back they found that the German colonial empire had been entirely divided up between France, Britain, and Japan, and Italy had not been given a thing. They said: "How about this?" Clemenceau answered: "My dear fellow, the world is in danger of chaos. You were not here and we had to make these arrangements, furthermore, what are you going to do about it?" They could do nothing, but the Italians nursed a bitter grievance. Mussolini came to power and began to negotiate: "How about a little rearrangement of this thing? Italy has come up in the world. I realize that you double-crossed us but after all now we are able to talk about this thing again - how about it?" Well, they could not see it. To save the Italian pride, they said: "We will give you a little something" - that looked good on the map, so they gave Italy a big slice in Tripolitanian hinterland. Mussolini had his air pilots fly over it and all they could find was about thirty-six people in two hundred thousand square miles. Then the British gave them Jubaland here, which is a God-forsaken place, but looks good on the map. After Mussolini had been negotiating for about five years he had an interview with the English journalist Ward Price and he said: "Go home and tell your people I am not a collector of deserts." He said further in substance: "All right, boys, if you won't play ball I am going out to get something that neither of you own, something that we pretty nearly got a good many years ago. I am going out to take Ethiopia." Then, of course, came the "rape" of Ethiopia, which was not a nation but a ramshackle oriental empire. You see back of this was not a mere ruthless, cynical determination to go out and start something just for the sake of a fight; it was the result of a whole lot of disappointments, disillusionments and downright double-crossing on the part of everybody. I am not attempting to defend Italy, I am simply saying Italy is part of a system in which everybody had double-crossed everybody else. It all behooves any of them to get moralistic at any stage of the proceedings because there isn't any morality involved in the whole damn thing. Take this whole unnatural setup in Central Europe - if the Germans go down there and get the whiphand it will be according to the normal economic trend, reinforced by the fact that this economic setup after all was so bad that it inevitably threw it more and more potentially into the Germans' hands.

Take the Japanese-Chinese situation. You have here the effect of industrialism coming into Japan, a primitive country, which was the same as the effect of industrialism everywhere when it comes with greater opportunities, the mobilization of resources hitherto limited, etc. It makes it possible for a great many more people to make a living and it produces an enormous increase of population. Then that population, as is shown by the western world, reaches a certain point; and because of the growth of great cities, the rising standard of living, the congested living quarters in the cities, and the growth of scientific knowledge you get checks upon population growth either automatic, such as the postponed marriage, etc., or conscious birth control. Those same factors are beginning to be present in Japan. It is not a case of where the Japanese are going to pile up indefinitely. There have been a number of studies made about the Japanese situation, mostly by population experts, and I think they generally come to the conclusion that the Japanese population will be stabilized somewhere between ninety and a hundred millions somewhere around thirty to forty years hence. But, already Japan is over-populated and they simply can not live on their own resources. Immigration is out of the question. It is not a practical matter, unless they do some drastic thing such as killing off Chinese and settling Japanese, but even so it is a very difficult problem. The only way you could solve the situation is by transporting millions of Japanese. They would have to be transported by millions to ease the situation. Japan's only real way out is further industrialization and the supporting of this already excess population by more foreign trade, by better access to raw materials, by more foreign investment, by more various services such as shipping, etc. That is the only way in which those people can be supported. The alternative, of course, is mass starvation and anarchy. The Japanese are not minded to crawl back into their island and starve to death, they are not minded to do it, treaties or no treaties. It is not a legalistic proposition, it is a life-and-death proposition. You can not get away from it. What did they do? They tried to rationalize their industries and undersell everybody, especially in the colonial areas; and all the powers got alarmed and jacked up tariff barriers and put Japan on a quota. Remember the row that took place in this country? The Japanese said: "Well, my God! in a world of economic nationalism with prohibitive tariffs, quotas, embargoes, we have got to have one place where we have

the inside track" - and that place was China. That was what, in my mind, has precipitated the great Japanese drive on China. I do not think the Japanese, in their wildest dreams, think of trying to actually conquer and occupy the whole of China. The Japanese feel that they must have a hold on China sufficiently strong so that they can regulate China's internal national evolution so it will not be directed against Japan, and these markets and these raw materials and these investments will be an assured outlet for Japan. Japan may succeed and she may fail in this war, but given the circumstances you can see that aggressive action on the part of Japan toward China was practically inevitable.

What are we going to do if we want to remove a situation like that? Supposing Japan loses the war. Supposing a diplomatic front is finally formed to compel her to get out of China even without war. Supposing we make war upon her, a number of other people beat her, and there is a revolution in Japan and the old order is swept out. That mass of people will remain. No matter what happens to the government you will not abolish those people and those people will be more impoverished and more embittered and in a worse condition than ever. You will have that mass of embittered, despairing people, and if you get centers like that they alone will poison international relations and are bound to make more trouble sooner or later because you can not keep a numerous, intelligent people down. You can not do it. The only way is to kill them off - short of that they are going to make trouble just so long as they are in a desperate situation, and the more desperate the situation the more trouble they are going to make. That is what the last war has taught me, at any rate.

What are you going to do? I do not think you can do very much at the present day because, as I say, you have this conception of the world and no nation up to date has as yet made a single notable sacrifice, political or economic, primarily to further international peace and cooperation. That is a broad statement but I believe that I am right - no nation has made such a gesture and no nation that I know of today is willing to make any notable sacrifice solely for that. Until you get people in a frame of mind where they are willing to envisage this thing in a different way you are not going to get very far toward solving these problems. You may adjourn them. That is why I think the realistic, more or less, if you like hardboiled and cynical, attitude of Chamberlain and the City of London is the best policy for the world today, not that I believe

it is the ideal policy but it is the realistic policy. It looks matters in the face and seeks to deal with a very imperfect world. If it can adjourn or minimize or localize these troubles, it seems to me it has done very much; whereas if you take the attitude of most of your internationalists with their idea of peace and security and all these things you run squarely into a world war of ideologies as well as interests, which will just simply tear the planet to pieces; and that, to my mind, we ought to avoid even at a very great cost.

I just throw this out as a suggestion: - It is not practical politics at all. From the practical point of view it is nothing but an insane dream. I do not say it is the only way, but just one way that occurs to me. Supposing the powers were to get together and nominate a board of some of the greatest experts in the world in politics, economics, population, raw materials; everything. Supposing they were to get together and this international board was to say to the Japanese: "Look here, we see just exactly what a spot you are in. You have about thirty million people that you cannot nourish from your home resources and you have thirty or forty million more coming and this thing is going to be a crisis for the next thirty or forty years. We have drawn up what we think is a fairly workable blueprint of your needs and necessities and we propose to you that if you stop this business, if you stop trying to dominate China, trying to menace the Far East and trying to blow yourself up like the frog in the fable, threatening everybody with war, if you will drastically cut down your army and navy and renounce these imperialistic policies on the mainland, we will guarantee you a sufficient outlet for foreign trade. We will more or less ration ourselves with regard to Japanese goods. We will all do it." If one nation should lower the barriers the Japanese would put in so much goods it would put that nation out of business, but if the whole world did it it could be prorated. "We will see that you get raw materials in terms of you at prices you can afford to pay. This will be worked out; we have rough blueprints; we can go along experimentally for two or three years and from time to time this will be revised." I think that if a program like that were put out, the Japanese would be very strongly inclined to accept it; certainly it would be a welcome relief from the terrors that now beset them. If I were a Japanese I would be just scared to death with the condition that my country was in and the serious future which was before me. That is what I mean by constructive international action.

realistic action; but of course you know it is impossible today. Imagine what would happen if such an idea were proposed! Imagine the tariff lobbies and groups! Imagine what they would say up on the Hill! You can not do it. It is the same in these other countries - you just can not do it; but, gentlemen, something like that will have to be done if we are going to do away with acute causes of war. Until we change our thinking and are willing to act in that genuinely international commonsense way and so long as we have a world of selfish sovereign states, we have got to deal with the world as it is at present; and to my mind we probably will have to go through one or two other great wars until the destructive effects are so great that the world will come to a willingness to take constructive action along the lines that I suggest, pay the price, and really remove the causes of war.

I know I have talked far too long but I have tried to give you just what I consider to be the highlights of the situation; how it arose, what it is like, what it is leading to with the good and the bad aspects, and just what I consider to be a possible hopeful but wholly impracticable glimpse into the future. That ends my formal talk, and I hope there will be plenty of discussion as to the things that I have sketched for you.