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DISCUSSION
Following Lecture of
Capt. William R Winslow, C. E on
"The Construction Division"

December 7, 1938

Q Do I understand you to say that Type B construction is performed by the Construction Division, Q.M G and if so, what is the situation?

A That is correct, and that has given us some study because obviously the Construction Division of the Q M.G., while they may be experts on construction are not experts on the manufacture of gas masks, for instance. Yet the regulations are quite specific as to who is going to do this construction The answer is, of course, to get close contact between the Construction Division of the Q.M G and the agencies involved, such as the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service. It has been thought that perhaps when the construction itself is started it will be logical to detail an officer of the Ordnance Department or of the Chemical Warfare Service as the construction quartermaster on the particular project, but at the present time, at least in time of peace, the problem was simply to get logical plans and specifications out for the gas mask factory or the loading plant, and we have done that by having the Quartermaster General get in contact with the other two branches and consult with them.

Q If we wanted to construct some fortifications which were not in the theater of operations, who would have charge of that work?

A The regulations prescribe that construction will be done by the Quartermaster General other than fortifications, so the fact that your

fortifications were not in the theater of operations would not have any effect on that, they would still be done by the Corps of Engineers

Q I don't believe I understand just how the Army and Navy Munitions Board fits into that picture. For instance, does the War Resources Administration refer to the Army and Navy Munitions Board when there is conflict, or does the Army and Navy Munitions Board coordinate the requirements before they go to the War Resources Administration?

A The coordination and supervision is, of course, the direct responsibility of the War Resources Administration, but it is expected that the two military services will iron out their conflicts before they get there. In other words, the War Resources Administration will receive a coordinated military program which it is required to fit over the capacity of the industry and to coordinate with the requirements of the civilian population. If there is some basic conflict which can't be ironed out, of course that would eventually reach the top superagency, but the plan is to get coordination between a military program and a civilian program, the military program being coordinated by the Munitions Board before it gets up to the top agency.

Q In that same connection, does the Navy have a corresponding construction program now?

A Yes, I haven't mentioned it here, but your committee which studies construction will have that in your directive, and you will find the Navy has a construction program and a very good one, a very complete one for construction at the various navy yards and docks, etc. As a matter of fact, we coordinated with the Navy in determining our list of

congested districts. Commander Pollard in the Navy and I have worked close together on that, and obviously a congested district was determined on the combined requirements of both the Army and the Navy.

Q. Going back to the second question about fortifications, I don't know the regulation about that

A. The regulations prescribe that they be built by the Engineer Corps.

Q. I am not clear as to just what features the Corps of Engineers will control in a theater of operations. We are too prone to look upon a theater of operations as distinct from the country whereas it will very probably be part of the country.

A. That question comes up each year. The regulations themselves are an outgrowth of the World War where it worked out very nicely. We had a theater of operations across an ocean and all construction in France was done by the Corps of Engineers and all construction in this country was done by the Quartermaster General. There was a distinct dividing line and no conflict. If you assume that the war was fought in this country, the line of demarcation and the zone of the interior is quite nebulous, certainly in times of activity. There is liable to be a conflict of authority there. I don't know just what the answer is. The Corps of Engineers is going to do all the construction in the theater of operations and the Quartermaster would do all construction in the zone of the interior. Some higher authority will have to make the decision in the zone between. The regulations are quite clear in what they prescribe.

Q. In connection with that point, as I understand it, the Protective Mobilization Plan is a general plan. Is there any adaptation of this construction plan to a specific war plan or is it all generalized, based on the Protective Mobilization Plan only?

A. This plan is based upon the general mobilization plan and also upon the Industrial Mobilization Plan which, too, is general. There is no question in my mind, and I don't believe there is in that of the other officers in the Planning Branch, but that eventually we will have to have color procurement plans just as we do have color tactical plans. However, you can't go to an industry and say, "If we fight the Japanese we do so and so," or "If we fight the Germans we want you to do so and so " In the first place, you can't mention the color plans to them, in the second place you have to give them a job and say, "If we go to war we want so much " Dealing with industry has to be done on a general plan After we get the general plan and the thing has had some years to reach a complete form, we will have to make our own plans as to how the general plan is going to meet various tactical situations, but at the present time this plan and all the others are based on the General Mobilization Plan and the Industrial Mobilization Plan.

Along that same point, I might state that under the new War Department plan instead of having the various color plans just general plans they have an Operations Plan and also a Concentration Plan By that means they can have a little more secrecy as to operations and they can mobilize or concentrate wherever they please

~~Q. I am not quite clear as to the method of contracting for the Type~~

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Q. Yesterday we had a couple of very interesting lectures by members of the General Staff on the procurement of man power, and recently in this College we completed a study of the construction industry as it now stands in which it appeared, as you have also indicated, that the industry would function at somewhat reduced speed as a whole in time of war, therefore, a lot of those men in the construction industry would probably be available for induction into the armed forces. It also occurs to me that the better men in the construction industry, the construction foremen and all men of that type, are generally men of intelligence who have done a lot of outdoor work, are used to handling men and in many cases are very good non-commissioned officer material for the armed forces. The General Staff told us that they were trying to get all the non-commissioned material they could. It was mentioned that about 20% of the Army and about 30% of the Navy are going to have to be skilled men, either as non-commissioned men or specialists. Would you elaborate more on where the compulsion is going to come from to hold any of these men in the industry, whether it actually would be important and how it will be applied?

A. It is no different in the case of construction from that of any other industry where skilled men are concerned. There is no way of preventing volunteering and, as you say, some of your best men that you would like to keep most are going to be the first ones to volunteer. There is nothing to be done except putting out the right sort of publicity to attempt to hold them. After your Selective Service has come into effect, the tendency to keep a man on his job will come from his boss.

His boss will request a deferment of his draft, and all we can do in the country as a whole is see to it that publicity is given so that contractors will realize that a construction program is to be forthcoming and will request deferment of these key men. It is all a job for Selective Service.

Q The crux of the matter would seem to be this. The General Staff says they don't want publicity, the only publicity they want is to get men, and from yesterday's discussion it would appear that that is very necessary. In other words, the needs that they are going to have for man power voluntary enlistments are going to be several times what they were able to arrive at in the World War. Therefore, the emphasis must be and should be ^{on} getting those men into the Army rather than keeping them out.

A I would say you have put your finger on a source of conflict between the War Resources Administration and the Chief of Staff, and it will depend on who has the loudest voice.

Q Normally when we use the term "allocation", and particularly, accepted schedules of production, we think of an industry as a facility in being. You mentioned the fact that some of that type C construction was connected very closely with accepted schedules of production. Would you care to go into that a little bit as to what extent accepted schedules of production are contingent upon additional construction and what the nature of the items are in general.

A When an accepted schedule is signed it has on it a figure which shows the load placed on that facility. Wherever any new construction is required in order to carry that load it is noted on the back of the form that new construction, another wing or another receiving plant, or depot,

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will be required at that factory in order to meet that plan. If it is noted on the form for allocation that new construction is required, the form is sent to the Construction Division where it is compared with Form 101 to see that a construction plan has also been submitted. If that has not been submitted we go back to the supply arm or service and say, "You have indicated new construction on your procurement or allocation form, but you have failed to submit a construction form." We get the construction form accordingly. The allocation form is initialed by the Construction Division to show that that has been taken care of. As that plan for procurement reaches the factory it has a complete plan showing just how the factory is to function to meet that new construction. It is an essential part of the factory plan and will be included therein. In the case where there is no factory plan, which is the case 99% of the time there will simply be a notation that new construction of such and such a type, with approximate cost of so much, will be required.

Q Is it always the case that an accepted schedule of production involving the creation of a new plant is avoided until a diligent search is made to see if somebody else hasn't some facilities that can be allocated and the accepted schedule of production obtained? It may be easier sometimes to take one allocation and say you will get the bulk of your things there because they say, "If we can have a little more construction," rather than get out and find out if there isn't some other place that can do it without additional facilities.

A Of course I don't know how well that has been done It is certainly what should be done and it is what is contemplated when the instructions are put out. I would say from the fact that we estimate that the total war construction load is only about five hundred millions that that has been done rather well. After all, that is not very much compared with the normal national construction load of upwards of two and three billions So just using those figures as an index it seems to me we have done rather well in eliminating non-essentials.

Q. This is the first chart in which I have noticed the War Service Committee standing out and its duties outlined I am just wondering what the duties of one of these officers is going to be when he gets into a discussion and finds that every decision he made the construction facilities didn't like, and he has to reverse himself.

A. We hope it won't be that

Q It seems to me you are inviting the construction facilities to do that.

A. This is one of the features that has been taken from the plan of the War Industries Board as it was finally worked out during the World War and as it was functioning at its best. In every case where they were dealing with an industry they invited in a committee of the experts of the industry to let them know what problems the industry was facing and also to act as an agency to see to it that the mandates of the superagency were properly distributed to the industry The idea is to get in men who are big enough so that you are not going to have them acting as a quibbling agency They were the biggest men in the industry, men who were able to appreciate the

national problem and also men who when they spoke to the industry were listened to. This is not going to be some small type of contractor It is a big shot. It worked during the World War and we think it will work again It was the only way of getting one hundred percent cooperation

Q In that Type C. construction, is any consideration given to taking over idle facilities rather than building new plants? Many plants throughout the country might not be one hundred percent suited but would do I noted that U. S. Steel was trying to sell between forty and fifty million dollars worth of plants. Those plants could probably be used, and I was wondering whether that is considered in Type C construction plan

A What you have hit on there is one of the points where we have to rely on the officers from the supply arms and services who are out in the field. They have a job of surveying the industry in their field and of best allocating their load to that industry, and certainly it is up to them to use idle facilities where possible

Colonel Rutherford I came in as one question was asked about possibly these fellows are going to get in the way of the corps area commander. I don't believe so. After all, this economic control agency we are setting up is supposed to help. They are just as interested in winning the war as we are. I don't think we will have the type of man who is going to obstruct anything that is being done I think all that the Army, Navy and other services directly connected with the war will have to do is make their wants clearly known and they will be given priority enough to get the job done. I have no fear at all that they are going to interfere with us. They are simply there to help. I think we should look on them as our best friends