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THE SUPPLY DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

by

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The conference this morning covers the operations of G-4 of the War Department in both peace and war.

In any study of the War Department set-up you should be thoroughly familiar with and understand AR 10-15, August 18, 1936, because it is the fundamental regulation governing the War Department. Under the subject regulation, G-4, as an assistant to the Chief of Staff, is charged, in coordination with the other divisions of the Staff, with the preparation of basic supply plans which will enable the several supply arms and services to prepare detailed plans for the accomplishment of their several missions and with the adjustment of plans where necessary to meet the changing military needs or fiscal limitations. In the development of these plans the arms and services look to G-4 for decisions on military questions and to The Assistant Secretary of War for decisions on business or industrial questions. In other words, G-4 is required to get up a requirements program in anticipation of war and then, when difficulties arise, to restate that program in accordance with the limitations placed upon it by procurement possibilities - limitation of funds, or other factors which had not been foreseen.

The responsibilities of the Staff and The Assistant Secretary of War with respect to the development, classification, and procurement of equipment are covered in AR 850-25, July 23, 1936. While G-4 alone does not determine what research will be undertaken or what new items of equipment will be developed, he is responsible to the Chief of Staff for all necessary preliminary investigation and work to bring about a proper balance between possibilities of supply and the expressed desires of the using arms or services. G-4 must be a realist. In the Army research must pay its way either in reduced production costs for the same item or in a better item for the same money. We cannot afford to spend our time or money on the development of an item just because it might be more convenient or an ingenious gadget. It must be much better for the purpose than what we have. Neither can we enter into the development of an item which is being developed in civil life. We may not always like the commercial item, but when war comes we will have to use it if it is reasonably satisfactory. One of G-4's problems is reconciling the frequent idealistic desires of the using arms with the practical problems of procurement and maintenance. Under present world conditions there must be no long delay in search for the ideal or perfect solution. A practicable, usable solution

must be accepted with a recognition of the fact that production must begin as soon as possible, in reasonable quantities, when the need arises

In time of peace we have in G-4 the Planning and Equipment Branch, the Supply and Transportation Branch, the Construction Branch, the CCC Branch, and the Finance Branch. We have a total of 20 Regular officers, one National Guard officer, and one Reserve officer. In war, the number of officers assigned the division is increased from a total of 22 officers to 29 Regular and 16 Reserve officers. All of the additional Regular officers, under present plans, will come from the current War College class if a mobilization is required during this fiscal year. On mobilization an additional branch is added to the organizational set-up of the division by separating the Supply from the Transportation functions of the existing Supply and Transportation Branch.

The PLANNING AND EQUIPMENT BRANCH is charged with

- a Preparing the tables of basic allowances.
- b. Passing upon all questions of standardization of experimental items and determining the quantities to be included in the list of the critical items in the War Reserves.
- c. Establishing priorities for the preparation of the annual estimates for Research and Development, Rearmament and Equipment, and for War Reserves, keeping check of the expenditure programs of the services to see that the War Reserves are not neglected and expenditures are essentially those set up and defended in the budget.
- d Examining the supply feature of the projects for the defense of overseas departments.
- e Preparing those parts of the Protective Mobilization Plan and the several color plans which deal with matters of primary interest to G-4.
- f Maintaining liaison with The Assistant Secretary of War, the Chiefs of Arms and Services, the Navy Department, and other Government agencies concerned in the development and procurement of munitions.

The October 1938 revision of the Protective Mobilization Plan is now being completed. After its approval it will be practicable, for the first time since the 1933 Plan was

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abandoned, to require Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services and Corps Area Commanders to compute their supply requirements for mobilization.

The Planning and Equipment Branch is also charged with the preparation of the supply series of Mobilization Regulations. These regulations, as now published, were written around the 1933 Plan and must be revised to conform to the Protective Mobilization Plan.

In time of war the Planning and Equipment Branch will be charged with the supply requirement features of new plans to meet changing military needs and with furnishing G-3 with supply features of all new plans. It will prepare changes in Tables of Basic Allowances and in Tables of Allowances made necessary by the situation, and pass upon requirements for new equipment, substitutes, and improvements of existing equipment. It will coordinate programs for research and development and for rearmament and re-equipment, both within the Army and between the Army, the Navy, and other Governmental departments concerned in these matters. It will also make timely plans for the proper disposition of all War Department materiel and supplies that will become available at the termination of the emergency and will coordinate plans for the preservation of the War Reserve at the cessation of hostilities.

The name of the SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION BRANCH, G-4, describes its activities very concisely, and I am sure all of you have a pretty fair idea of the kind of problems that would be handled in this Branch of G-4. The Supply and Transportation Branch and the Planning and Equipment Branch are closely integrated and at times overlap. In general, Planning and Equipment is a planning branch and in matters of equipment deals with the future, whereas Supply and Transportation is primarily concerned with current problems. I think you would be most interested in some of the daily problems which must be solved and I will touch very briefly on a few of these for illustration.

Its most common activity in peace, although perhaps not its most important duty, is simply the distribution of current supplies and transportation to the Army.

Briefly speaking, a supply problem comes to G-4 only when it involves some issue in excess of allowances, or when a supply service is unable to meet a legitimate demand and asks what shall be done.

The greatest difficulty in handling problems of this nature arises from the shortage of supplies in relation to the demand. As a result of this condition, the provision and distribution of motor equipment in particular, is a continuous process. We must first secure approval for inclusion of the items in the budget, then induce Congress to appropriate the money, and thereafter must undertake the difficult task of making a fair distribution to the field. For example, commanders in the field, of all echelons, are constantly presenting urgent needs to the War Department. The Nth Infantry needs a new automobile. Everybody, including the Nth Infantry, says that is very true and approves the request. The War Department has apportioned all vehicles and says it has no money to buy an automobile for the Nth Infantry. This is a pretty poor answer, so we are studying the plan of giving all vehicles to the Corps Area Commander and delegating to him the decision as to whether the Nth Infantry or some other of his regiments will receive this new automobile. Many people think this scheme is wrong; that we ought to keep on as we do now and tell the Quartermaster General to give the automobile to the Nth Infantry, if it has put up the best story. Personally, I think we should give the automobile to the Corps Area Commander. No decision has been yet made, and I do not know what it will be.

I want to go into this matter of motor vehicles a bit further, and I hope you will note this carefully, for the reason that these approved supply policies will necessarily be disappointing to many post and organization commanders, unless the necessity for them is known and accepted.

Two things have been decided: First, that each station will be given an administrative allowance of vehicles which is barely adequate for operation of the station in the absence of all tactical organizations. Please visualize what that means. Next, it has been decided that organizations will be given only such vehicles as are necessary for minimum training needs. This number of vehicles is considerably less than provided in Tables of Basic Allowances.

Since these two allowances run concurrently, it is clear that there will rarely be found any Army vehicles which are not in almost daily use.

You will note at once that this policy will leave us very short of vehicles on M-Day. How we expect to meet this situation has puzzled a good many. There is really very little option in the matter. As long as we need critical items we cannot spend money for articles that are far less difficult to secure. Procurement of motor vehicles must therefore be deferred.

It follows from this that we can admit no delay in the procurement of motor vehicles when such procurement becomes necessary in quantity, and it is here that the demand for standardization enters the picture. Whatever the form standardization takes, there must be no interruption in the then current flow from the assembly lines of the motor industry.

Whenever the opportunity presents itself, G-4 does everything possible to assure that each arm and service will not be equipped with special vehicles or other special articles. We are trying to keep down the number of articles of special equipment and we try to force a branch or a service to accept an article which is common to some other branch, if it is reasonably usable.

As to the diversification in types of models, competitive bidding is one reason why we have so many types, and there seems to be no escape in peace time. In war we would buy such large quantities that possibly we can assign one model to each division or possibly each Army Corps.

As you know, the War Department operates only four passenger transports and it is quite a problem to arrange that these four boats maintain schedules to meet all needs. Of course, The Quartermaster General works up these schedules, but many questions arise where decision must be made by G-4. The Army also operates quite a fleet of harbor vessels, and continuous adjustments are in process in order to get the maximum use out of these boats.

Each year the requirements of the Army for animals have to be redetermined and tables of distribution prepared under which The Quartermaster General will supply actual shortages. Continued motorization of the Army has produced a downward trend in the number of animals, and since 1926 the total number of animals has been reduced by one-half, in other words, from about 43,600 to 21,700. We have been able to get funds for the approximate number of animals needed each year, so distribution is not a difficult problem.

A good many bills are introduced in Congress each year which involve the issue of supplies by the War Department, and the Supply and Transportation Branch prepares the necessary reports to the Congress expressing the attitude of the War Department. I may say that the committees of Congress give great weight to reports of this kind and it is very seldom that legislation is enacted when the War Department recommends adversely.

As you know, a large part of Army Regulations relates to questions of supply. Since these regulations are constantly under revision, considerable study in the Supply and Transportation Branch is involved.

Within the Army there is a continuous accumulation of obsolete and useless material and the Chief of Staff has been insistent that such material be cleaned out. Of course, the job is never completed, but continuous action is in progress to dispose of such material in the most appropriate way. A great deal of it is declared surplus and reported to the Procurement Division of the Treasury. I believe that progress is being made in this housecleaning.

The Supply and Transportation Branch, in time of war, will include so much activity that it will then be divided into two branches, the Supply Branch must set up priorities in the way of supplies which go to troops and see that these supplies are ready at the right place and time, the Transportation Branch will regulate matters pertaining to transportation of personnel and supplies as far as such regulation requires command control by the War Department. This latter branch would be the agency that would prepare staff directives to the Traffic Manager of the War Department, and provide him with most of the information pertaining to military movements. This branch would also be deeply concerned with the supply of field transportation to the Theater of Operations and must see that adequate supplies of vehicles, whether these are for combat trains, or in a large motor pool, are made available to GHQ. Incidentally, the current plan provides that as far as possible all trucks be held back in a general pool until temporary assignment to units becomes necessary. A field Motor Transport Service will operate this pool. I mention here vehicles only, but you will understand this is just one of the important items that the Transportation Branch must consider.

The CONSTRUCTION BRANCH is charged with long-range construction plans, maintenance and operation questions, land acquisition matters, and leases and licenses. In addition, it has the responsibility of considering possible mobilization sites and the construction required thereat for use in an emergency. It is probably the most active Branch in G-4 -- certainly, it daily handles questions of considerable import to the welfare and contentment of every branch of the Army.

The advantage of having definite plans available, which can be followed and adhered to, has been clearly borne out

in construction matters. The Construction Program, after thorough study, was revised about two years ago, and it was determined that, roughly, \$162,000,000 worth of construction was needed in the Army for other than Air Corps stations, and from \$100,000,000 to \$125,000,000 at Air Corps stations. Based on this revised program, we were readily able to prepare a priority list for presentation to the Congress at its last session, with a view to securing a direct allotment of PWA funds. The availability of this plan enabled everyone to talk along the same lines, and I feel, had much to do with enabling us to secure approximately \$50,000,000 of PWA funds that are now being expended for construction purposes. The total new construction actually being undertaken this year, by combined appropriated, PWA and WPA funds, amounts to approximately \$67,000,000. Our use of PWA funds was somewhat restricted, as aside from the fact that use of these funds was restricted by law to the continental limits of the United States, one requirement for allotting the money was that the construction had to be started by August 15. This forced upon us the necessity of considering only construction for which the Quartermaster General had readily available plans that could be used without the delay of preparing new plans and specifications. Fortunately, he was quite well prepared to take care of almost everything, except certain unusual buildings.

The Construction Branch of G-4 is also charged with study of maintenance questions throughout the Army. As long as we have WPA or similar relief funds which can be obtained by the various posts and stations to augment their meager appropriated maintenance funds, our maintenance questions are not too severe, but when the liberal application of relief funds ceases, Post Commanders at the time will have a real job on their hands in trying to maintain the post in the luxury to which it has become accustomed. The finding of a satisfactory solution to take care of this condition when the time comes is a question that will severely tax any group of officers.

A land acquisition program is now in course of preparation, which is intended to be an adjunct of the construction program and will enable us to establish a priority of need for land at various posts and in various sections of the country, and to arrive at a sensible and logical program for land acquisition. Closely allied to land acquisition is the problem of keeping our existing land holdings unimpaired for full military use. The War Department receives numerous requests for the lease or easement of portions of military posts for rights of way, for roads, railroads and other utilities to civilian communities. In general, the proposal is quite

important to the civilian communities concerned. Their proposals must be carefully investigated and weighed against the possible impairment of the Army installation concerned. Worthy occasions arise where the War Department can and properly does accede to the proposed utilization of the land in question. But G-4 must look at all of these requests with the eye of a watchdog who distinguishes between friend and foe but recognizes but few friends.

G-4 has just prepared a redraft of its section of the Mobilization Regulations and for construction purposes is recommending that the housing and hospitalization of troops of the Protective Force be assigned as a duty to the Corps Area Commander, and that for such housing he be advised to use only those facilities, both Regular Army and National Guard, which are available to him, supplemented only by urgent minor construction. Any construction that must be provided for forces to be mobilized in addition to the Protective Force has been recommended by G-4 to be a function of the War Department, The Quartermaster General to be responsible for and maintain standard plans for cantonments and other construction required, and The Surgeon General to be responsible for all general hospitalization. This is a decided change from previous regulations, and if this recommendation is approved, it will eliminate the need for maintaining M.F. 4-2 and 4-3.

The Construction Branch is now compiling data on Regular Army and National Guard Reservations and National Guard Armories to show the maximum housing capacity that can be provided at each of the above. Data are likewise being collected on various lands of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior that might be suitable for use by the Army during mobilization. These data will be of considerable assistance, not only prior to mobilization, but throughout the emergency. While it is expected that the location of most of our camp sites and cantonments can be determined prior to, or early in the mobilization, it is more than likely that the Construction Branch will be beset with many difficulties when the time for action comes.

The FINANCE BRANCH fills a very important place in our peace-time set-up. The Chief of the Branch represents G-4 on the Budget Advisory Committee. Upon the passage of the annual War Department Appropriation Act the Finance Branch is responsible to G-4 for getting out the War Department Expenditure Program which, when approved, becomes the guide for all expenditures. While the other branches of G-4 have primary interest in these expenditures from the angle of the procure-

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ment of supplies and equipment, it is the duty of the Finance Branch, with its background and knowledge of the build-up of the appropriation, to keep a watchful eye over expenditures as such, and to set up and control reserves in those appropriations where such are necessary or advisable. By so doing, it is possible to meet urgent unforeseen needs by applying savings or other funds that might revert to the Treasury as unexpended balances.

The Finance Branch also has the difficult job of controlling the funds for flying pay, travel of personnel and rail transportation, as well as taking action on legal matters pertaining to the fiscal functions of the War Department.

The importance of this branch will be relatively less in war than in peace. In war, War Department money is plentiful and much easier to get. A G-4 liaison agency on fiscal matters will be necessary, however. Many questions of legality and policy in fiscal matters must be solved. Miscellaneous matters which have no place in the other branches will also be handled here.

I desire at this time to stress the value to each and every officer of a knowledge of War Department fiscal procedure. Colonel Loughry has already told you about the method of building up the War Department budget and the difficulties encountered in getting the appropriation through the Bureau of the Budget and through Congress. Contrary to the belief of a great many officers, the War Department has no reserve that is appropriated as such. Every penny appropriated has been justified for some specific purpose which has been carefully scrutinized in turn by the Budget Advisory Committee, the Bureau of the Budget, and both houses of Congress to determine its necessity. Any funds which may be available for a purpose other than that for which appropriated must be diverted from a project for which the funds were appropriated. Naturally, unforeseen needs will require funds. By the practice of care and economy in the expenditure of Government funds and supplies, the savings that can be accomplished become available to meet these unforeseen demands.

The CCC BRANCH has three officers. It was moved over from G-3 last March when I was transferred to G-4. We find that the command post for the CCC in the War Department must be concentrated in one section of the General Staff. Our formulation of policies, drawing of plans and operation have been very much facilitated by having it all in G-4. We continue to obtain assistance from G-1 on the question of

policies about Reserve officers. Other questions that come up we refer to the War Department Bureau that can give us assistance, such as The Judge Advocate General or the Inspector General. The operating bureaus are Quartermaster, Finance, Surgeon General and Signal, but we also have CCC clerical assistance in The Adjutant General's Office, The Judge Advocate General's Office, and the Chief of Chaplains' Office. The CCC Branch draws plans for each quarterly enrollment, which usually involve the organization of new companies and their transfer around the United States. At the present time we have 1500 camps divided 30% to the Interior Department, and 70% to the Department of Agriculture, with 300,000 enrollees, of which about 9% are veterans. The estimates for appropriations for the CCC are all coordinated in G-4 and G-4 supervises the presentation of the estimates to the Director, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Appropriations Committees of Congress.

With reference to the Army and Navy Munitions Board, I take it that you are thoroughly familiar with its composition and functions since they are covered in the 1936 Revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Of the three Army officers on the Executive Committee, one is a member of the G-4 Division of the General Staff. In this manner G-4, and through him the Chief of Staff, is kept advised as to current matters, especially where questions having a direct bearing on the military requirements of the Army are involved. Last year's revision of the Army's initial requirements was of considerable assistance in relieving congestion at certain points in the allocation of facilities. G-4 recently completed a very thorough re-study of this matter, seeking to reduce still further these requirements. We now feel that the Army's requirements under the present mobilization plan are down to bedrock.