

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE  
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THE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION (G-3)  
OF THE  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

by

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1. I hope you will pardon me if I take up a little time to set a background for the main part of this talk which is the duties of G-3, War Department General Staff. My talk will be entirely military - it will omit any mention of naval matters.

As you all know, G-3 is but one element of the General Staff that assists the President, the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff in carrying out their duties in connection with the directives of the Constitution and federal laws. As you also know, although delimited in its functions, G-3 cannot be definitely limited in its field of thought and action, for in order to carry out its prescribed duties it must look at the problem from the viewpoint of the powers of the individuals just mentioned. In other words, the division must extend its action far enough to insure that all concerned know and consider the particular points for which G-3 is responsible.

2. Let me try to illustrate how G-3 affects all the other elements of the War Department. I am sure some of you, when you were in Paris after the war, visited the Pantheon de Guerre to see the great picture in that huge building. That picture showed the whole battlefield of the western front and the activities of the allied armies. I wish you would try to imagine a similar picture which would show all the military elements of the national defense of America. First, men will appear in this picture, - every detail about personnel of the army will come from G-1. Second, material will appear in the picture, - all the details of equipment, weapons, supply and maintenance are the concern of G-4. Third, the enemy will appear in the picture. What must our forces overcome? This is the concern of G-2. Fourth, the picture will show war plans, how the Army will use G-1's men and G-4's materiel to whip G-2's enemy - that is the function of the War Plans Division. Last but not least, the background of our picture must exhibit expanse and depth sufficient to portray the fact that all our elements of defense are supported by industry and agriculture integrated by national solidarity. Is our picture complete? We have men, materiel, enemy and war plans, all shown on a background of comprehensive national solidarity, and so far there has been no mention of G-3.

Where does G-3 come into the picture of military preparedness? Why, G-3 puts life into this picture. It or-

ganizes the men of G-1, the matériel of G-4, into a living working organization that will carry out the war plans against the enemy. G-3 is concerned with shaping the character and composition and training of all the organizations and echelons of the Army so as to make them effective operating agencies.

As in imagination you have fixed your eyes on the picture of national defense, your attention must have focused on the culmination of all the activities of the War Department - that is, the mobilization of America for operations.

G-3 is concerned with the details of mobilization. G-3 controls the movements that carry out mobilization and also directs the training and education necessary to prepare the troops for military operation.

Let us think a moment of education and training which are important G-3 functions. In the Army, what are the stages of education and of training? The first stage is the education of the individual, the second stage is the education and training of units so that the individuals in the basic elements will learn how to cooperate in the use of the weapons with which they are provided or in the execution of the functions for which they are equipped. The third stage is the training and education of the combined arms. It is education in the team work of units that are differently armed and equipped, and that have varied combat or service functions. Therefore, when I said that it was G-3 that puts life into the picture and lets the Army function, I was not claiming a predominant position for G-3. The Army could not operate without men or materials, it needs a mission and it needs war plans, but with all these it still can't operate without the organization, or without the education and the training to balance and to articulate every element into a living functioning whole.

3. With this in mind, let us now take up a more detailed consideration of the organization of the G-3 Division.

The peace organization of the Operations and Training Divisions is as follows. A Training Branch, an Operations Branch, and a Mobilization Branch. The war organization is an Operations Branch and a Training Branch.

The peace time functions of the Operations Branch concern principally organization, troop movement, distribution of Regular Army units, type of equipment and weapons.

The peace time functions of the Training Branch concern principally troop training, schools (except the Army Industrial College), policies governing, and training of the civilian components, publications in connection with training and tactical and training inspections.

The peace time functions of the Mobilization Branch concern principally details of mobilization, logistics plans pertaining to war plans and demobilization plans. The lecture that follows this talk will give you more details concerning mobilization plans.

The Operations Branch of the wartime organization, as far as functions are concerned, is an expanded peacetime Mobilization Branch which absorbs the troop movement and troop location and assignment duties of the peacetime Operations Branch. This arrangement results in a branch clothed with the necessary powers to control the execution of the mobilization Plan that is made in peacetime and also to change that plan to meet the demands of changing conditions on M. Day and by operations in the field.

The wartime Training Branch is a combined peacetime Training and Operations Branch to which is added a Research and Planning Section which keeps close contact with actual operations in order to make tactical doctrines, organization, weapons, equipment and training meet the demands of the forces at the front.

Limeographs showing all the functions of the branches mentioned will be furnished you for your further study or information, so I will not take time to mention them now.

4. To my mind what I will say in the remainder of my talk should be emphasized because of its close relationship to the work of this college. It concerns mobilization from the standpoint of procurement. In this connection I would like to make clear what is meant by the terms "Initial Protective Force (IPF)", "The Protective Mobilization Plan" and "Augmentation Mobilization Plans" which will be mentioned. The Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) contemplates a balanced force of approximately 1,000,000 men. The Initial Protective Force (IPF), which is included in the PMP is that force which it is contemplated will be available for use by 30 M. Successive expansions of the force contemplated by the PMP are provided in Augmentation Mobilization Plans.

In mobilization, there must be a balance both as to time and numbers between personnel (troop units) and equipment, maintenance and supply.

This requires a knowledge on the part of G-3 of the time necessary to procure equipment and comes in especially in connection with heavy weapons or intricate and delicate instruments. The more mechanized and up-to-date an army becomes the more study and advanced thought and preparation must be devoted to the subject of procurement. There should be no tendency to make supply govern blindly the number of troop units to be mobilized by a certain date. There should be a mutual understanding and especially should G-3 be cognizant of the limitations placed upon procurement agencies. Procurement must not take advantage of its character, that is, the fact that it is based upon actualities and not wishes, to create a position of superiority.

G-3 bears the above facts in mind in making up the IPF and PMP and the augmentation plans in extension of those plans.

The procurement of critical items for the PMP is mainly covered in the War Reserve, therefore it is the Augmentation Plans that will test the capacity of our nation's industry. It is the duty of the General Staff to see that these augmentation plans keep up-to-date on weapons and implements of war, and also that they visualize possible changes that may be necessary due to a particular theatre of operation or to improvement in weapons or equipment. The procurement plan may, therefore, cover items that may not be actually obtained. This may occur because when the time comes to put the augmentation plans into effect the circumstances may dictate changes in equipment or weapons. I believe that the procurement plan should have such flexibilities to allow omissions or substitutions with as little confusion as possible. Further, the Augmentation Plans formulated by the General Staff must indicate where omissions or substitutions may occur in order that the procurement plans may provide allotments to factories to meet such vital changes.

G-3 is also responsible for the preparation of tables of organization which form the basis for procurement both in personnel and equipment. This division of the General Staff works closely with G-4 in the formulation of Tables of Allowances, Tables of Basic Allowances, and Tables of Equipment. The War Plans Division is vitally concerned with the character of weapons and the character of combat vehicles insofar as they are affected by terrain and climatic features in a

possible theater of war. For this reason, G-3 works closely with the War Plans Division in connection with these matters.

All three of the Divisions interested in weapons and vehicles must assist procurement by the application of the idea of simplicity in the case of weapons and must endeavor to use as many commercial vehicles as possible, reducing to the minimum special vehicles and diversion from commercial vehicles.

5. In concluding there is one point that I wish to drive home. It is this. No future war will be a short war. The fact that the Central Powers banked upon a short war was the primary cause of their final defeat - they did not have the resources at hand when the pinch came. The present war in Spain was to be a short war. The present conflict in China seems to be of much longer duration than we expected. The increased power furnished by modern aircraft may shorten the duration of future wars, but it will increase the drain on a nation's resources, which in reality is equivalent to increasing the length of wars.

The establishment of an Initial Protective Force and a PIF of about 1,000,000 men is only a stepping stone to the more important task of preparation for defense. I refer to the Augmentation Plans which form the basis of our procurement plans for a major effort. The efficacy of these plans will be our national defense bulwark. They must be built on the basis of a long war. If this is done a short war might be a happy miracle. At any rate, such planning will be economy under any circumstances.

With a long war as a basis we should not cease attempting to improve industry's ability to increase its output of war munitions until we can say industry can supply munitions as fast as we can secure and train men effectively for operations. This is not as impossible as it might seem for the deeper we go into attempts to increase industry's output, the more closely we determine the man power needed for that purpose. This progressive study will eventually establish the proper proportion between fighting men and the men supporting the fighters. Until this proportion is known we cannot determine the size of the effective military force this nation is capable of producing if we ever find ourselves with our backs to the wall.

EXHIBIT A

G-3 Division of War Department General Staff  
Peace Organization

TRAINING BRANCH

FUNCTIONS

Preparation of plans and policies and supervision of activities relating to

Troop Training

- Current training
- Training directives
- Special Field Exercises for large units
- Training fiscal matters
- Training ammunition allowances
- Training facilities
- Mobilization training

Schools

- U. S. Military Academy
- General Service Schools (Except The Army Industrial College)
- Special Service Schools
- Education of Regular Army officers in civilian institutions

Civilian Components

- National Guard
- Organized Reserves
- Reserve Officers' Training Corps
- Citizens' Military Training Camps

Publications

- Technical and Training Regulations
- Field Service regulations
- Manuals
- Army Extension Courses
- System of Military Publications
- Training films
- National Rifle Matches
- Athletics
- Tactical and Training Inspections

OPERATIONS BRANCH

FUNCTIONS

Preparation of plans and policies and supervision of activities relating to

Army Organization

- Tables of Organization for all branches of the Army of the United States.

ANNEX A - Continued.

Assignment of units to higher organizations.  
Distribution and location of units of Regular Army  
in peace and of all components of Army of the United  
States in time of war  
Military police  
Operation  
Troop movements.  
Assignment of replacements.  
Establishment and abandonment of posts.  
Execution under Mobilization Plans.  
Consultation with G-4 on types of equipment, and on major items  
such as guns, rifles, tanks, etc , consultation with WPD  
So much of Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances and  
Tables of Equipment as relate to the allotment of major items of  
equipment to units and the distribution of such items within  
units  
Miscellaneous.

MOBILIZATION BRANCH

FUNCTIONS.

Preparation of plans and policies and supervision of  
activities relating to

Mobilization Plans

Preparation of War Department plan and revision thereof.  
Coordination of all plans which are based directly on  
War Department plan  
Regulations, etc.

Logistics Plans

Preparation of those parts of the logistics plans per-  
taining to the several war plans which are the  
responsibility of G-3, and the revision thereof.  
Coordination of the G-3 features of logistics plans  
based directly on War Department logistics plans  
pertaining to the several war plans.

Demobilization Plan

Distribution and location of units of the National Guard and  
Organized Reserves in time of peace.  
Current matters affecting readiness for mobilization

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EXHIBIT B

G-3 Division of War Department General Staff  
War Organization

OPERATIONS BRANCH

FUNCTIONS:

LOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT SECTION

To secure necessary data on the location of units and replacements mobilized.

To direct changes in priorities for mobilization.

To determine the state of readiness of units and replacements for assignment to Theaters of Operations.

To assign units and direct replacements in coordination with GHQ.

TROOP MOVEMENT SECTION

To direct inter-corps area troop movements and to supervise such movements in collaboration with G-4.

PLANNING SECTION

To prepare any extension of the Mobilization Plan.

To prepare the G-3 part of any new logistics plan, or major revisions of such plans.

To prepare plans for demobilization.

TRAINING BRANCH

FUNCTIONS:

TRAINING SECTION

To direct and supervise all training within the Zone of the Interior.

To determine the state of training of all units and replacements destined for Theaters of Operations or for Zone of Interior defense.

To prepare training literature dealing with operations of the combined arms.

To review training literature of the arms and services, prepared by the chiefs thereof.

RESEARCH AND PLANNING SECTION

To carry out research on tactical doctrine, organization and equipment.

To formulate tactical doctrine.

To determine changes in organization in coordination with GHQ.

To allocate major items of equipment.

To supervise development of equipment from the tactical viewpoint in coordination with G-4, WPD and GHQ.

EXHIBIT B