

764

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THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN
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THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN

This lecture deals with "The Protective Mobilization Plan." To begin with, I desire to remind you that the Protective Mobilization Plan in itself does not constitute the complete War Department Mobilization Plan but is only a part thereof. It is designed to provide the means which will enable us to meet the initial requirements of any possible emergency and may be said to implement the initial military program for a future emergency. Later, I will refer again to the War Department Mobilization Plan and will indicate how successive expansions of the force contemplated by the Protective Mobilization Plan are provided by means of Augmentation Plans. For the present, the lecture will be confined to a description of the Protective Mobilization Plan.

This plan provides for the mobilization, at the maximum monthly rate, of a balanced force of moderate size which can be speedily and properly armed and equipped. Specifically, it provides for raising the present military establishment to a force of approximately one million enlisted men with the necessary complement of officers. About 750,000 of the enlisted men provided will be required for units to be mobilized and the remainder will be needed for the War Department overhead, corps area service commands and replacements. The units referred to comprise, in general, 22 Infantry divisions, 5 reinforced Infantry brigades, corps troops for four corps, army troops for two armies and certain GHQ Reserve and Harbor Defense troops. Included therein are reinforcements for foreign garrisons. The mobilization of the necessary manpower to provide the above mentioned force cannot be effected immediately or even during the first and second months after the initiation of mobilization. Naturally, it is highly desirable to mobilize this force as rapidly as possible. However, the speed of mobilization during the first two months is limited by our ability to procure additional enlisted personnel. Careful study has indicated that we cannot reasonably expect to procure more than about 300,000 enlisted men* by voluntary enlistment during the first month of mobilization and about 200,000 enlisted men during the second and each succeeding month until selective service can become operative. If a selective service law could be passed and placed in operation immediately, the mobilization rate could be increased. However, it will take time for the introduction and passage of such a law as well as for setting up the administrative machinery to place it in operation. For planning purposes, it is therefore assumed that selective service can begin to produce processed men ready for assignment by 61A. The operation of this law will greatly increase the number of men that can be procured in any given period, and thereafter supply becomes the controlling factor which limits the speed of mobilization. In determining a mobilization rate which will be practicable after the operation of the selective service system has eliminated personnel procurement as the controlling factor, we have adopted the following as a general guide

a. The organizational equipment which can be made available in any 30 day period will be that required for a balanced force of not to exceed 150,000 men completely equipped.

* The 300,000 enlisted men do not include those enlisted men in the Regular Army Reserve.

b. The requirements in organization equipment for units in the Zone of the Interior will be reduced, wherever practicable, in order to permit the mobilization and training of a greater number of individuals.

c. The number of individuals procured for units and installations which will not cause an increase in the requirements for organizational equipment, will be limited only by the numbers needed and the ability to care for them properly after they are procured.

From an examination of Exhibit No. 1 to this lecture, it can be seen that this limit is not exceeded by the Protective Mobilization Plan.

As previously stated, the Protective Mobilization Plan provides for the mobilization of a balanced force of moderate size. Let us see if we have provided such a force. (See Exhibit No. 1.) It is moderate in size, to be sure, amounting in numbers to approximately 1,000,000 enlisted men, but is considered adequate for the initial protection of the United States and its possessions. As to whether it is a balanced force, that is another matter. It might be well to explain here what we mean by a "balanced force." Possibly it might better be referred to as "an effective combat force." In the following explanation of a balanced force, reference is made to a mobile combat force.

The Staff Officers Field Manual, Part Three, states that an army is comprised of a headquarters and army troops and two or more corps, temporarily assigned, the number of corps depending upon the nature of the service required. In addition, certain troops of GHQ Reserve are attached from time to time as their special services are required. This manual gives the organization of a typical army consisting of army troops and three corps. It also states that a corps is composed of a headquarters, and corps troops and two or more Infantry divisions temporarily assigned, the number of divisions depending on the nature of the service expected of the corps. The typical corps consists of the corps headquarters, corps troops, and three Infantry divisions. The division is a fixed unit and comprises in its organization the essential combatant and administrative branches all in correct proportion and so organized as to make it tactically and administratively a self-contained unit, capable of independent action. The GHQ Reserve comprises organically those troops which are not habitually required by an army. Units of the GHQ Reserve are allotted by the commander of the field forces to theaters of operations in accordance with their requirements. Within each theater, allotment is made to armies or groups of armies of additional special troops of the types and strength required for the particular operation involved. So, in referring to a balanced force we have in mind one or more armies, each army consisting of a headquarters, army troops for a type army, and two or more corps each of which consists of a headquarters, corps troops for a type corps, and two or more Infantry divisions. The number and type of GHQ Reserve troops is not fixed but is dependent upon estimates of what may be required to meet probable situations.

The mobile force provided by the Protective Mobilization Plan seems to be somewhat out of proportion in the number of Infantry divisions to corps and army troops. However, after careful consideration, it was decided that corps troops for four corps and army troops for two armies, supplemented

by certain GHO Reserve troops would meet the initial requirements of any situation which might arise. Furthermore, in this connection it might be pointed out that when we speak of corps troops for four corps and army troops for two armies, it is not meant that the corps and army troops are assigned to any particular corps or army. The plan includes the corps troops that would normally be part of a type corps and the army troops that would normally be part of a type army, except that the mobilization of some of the less essential army troops has been deferred.

Those units of the Protective Mobilization Plan which, it is believed, will have on M day, or can have by 30M, the strength, organization, equipment and training essential to make them available for use in the field under the conditions that may be expected during the early days of mobilization are included in what is known as the "Initial Protective Force (IPF)." Such units include those of both the Regular Army and National Guard. Those of the Regular Army available for use on M day amount to 84,822; those of the National Guard available for use by 30M amount to 295,703, and the entire IPF totals 398,526. This last figure includes 21,338 Regular Army procured immediately after M day. Not included in the above figures are the active units of five Regular Army skeletonized Infantry brigades, although these can, if the situation demands, be used on M day. However, the plan contemplates that they will not be committed to immediate use in the theater of operations, but will constitute a trained nucleus around which additional Regular Army units can be mobilized. It is planned that these active units be expanded immediately into reinforced Infantry brigades.

Referring again to Exhibit 1, it will be noted that four Regular Army divisions are included in the IPF, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions. Actually none of these divisions is entirely complete during peace but wherever possible, the PMP supplies the missing units by making provisions for the transfer to these divisions of active units from the remaining five skeletonized Regular Army Divisions, the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th. For example, the 28th Infantry of the 1st Division is a two battalion regiment. The additional battalion required to complete its organization is supplied upon mobilization by the transfer of the personnel of a battalion of the 5th Infantry of the 9th Division. The organization of the 4th Division in time of peace is much more incomplete than that of the 1st, 2d, and 3d in so far as active units are concerned. To remedy some of its deficiencies, one complete Infantry brigade and one Infantry regiment are transferred thereto on M day. The 8th Brigade, consisting of two Infantry regiments of only two battalions each is transferred out of the 4th Division on M day. Inactive headquarters and service units which cannot be activated by the transfer of active units are organized immediately by utilizing cadres from certain active units which are not required for early use as well as cadres taken from certain zone of the interior installations, and are then brought to their required strength by the use of men with previous service. As an example, some of the units of the Medical regiment of the 3d Division, inactive during peace, are activated by cadres from certain General Hospitals and selected men from recruits obtained early. Despite the provisions for completing their organization, the first four divisions will still be short Field Artillery units initially, and their 75mm gun regiments will go out lacking some gun batteries. These inactive batteries are to be mobilized as early as the personnel procurement situation will permit and made available for use as soon as their organization and training can be completed.

All of the units mobilized during the first month are organized at peace strength except those for which there are no tables of organization for peace. The individuals to bring units mobilized initially at peace strength to war strength are procured during the third month and, after completion of the prescribed course of training at replacement centers, will be made available to the peace strength units at one time. The procurement of these filler replacements to war strength is not planned for an earlier period because of the limitations in personnel procurement previously referred to, although naturally, if recruits are procured faster than anticipated, the necessary replacements will be forwarded to replacement centers earlier. All units whose mobilization begins after 30M are mobilized at war strength. The mobilization of units required to supply deficiencies in the organization of all Regular Army and National Guard divisions, such as the artillery batteries of the four Regular Army divisions previously referred to, is so planned as to make them available to their divisions at war strength at the same time as the filler replacements to raise units from peace to war strength are received.

Considering again the question of balance, the Initial Protective Force as it now exists is not an effective combat force. The number of corps and army troops that are available for use on M day or by 30 M are practically negligible. It is hoped that some of these deficiencies will eventually be supplied during peace either by activating units in the Regular Army and National Guard or by the conversion of less essential units therein to units of the desired type. Deficiencies now exist in such supporting troops as artillery, engineer, signal, medical and quartermaster units. In order to round out a balanced force which will include the units in the IPF, it will be necessary to mobilize a number of inactive units. Provision is made in the plan for initiating the mobilization of as many of these units as possible during the first month and the remainder during succeeding months. All are needed but they cannot be made available for use until their organization and training is complete. Consequently, the balancing of the force initially available will be a gradual process taking place over a period of about four months. The deficiencies in corps and army troops must be met initially by the immediate expansion of the nucleus in Corps and Army headquarters that now exist and the temporary expedient of utilizing artillery, engineer, signal, medical and quartermaster units of divisions which may be in reserve.

Included in the GHC troops are the following active Regular Army units which are available for use on M day. The GHC Air Force, infantry (tank) units, 2 infantry regiments (24th and 25th), 2 cavalry divisions, 1 mechanized cavalry brigade, 4 cavalry regiments, 5 antiaircraft artillery regiments, 1 signal battalion and certain other minor units, also the following active National Guard units which are available for use by 30 M, 1 cavalry division, active units of 3 cavalry divisions, 3 cavalry and 12 infantry regiments, 10 antiaircraft coast artillery regiments and 1 signal battalion.

In general, the execution of the Protective Mobilization Plan is decentralized and is the responsibility of corps area commanders. They are responsible for the procurement of personnel for the units and individuals for which their corps areas have been designated as corps areas of origin, as well as for the units and installations of their own corps area service commands. They are also responsible for feeding, clothing, sheltering and providing medical attention for units and individuals while in their corps areas. They carry on all training activities except those retained under War Department control.

The War Department does specify, however, the location of reception centers, unit training centers, and enlisted replacement centers and indicates the units which are to begin or complete their organization and training at each unit training center. All Regular Army active units are to mobilize at home stations and concentration plans for army strategical plans pick them up there. Active National Guard units, after being inducted into the Federal service, are to be moved to unit training centers in the South to complete their organization and training. As National Guard units are maintained during peace at "maintenance strength" which is considerably below peace or mobilization strength, it is highly desirable that they be permitted to continue their organization and training until 30M in order that they may absorb a relatively large number of recruits and receive some divisional training before being picked up for use in the field under a concentration plan. If the situation requires, National Guard units can be made available for use as soon as their induction into Federal service is completed. On the other hand, it is also possible that they may not be required for use in the field by 30M and can continue their training after that date. One of our existing war plans provides that some National Guard units proceed to concentration areas immediately following their induction into Federal service while others are not required for use until considerably after 30M.

Exhibit No. 2 shows the corps area of origin and the primary and alternate unit training centers for National Guard divisions. The alternate centers are to be used if, for any reason at the time mobilization is ordered, it is deemed advisable.

Inactive units pertaining to partly active units, as, for example, an inactive battalion of an active regiment, are organized and trained in most cases at the home station of their parent units or at the home station of units or installations which furnish cadres for them. All other inactive units are organized and trained at the unit training centers designated in the plan. Exhibit No. 3 shows the unit training centers provided for units of the Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Quartermaster Corps, etc. The corps area of origin of the units which are to be organized and trained at each of the unit training centers is shown in an annex to the Protective Mobilization Plan.

Exhibit No. 3 also shows the location of the replacement centers contemplated. Mobilization tables, which form one of the annexes to the Protective Mobilization Plan, indicate how many individuals are to be procured by month by each corps area as replacements for each arm or service. Following procurement, individuals to be assigned as replacements are held at reception centers until the War Department indicates the particular replacement center to which they are to be forwarded.

It will be noted that unit training centers and replacement centers are, with few exceptions, located in the South. This was done for the following reasons

- a. Climatic conditions are favorable to all year out-of-door training.
- b. Mobilization can be expedited in that climatic conditions permit the use of tentage, thus saving time and money that would be required for construction of contentment buildings.

c. Sufficient, or nearly sufficient, government-owned land is immediately available for the mobilization of the mobile force of the size contemplated under the P.M.P.

In connection with training for mobilization, peacetime procedures will be modified only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of a particular situation. Such modifications may be

a. That the conduct of training is not decentralized to as great an extent.

b. That the least important subjects are eliminated and the most essential are given priority.

c. That training is intensified and the amount of training per day is increased to the maximum which can be advantageously absorbed.

Passing now to the organization and training of units and installations, little time will be available for the training of active units required for immediate use. Consequently, individuals required to bring such units to mobilization strength must be carefully selected, in order that they may be readily assimilated without decreasing the effectiveness of their unit. The Regular Army Enlisted Reserve will provide a very efficient source of trained men for this purpose. Such active units as are not required for immediate use in the field will continue their training with emphasis on those phases necessary to prepare them for contemplated operations.

Cadres are the framework of new units and installations. Their proper organization and training is the secret of the rapid and efficient preparation of units and installations for active operations. Cadres include officers and enlisted men. For inactive units, all officers required by tables of organization and those enlisted men indicated in cadre tables published by the War Department are included. With few exceptions, we now have sufficient officers to furnish cadres for all inactive units mobilized under the Protective Mobilization Plan. Enlisted cadres may be organized from the personnel of active units and installations as specifically provided for in the Protective Mobilization Plan, the Regular Army Reserve, Regular Army units whose strength is above their prescribed mobilization strength, previous service men, partially trained personnel, and, for occupational specialists, those individuals who have had experience in comparable civil occupations.

Provisions for the organization of inactive units which must be organized and made ready for use by 30M deserve and have received especial consideration. Active units and installations have been specifically designated in the Protective Mobilization Plan to furnish enlisted cadres for inactive units of this category. Furthermore, these cadres are not to be limited to the individuals indicated in cadre tables or tables of organization but their nature and size will be determined by corps area commanders in accordance with the type of unit concerned and the time within which the unit must be made available for use in the field. To insure the effectiveness of these units, the additional enlisted men required to bring them to prescribed strength must be carefully selected.

Enlisted cadres for other inactive units which begin their mobilization during the first month but are not required for use until later will be obtained from any or all of the sources previously indicated and will be sent direct to the unit training center at which their unit is scheduled to begin its organization and training. Every effort will be made to have them arrive at training centers as far in advance as possible of the additional enlisted personnel required to bring the unit to its prescribed mobilization strength.

For those units whose mobilization is scheduled to begin after 30M, enlisted cadres will be procured during the month preceding and will be forwarded to enlisted replacement centers where they will undergo intensive training. Shortly before the time scheduled for a particular unit to begin its mobilization, its cadre will be selected from the personnel in the appropriate replacement center and forwarded to the unit training center at which the unit in question is to be organized. The cadre selected need not comprise the individuals originally sent to the replacement center for training but will be formed from the best qualified personnel among the trainees thereat.

Officer cadres for all units should arrive at unit training centers well in advance of the organization of their unit in order that they may assist in the necessary arrangements for the care of their enlisted men, become familiar with local training conditions, contact and continue the training of their enlisted cadres and, in the case of those officers who do not receive refresher training at a special service school, undergo refresher training.

Inactive units, other than those required for use during the first month, will be trained in accordance with the unit training programs for mobilization which have been prepared and issued by the War Department for various types of units. These programs are in reality master schedules from which detailed schedules can be developed in accordance with the situation as it may exist at the time. They permit of modification to meet changes which may occur in the training time available. Following the arrival of cadres for units of this character at unit training centers, it is desirable that all of the remaining enlisted personnel to bring the unit to prescribed strength be furnished at one time. This will not always be practicable and the personnel may arrive in increments. When such is the case, companies or similar units should be completely organized progressively rather than by distributing the personnel of each increment thinly amongst all companies. Such an assignment will simplify and provide continuity in training.

Installations of the zone of the interior such as reception centers, replacement and unit training centers, hospitals, depots, and the like, will function on mobilization or as soon thereafter as created. It is, therefore, necessary that peacetime training be given to officers that will be assigned to these installations. On mobilization, training of the personnel operating these installations necessarily must be conducted concurrently with the performance of assigned duties.

The plan provides for the training of individuals, as distinct from units, to be conducted as follows

Special service schools will be continued in operation and will conduct successive short courses for the refresher and specialist training of officers. These courses will be for officer loss replacements, officer filler replacements to raise units mobilized at peace strength to war strength, officers assigned to units and installations but who are not yet required for duty thereat, officers to replace instructors or to become the additional instructors which will be required during later phases of mobilization, and officers who are recent graduates of the ROTC, CMTC and officer candidate courses who require specialist training. Officers who do not receive refresher or specialist training at a special service school because of lack of time will be given such training of this character as may be necessary and practicable in troop schools of the unit or installation to which assigned. Special service schools will also conduct officer candidate courses although it will not be necessary to initiate such courses during the first or, in most cases, during the second month of mobilization as the number of reserve officers available is sufficient to fill anticipated needs for the early months. Under the Protective Mobilization Plan the existing special service schools can take care of the training of the number of officer candidates which will be required. If a situation occurs which requires that the force provided by the Protective Mobilization Plan be augmented, additional officer candidate schools will be established from time to time by the War Department at other locations when it is foreseen that the requirements for training new officers cannot be met by existing Special Service Schools.

The peacetime courses of instruction at the Army War College, Army Industrial College and Command and General Staff School will be discontinued under this plan. The Command and General Staff School will be prepared to conduct short courses of instruction of about three months' duration for command and general staff training beginning at such date as may be announced by the War Department.

Enlisted men procured for use as loss replacements and as filler replacements to raise units mobilized initially at peace strength to war strength will be trained at replacement centers except that initially a limited number of specialists may be trained in enlisted specialist courses at special service schools or certain other places at which special training facilities are available. The training of enlisted specialists will be discussed in more detail presently. Training at replacement centers will be guided by the "Mobilization Training Program for Enlisted Replacement Establishments" issued by the War Department. This program consists of two parts. In general, the first part consists of a basic course for essential individual instruction. The second part consists of a group of courses in the various administrative and combat specialties.

Returning now to the training of enlisted specialists, it will probably be impossible during the early days of mobilization to provide the means at all enlisted replacement centers for training volunteers from civil life to fill vacancies in all types of required specialists. Some types of enlisted specialists will require comparatively simple equipment and facilities for their instruction which can be quickly procured and established at enlisted replacement centers. Other types, such as a machinist for example, will require more elaborate equipment and the facilities and means for training specialists for this character, if not

already available at replacement centers, probably cannot be made available for several months. By that time selective service will begin producing a sufficient number of individuals who are already qualified by their civilian vocations to fill a large percentage of the Army's requirements for occupational specialists. Therefore, the necessity of establishing facilities for the training of occupational specialists at enlisted replacement centers, in addition to those which can be made quickly available when mobilization begins, will be limited to such facilities as may be required for training purely military specialists and those occupational specialists in which general shortages may be expected to occur during selective service.

Prior to the operation of selective service (61st for planning purposes) individuals to be trained to fill vacancies in those types of required specialists, which cannot be trained at enlisted replacement centers, must be trained at places where training facilities are available such as out existing special service schools, motor repair shops, General Hospitals, medical schools, civilian trade schools, etc. In fact, it may be highly desirable to continue the use throughout the emergency of the excellent facilities which exist at many civilian trade schools for the training of certain particular types of specialists. The War Department is beginning a study in conjunction with the Division of Vocational Education of the Department of the Interior with a view to determining the nature, number and facilities of such establishments which could be made available during an emergency for the purposes described.

As a further aid to a better understanding of organization and training under the Protective Mobilization Plan, there is attached a diagram, Exhibit No. 4, showing the general scheme contemplated. By following this chart it can be seen that, except for recruits enlisted by unit recruiting, all enlisted men procured go to one of the reception centers located in the various corps areas. From these reception centers enlisted men accepted for general service are given any one of the following assignments:

a. Assigned as filler replacements to bring units to mobilization strength.

(1) Those assigned to Regular Army active units are forwarded to the home station of such units if still there, otherwise to the concentration area of the unit.

(2) Those assigned to Regular Army inactive units required for use by 30M are forwarded to station where unit is being activated if unit is still there, otherwise to the concentration area of the unit.

(3) Those assigned to National Guard units are forwarded to the home station of such units if still there, otherwise to the unit training center of the unit.

b. Assigned as filler replacements for overseas garrisons and forwarded to overseas discharge and replacement depots from where they are sent overseas.

c. Assigned as loss replacements or filler replacements to bring units mobilized at peace strength to war strength or as cadres for units to be mobilized after 30M and forwarded to appropriate enlisted replacement centers.

d. Assigned as cadres for inactive units mobilizing during period 1-30M, and forwarded to unit training center.

e. Assigned as enlisted filler replacements to bring units to mobilization strength and forwarded direct to unit training center.

Those enlisted men received at enlisted replacement centers are given courses of instruction to fit them for their coming assignments. Some are sent to special service schools for specialist training upon the completion of which, part are returned to enlisted replacement centers and part are forwarded to units at unit training centers. After completion of the courses of instruction at the replacement centers, individuals are then ready for any of the following assignments

a. As cadres for units mobilized after 30M and are forwarded to unit training centers.

b. As enlisted loss replacements or filler replacements to war strength and are forwarded to a Concentration Area or Theater of Operations.

Individuals who receive training at special service schools including officers taking refresher or specialist courses, officer candidates and enlisted specialists are ready for assignment as follows upon completion of their respective courses.

a. Enlisted specialists to enlisted replacement centers or to units at unit training centers.

b. Officer cadres for units mobilizing after 60M to units and forwarded to unit training centers.

c. Officer loss and filler replacements to war strength and forwarded to concentration area or theater of operations.

Passing now to the supply features of the plan, you will recall a statement made earlier in this lecture that the force contemplated under the plan should be one that can be speedily and properly armed and equipped. In order to insure the fulfillment of this very important requirement there has been set up a War Reserve objective which provides for the inclusion in war reserve of all the critical items of equipment required for the force contemplated. During peace, it is believed to be unwise and economically impracticable to attempt to maintain in War Reserve all of the items necessary for a wartime force. Present peacetime procurement of munitions of war should include only those items which are unobtainable from any source in the time and quantity required and for which suitable substitutes do not exist. Such items are referred to as critical items. The following items are examples of those considered critical under the present War Reserve set up 50 cal. machine guns, 3" antiaircraft guns, semi-automatic rifle cal. 30, height finders, tanks, scout cars, ammunition, etc. As examples of non-critical items can be mentioned 30 caliber rifles, motor vehicles of commercial type, sand bags, shoes, barrack bags. The procurement objective for critical items conforms step by step to the Protective Mobilization Plan. The first objective provides for critical items for the Initial Protective Force. The second procurement objective provides for the same category of items for the remainder of the units included in the Protective Mobilization Plan, including the overseas defense projects. Both of these objectives are to include initial equipment and maintenance until production can supply the demand. Requirements for larger forces are

to be studied and set up, by steps, as a procurement planning project only, in order that the supplies and equipment which will be required in the case of a major mobilization of manpower may be accurately determined.

With reference to the functioning of the supply system during mobilization, every effort has been made to keep to a minimum the departure from peacetime procedure.

a. No change is contemplated initially in the peacetime procurement and issue of Class I supplies.

b. As for Class II, III and IV supply, the following procedures will apply

(1) All requisitions on which shipment from depots has not been made are canceled as of 14 day.

(2) Duplication of requisitions are prohibited.

(3) Credits established by chiefs of supply arms and services in accordance with subparagraph (5) below, will be set up on specific depots against actual supply on hand or readily procurable by the Depot within the period of the credit. The extracting or requisitions or calls from one War Department Depot on another is prohibited.

(4) Chief of supply arms and services are responsible for providing initial equipment in accordance with Tables of Basic Allowances for Mobilization for the units and individuals listed in the Protective Mobilization Plan, utilizing substitutes when necessary.

(5) The system of supply for units and installations listed in the Protective Mobilization Plan is to be effected as shown in the chart which constitutes Exhibit No. 5. This chart indicates responsibility for the computation of supply requirements and outlines the plan of distribution and issue.

Storage and distribution will continue to be organized under the present set up of War Department control and supervision. However, it may become necessary to organize certain reserve depots for the supply of the theater of operations.

Existing facilities under the control of the War Department will be used to the maximum. Tentage will be used where practicable when additional shelter is required. In general, any new construction required by corps area commanders will be limited to tent floors, kitchens, messes and sanitary features. Authority for the construction of one building costing in excess of \$2,500 or for a construction program in a corps area costing over \$50,000 will be secured from the War Department by corps area commanders.

For hospitalization, maximum use will be made of War Department facilities under the control of corps area commanders. Corps area commanders will cause a survey to be made of the normal average number of vacant beds in Veterans Administration facilities, Public Health Hospitals and the Indian Medical Service Hospitals whose location is such as to make their use feasible for hospitalization of Army personnel during mobilization. The Surgeon General will be advised of the results of this survey, together with the estimated amount of additional hospital facilities required in each corps area. Based on this report, the

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necessary additional hospital facilities required by corps areas will be allotted or the necessary construction authorized by the War Department for the additional needs.

My lecture, to this point, has been concerned almost exclusively with the Protective Mobilization Plan. However, it is not without the realms of possibility that we may be faced at sometime with an emergency which will require a greater expansion of our present military establishment than is provided by that plan. Some emergency may demand the maximum national effort. In order that we may be prepared to meet any possible contingency, the War Department Mobilization Plan includes additional plans entitled Augmentation Mobilization Plans. These make provision for the augmentation of the force provided by the Protective Mobilization Plan by successive balanced increments, as needed, to provide the additional forces that may be progressively required up to and including the total force required to meet the maximum emergency which may possibly confront this nation. There are to be four augmentation plans. These, together with the Protective Mobilization Plan, will provide for a total force which will consist, in general, of four armies, appropriate GHQ Reserve troops, harbor defense troops and the necessary zone of the interior overhead.

While details of augmentation mobilization plans have not been completed, it is tentatively considered that the first augmentation plan will provide in general for completing the organization of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th divisions of the Regular Army, activating the corps troops for five additional corps, completing such army troops for two armies as were not included in the Protective Mobilization Plan, expanding the mechanized Cavalry brigade into a mechanized division and activating certain additional GHQ reserve units. The second and third augmentation mobilization plans will each provide for army troops for one army, corps troops for three corps, 2 Infantry divisions, an appropriate group of GHQ Reserve troops, and Harbor Defense units. The fourth augmentation plan will provide a similar force except that no army troops are included. The situation demanding, and the availability of supplies permitting, the first augmentation plan will be initiated prior to the completion of the Protective Mobilization Plan. For planning purposes, it is assumed that the procurement of personnel for all units and individuals contemplated by this plan will begin at 6AM and be completed by 120M. Each augmentation thereafter will be initiated as required. Policies, procedures and instructions applicable to all of the augmentation plans, as well as to the Protective Mobilization Plan, are now included in mobilization regulations. Tables showing, for planning purposes, the units and individuals to be mobilized, time when mobilization is to begin and time when units and individuals are to be made available for use are now being prepared. Consequently, when and if it is decided to augment the Protective Mobilization Plan, it will be possible to complete the necessary details. By M day or soon thereafter the extent of the particular emergency will indicate whether an augmentation of the Protective Mobilization Plan will be necessary. As any such augmentation cannot be initiated before 6AM, there will be sufficient time to amplify the existing instructions of a general nature relative the mobilization of the additional forces required.


Discussion, if any, filed in Record Section, A W. C.

MOBILIZATION COURSE NO 2,
1938-1939

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DIAGRAM 1
GENERAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING DURING MOBILIZATION



Key: ——— Indicates normal procedures.
 - - - - - Indicates a possible variation from normal.

Note 1. Officers required for the following will proceed, when ordered, from their stations or homes direct to the proper place:
 Officer filler replacements to bring active units and installations to mobilization strength.
 Officer cadres for units and installations mobilizing prior to 61M.
 Refresher or specialist training at a special service school.

Note 2. Officer candidates, when procured, will be sent direct to a special service school.

PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN
1939
CHART SUPPLEMENTING PARAGRAPH 17

1 Type of Unit	2 Class of Supply	3 Computation of Requirements	4 Source of Supply	5 Where and When Supplied	6 Responsibility			
					a Station Commander	b Corps Area Commander	c Chief of Combat Arm	d Chief of Supply Arm or Service
See Remarks (7)	For Ammunition See Remarks (6)	See Remarks (3)		See Remarks (5)				See Remarks (4)
Active Regular Army and National Guard Units.	Individual clothing and equipment. See Remarks (1)	By Corps Area Commander.	Station stocks.	At home stations	Assists Corps Area Commander in compilation of shortage. Keeps individuals fully equipped at all times. Issues from local stocks to meet shortage.	Consolidates requirements and adjusts stocks between stations to reduce shortages.	None	Sets up and revises annually special credits in stated depots for each corps area and informs depots of their detailed responsibilities.
	Unit equipment, clothing and individual equipment other than that issued by CMC and Medical Dept. See Remarks (2)	By Corps Area Commander.	Station stocks. War Department depots and procurement.	Shortages not supplied from station stocks on arrival of unit at Concentration or Training Area.	Same as above.	Same as above -- and makes annual report of shortages by major units to Chief of Supply Arm or Service.	None.	Keeps current list of shortages consolidated by major units and plan of distribution.
Inactive Regular Army and National Guard Units.	Individual clothing and equipment. See Remarks (1)	By Corps Area Commander.	Station stocks. War Department depot stocks.	At reception centers.	Makes issues from stocks placed at his disposal by Corps Area Commander.	Calls on War Department depots for delivery of stocks placed to his credit. See Remarks (8).	None.	Sets up and revises annually special credits on stated depots by Corps Area. Releases credits when directed by TAG.
	Unit equipment, clothing and individual equipment other than that issued by CMC and Medical Dept. See Remarks (2)	By Supply Arm or Service.	Station stocks. War Department depot stocks and procurement.	At Concentration or Training Area. Shipments to be initiated by War Department.	Makes issues from stocks placed at his disposal by Supply service. See Remarks (4).	Advises War Department when concentration or training areas are ready to receive shipments.	Assists Chief of Supply Arm or Service in compilation of requirements.	Keeps current list of shortages by major units and is prepared to initiate shipment at direction of TAG.
Reception Centers, Unit Training Centers, Enlisted Replacement Centers, Corps Area Service Commands and all other installations not exempted from Corps Area control.	Individual clothing and equipment. See Remarks (1)	By Corps Area Commander.	Station stocks. War Department depot stocks.	At reception centers.	Makes issues from stocks placed at his disposal by Corps Area Commander.	Calls on War Department depots for delivery of stocks placed to his credit.	None.	Sets up and revises annually credits on stated depots by Corps Area. Releases credits when directed by TAG.
	Unit and station equipment; clothing and individual equipment other than that issued by CMC and Medical Dept. (See Remarks (2))	By Corps Area Commander.	Station stocks. War Department depot and procurement.	At installation when directed by Corps Area Commander.	Makes issues from stocks placed at his disposal by Corps Area Commander.	Calls on War Department depots for delivery of stocks placed to his credit.	None.	Sets up and revises annually credits on stated depots by Corps Area. Releases credits when directed by TAG.
Units Exempted from Corps Area Control.	Individual clothing and equipment. See Remarks (1)	By War Department.	War Department depot and procurement.	Replacements as directed by Corps Area Commander.	Stocks placed at his disposal by Corps Area Commander.	War Department depots for delivery of stocks placed to his credit.	Area Commander with necessary information upon which he can compute requirements.	Keeps up and revises annually credits on stated depots by Corps Area. Releases credits when directed by TAG.
	Unit and station equipment (including that for training purposes), clothing and individual equipment other than that issued by CMC and Medical Dept.	By chief of responsible arm or service.	Station stocks (including excess in the Corps area). War Department depots and procurement.	At the installation. On call on supply service by chief of responsible arm or service.	Makes issues from stocks placed at his disposal by supply service.	None.	Advises chief of supply arm or service when installation is ready to receive equipment.	Sets up and revises annually special credits on stated depots. Releases credits to chief of responsible arm when directed by TAG.

REMARKS

- (1) Individual equipment includes only items issued by the Quartermaster Corps and Medical Department and indicated as required for issue at reception centers in instructions issued by chiefs of supply arms and services prepared in compliance with (3) below.
- (2) All Federal Government supplies and equipment in the hands of troops -- both Regular Army and National Guard -- and in storage in state warehouses or Regular Army posts, camps and stations under his control are at the disposal of a Corps Area Commander and will be utilized to the maximum to complete the initial equipment of units and activities. Corps Area Commanders will prepare reports of net shortages of initial equipment for units and activities after all supplies available to them have been apportioned. Any supplies or equipment not required by corps area commanders as indicated above will be reported as excess. Equipment so reported will revert to War Department control.
- (3) Reports of shortages will be prepared annually and submitted to the appropriate chief of supply arm or service not later than March 15. Reports will be prepared in accordance with instructions issued by the chief of the responsible supply arm or service. They will cover the first three months of mobilization only and show separately the shortage for each of the three months. As far as possible shortages will be consolidated by major units at the same station, such as divisions or separate brigades.
- (4) a. Based upon reports of shortages submitted as directed herein, the chief of each supply arm or service will maintain up-to-date records showing the shortages of initial equipment other than individual clothing and equipment issued at reception centers for each major unit or activity, together with total shortages for each item and the proposed distribution to units and activities. All shipments of unit and station equipment will be initiated by the War Department.
b. The chief of the supply arm or service will compile list of shortages of individual clothing and equipment by Corps Area by 30-day periods. These lists will be revised annually on March 15. Based on these revisions the chiefs of arms or services will set up specific credits on April 15 on designated depots for each corps area to meet these requirements and will furnish these depots with complete lists of such credits. In issuing calls on depots against established credits for individual equipment and clothing Corps Area Commanders will designate not in excess of three shipping points per Corps Area. Final release to Corps Areas of credits set up will be made by The Adjutant General.
- (5) Commanders of corps area and exempted stations will notify the War Department immediately when concentration areas, training centers or other establishments are ready to receive supplies. Supplies will not be shipped until such notification has been received. Chiefs of supply arms and services will be prepared to make shipments of supplies required for initial equipment immediately upon receipt of such notice. In general, shipments will be made by major units.
- (6) Initial allowances of combat ammunition, for planning purposes, will be available for issue to units when directed by the War Department at the time units are shown in Annex No. 7 as "available for use". Requirements of ammunition for training will be computed by the Chief of Ordnance on the basis of approved allowances for mobilization training when directed by The Adjutant General. He will furnish credits to commanders of corps areas and exempted stations for 30-day periods showing the amount of the credit by item and the depot at which the credit has been established. The credit for the first period will be available by 10-M.
- (7) Priorities for issue of initial allowances of equipment will be:
 - a. Units listed in the initial Protective Force (see Annexes No. 1 and No. 7).
 - b. Installations required during the period M - 30 M.
 - c. Other units whose mobilization begins during the period M - 30 M.
 - d. Units and installations mobilized after 30 M.

Among units the priority of issue will be in accordance with the dates units are shown as "available for use" in Annex No. 7, except as modified to meet a specific situation.
- (8) Requirements for maintenance of equipment in the hands of units or of activities and installations will be computed by chiefs of supply arms and services on the basis of approved maintenance allowances. Credits will be furnished to commanders of corps areas and exempted stations for 30-day periods showing the amount of the credit by item and the depot at which the credit has been established. The credit for the first period will be available by 15 M. In establishing these credits account will be taken of the equipment reported as surplus by the corps area commander.

776

DISCUSSION

following lecture by Colonel John H. Hester, G.S.C.

The Army Industrial College
Washington, D. C.

January 16, 1939

Colonel Riefkohl: I think one can hardly listen to Colonel Hester without realizing that the manpower problem is quite as complicated as the procurement problem. There are details which have to be considered to carry into effect. Colonel Hester will answer any questions which may be asked.

Q. Colonel, you brought out that after about 60M, when selective service comes into consideration, the rate of mobilization will be controlled largely by supply consideration. In building up these plans were there any rules used, or any rules considered as far as that was concerned?

A. There were. We have adopted the following as a general guide for that purpose: "The organizational equipment which can be made available in any 30-day period will be that required for a balanced force of not to exceed 150,000 men, completely equipped." The requirements in organizational equipment for units in the Zone of the Interior will be reduced wherever practicable in order to permit the mobilization and training of a greater number of individuals. The number of individuals procured for units and installations will not cause an increase in the requirements for organizational equipment and would be limited only by the numbers needed and the ability to care for them properly after it has been procured.

You don't need any plans. The reason I say that is that the very first thing we do when we start the first augmentation plan is to apparently violate it. When you consider all these factors, the equipment and those units for training in the Zone of the Interior can get along with less equipment. We think we are all right.

Q. The War Department Mobilization Plan, the old plan, called for a large number of Reserve Officers. Certainly the FMP won't use that number. Will the others be designated for deferred mobilization or what will happen to those Reserve Officers over and above the strength of the FMP?

A. Those officers that are over and above that which will be required in the FMP and for putting it into execution will continue to be carried as they have been carried for many years. That is, we still have the augmentation plans which would require their use. In other words, they are in the War Department Mobilization Plan and the War Department Mobilization Plan embraces the Protective Mobilization Plan and Augmentation Plan.

Q. But they will be given a deferred augmentation, more or less?

A. Right.

Q. Colonel Hester, with reference to National Guard units, I understand they will be inducted into the Federal Service shortly after M-day, but in all probability they will not be up to the strength required. Will the recruitment of personnel for these National Guard units be handled by the states or will its increased numbers come from the voluntary mobilization plan that we have and just be sent arbitrarily to these units at their training points from recruiting centers?

778

A. Both methods will be followed. These National Guard divisions will begin at once to bring in the number of men in order to bring their units up to mobilization strength and they say, that is, those that have been consulted on it, that they can do that by 7M before they go to these unit training centers. If they can't do it, of course, the necessary additional men would be sent them from the reception centers.

Commander Dunham: This is perhaps a good question for a Navy man. If I remember correctly, they more or less scrapped the '33 plan for one reason--because they couldn't beat it from a materiel standpoint. It looks to me like under the PMP, with the Augmentation Plans, that within a relatively short time, not as fast as under the original plan, but within a relatively short time, you will have four million men; whereas, I remember that on some of the test items it takes 18 months and 24 months before some of the important equipment can be supplied. Can you elaborate on that, explain how it seems reasonable to bring in four million men within a year?

A. Well, as you say, the '33 plan was changed. I don't like the word scrapped because we didn't exactly scrap it. We still maintain approximately the same units that would be included in that--four armies. As to the fact of including the same number of men by the same time, there has been a decided difference in the early months of mobilization in reference to both procurement of men and supplies. Now as to whether or not we have gone too far from a supply standpoint, and have provided, or will provide--of course, these plans

771

haven't been drawn up yet and when we do draw them up, we may not have them in by one year, but before that time we would find out from The Assistant Secretary of War's Office from some of your committee reports here, that we can't do it and we will have to change accordingly. Please bring to my mind anything I have left out.

Commander Dunham: I had particular reference to some of the important items that we have tested here in the school, which developed that we couldn't secure them until long after the year, some of them as high as 24 and 36 months.

A. As I see it, we will have to do the same thing that we have done in similar situations under the PMP. For example, last year the '38 PMP plan showed certain units beginning their mobilization at 91M, units that we badly needed, but we were told that we could not possibly get the equipment until say 180M, I forget what time it was. So we deferred the mobilization of those units until 91M, but we didn't want to shove them entirely out because we wanted to be sure that the equipment would some day be set up for those units in War Reserve, in which case we would advance their mobilization the very first month. Anti-aircraft units are what I'm thinking about. There isn't much reason for providing mobilization for anti-aircraft movement on M-Day if they can't get the equipment until four or five months later. It would just be a waste of men.

Q. Colonel Hester, you mentioned something about vocational schools and their use in training men for the Army. It strikes me that if you take any of the products of those schools you are going

100

to throw a monkey wrench into the wheels of industry. Will you enlarge on that point? Are you going to put them under military control?

A. Well, I might as well be perfectly frank with you and tell you I can't answer that question because we haven't gone that far. For example, I will try to answer some of it. You know, now we send certain individuals to civilian educational institutions for training in the Army. When we bring in some of these individuals from civil life by recruitment and we know that after they go through that classification system in reception centers or further classification and replacement centers and they find that there is a third group of men that are well qualified to be trained as well, some special man that is required or group of men that are required in units that they can't train at these replacement centers but they know that a school exists over here in Detroit where those men could be trained, as I see it now, they would send those individuals to that school where they would be trained. They would be on detached service. I think I answered the first part of your question there, because they would be men already enlisted.

Q. After seeing the rapid mobilization which took place in Czechoslovakia, for example, GIM seems a long time to get a Selective Service Law in operation. I would like to ask if we couldn't speed up that time, shorten that time, or would it be desirable? Are there other considerations which enter into that which make deferment satisfactory to GIM?

A. I think it would be very desirable to push it up if we could. Under the '33 plan it was assumed it would be in effect at 45M. We may have to push it above 61M and bring the men in faster. We hope and we flatter ourselves that the plan is elastic enough to take care of that. For example, we have got these replacements that are set up and if these men come in faster than we expect we can send more to replacement centers for one thing, and also we can advance time for mobilization for some of these units that we require earlier.

Colonel Miles: It seems to me a rather important consideration as to how much advance public opinion is about prior to M-Day. Without favorable public opinion the Army won't be able to do anything about it, but with public opinion behind military preparedness in the sense it is today, I think a great many of those things can be accomplished prior to M-Day, which may speed up the induction of people into the Service. I will never forget in October, 1916, having an Assistant Secretary of War visit the Arsenal where I was stationed and we had word from the War Department General Staff that absolutely no publicity was to be given the visit to the Arsenal because of the fact that it might be misconstrued as a breach of neutrality. Well, I can't conceive of any such thing occurring today. We have grown up a little bit since 1916.

Colonel Hester: I might add one more thought to your question. All of the units that are mobilized during the first month under this plan come in at peace strength, not at war strength, and under the plan the individuals to bring these units up to war strength do not

come in until 61M. The reason for that is that we can do just so much with this additional 300,000 men and after considering it from all angles in priority, we have decided that it is better to bring these units in at peace strength than to leave out some other units in order to bring them up to war strength at once. Now, if the Selective Service should go into effect, we could bring these units up to war strength much sooner.

Q. Colonel, you brought out this replacement center would be established for each branch and that, while initially, officer candidates would be trained at the service schools, eventually other candidate schools will have to be established. Will you please tell us what the responsibility of the Chiefs of the Arms and Services would be with respect to training at replacement centers and schools to be established later? As I understand it, the present service school is under the Chief of the Arm or Service, but what about the future officers' schools.

A. The future officer candidate schools will also be under the control of the War Department.

Q. How about the replacement centers?

A. The initial replacement centers are now under the Corps Areas, except the initial replacement centers for Field Artillery and the Air Corps. As to whether in an augmentation plan, you have in mind what are we going to do?

Q. What I was referring to was the responsibility of the War Department in regard to training in those centers. Would it be conducted from Washington or from decentralized corps?

A. Even in those centers that are decentralized to the corps area commanders--in general, the training is one of the things which would be decentralized--but under mobilization regulations recently issued, even though the control of that replacement center is under the corps area, the Chief of the Arm has a certain amount of control of the training. That is to say, he can exert a considerable effect, because it provides he will prepare the training program to be followed, and also that he will be the inspector of training for the War Department, to keep the Chief of Staff informed. One other thing that gives him a measure of control is that he is permitted to select or have a voice in the selection of the head of the school and the key men of the ^{instruction} staff.

Q. Colonel, we have heard a great deal today about the IPF and the PMP and the WDMF and the Augmentation Plans of 1933, and the Revised Plan. Suppose we declared war on Germany tomorrow, what are we going to do? What plan are we going to use?

A. We are going to use the PMP.

Q. That is ready now to put into effect?

A. If I had to answer that--I hope it is.

Q. Then we can consider the 1933 Plan as not going to be effective and it will have no effect? We won't abide by it at all?

A. If war would be declared, we hope to abide by the instructions we now have.

Q. And these instructions of the PMP have all been issued to units, to corps areas and Chiefs of the Arms and Services and they

know definitely the units they have to bring into the service and the supplies they have to obtain?

A. Well, now, I hope they do. I am sure that they know now. In view of the fact that the PMP of 1939, recently issued, gives the necessary instructions in reference to some of the points that you brought up there, I am sure that they do. All of the annexes to that Plan have not yet been issued but we expect to issue them within the next two weeks, but the annexes to the plan sent out in 1938 still apply until these other annexes get to them and they have been told that. If mobilization should come today, I would have some of the fears that you have got in your own mind. I just hope that everything would go all right.

Q. Colonel, to return a little bit to the supply features of this plan, I notice that the PMP suggests three major areas in which depots are to be established, that is, the west, the south, and the east. Would you care to enlarge on that a little bit, how that is going to fit in with our present Quartermaster Zone Depots?

A. Well, I wouldn't mind doing it at all, but it is so much better to let someone who is in the audience who is the father of that, you might say, who knows infinitely more about it than I do, tell you about it. Colonel Phillips?

Colonel Phillips: That is in there basically as a guide to the Chiefs of the Supply Arms and Services. It looks like we are getting a little bit more money and will have some additional depots for them to make their plans, so that we will not make the mistakes of the past and have our whole supply setup lined up in one section of the country. It also has the further view of supplying Theaters

of Operations if that becomes necessary. In other words, there might be a grave situation when, if in our peacetime planning we put our installation with that situation in view, we might reach a status where we could turn over complete depots to the Theater Commander in a grave situation.

Q. Will these be general depots carrying supplies for all arms and services?

A. Not necessarily. This general depot is more of a general depot area.

Colonel Lewis: Colonel, you have indicated that the manpower rates for the first month would be around 300,000 and the second month about 200,000. If we add the Navy and Marine Corps requirements, that brings it out even better than 500,000. How does that rate compare with the maximum induction rate from all sources we had during the World War?

A. Before the Selective Service?

Q. I mean the maximum induction rate we had at any time during the World War.

A. Well, as far as voluntary enlistments are concerned, I know that is considerably above the number we have procured by voluntary enlistments, but in so far as the Selective Service is concerned, I don't remember the exact figures. I don't know whether I am right or not, but it would seem to me that under Selective Service we could meet that rate without any trouble.

Colonel Lewis: Well, I hope we are not optimistic.

A. Are you talking about the voluntary enlistments?

Colonel Lewis: I am talking about the total rate of induction from all sources. I think it was during the month of August, 1918, that it reached approximately 320,000.

A. I don't remember when that was. That must have been during the period of selective service. Before the selective service went into effect the number of volunteers by month was certainly far less than we provide under this plan.

Colonel Lewis: It sticks in my mind that about 150,000 was the maximum we ever obtained by voluntary enlistment. Do you think we can ever attain anything like 400,000 men--that is, including the Army and Navy requirements? Do you really believe that could be attained?

A. Well, that matter has been very carefully considered by G-1 Division. They have gone into it much more thoroughly than I have, so I can only answer that as to what I think. I take their opinion of it, so I would rather not say what I think based on my study of it. Based on their study, I think it can be done.

Colonel Lewis: I would like to make a comment on another subject. You have agreed that the FMP force is now a balanced force--probably the best we can do. War game of that indicates that we are very short of Signal Corps units, Field Artillery units, and GHQ, Quartermaster service units and Medical units. Now an Army Commander can struggle along with disabilities that would arise due to a shortage of Quartermaster Corps units and Signal

Corps units for a time, but I am afraid it would invite a national scandal to be short of supporting artillery and then to be short of the medical personnel to care for the casualties. I feel that these two shortages are fraught with extreme danger.

A. Well, I brought that out when I stated that the Initial Protective Force was not a balanced force, but I don't know whether I added that efforts are being made to improve the balance of that force during time of peace. It is well known that we are short in certain Artillery units, Field and Coast Artillery, and anti-aircraft, medical and signal and other units--engineers, but you saw what the Initial Protective Force is--we can't break it up. I won't say we can't break it up in order to make it a better balanced force, but we aren't doing it anyway.

Q. Colonel, along that line, I have seen some reference recently that that very point was studied each year and that that was a major factor included in the Chief of Staff's recommendations as to procurement of equipment--the study of the PMP or IPF. If they reveal unbalanced forces, that would be considered by the Chief of Staff and would be given considerable weight in his recommendations for military equipment for the next year. Can you say anything about that. Is that the case? Do you know what the plans are to correct this unbalance?

A. That is my understanding. Not only that, it has been stated in the newspapers and before Congress that they are trying to build up this war reserve and this war reserve is based on the

722

IPF and the whole Protective Mobilization Plan. So every article of equipment, as I understand it, and the man from G-4 can correct me if I'm wrong, every article they are asking for is for that purpose--to provide a war reserve of equipment for these units and also for those units that are already in there and active and which are short equipment today.

Q. Along the lines Colonel Lewis suggested, if, in raising the initial force, it is going to be weak in certain important units, Field Artillery and Hospital units, has it ever been considered to overbalance the peacetime Army in those arms in which it would be most difficult to raise in wartime? For example, if you could raise Infantry the easiest, make the peacetime Army quite low in ratio of Infantry and have a large overbalance of Field Artillery and Hospital units. That seems to me to be the way to balance the shortage in raising the first wartime force. That possibly is being done.

A. That has been considered.

Q. It seems to me to be the only answer to Colonel Lewis' objections.

A. In other words, you want to know whether it has been considered to convert some of the existing units that we have in the Army and National Guard into units that are more essential to balance this Initial Protective Force. Is that your idea?

Q. Yes.

A. That has been considered and is being considered, but I wouldn't mention any units or any branches or anything like that.

Colonel Riefkohl: General Beck has a word to say.

General Beck: We have activated some extra artillery not very long ago, and we are working on activating more. In other words, we found that the Field Artillery was something like--oh, I don't know--50 or 60 men who can shoot a gun--worse than that. What we are doing is not increasing the number of units but increasing the number of guns that the artillery has under those units--putting guns into useful occupation and that is going on to the limit of the present Field Artillery strength. As to the Signal Corps, we recognize the fact that it is short and we are working on both. We feel that for the Signal Corps we can get two or three units anyhow directly from these telephone people and radio people and things of that kind when we need it right off the bat. We can go into the field just that quick with a good Signal Corps. We are working along those lines, so you see we are trying. This reorganization too that we have had before us will straighten out a lot of that in so far as proportion of arms are concerned. Of course, we can't create more units by reorganization, but we can get a greater balance, a more, you might say, proper balance in Infantry divisions, in Cavalry divisions, than we have had heretofore and I am rather hopeful that it won't be long before we will have a much better balance that will technically look better and we will operate much better as units.

Colonel Miles: Do any of our guests care to say a word?

There appear to be no further questions. I think we are greatly indebted to Colonel Hester for giving us this exposition of the

740

combat side. It impresses itself upon me that the fellows who are on the combat side have greater problems than we have on the industrial side. I have sort of congratulated myself here since I have listened to these talks that I am on the simple side of the picture. However, I think that what we need in the Army is teamwork and I am sure that we can assure our brothers in the combat side that the procurement and supply side of the Army will do its level best to meet every demand that they place upon us. Thank you, Colonel Hester.