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AN IMPRESSIONISTIC SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS
by
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AN IMPRESSIONISTIC SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS.

I can assure you that I am very glad to be with you again, and I shall try to do very much the same thing as I did last year, that is, more or less extemporaneously chat about what seem to be the outstanding features of the world situation as revealed by references to the map. I am rather sorry that this is an outline map. It may be rather difficult for you to visualize some of the things, but I imagine that you have the countries of the world pretty well fixed in your mind.

Of course I need not emphasize the fact that since I was with you about a year ago very great things have happened and there have been great changes in the world situation. When I addressed the class last year I was really quite optimistic. It seemed to me that the policy of understanding - I prefer to use that word rather than appeasement - inaugurated by Mr. Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain, pointed the way to the possibility of a fairly effective, perhaps we shall not say solution, but at least a fairly effective meeting of the minds of principal European powers and a genuine relaxation of the high tension that had prevailed in Europe for several years. Today I am not nearly so optimistic. My feelings are perhaps slightly paradoxical. I am fundamentally pessimistic and yet my pessimism does not take the form that most people have. I think the chances are that there will not be a general war in Europe this summer. Perhaps there may not be a general war in Europe at all, but that does not mean that there is any likelihood of genuine peace descending upon Europe for a long time to come.

In fact, the events of the last year necessitate, I believe, a fairly fundamental revision of our thinking about such matters as peace and war. What we see going on in Europe today is what in former times would have undoubtedly meant war in the old sense, that is, fighting, killing, and all the other paraphernalia that have gone with what we know as warfare since earliest times. It may be that what we are seeing today is a new type of warfare, not waged with shot and shell and not necessitating the wholesale killing of men upon the battlefield, but nevertheless, it is something very analogous to what we know as war.

Let us get right down to fundamentals and see what war is. I think that most of the classic writers on war say that it is a fundamental clash of wills between either two nations or two groups of nations, in which one side seeks to break the will of the other and impose its will upon them. That is

essentially what war is. If it becomes basic enough, those nations are willing to go to any feasible lengths to break the other person's will. Up to recent times the chief method of accomplishing that was by armed force, in other words, old style war, but the progress of the military and naval arts, the development of the airplane, etc., so far as these crowded nations of Europe are concerned, have, to my mind, introduced some pretty fundamental modifications of the situation.

The lessons of the last war seem to be that that war did not accomplish what war basically is designed to do. It did not definitely break the will of the vanquished; neither did it impose the will of the victors. The collection of treaties of Versailles imposed such a condition upon Europe that sustained recovery was impossible. The economic set-up imposed by the Versailles treaties was such, especially in Central Europe with the break-up of the old Austria-Hungary empire, that the heart of the continent was doomed to economic stagnation and decay. The political consequences reversed the whole modern trend which is toward the integration of larger and larger units by splitting up, by Balkanizing most of the continent of Europe, making a larger number of smaller states, some of which were wholly artificial, and dictated largely by political considerations.

Last year I called attention notably to the conditions of Czechoslovakia, which I then described as a political monstrosity, which had been given its form largely by the insistence of France in order that Czechoslovakia should serve as the gendarme of France and the allies to prevent any recovery of Germany, and in which Czechoslovakia had been forced to take in much larger groups of racial minorities than either certainly Masaryk, who is a very farsighted statesman, or Mr. Benes, would have liked, but they were compelled to do it. Therefore, I felt at the time that Czechoslovakia was such an artificial creation that it probably was doomed to partial or complete extinction, and what made me optimistic last year about the outcome of that crisis, which had then begun, was that I felt there was no fundamental clash of wills between the great protagonists of European policy, Germany and England. I felt at the time what turned out to be true later, that the British government had reconciled itself to a German overlordship over Czechoslovakia and probably to the inclusion of the Germans of Sudetan land. Therefore, all through the spring and right through the great crisis last summer I felt there was not going to be any war, that there would be a settlement because there was no fundamental clash of wills involved.

54

There were grave dangers of war if France had not been forced to accommodate herself to British diplomacy. If she had jumped the fence, as it were, and attacked Germany, or if the Czechs had started a war, war might have resulted because in all these situations, even after you have evaluated and evaluated correctly, the known and predictable factors, there remains a residual which can only be termed the X quantity, the behaviour of personalities, possible waves of popular feeling, some mass emotion which becomes highly contagious and which will sweep peoples into war by an excess of almost beserk rage, or some wave of panic which will break their will to resist and lead to political concessions much greater than could have been imagined from a mere evaluation of the known and predictable factors. Why I call that an X quantity is that these personal and psychological factors are essentially unpredictable. They cannot be evaluated and therefore they must be left as an X quantity in every equation which may vitiate the soundest and wisest analysis of those things which can be predicted and which are fairly known.

Now what happened in Europe, as I see it, was this. Mr. Chamberlain was reconciled to the German triumph in Czechoslovakia. He had reconciled himself to a German economic primacy in Central Europe. I took up that question last year and I endeavored to show how the situation throughout Central Europe was so bad largely as the result of peace treaties, that these various succession states could not stand alone economically and that some arrangement with Germany would have had to be made sooner or later because Germany was their natural market and natural complement, that the great German industrial area was the natural place from which they would draw most of their manufactured goods and Germany offered the major market for their raw materials. It is a situation which is economically perfectly sound, but of course you can't judge Europe on economic terms as you can an integrated area like the United States because there is no united states of Europe. Those European countries are sundered from one another by political, cultural and religious gulfs and their national existences are so precious to them that in the last analysis they are always willing to sacrifice economic well-being for national existence.

It seems to me that Mr. Chamberlain and the British government practically told Germany this. We are willing to acquiesce in your gaining economic primacy over Central Europe, but it must be done in two ways. In the first place, it must be fairly gradual. In the second place, it must remain primarily on the economic plane. So in a sense Hitler had encouraged

that viewpoint that it would be accepted by Germany because down to the time when he went in and grabbed the Slav part of Czechoslovakia he had always maintained that was his Third Reich. He would not annex any large non-German populations. They didn't want them, but his Third Reich would be politically thoroughly German, and it was upon that Germanic unit of blood and speech and culture and tradition that his Third Reich was going to be built, and that beyond that of course there would be an economic field where Germany would be economically predominant but that he did not wish to annex any of these countries. It was upon the basis of that, I believe, that the British offered Germany that compromise. Of course the terms of that compromise were broken when Hitler went in and annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia. That is incorporating seven million Slavs directly into Germany and also by the protectorate over Slovenia, practically annexing a couple of million more. Furthermore, it was perfectly evident that he was going to proceed both in a very much more rapid way than the British had believed he would do and also that he would abandon his racialist concept for what he called legal and sound in his "Lebensraum" and that Germany would not only have economic predominance but also practically political predominance and probably with those two there would go strategic predominance so that he would be able to acquire such a mastery over those nations that he would not only be able to have first call upon their products in time of war, but he also would have first call upon their equipment and their man power, in other words, that he was planning to build up a great Germanic empire no longer strictly racial out of the old imperial type.

Now, as soon as he showed his hand in that way of course Great Britain has reverted immediately to her classic policy of attempting to oppose to the bitter end any power that attempted to erect that sort of an empire, and it is the thing she has done ever since Phillip the Second tried to build up a great empire, the Hapsburgs and later the Bourbons, and Napoleon, and William the Second. So England reverts to the classic pattern and she is attempting to forge a coalition just in the old style, and of course Germany and Italy are plying with the axis alliance, which is being signed formally today.

Now why, in view of all that, do I still consider that war is, perhaps not unlikely, but to put it statistically I think the chances against war are at least sixty-forty. The reason is that a general war in crowded Europe today would probably result in such terrific destruction, such tremendous

loss of life, not merely among the combatants but among the non-combatants, such horrible disorganization of the countries, with possible famine, epidemics, and such appalling economic wastage of everything, and of course absolute financial bankruptcy, debts which could never be paid resulting either in repudiation or inflation, that the chances are that so far as these crowded countries of Europe are concerned there would be in the strict sense neither victors nor vanquished, that is, the technical victors would be in almost as bad a position as those whom they had defeated on the battlefield. The position of the victors would be very much like the statue of the wingless victory in the Louvre. It has no arms and part of its face is gone and one of the breasts is chipped off, a terrible mess, and an Irishman was being shown that. "Pat, that's the statue of victory." "If that's victory", he said, "Show me the other fellow." That would be about the position of the victor and the vanquished after another general war in Europe.

Let us see now that conforms with the classic theory of breaking the will of the enemy and imposing your will upon the enemy. If victors and vanquished alike were so shattered and so disorganized and so broken that they were all falling into a morass of chaos and revolution, if the nations themselves were disappearing, in chaotic maelstrom, where would your national wills be? There wouldn't be any. The whole picture would have dissolved into fragments. I think it is a knowledge of that, that in another war of this character there will be, in the larger sense, neither victors nor vanquished, which is the great deterrent to formal war.

War in Europe today means collective suicide. What you may get is a further conduct of this bloodless warfare that is going on, this diplomatic war in which armies and navies are used as instruments of pressure politics and where you get all sorts of economic pressures and psychological pressures. Unless, as I say, some leader's nerve cracks or unless some people go berserk under the strain, I believe the chances are you are going to have this sort of thing going on for six months, a year perhaps, or two or three years, until one of three things happens. Either one nation or one leader or a group of leaders goes berserk - "Never mind, anything is better than this. Let's risk everything. Let's have a war. We can't stand this any longer." Or you are going to get a psychological cracking of one side. One side just can't stand the strain and it is going to crack and you are going to have a bloodless victory for the side with the stronger nerves and the greater staying power. Third, you may get a condition of stalemate and mutual exhaustion in

which these powers are literally crushed, beneath the weight of their own armor, in which they are like some of those mythical dinosaurs that armored themselves so heavily in the course of their physical evolution that they just couldn't get around. They couldn't move quickly to get enough food, and so when the climate changed slightly and vegetable food became somewhat less abundant they just starved to death. That is what scientists give as one of the reasons why those dinosaurs perished from the earth.

It may be that peoples over there will have mortgaged their power to such an extent that they are reduced to the condition of a group of invalids in a hospital ward that will shaking their fists at each other from their respective beds but simply won't have the strength to have an honest-to-goodness mix-up on the floor.

I don't know which of these things is going to happen. It is obvious that unless you get a genuine agreement, a genuine meeting of the minds, one of those three things is going to happen, and I don't know which. My bet is that both sides are so far apart that it will be quite some time before they either decide to make genuine agreement such as seems to be possible, a compromise agreement which seemed to be possible last year when I spoke, or until they have arrived at such a stage of mutual exhaustion that they just can't go on, and they sort of make a patched-up thing that may not satisfy anybody but which is a way of getting along, and then out of that you may get a later agreement. That has often happened after certain great wars when both have fought to a standstill, such as happened after the Thirty Years' War. The two religions fought each other to a standstill and they made an agreement which neither side liked but dictated by the necessities of the moment, and then that purely accidental settlement became a permanent thing on which the new Germany, post-war Germany after the Thirty Years' War, on which it was based, lasted down to modern times. That is the way I see things in Europe today.

There is just one thing I want to bring out, the one very constructive consequence, I believe, of Mr. Chamberlain's policy that is not often realized. Much made possible, for the first time, a thorough going understanding between Britain and France. Up to that time of course the French had never reconciled themselves to giving up that predominant position in Central Europe that they built up at the close of the war and which, of course, was merely a historical revival of the ascendancy of France in Europe which France had really enjoyed

certainly from the days, with few interruptions, of Louis XIV to Napoleon, and then in a modified form even down to the fall of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War. Those ideas go very deep in the French mind. The French feel that despite their diminishing population, they should have a supremacy over western and central Europe. Of course, while such ideas were in the French mind and while there was that position which might be maintained, so long as there was any hope of the French maintaining that position, Britain simply could not make an absolute 100 percent alliance with France because in that case France might have used Britain to start a policy in central Europe and to get Great Britain to bolster up a position there, which was not the British interest to maintain.

Munich, of course, thoroughly demolished that French position. As soon as Czechoslovakia ceased to be a strong military power, the whole French position just crumbled away. There was nothing left. France simply could not rely upon Yugoslavia or Roumania or any of those states, and therefore that position was liquidated. That meant that France was definitely committed 100 percent to reliance upon Britain for support. It also meant, however, that Britain now could and desired to give France unlimited support because France, having liquidated her strategic diplomatic position in central Europe, now had become a west European and colonial power which, of course, is what Great Britain is, a west European colonial power, and thenceforth the two nations could see eye to eye and co-ally themselves for the first time solidly and unreservedly. That is what happened as the result of Munich. You get practically absolute identity of interest between those two powers, Great Britain and France. When I say Great Britain, I refer to Britain only. You have to take into consideration when you regard Britain the British empire, especially the British commonwealth of nations, because ever since the statute of Westminster they have been technically independent. They can adopt any policy they choose in case of war, they could remain neutral. I suppose theoretically they almost could fight England if they wanted to. The various dominions are having more and more influence upon British policy. That is one of the reasons, undoubtedly, why Britain did not dare to take any commitments toward France in regard to central Europe, because it would have been a very difficult thing to get the dominions to fight for Czechoslovakia or Roumania or Yugoslavia. So Munich resulted in consolidation there.

You have a western axis that is very, very solid. It is one of the most solid things in the world today, I think, because like everything that is solid it must depend upon mutual

self-interest. Now, in regard to the Rome-Berlin axis, you get something that is not nearly so solid, because Britain and France are defending those things which they now have and which they regard as vital to their continued existence. Therefore, they are on the defensive, self-preservation urging them to stick together. Of course Germany and Italy are the great dissatisfied powers and they are both out to effect further changes in the world situation. They are the great have-not powers, and they realize that the only way they can get those things, or hope to get those things, is by sticking together. At the same time, they don't want the same things. What Germany is after primarily is the complete dominance of central Europe, including Poland and Roumania and its integration into a solid empire by which Germany will be able to tap not only the economic resources but also the man power of those nations. To use those nations for any purpose they choose, either for an eventual attack upon Russia, a drive to Asia Minor, or the Near East, or a move to attack France and Britain and break up their vast colonial empires. Of course Italy wants Mediterranean dominance and a great share of Africa, not merely North Africa but also a big slice of the really worthwhile part of Africa, that is Equatorial Africa where the great undeveloped sources of raw materials of all kinds are today. That is probably the most valuable unexploited area in the world today, far more valuable effectively than Latin-America because its populations can offer no resistance. In Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine a series of nations have grown up which have attained considerable power of their own, not to speak of the protection of the United States. In Equatorial Africa you have nothing but low grade savages who probably will never be capable of effective resistance against any invader, against any colonial power. The effect of white civilization upon these primitive negroes seems to be a very disastrous one. They don't seem to be taking to it. They seem to be assimilating its vices and not its virtues, and so this vast area is as clay on the potter's wheel. Whoever possesses it can do with it as it will, with no internal resistance at all. You have virtually an Anglo-French monopoly of the whole continent of Africa which, with its outlying islands, has an area of 12,000,000 square miles, four times the size of the United States. Britain and France together own or control over two-thirds of it, and if you take in the holdings of their satellites, Belgium and Portugal, they have pretty nearly nine-tenths, and more than nine-tenths of everything worth having.

That predominance of Africa is becoming more and more irksome, not merely to Germany and Italy but also to other powers. You have seen in the last year or two that Poland is putting

forth provisional claims. When Germany suggested the return of her colonies Poland said, "If anything like that is going to be done, we are also an overpopulated country, we also feel that we are a first-class power, and we also demand our place in the African sun."

Sooner or later you are going to get an increasing challenge to that monopoly, and I have always felt that when Mussolini went into Ethiopia it was not merely for what he could get out of Ethiopia but to get into a strategic position in the Ethiopian highlands, a predominant position in that part of Africa to occupy that country, and to introduce large numbers of Italian settlers and ultimately to raise armies among the inhabitants, who are very good fighters, and be in a position some day to say, "Look here, gentlemen, this pie has to be recut, and I am in a position to demand a major slice." Although I have never seen it mentioned, I have always felt and I have mentioned it in some of my writings that I think that was in the back of Mussolini's mind, and I think ultimately, unless Italy is embroiled in a war and loses Abyssinia, her hold is very superficial, but if she really gets thoroughly entrenched there sooner or later you are going to see a show-down, and Italy is going to break that Anglo-French monopoly and get her share of the colonial swag. With regard to Italy and Germany, unless the two powers feel that the time has come when they can strike simultaneously for major objectives and get away with it, I don't think they are going to deliberately precipitate a war. On the other hand, since France and Britain are primarily on the defensive and know what a terrible thing a war would mean—shatter both of their empires, to say the very least, there is a very slight belief that they would risk precipitating a war, that they would deliberately attack either Italy or Germany. For one thing, if they did deliberately attack, the moral imponderables would desert them. There would be a feeling of revulsion in this country and in all of the neutrals in the world. Therefore, I look for a continuation of this series of crises.

This power diplomacy which has been extended so infinitely beyond what any previous pressure diplomacy has been in the past that it can be likened to a new form of warfare. That, as I say, is briefly my analysis of the European situation.

I must not leave Europe until I speak about the Russian situation. That is a very interesting thing and it may have the most far-reaching consequence. Probably the most fascinating subject of speculation today is what is in Joseph Stalin's mind. Naturally I have no access to Stalin, so we can only

surmise, and my surmise may be entirely wrong. In fact, in all that I am saying today I am giving you most of my own views. I am throwing them out for you to criticize and tear to pieces, in the question period, if you choose. All I desire is to promote thought and to give you my idea of the picture as a part of the larger whole.

As I see it, this is what is taking place. To begin with, Stalin is a Georgian. He comes from the Caucasus. I think he has never been out of Russia. He may have been technically across the frontier but never lived in western Europe. He knows nothing about western Europe and knows no western Europe language. He is not interested in western Europe, and he regards it apparently as a decadent, bourgeois mess, which some day will be mopped up by world revolution. In this there is a continuation in his thought with what took place even in the old czarist days. Ever since Peter the Great, Russia has been torn between two schools, the westerners and the easterners. The westerners tried to remake Russia along western lines and felt that Russia, in order to further her evolution toward westernism must play an important part in European affairs. Then there have been the traditional easterners, who thought that Russia was fundamentally Oriental and Asiatic, that she should take merely the technique and methods of the west but not its spirit and ideas, that Russia should more or less turn her back on Europe and develop her own vast territory and consolidate her power in Asia. This was all in the old Czarist Russia, nothing to do with Communism. Of course Communism has come in with its theory of the world revolution, and you similarly have a division among the Communists. As you know, men like Trotsky and Lenin were westerners. They lived a large part of their lives in western Europe and they were more concerned with it really. When Lenin and Trotsky first came to power they weren't interested in Russia. They didn't use the word Russia, but U.S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they envisaged a world-wide federation of soviet republics in which Russia was simply the more or less fortuitous center where the thing had begun. In fact, as you know, they split up Russia into all sorts of autonomous groups which still technically survive. That was all postulated upon the rapid spread of the world revolution. Of course the U.S.S.R. remained the sole Communist state in the world, and after the death of Lenin, Stalin came in, this Georgian who had no use for the west, very disgusted with the west because of its refusal to accept Communism and also very much concerned with the hostility of the bourgeois world toward Russia. "All right, we have one-sixth of the land area of the globe, tremendous resources, enormous population. Now let us erect

1168

here the Socialist Fatherland. Let us make it so strong that we can live by ourselves, that we don't need this outside bourgeois world. We will build up our defenses against attack, develop what we have, and gradually through the success of our experiment we will become so strong that in time when these imperialistic bourgeois nations have fought one another some more and exhausted themselves we can probably take them almost without firing a shot. Meanwhile we must be strong and develop ourselves." Gradually, our of that has come this curious paradoxical something, which can be called, I suppose, Communistic Nationalism, because the younger generation there is very nationalistic, and they look upon Russia once again very much as we do our own country or anybody does his own country, and they set off the U.S.S.R. as against the rest of the world.

The whole of Stalin's internal policy, as I see it, has been that of an Easterner. He has developed Russia to the extent of his ability, he has built tremendous manufacturing centers, has developed the mineral resources of Eastern Russia. He has sent hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions of people, to Siberia. He has built up in the Far East a tremendous army and air force and submarine flotilla, but he has also sent in many hundred thousands of colonists all along here (indicating) so that this can be self-supporting in foodstuffs, cattle, and everything else. So it seems to me that his whole policy has been that of looking away from Europe and looking into Russia itself, and looking toward Asia.

What I think is in Stalin's mind is this, and it is just a guess. Those western powers have developed this bitter antagonism, and now Britain and France are coming to him to help on their side. "Well," Stalin says, "Boys, if you want me to play with you you have to do pretty much as I say. It seems to me I am in the Trading position." So, so far as I can see, Stalin is standing pat. "You have to give me a hard and fast alliance. You have to undertake to guarantee me my frontiers and also those of these Baltic countries, and if war breaks out you have to come to my assistance with all your forces." That is something quite different from what the British tried to get off. They wanted to have Russia come in if necessary, but they didn't want to obligate themselves to defend Russia. However, Stalin's trading position is very strong. If Britain and France are forced to go all the way in giving this treaty of alliance, it makes Stalin diplomatically the strongest factor in the Old World. He can precipitate a war any time he wants. You can always force somebody technically

to attack you, you can always bring it about, in which case he would be the deciding factor as to whether there was going to be a general war in Europe or not. The situation would be a pretty dangerous situation, because nothing would please Stalin and his advisors more than, presumably, a general war in western Europe in which western Europe and Central Europe would be entirely shattered and in which there would be chaos and the possibility of turning all of Europe into revolution.

So far as the Far Eastern situation goes, nothing very much has happened since last year. You have a continuation there of the attempt of the Japanese to break the Chinese will to resistance. They have won tremendous military victories, the Japanese, but the Chinese are still psychologically resisting, and you have a condition which is becoming increasingly severe upon Japan. I think we will have to wait for sometime to see what is going to happen. Of course, if there should be a war in Europe that would instantly change the whole situation. You might have a Japan attack upon Soviet Russia, also a Japan attack upon the Dutch Indies and Indo China, in which case there would be a great likelihood we should be embroiled. That is about all to be said for the Far Eastern situation.

I don't see any great change in the Latin American situation. I greatly discount all this talk about the immediate threat of totalitarian inroads in Latin America. Of course you have to distinguish between the economic and the political. There have always been trade revaluations going on for decades and generations and they will continue to go on. The reason why I don't think there is much danger of real Fascist and Nazi penetration in Latin America is because these countries have been dictatorships long before Germany and Italy ever thought of such things. In fact, so far as the trimmings are concerned, these Latin America nations could probably teach Hitler and Mussolini quite a few tricks, but the motive behind the dictatorships is different. The real motive behind the totalitarian countries of Europe is scarcity, immediate danger. They have so little and they are surrounded by such enemies, and any attempt to better their situation meets with such terrible resistance that they have felt it necessary to put themselves on a rigid efficiency basis to turn themselves practically into modern Spartas, and the best way to do that, they believe, is to submit to the rule of one gifted man who can synthesize everything for the national good. That is the spirit behind totalitarianism.

The spirit behind these Latin American dictatorships is something very different. These Latin American countries started from just little civilized nuclei separated by

enormous masses of wilderness, and although they have been expanding and some are fairly well developed, still there is enormous room inside their frontiers. They don't have to conquer each other because they have so much to do to develop what they already have. The reason for the dictator there is the lack of a stable population, a stable culture, stable political traditions. As you know, they were under the despotic rule of Spain, and there are all sorts of castes and colors down there. Most of those countries have only a handful or a small upper crust of whites and beneath are the half-breeds, mulattoes, native Indians and negroes, and you get a frontier condition. When the hand of Spain was withdrawn, those people with no common feeling immediately fell into anarchy, and the result of that was local despotisms to maintain order. Then, because it was merely the sterile despotism of a man and a group bent on enriching themselves, as soon as their power weakened there would be revolution and another group would come in. The thing is perpetuated. But that is not totalitarianism because there is no feeling of tremendous unity and no compulsion to unite against anybody. By the way, people do not unite for something, they unite against something or somebody. There is no compulsion to unite effectively against anybody else in Latin America because they have too much to do inside their own borders. Therefore, to call them both dictatorships is to confuse two very different things.

To my mind, there is only one country that has anything approaching a democratic form of government in Latin America, and that is little Costa Rica. Elsewhere I know of no approach even to what we know as a democratic form of government. All are disguised, more or less dictatorships, all more or less unstable.

I believe there is a very dangerous situation developing in Chile with this new government, not merely a political revolution but danger of a real serious social revolution down there, akin to what happened in Mexico, and you have to look out for that. In fact, there is that tendency in Peru also. That is dangerous. But that has nothing to do with the fear of Nazi or Fascist penetration. They may come in and fish in troubled waters, but I don't think there is any immediate Fascist danger in Latin America, - just a working out of the same old thing.

That closes my formal remarks, and I shall be glad to answer any questions, not merely on what I have formally said but anything that suggests itself to you.

Discussion following lecture by
Dr. Lothrop Stoddard, Author

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Q Dr. Stoddard, provided the United States would support a world court, do you believe that there is any possibility of a league of nations being formed within the next few years that will have any substantial amount of power?

A No, sir, I don't, because the last League, of course, was founded for selfish purposes and it was conducted for the selfish ends of its principal framers, and until the nations of the world are willing to make genuine sacrifices all around, primarily for the promotion of peace you are not going to get stable, peaceful conditions in this world of ours. I discussed that at great length in my talk last year, the paradox between this modern world of ours which science and invention has so transformed and which has been technically so slung with the clash of these wholly selfish national groups which are guided exclusively by national self-interest, in the rather narrow and immediate sense of the word. No nation, so far as I know, has made a major sacrifice primarily for the sake of general peace. They have made concessions when they have had to, but there has been a lot of talk, a lot of nice talk on the subject but nothing has been done, and to my mind, what you get in Europe today is just pure power politics.

These so-called ideologies we hear so much about are largely rationalizations of self-interest. People talk a certain way because it is necessary to kid themselves into feeling they are doing some noble

thing, but when you get right down to brass tacks you find it is for the national interest. When the national interest changes you change your tune. A year ago Chamberlain was talking about common sense appeasement, how we must make certain sacrifices necessary in principle for a common sense understanding, and just as soon as Britain's toes are really stepped on all of a sudden he discovers ideals, the rights of small nations.

This world today as it always has been and as it always will be, is run, so long as you have the world divided into sovereign states universally dominated by national self-interest, world politics is going to be, in the last analysis, power politics, and we might just as well realize that because here in America I think we suffer from a very special danger that the American people don't believe that. We are the only great nation, so far as I know, that can be either cajoled or hypnotized into a war for abstract ideals. All the other nations, in the back of their minds, know what it is all about. We don't.

Q What are your impressions of the future of the German economic situation? Does it require permanent expansion into new territories?

A It requires expansion to a point, it doesn't require indefinite expansion. You can conceive of the situation where it would get into such a strong position - if it dominated the whole of Central Europe you would get in a strong enough trading position so you might conceivably get a situation where it would compel the return of a share in Africa and a share in the development of that vast area. It could compel economic treatment from other nations where you might get this economy of theirs into a position of fair balance. One can't say. Right now, of course,

1172

it is an untenable situation because they have been making such terrific efforts to arm, and to valorize their whole entire economy for pressure politics, to get a square adjustment of that situation that they are under a strain. Hitler and the other Nazi leaders admit it. They say, "We can't go on this way indefinitely. We know that we are mortgaging our future. We know we are putting forth efforts that can't be permanently kept up, but we feel by doing this we will get to a point where we will no longer have to overstrain ourselves to this degree."

Q Would you care to make any remarks about the United States eventual position in the Philippine Islands and its connection with Dutch East Indies, Japan and Australia?

A Of course I feel that our whole connection with the Philippines has been a very unfortunate one. We went in there and we started, in my humble opinion, from the wrong premise. We didn't do as the Dutch tried to. They looked after the material prosperity of their peoples, who are of course the same stock, but they never attempted to turn them into imitation Dutchmen and they never attempted to westernize these peoples and to give them a western standard of living. We have gone in and we have sent 10,000 "schoolmams" over there, and are trying to give them a standard of living three times as high as any of the peoples around there. So much emotionalism has developed. The multitude of Americans has such a high regard for their wards, the little brown brother, that if anybody started to pick on them, a terrific cry in this cry arises to rescue the Philippines. Yet in the situation that prevails in the Far East, the Philippines are, as I regard it, militarily untenable without the

expenditures of vast sums of money and the increase of our fleet. It seems to be a unhappy situation because if and when the Philippines acquire independence we will be placed in the position of responsibility without authority, which is the worst position a country could possibly be in. I regard it as one of the most unfortunate things that Dewey ever went to Manila or that he hadn't weighed anchor and headed for the open seas as soon as he demolished the Spanish fleet. I think the Philippines are a great liability, myself.

Q Assuming that there may be a possibility in the future, near or remote, of having the seat of the government of the British Empire moving over into Canada, how do you think that is going to affect the United States, and just how do you feel about this good old democracy, hands-around-the-table, with England and France?

A Like everything else, I think we should do it in a realistic way. It wouldn't be to our national interest to see Britain destroyed or the British Empire smashed up. On the whole, it is to our advantage that that existing structure should be substantially maintained, but we do not have any specific interest in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the British Empire as it now exists throughout its far-flung dominions. We certainly couldn't see anything happen to Canada. We simply couldn't see any change of ownership in any of the British West Indies in the New World. When you get to Australia and New Zealand you are on the borderline. I don't believe personally, that we could see Australia and New Zealand conquered by Japan. I think we would have to

fight Japan to rescue Australia and New Zealand. When you get to Africa and when you get to India and those parts of the Empire we have no particular interest in seeing that that structure is maintained.

It is one of the most difficult problems I know, as to how we can implement the national interests of the United States with the interest of the British Empire, how far we are disposed to go along and how far we are disposed to abstain. Certainly one thing - we will make a mess of it if we don't keep it on a realistic practical plane.

Q In the press recently there has been quite a bit relative to Japan making drastic demands on Holland and concessions in the Dutch East Indies. Do you think in case Japan does do that that England will collaborate with Holland?

A I should think that England and France would have to collaborate with Holland. If the Dutch East Indies should fall into the Japanese hands, the position of the British and the French, especially the British, would be absolutely untenable. Supposing that Java and Sumatra were in the hands of the Japanese, Singapore would be outflanked. It would be surrounded, killed, and the way would be open for the Japanese to attack India and to penetrate the whole situation there. It might even be possible for the Japanese to begin to put pressure on the east coast of Africa. I can't see how the British would permit the East Indies to fall into the hands of Japan. It seems to me they would have to fight.

Q Do you think Japan has that in mind?

A Certainly, but I don't think Japan is going to do anything of such a nature unless there is a drastic war in which England will be

engaged with the axis powers. If that should take place, I think very likely the Japanese would descend upon the Dutch Indies, but not unless a general war in Europe breaks out.

Q Do you think Japan really has a greater stake in East Indies than in China?

A I think that the objectives of Japan are different. I don't think the Japanese ever contemplate annexing China or trying to keep it under her direct control. I think Japan is reckoning on this. Of course the psychology of China has been rather warlike. They have been overrun by barraging from the north and after a certain amount of resistance their will to resistance has been broken - "all right, we will accept you." Then the Chinaman went on living his normal life. I think the Japanese are reckoning on that happening, in which case they can install Chinese dynasties, Chinese governments, and indirectly govern the country but never become Japanized. On the other hand, I believe in the Dutch East Indies - you see, Malays are not like the Chinese. They haven't the resisting or the racial stamina, the tremendous cultural power of the Chinese. Of course the Japanese are largely Malay stock anyway and probably that much closer to the Malays than the Chinese, and I believe that you could have wholesale immigration there. Of course most of these Dutch islands are very much under populated. Java and Sumatra are the only ones well developed. Borneo and the Celebes are just nothing but a very scanty population and you could have millions of Japanese go there and amalgamate with the people and Japanify those islands.

11/15

So the objectives of the Japanese are very different. Of course you would have the fact that the Chinese are very efficient economically. The Japs have not succeeded in doing that.

The Japanese must for their own self-preservation have a certain influence upon the development of China so that it shall develop in a way that will not be hostile to Japan, because if China should ever assimilate enough of western civilization so that she could reconstitute herself as a strong united power Japan would be automatically dwarfed into insignificance. Therefore, it is a life and death matter for Japan to see that China does not evolve in a way hostile to herself.

So aside from the economic aspects there is that political strategic power which transcends almost everything else, but in Dutch Indies you have a very different situation.

Q In connection with the recent activities of Japan which concern the extra-territorial rights of the western powers, we see there was a very quick reaction to that on the part of the western powers. I wondered what in your opinion is the likelihood of Japan taking action, taking over the settlement in Shanghai? Is that of sufficient importance to cause the western powers to any action?

A There again I think that their action down here in this small fort (indicating on map) was a trial balloon to see what would happen. The way there was united action on the part of the United States, Britain, and France showed the Japanese that the western powers were disposed to resist them. There again I should be very much surprised if the Japanese should attempt to jump the Shanghai concessions unless there was a major

war in Europe. I don't think it is likely, it seems to me too dangerous. They probably realize it is too dangerous. Many of those moves I imagine are matters of face between the Chinese and the Japanese. When the Japanese make a move like that, if the European powers don't resist, the Chinese gain a lot of face. "The western powers aren't really going to oppose you. You had better make terms with us." That has a great effect on lots of Chinamen. Japan sees it would be too dangerous to do anything in Shanghai. Of course it is largely a psychological struggle now. I don't think the Japanese really intend to occupy the whole of China. They have a strangle hold on China, they will keep at it until the Chinese will to resist is broken. It is a psychological struggle more than a military struggle. Every move like that the Japanese will try to gain additional face.

Q What are the probabilities of Japan and Russia tangling in the near future?

A Well, I don't think that they will tangle unless and until there is a war in Europe or until that situation has clarified, because the situation is too uncertain. If Japan goes in and tangles with Russia, and with China on her hands and Russia on her hands, she is absolutely stopped from taking any action here. I think Japan is leaving her hands free to move either toward Russia or the Dutch Indies and the south. I think she is waiting to see which way the cat will jump.

Q Do you think that power politics would be helped any if Japan should dominate the Far East and if Germany should dominate Europe?

A I don't think that either the Germans or the Japanese have the genius for world empire that the British have, or that the Romans have. The British have a great tolerance and they are tolerant and snobbish. Their tolerance is due largely to the fact they think they themselves are so immensely superior to everybody else, they don't even want to make anybody else into Britishers. The British don't want to spread their British culture either, in fact when they go into a foreign country the first thing they do is set up a club and it is the hardest thing in the world to get a native inside the club doors. The Romans were very much the same way, - "I am a Roman citizen, I am immensely superior to all these provincials." So you get that complete tolerance of the Romans and the British. That is the secret of their genius for empire. That is where we showed our lack of genius for empire, when we tried to make the little brown brother an imitation American.