

RESTRICTED

THE ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE
Washington, D. C.

Course 1939-1940

THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN
by
Major Robert W. Hasbrouck, G.S.C., G-3

January 2, 1940

AIC 153 (1/30/40) 20 g

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT MOBILIZATION PLAN

The purpose of this lecture is to discuss the War Department Mobilization Plan with particular attention to the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP). It should be understood that the War Department Mobilization Plan embraces not only the Protective Mobilization Plan but also the following

- (1) Four Augmentation Plans which provide for progressive increases in the force provided by the PMP to a strength capable of sustaining a prolonged national effort.
- (2) The mobilization features of strategic concentration plans, more commonly referred to as "color plans".
- (3) Mobilization Regulations.

Augmentation Plans and Color Plans will be referred to again later. However, a brief explanation of the purpose and content of Mobilization Regulations may well be made now. These regulations prescribe the basic policies and methods of procedure which it is contemplated will govern any mobilization. They include Mobilization Regulations -- General and four series, numbered 1 to 4 inclusive. Mobilization Regulations -- General cover matters which relate to mobilization as a whole, while each numbered series relates to matters which are within the province of a particular division of the General Staff. Series 1, for instance, pertains to G-1 matters such as the procurement of enlisted men by voluntary enlistment and by selective service, officer candidates, promotion, classification, welfare, morale etc. Series 2 relates to Military Intelligence while Series 3 covers Organization and Training. Series 4 relates to Supply, Hospitalization and Transportation. A general revision of Mobilization Regulations has been undertaken during the past two years. The revision of many of these regulations has been completed and it is probable that the revision of all will be accomplished within another six months. With these regulations available, the text of mobilization plans can be presented in very brief form and will consist principally of references to regulations and to annexes of the Plan.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

MOBILIZATION POLICIES

Several of the basic policies governing mobilization as enunciated in Mobilization Regulations deserve especial emphasis.

Existing peacetime procedures are to be continued initially to the maximum degree practicable. If necessary, they will be modified progressively to meet the demands of the particular emergency. It is not contemplated that there shall be any sudden or radical changes when mobilization is ordered, but that there shall be a gradual expansion of peacetime methods to meet the needs of the particular situation. The inauguration of new methods and procedures upon mobilization would probably result in misdirected effort and costly confusion.

Control of mobilization is centralized initially in the War Department, with a minimum delegation of authority to corps area commanders and other subordinates. Centralized control gives flexibility to the Plan. The G P and pertaining Augmentations envisage no specific war. They must, therefore, be capable of being adapted to any particular emergency so as to permit the mobilization of only those units and individuals required, and further, they must permit adjustments to be made as to the time and location of the mobilization of these units. Such flexibility cannot be obtained by a decentralization of control to subordinate agencies.

Execution of mobilization is decentralized to subordinate agencies. The directives contained in Mobilization Regulations set forth the mobilization functions and responsibilities of corps area commanders. They are responsible for making available, by procurement, if necessary, the personnel for the units and individuals for which their corps areas have been designated as corps areas of origin, as well as for the units and installations of their own corps area service command, and for certain other categories of personnel. They are also responsible for feeding, clothing, sheltering and providing medical attention for units and individuals while in their corps areas. They carry on all training activities within their corps areas except those retained under War Department control.

Maximum use is to be made of real estate under government control, especially that in locations where climatic conditions favor year round training. The efficient use of the real estate

RESTRICTED

241

RESTRICTED

available requires that the War Department designate the location of various mobilization installations such as unit training centers and enlisted replacement centers. The distribution of real estate now under government control, as well as the favorable climatic conditions which exist in some corps areas for year round training, will result in a number of units and individuals undergoing the major portion of their training in a different corps area from their corps area of origin.

EVENTS LEADING TO ADOPTION OF THE PROTECTIVE
MOBILIZATION PLAN (PMP)

Before beginning a discussion of the Protective Mobilization Plan, it is believed that a short resume of the events leading to the formulation and adoption of that plan will contribute to a better understanding thereof.

The 1933 War Department Mobilization Plan, which was replaced by our present plan early in 1937, may be described as an exceedingly ambitious plan. It provided for four field armies to be mobilized concurrently and visualized the expansion of the Army of the United States to a million and one half men within sixty days after the initiation of mobilization. Studies as to the practicality of this plan revealed serious defects which can be summarized as follows

- (1) In the first few months of a war, industry could not produce sufficient quantities of needed supplies to meet the requirements of the plan.
- (2) Grave doubt existed as to whether the contemplated rate of procurement of personnel could be realized in the early days of mobilization.
- (3) The adaptation of the mobilization as prescribed by the plan to the requirements of the various color plans was impracticable. In each of the color plans it was necessary to assign troops to the various concentrations according to color plan requirements and regardless of mobilization assignments to corps and army. In many cases it was necessary to change mobilization dates in order to furnish the type of unit desired at the time.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(4) Much of the existing school system was abandoned. Schools were decentralized under Corps Area Commanders requiring much duplication without adequate provision for competent instructors.

(5) Mobilization of troops in northern areas was provided without adequate provision for changes during winter months when climatic conditions would handicap training.

These defects were of such a serious nature that the decision was made to discard the 1933 Plan and on December 16, 1936, the Chief of Staff issued a directive which read in part as follows

"1. The War Department Mobilization Plan (1933) will be replaced by a 'Protective Mobilization Plan' as soon as possible.

"2. The Protective Mobilization Plan will provide for the mobilization of a moderate but balanced force for the protection of the Continental United States, including Hawaii and Panama. The size and character of this force should be such as to permit its being speedily and properly armed and equipped. The Protective Mobilization Plan will be pushed to completion at the earliest practicable date, as a task having first priority, and such recommendations will be submitted as may be necessary to amend existing regulations.

"3. Upon the completion of the Protective Mobilization Plan, there will be prepared and submitted an augmentation plan for the creation of additional forces, if required."

Subsequent Staff conferences resulted in the decision that a balanced force of 1,000,000 men would be adequate for the task imposed as well as a practicable one from the standpoint of its being speedily and properly armed and equipped. The decision was also made that of this force, approximately 750,000 men are to be included in units destined for the theater of operations and that the remaining 250,000 are to be used as required for replacements, corps area service commands and War Department overhead. It was further decided that the requirements of this force for critical items of equipment and ammunition are to form the basis of our War Reserve objective.

RESTRICTED

THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN (PIP)

From the foregoing it can be seen that the PIP is our initial military program for meeting an emergency which requires the protection of the Continental United States, including Hawaii and Panama. Specifically, the Plan provides for raising our present military establishment to a force of approximately 1,000,000 enlisted men and 7 1/2,000 officers. About 750,000 of the enlisted men will be required for units and the remainder as replacements and for overhead. If additional forces are required, augmentation plans, or so much of them as is necessary, must be put in effect.

INITIAL PROTECTIVE FORCE (IPF)

Those units which will have on Ii-Day or can have by 30 Ii the strength, organization, equipment and training essential to make them available for use in the field under conditions that may be expected to exist during the early days of mobilization are included in the Initial Protective Force. The qualifications for inclusion in this force must fit very largely to active units of the Regular Army and National Guard. However, there are a number of small inactive units included such as Field Artillery combat trains, Quartermaster service companies, etc. They are necessary for the successful operation of the active units of the IPF and it is felt that by giving them large cadres from active units that they can be whipped into shape so as to be able to function effectively by 30 Ii. If we were to mobilize now, our IPF in the Continental United States would consist, in general, of the following

- 5 Regular Army Infantry Divisions (Triangular).
- 18 National Guard Infantry Divisions (Square).
- 1 Regular Army Cavalry Division.
- 4 National Guard Cavalry Divisions (None are completely organized).
- 4 Corps Headquarters, Corps Troops for one Corps and most of the Corps Troops for another Corps.
- 2 Army Headquarters and a very few Army Troops for one Army.
- The G.I. Air Force, a Mechanized Cavalry Brigade, and a few other G.I. Reserve units.
- Harbor Defense Troops totaling about 20,000.

On Ii-Day, the units in the IPF in the United States will total approximately 330,000. By 30 Ii, they will total approximately 441,000. The difference is due to the inactive units

RESTRICTED

which must be activated and to the fact that at present most National Guard units are maintained at about 75% of peace strength and must be brought to peace strength by 30 11. Four Regular Army reinforced Infantry brigades and four Cavalry regiments are not included in the IPF although they can be made available for use on H-Day or at any time thereafter if the situation so demands. However, if not required, the plan is to use them as a nucleus for the immediate mobilization of four more Regular Army triangular divisions and one additional Cavalry Division. The critical items of equipment for units of the IPF constitute the first priority in the War Reserve objective. Appropriations made by the last Congress have permitted the initiation of procurement of a large part of the critical items required for units of the IPF.

UNITS IN THE REMAINDER OF THE PIP

Those units of the PIP which are not included in the IPF are designated as units in the "Remainder of the PIP". Except for the four reinforced brigades and four Cavalry regiments previously referred to, all such units are inactive units. The IPF is not a balanced force. It is sadly lacking in Corps, Army and GHQ Reserve units. Consequently the units in the remainder of the PIP are those required to make up these deficiencies as well as to provide for an increase in our harbor defense units. Mobilization of these units is begun as soon as possible. Some begin their mobilization during the first month, others during the second month and the remainder during the third month of mobilization. They become available progressively beginning at 90 11 and all will be available under the Plan as it is now being revised by 210 11, seven months after mobilization has been initiated. At that time the force of 750,000 men in units will comprise the following

- Army troops for two armies.
- Corps troops for four corps.
- 9 Triangular Divisions.
- 18 Square Divisions.
- 6 Cavalry Divisions
- GHQ Reserve troops including the GHQ Air Force, Mechanized Cavalry Brigade and 27 Antiaircraft regiments. (Note 10 additional Antiaircraft regiments are included in Corps and Army troops.)
- Harbor Defense Units totaling approximately 58,000.

RESTRICTED

27

No appreciable amount of funds has been made available as yet for procurement of the balance of the critical items required for the PIP except for certain antiaircraft equipment. The Protective Mobilization Plan has been formulated on the basis of equipment on hand for the entire force to be mobilized. In case mobilization should occur before our war reserve objective has been fully attained, it will be necessary to use a considerable number of substitute items of equipment now on hand in lieu of critical items not yet available if the entire force provided by the PIP is to be mobilized and made available within the time contemplated.

PERSONNEL FEATURES OF THE PIP

It is contemplated that the Congress will be requested to enact a selective service law in the event of any serious emergency. However, time will be consumed in the passage of the necessary legislation, and in setting up the machinery to administer it. Consequently, for planning purposes, it is assumed that selective service will begin to produce processed men ready for assignment by 60 days. Our requirements for additional manpower during the first two months must therefore be met by the enlistment of volunteers. Since, as has previously been remarked, the PIP has been formulated on the basis of a War Reserve actually in hand when mobilization begins, the number of troops which can be mobilized during the first two months will be dependent upon the number of volunteers that can be procured during that period. Studies made by the G-1 Division of the War Department General Staff indicate that we can expect to obtain about 300,000 volunteers during the first month and 200,000 during the second month. In addition, the Regular Army Reserve numbering about 24,781 at present and with an ultimate strength of 75,000 will be available immediately. These figures control the mobilization rate during the first two months of the PIP and the requirements set up for new personnel during these periods must remain within these limits if the Plan is to remain within the realms of practicality.

All newly enlisted men except those obtained through unit recruiting are to be sent to reception centers. Three or four reception centers are to be established in each Corps Area at Army Posts designated in the PIP. Here the men receive their clothing and individual equipment, and are processed. Processing includes classification. Following this they are assigned and dispatched as rapidly as

RESTRICTED

possible in accordance with their assignments to a unit training center, an enlisted replacement center, or to an installation of a corps area service command or of the War Department overhead.

MOBILIZATION OF UNITS IN THE PMP

In order to conserve personnel, all units which begin their mobilization during the first month mobilize at peace strength. Thereafter all units mobilize at war strength. Filler replacements, to bring units which mobilize initially at peace strength to war strength, are procured as soon as selective service becomes effective and sent to enlisted replacement centers for training. The Plan provides that they will be made available to the units concerned by 150 H.

REGULAR ARMY UNITS

Regular Army active units mobilize at their home stations. For planning purposes, it is assumed that Regular Army active units included in the IPF will clear their home stations by 5 H and proceed to concentration areas in accordance with strategical plans. Such active units as are not needed initially remain at their home stations and continue their mobilization and training. When directed by the War Department, units which are to serve as the nucleus for additional divisions may be moved to unit training centers.

Regular Army inactive units which are included in the IPF and must therefore be ready for use in the field by 30 M, mobilize at the station of the active unit designated to furnish the enlisted cadre. All other inactive units mobilize at unit training centers. The unit training center at which each such unit will mobilize is indicated in an annex of the PIP.

NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Active units of the National Guard are inducted into the Federal service at or in the vicinity of their home stations. Following this, and not later than 10 M, they are to proceed to designated unit training centers where they continue to perfect their organization and training until 30 H or until such time as they are actually required for use. A prospective change in the PIP will indicate that they are to be considered as available for use in

RESTRICTED

defensive operations by 30 11 but at a later date for offensive operations.

National Guard inactive units are first assembled at points to be designated by the states concerned. Here they are inspected and extended Federal recognition following which they are dispatched to designated unit training centers. Time limits have been set for the presentation of such units for recognition. Authority will be withdrawn for organization by a state of any inactive unit which has not been presented for Federal recognition by the time set, and it will then be mobilized by the appropriate corps area commander in the same manner as any Regular Army inactive unit.

TRAINING FEATURES OF THE PIP

Except for the division training centers for National Guard divisions, all training centers are branch training centers. For example, there are three unit training centers for Field Artillery, three for Engineers, four for Quartermaster units and so on. Enlisted replacement centers are also branch centers. It is believed that this will increase uniformity in training, the lack of which in units arriving in the AEF during the World War drew forth criticism from General Pershing. Mobilization training programs for the training of units and replacements have been prepared by the War Department. Rigid adherence to such programs will not be required. They are to serve as a guide and as an indication of the relative importance of the many things in which a soldier must be trained.

Officers who are not required for immediate assignment will receive refresher or specialist training in short courses at our present service schools. Those required for immediate assignment will receive refresher training in troop schools at their place of duty.

It is planned that the training of enlisted specialists will take place at Enlisted Replacement Centers and, for certain specialists, in civilian vocational schools. Initially, however, the facilities for training specialists at many of the enlisted replacement centers will be lacking. To bridge the gap between 15-Day and the time when these facilities can be provided, the training of enlisted specialists will be accomplished during the early days of mobilization with facilities now existing at our special

RESTRICTED

service schools and by greater use of civilian vocational schools. The plan for the use of these vocational schools is not complete. Industry will need many additional skilled workers in the event of mobilization and its requirements, as well as the Army's, must receive due consideration in planning for the use of such schools.

SUPPLY

The force provided by the Protective Mobilization Plan and the rate at which this force is mobilized are modest when compared with the 1933 and previous mobilization plans. Still, the PIP presents a most difficult, as well as an interesting, supply problem.

The G-4 Division, since work on the PIP was first begun, has been gravely concerned with the problem of the first thirty days -- the critical period when the IPF springs into being.

REGULAR ARMY UNITS

Consider first the Regular Army. The units of the Regular Army mobilize at their widely scattered home stations and those included in the IPF are presumed to clear those stations by 51. Since there is an Army Regulation which required that organizations of the Regular Army be fully equipped at all times for mobilization, you might assume that in so far as the regular establishment is concerned no problem of supply of initial equipment is presented. But for reasons of economy it has not been practicable to issue complete mobilization allowances of certain items, notably motor transportation. Also, an analysis of Annex 7 of the PIP will show that approximately 83 inactive Regular Army units are included in the IPF. These units are to be activated and made available for use at varying periods from 1 to 301. The organizations furnishing the cadres for the activation of these new units do not have the initial organizational equipment required. It is obvious that this equipment cannot be supplied at the home stations but must be issued in concentration areas. Concentration areas are not prescribed in the PIP, so we must consider the concentration area prescribed in each Color Plan.

RESTRICTED

NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

The initial equipment of the National Guard also presented a difficult problem, but a different problem from that of the Regular Army. All National Guard units go to training areas and none are required to be available for a Theater of Operations before 301. However, the maintenance strength of the National Guard is but a fraction of its mobilization strength. It is impracticable to issue to the several units all the organizational equipment required for mobilization. In fact, a number of the states do not have adequate storage facilities sufficient for this equipment, either in armories or state warehouses. The advisability of issuing equipment to the National Guard in excess of its peace training requirements would be questionable even if storage space were available.

MOBILIZATION REGULATIONS

After the problem had been visualized we turned to Mobilization Regulations under the 4 series. They failed to present a solution. The 4 series of Mobilization Regulations was written around the 1933 and previous mobilization plans and many of the directives did not apply to the Protective Mobilization Plan. The decision was therefore reached that this series of regulations would be disregarded and a supply plan formulated and written into the P P with a view to a later revision of Mobilization Regulations. An approved solution of the supply problem is contained in Section 5 of the P P.

INITIAL EQUIPMENT

The plan may be summarized as follows

During the initial stages of mobilization there will be no change in the peace time procedure for procurement and issue of Class I supply except that increased latitude for local procurement is authorized and encouraged.

Storage and distribution of all supply will continue under the peace time set-up of War Department control through its depot system. Certain departures from present procedure are considered necessary as follows

RESTRICTED

Requisitions on which shipment from War Department depots has not been made are cancelled as of 14-Day on all Class II and III supply.

Extracting of requisitions from one War Department depot to another is prohibited.

Section 5 attempts to answer the following all-important questions by means of a chart

What are the requirements of unit and individual equipment for the 33 Divisions and 571 non-divisional units included in the PIP?

How, when, where, and by whom will this equipment be issued?

The items of individual clothing and equipment which are necessary for a soldier to carry with him at all times in order that he may be clothed and able to eat and sleep are treated separately. Corps Area Commanders are required to make all computations of shortages or requirements for these items. Credits to meet these shortages will be established in specified War Department depots and shipments made on call of the Corps Area Commander, but only to his reception centers. This restriction serves to lighten the burden of the depots and is practicable since all recruits except the volunteers picked up by units at their home stations will pass through reception centers.

Requirements for other organizational and individual equipment required for active units of the Regular Army and the National Guard are computed by corps area commanders and will be supplied by the chiefs of the responsible arms and services direct to major organizations at training centers or in concentration areas. No attempt will be made to supply shortages of Class II and III supplies from War Department depots to units at their home stations.

Shortages for the inactive units both of the Regular Army and the National Guard are computed by the chiefs of supply arms and services.

Computations of all station, as well as unit, equipment are made by corps area commanders for reception centers, unit training centers, and all installations not

RESTRICTED

exempted from corps area control. The chiefs of the responsible arms and services compute the requirements for the activities exempted from corps area control. Reports of all shortages are required to be submitted in the form and arrangement desired by the arm or service concerned by March 15 of each year. The supply arms and services then set up credits for individual clothing and complete their plan of supply for the organizational requirements utilizing substitutes where necessary. This work, in theory, was to be completed by April 15th, the effective date for the annual revisions of the PIP.

It should be noted that the above procedure entails a great amount of detailed work both in the corps areas and especially in the offices of the supply arms and services, as the requirements must be broken down by organizations and plans made to supply the many units at their widely separated training or concentration areas.

The plan has now been effective a little more than one year. Computations were made and submitted, but after the work had begun there were some changes in tables of organization and others in tables of basic allowances so that the tabulations gradually lost some of their value. The plan was in general well received and was considered workable. However, as the result of the experience gained and the comments of interested arms and services, a decision has been reached within the past two weeks to make a major change designed to reduce the detailed work of the supply arms and services and to give the system greater flexibility.

THE NEW I.R. 4-1

For mobilization purposes supplies are set up by the new regulations in the following classes

Individual clothing and equipment. - No change is made in the method of handling these articles.

Unit equipment and the clothing and individual equipment not required for issue at reception centers is placed in three categories

Controlled items.
Credit items.
Requisition items.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Controlled items will be designated by the chiefs of the supply arms and services and will consist in general of major items of equipment a mobilization shortage of which is anticipated. This list will be revised by the chiefs of supply arms and services as the status of the items included changes. Controlled items will be reported by major units as was the case for all items except clothing under the original system. Chiefs of supply arms and services are still responsible for the shipment of controlled items direct to organizations.

Credit items will be designated by chiefs of supply arms and services and will consist in general of articles included in Tables of Basic Allowances for mobilization which can be made available at the times and in the quantities required for mobilization. The list of credit items will include acceptable substitutes for controlled items where substitutes are available.

Credit items will be reported by corps areas in five groups Regular Army active units, Regular Army inactive units; National Guard active units, National Guard inactive units, other corps area activities. Reports on Regular Army and National Guard will show the quantity on hand, present shortage, and shortages which will occur during each of the first three months of mobilization due to the activation of inactive units. Reports on all other activities will show the shortage or excess that will remain in that group after supplying deficiencies in the Regular Army and the National Guard. Credits will be set up annually by the chiefs of supply arms and services on specific depots and will be furnished to the commanders of corps areas and exempted stations concerned. The usual safeguard that credits will not be available until released by The Adjutant General is included in the directive.

Requisition items consist of all articles and supplies not included in the controlled and credit groups. They will be obtained by requisition following the regular peace time methods and channels. No reports will be required on articles in this group.

MAINTENANCE

Requirements for maintenance of equipment in the hands of units or installations will be computed by the chiefs of the arms and services on the basis of the approved maintenance allowance and credits will be furnished to commanders

RESTRICTED

5/5

of corps areas and exempted stations for thirty day periods, the first credit for maintenance to be available by 115.

In the old Section 5 of the PMP and in the new I.R. 4-1 which will supersede this section, restricted clauses have been placed in an effort to insure that commanders will not call upon War Department depots for shipment of credit items until they have made certain that troops at the destination are ready to receive the shipment.

UTILIZATION OF ALL SUPPLIES

Corps area commanders are directed to utilize all federal supplies and equipment in the hands of both the Regular Army and the National Guard or in storage in state warehouses or Regular Army posts, camps or stations under their control to meet their mobilization requirements before a shortage is reported to the supply arms and services.

It is expected that the new mobilization regulation will be published within a few days and computations of requirements for 1940 will be made under the revised system. The shortages in future will be reported as of March 31st and credits will be set up as of June 30th of each year.

PORTS OF EMBARKATION

Many difficulties were experienced during the World War as the result of congestion at ports of embarkation. Section 5 and the new I.R.-1 both prescribe that on mobilization existing general depots located at ports of embarkation will plan to operate as such only until 6011. The logistics annex of each strategical plan will specify whether a depot at a particular port will be eliminated at that time or be continued to meet the requirements of a particular situation. Ports of embarkation will be operated essentially as relay points. Supplies received at a port will be for current use or for trans-shipment.

CONSTRUCTION

During the period covered by the PMP little, if any, new construction can be made available for use. It will be necessary to use existing facilities to the maximum, augmenting buildings by the use of tentage for shelter.

RESTRICTED

Section 5 provided that in general new construction by corps area commanders would be limited to tent floors, kitchens, messes, and sanitary facilities, and that authority for construction of one building costing in excess of \$2500 or for a construction program in a corps area costing over \$50,000 would be secured from the Secretary of War. In the new IR 4-1 the cost of a single building has been changed to \$5000 and for the construction program within a corps area to \$100,000. This restriction should not serve to prevent corps area commanders, after they have made a detailed estimate of their mobilization requirements, from requesting advance approval for the construction of additional facilities which cannot be included in the monetary limitations. The Quartermaster General is required to include in his plan detailed provision for additional depot or other storage facilities required by the supply arms and services for the execution of their respective mobilization missions.

Section 5 and the new IR both provide that rail movement of personnel and supplies between corps areas will continue under the supervision of the Quartermaster General as traffic manager for the War Department. A centralized control of all rail traffic is considered essential in any major mobilization. Certain restricted clauses have been placed in mobilization regulations in an effort to prevent the use of transportation facilities for storage purposes and no movement is permitted until assurance has been received that the supplies or personnel can be promptly unloaded at the destination.

The subject of hospitalization was included in Section 5 of the 1939 Plan but is to be made a separate regulation to be known as IR 4-2. This provides for the maximum use of the existing facilities under the control of the corps area commanders in meeting the mobilization load. The Surgeon General will annually furnish the corps area commanders with a list of hospital facilities under the control of other federal agencies which may be made available in an emergency. General hospitalization and a provision for fixed general hospitals is a function of The Surgeon General. Civilian hospitals, of course, may be used in an emergency. The plan of The Surgeon General under the PIP has not yet been received but it is expected to provide for the transfer from existing general hospitals of all patients who are primary responsibilities of other Government agencies.

RESTRICTED

The G-4 division does not feel that we have found a perfect solution of the supply problem of the PIP. Far from it — But if in Section 5 as revised by the new Mobilization Regulation we have an adequate directive on which detailed subordinate plans can be based, much has been accomplished.

AUGMENTATION PLANS

Exhibit "1" — "General Outline of the War Department Mobilization Plan", is presented for the purpose of showing the proposed composition of the forces tentatively selected to comprise each of the four Augmentation Plans and the proposed scheme of coordinating these plans with the Protective Mobilization Plan.

Augmentation Plans will become effective only upon orders of the War Department. The conditions existing in any particular emergency will indicate whether or not augmentation of the forces included in the Protective Mobilization Plan will be necessary. The size of the forces which will be required to cope with a particular situation will, in all probability, be generally known prior to mobilization; particularly so, should there be a long period of strained relations. In any event, because of the limitations on personnel procurement, it will be impossible to initiate an augmentation of the forces in the Protective Mobilization Plan prior to 611. Thus, there will be sufficient time after mobilization is ordered to amplify existing instructions relative to the mobilization of additional forces.

It is tentatively planned that the First Augmentation Plan will provide for the mobilization of sufficient additional Regular Army and National Guard troops to round out and give balance to the forces mobilized in the Protective Mobilization Plan. In general, the First Augmentation Plan provides for

Activation of the Corps troops for five (5) additional corps.

Completion of such Army troops of the two (2) armies as were not mobilized in the Protective Mobilization Plan.

Mobilization of certain additional GHQ Reserve and harbor defense units.

Mobilization of additional personnel required for overhead and replacements.

RESTRICTED

It will be noted in the chart (Exhibit 1) that the tentative plan is to begin mobilization under the First Augmentation Plan at 61M and procure the personnel required for the units involved during the period 61M - 120M, thus overlapping the Protective Mobilization Plan during the third and fourth months of mobilization. The corps units mobilized in the First Augmentation become available for use by 210M and all units provided by the plan become available by 240M.

The Second and Third Augmentation Plans each provide for the mobilization of the following troops

- 9 Infantry divisions (OR)
- 2 Cavalry divisions (OR)
- Headquarters and corps troops for 3 additional corps.
- Army troops for 1 Army
- Additional GHQ Reserve Units and Harbor Defense Troops.
- Overhead and replacements.

The forces provided by the Fourth Augmentation Plan are the same as those included in the Second and Third Augmentations, except that no Army troops are included.

It will be noted from the chart (Exhibit 1) that the divisions included in any augmentation plan become available for use one month later than the non-divisional units included in the same plan. This is due to the difference in time allotted for training. It is planned to give new divisions a six months' training period of which the last two months are to be devoted to training of the combined arms. However, the maximum training period allotted non-divisional units is four months.

The PIP, plus its four augmentations, is designed to raise the present military establishment to a force of four (4) armies together with the necessary zone-of-the-interior troops, comprising a total force of about 4,000,000 men, within a period of thirteen (13) months. Accomplishment of the Plan within this length of time is based upon the assumption that the necessary funds for mobilization of the personnel and the procurement of supplies will be authorized by the Congress. Provisions which have been made for augmenting the forces in the Protective

RESTRICTED

Mobilization Plan give flexibility to the Plan as a whole. Should unforeseen conditions arise during mobilization, such as internal disorders or labor difficulties causing interference or delay in the procurement of personnel or the delivery of supplies in the time required, the rate of mobilization can readily be delayed accordingly by arranging for the Augmentation Plans to be made effective at correspondingly later periods. It may be found in our peacetime procurement planning for organizational equipment that mobilization as tentatively set up by Augmentation Plans has been started too early, or that the availability of some units is scheduled in advance of the time when equipment can be procured. If such is found to be the case the flexibility of the plan will permit of corresponding adjustments to be made without difficulty.

The policies, procedures, and instructions included in Mobilization Regulations have the same application to all of the Augmentation Plans and to plans for strategic concentration as they do to the Protective Mobilization Plan.

It will be noted that throughout the discussion of Augmentation Plans, that there has been a generous use of the word "tentative" or "tentatively". This is because the troop basis for the various augmentation plans has been approved for procurement planning purposes only. The table, "Troop Basis for Computation of Supply Requirements", with which you are doubtless familiar, has been constructed from the data appearing in Annex No. 7 of the PIP and the tables indicating the units to be mobilized in each augmentation plan.

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION PLANS

Strategic concentration plans (pertaining to "color" plans) set up the requirements for forces to meet specific emergencies. From the viewpoint of a war planner engaged in the formulation of such a plan, the PIP and its augmentations may be regarded as a tool house from which are drawn the tools he requires to do a specific job. Many tools are now in the "toolhouse" ready for immediate delivery when mobilization is ordered. These are the active units of the Regular Army and the National Guard, and, should the situation demand their immediate use, all will be made available at existing strength. Should the situation require a greater force than that which comprises

RESTRICTED

existing active units of the Regular Army and National Guard, it will be necessary for the "toolhouse" to expand its stock by mobilizing, equipping, and training the additional forces required.

Strategic concentration plans and the PMP (with its Augmentation Plans) must therefore be carefully coordinated. The latter must provide for making units of specific types available for use when needed under "color" plans. On the other hand, "color" plans should give due consideration to the length of time required to mobilize, equip, and train the units required. To call for the delivery of units to concentration areas in advance of the time that it would properly take to equip and train them to perform their functions in theaters of operations gains nothing. Such action would merely force training to be undertaken on a large scale in the theater, or possibly cause delay in the employment of units pending the receipt of equipment.

CONCLUSIONS

It is believed that the PMP is a practical plan possible of accomplishment. Even though it were to be replaced by another plan tomorrow, the work spent on it will not have been wasted. Considerable benefits have already been realized as a result of the PMP. Congress has been favorably impressed by the plan and has been generous in providing appropriations for the procurement of the necessary war reserve. The imperfections in our peace time organization, both of the Regular Army and National Guard, as indicated by the PMP have served as a basis for the gradual improvement of our peace time forces. Such improvement is necessarily slow but is nevertheless continuing. It is not claimed that the plan is perfect. Undoubtedly, further improvements can and will be made in the PMP. However, despite certain possible imperfections of detail, it is believed the PMP furnishes a firm foundation from which to initiate a war time expansion of our forces.

AIC 153 (1/30/40) 20 g

RESTRICTED

Discussion following Lecture

"The Protective Mobilization Plan"

Given by Major Robert W. Husbrouck,
January 2, 1940.

- Q. What is the difference between mobilization regulations and the technical mobilization plan? It looks to me as if you have annexes in both places. Is it a point to try to get as much in the mobilization regulations as possible?
- A. That is the idea. When the mobilization regulations are completely revised you will find that the body of the plan will simmer down to several pages of merely regulations. The top regulations include and in some cases there are annexes. Of course, there are many details in every plan. There has to be variations and those particular variations are to be taken care of in the text of the plan.
- Q. What is going to be the worst shortage about thirty days after you start as far as troops are concerned?
- A. You can see there is going to be a shortage of all types of corps troops, field artillery, and everything else, field engineers and counter-ster units, and medical particularly. Of course the system of affiliated units which is now being taken up in the War Department, where the medical and signal corps are arranging with various civilian hospitals and the A.T. & T. to sponsor medical units and signal units, will do considerable to alleviate this shortage, once the signal system is perfected. These civilian institutions will produce these units for us or at least one

major part of the units. The A.T. & T. will produce radio, telegraph, intelligence companies, etc., within thirty days, but we will have to provide the enlisted men, the basic men to fill them out. That will take a little training but it will shorten the time.

Q. About the inactive units you referred to as a part of the National Guard, is that organization to be mobilized under state authority, are they regularly assigned in active units or are they inactive units?

A. No, they are regularly assigned. Right today there are inactive units in the National Guard and they are given ~~given~~ the opportunity to raise those units if they assemble and present them for Federal recognition within a certain time. For instance, if an I.P.F. combat train has to be presented at its assembly presentation by 10-M, if it isn't there by that time the authority to organize that unit is withdrawn and the corps commander goes ahead with the organization.

Q. Now in regard to the regular army, in the active unit where the cadets are furnished, I noted as you went over the charts, that the regular army departs from its regular station very early in the game. What becomes of that academy?

A. It is left behind and as soon the inactive unit is where it can move around it takes the place.

Q. They are left behind with nothing but a pencil behind their ear as far as equipment is concerned.

A. That is correct. They get the equipment from the concentration area. Of course from the standpoint of housekeeping, there is going to be enough in the post to take care of their needs.

Q. In your talk in regard to mobilization of the I.P.F., they are mobilized

principally at peace strength; at what point are they brought to war strength and when do they receive their additional equipment?

A . They are brought to war strength at 150-M. The reason for conserving personnel is that during that first month we have to take volunteers and are limited to 300,000 men. The additional fillers are procured as soon as selective service is made effective and personnel is no longer a controlled feature. They have to go to replacement centers and get some training and under the plan become available under 150-M. Now, the organization of equipment does not vary much from peace to war. I don't know exactly what you have in mind. Take the old type medical regiment; it used to expand by a number of companies when it went to war strength. Those companies were mobilized. Now the additional units that bring the regiment from peace to war strength come in as units from the training center; at least theoretically.

Q. Would you enlarge a little bit on the use of the regular army reserve, where they are going and what effect they will have on filling units up?

A. We have made a study in G-3 of possible uses for regular army reserve and we came to the conclusion you couldn't specify what use you would make of them until you knew the situation, but you ought to have in mind the possible uses. Starting with the outposts, such as Puerto Rico, Paname, and Alaska, we have to reinforce those garrisons during the first months by a number of individuals to bring the units there to war strength if that is where the first fighting is going to be. That is where you should send experienced men instead of recruits. When the outpost line is in danger a lot of those men will go there, we hope. That is our idea in G-3. In another situation where we are mobilizing an expedition to go somewhere, but the continent of United States is not in danger, there

27c

would be entirely different uses. In any case if we are going to have a large mobilization we have to have a foundation. By that I mean the reserve, the replacement centers, etc , and we feel that some of the men must be utilized for those installations. Of course, the matter was presented to Congress and merely discussed the uses of these men from peace strength to fill into mobilization strength. I don't think that is the entire picture. When you analyze these reserves and the former non-commissioned officers in the reserve, you will find you have very few. About 15% of the present 25,000 have been non-commissioned officers and most of them not beyond the grade of corporal. You have a bunch of good privates. You don't have to wait for fillers to come from the interior. I can't give you a definite answer.

Q. You spoke of the cancellation of requisitions on M-Day. Does that apply to the maintenance of permanent equipment?

A. Major Hasbrouck: I'll ask Colonel Phillips to answer that.

Colonel Phillips: No, that applies to organized equipment which is listed in the field centers as Class 2 and Class 3 supply.

Q. Does the I.P.F. and the P.M.P. include troops and equipment in Hawaii and the Philippines?

A. The I.P.F. does actually include the troops in the foreign garrisons. Ordinarily when people talk about the I.P.F. they don't include those troops, but to be 100% correct they should be included. You will find that information on a rather obscure page, the last page of Annex 7, I think.