DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

MEMORANDUM FOR: EACH OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THE ARMY STAFF

SUBJECT: Remarks by the Chief of Staff

The Chief of Staff desires that a copy of his remarks at his first meeting with the Army Staff after assuming the duties of Chief of Staff, United States Army, 7 July 1955, be brought to the attention of each officer assigned to the Departmental Staff, including Office of the Secretary of Defense and Office of the Secretary of the Army. A copy of his remarks is inclosed for your information.

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JOHN A. KLEIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

REMARKS BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
AT HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE ARMY STAFF
AFTER ASSUMING THE DUTIES OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY THURSDAY, 7 JULY 1955

Gentlemen, I thought it would be worth our time to take these few moments together so that I can meet with the senior officers of the staff, those whom I haven't had the pleasure of seeing since I returned to the building.

I see in the audience many old friends whom I'm very happy to see. I'm not speaking to you as a new arrival who's just appeared here, but as an old Pentagon hand who's returning to the salt mine. I welcome all my fellow cooperators and fellow laborers.

I have no "burning message" to bring, other than to chat for a moment about some of our present problems and some of my aspirations as I assume the position of Chief of Staff.

First I want to talk about the question of our common outlook on life. I've sat in the Far East and watched the developments here in Washington and in the Army, such as the difficulties in establishing the strength of the Army, and the budgetary problems which I knew were of terrible concern to all of those with the leadership and the well-being of the Army as a responsibility and as a matter of personal concern. I know how you gentlemen have assisted General Ridgway and the other senior officers of this headquarters in meeting these problems. I have wondered how the Army was being affected here in the Pentagon by the decisions which, many times I'm sure, appeared adverse to you. And whether the Army was showing the same ability to meet contraction as it had shown in meeting expansion in the early days of the Korean war. My impression has been that your heads may be bloody but certainly unbowed, and I want to stress how important I feel that spirit is, that the Army morale will never be lowered by these swings of the pendulum, back and forth. Of recent months, and recent years perhaps, the swing has been somewhat against us; but where we lose in quantity, we must make up in quality and courage in facing these difficult problems which sometimes seem virtually unsolvable because of the deficiency in the means which are given us. If we have some adverse currents against which we must fight, let's take the adversities and continue to wait for that day when the pendulum goes the other way.

Now I say this to you gentlemen, because you really have to set the personality of the Army. The Army is like an individual -- it has a personality, and each area within the Army has a personality. So that you gentlemen, in your dealing with your subordinates -- and you have many of them -- by your attitude, by your tone, by your reactions to these various

events that take place, will determine the outlook of these younger officers and in turn will determine their personality which is turned outward toward the other services, toward the Department of Defense, to the President, and to the Nation.

I asked myself, while coming back from the Far East, this question: if I could underline any particular directions or objectives for the Army, what ones would they be? I always recognize the danger of playing favorites among objectives, so to speak, because we have so many goals, none of which can be abandoned. But I believe I would venture to underline at least three areas which are obvious, I'm sure, but are so important they warrant mention.

Obviously, our first objective here, we who are responsible for the Army, is never to forget our mission of combat readiness. We do a great many things in the Army. I can't glance across the hoard of our cables and literature that pass across the desk from day to day without being tremendously impressed with the variety of efforts -- the many areas and fields in which we are involved. That variety is also a warning of the danger of diverging from the straight path and the final objective. We should ask ourselves frequently: are my actions, are those things for which I am responsible, are they contributing directly or indirectly to making this a better fighting Army, ready for combat?

Now at this point in talking to the other members of the staff, I have always said, "and furthermore, all types of combat." I think that question which is suggested -- are we ready for all types of combat -- is an extremely important one. We are always faced with the somewhat competing requirements of being ready for world war III and also for something greatly less than that. Our difficulties of adaptation are very clearly exemplified by what happened in Korea. At the outset and even throughout the entire conflict, I was frequently reminded of the fact that we weren't ready to fight a Korean-type war. We were not ready for the little war. We must look over the application of our resources, of our means, to verify that the little war, the brush fire, has not been forgotten, because the little war, if allowed to start, may in turn start the big War. The little war, especially if lost, may encourage the big war. And certainly all the efforts we expend in preparing for the little war are also applicable to the big war. So I just throw that out as a thought for all you gentlemen -- whether or not we are, in our planning, in our allocation of means, thinking enough about the little war, which can always occur, instead of expending everything we have for the big war, which we hope will always be deterred.

My second point really grows out of the first one. Not only do we have a combat-ready army, but we have the best Army available for the money. Our slogan ought to be, "the most for the money." By the most for the money I mean the most we can get out of the national allocation of

means made available from year to year for national defense; then, having got that slice, to verify that we are spending it for the right people and for the right things.

Again I go back to Korea. As I helicoptered month after month over the valleys of Korea and looked down on the materiel which we had brought to Korea, some of which was not contributing to winning the war, I was impressed with the fact that, at least for that type of operation, we hadn't spent our money in the wisest way. So I hope I can lead you gentlemen to reappraise and revalue once more as we make successive budgets. Are we really getting the best Army we can for the money that is available? We can't afford to waste a nickel, not in consideration of the interests of the Department of the Treasury, but in our own self interest, because we have such an unlimited requirement for funds and assets in order to equip ourselves with the most modern weapons of the future.

My third point rises from that word "the future." Our objective must be to keep looking constantly into the future while meeting the day-to-day requirements of the present. Now living in the future is primarily a mental operation -- an ability to extract oneself from a present environment and to imagine a future one for which preparations must be made. That, gentlemen, is the role of the forward-looking Army officer, the staff officer, the kind we assemble here in the Pentagon. We can never consider too strongly the requirement to select and encourage that type of officer and to place them in positions of responsibility where they can influence the thinking which in turn will regulate the Army of the future. As I've told my staff, I'm very much concerned with the loss in recent months and years of some of our outstanding officers -- particularly in scientific fields. We must do something, gentlemen, to pick out early in life this young man who will be the forward thinker, guide his career forward, and be sure that he reaches a position of responsibility here in the Pentagon in order to influence our planning and the development of our weapons systems.

Finally, the Army is no better than the outlook on life of the people in it. The Navy skipper always tries to have a happy ship, and I want this, our staff here in the Pentagon, to be a happy ship. I have served here in several capacities; I know how hard the life can be, particularly on the "Indian" down the hall. I have the highest admiration for that Indian who works unlimited hours, unnumbered days of the week, unnumbered weeks of the month of the year. But those hardships of life are offset if the feeling on all sides is that virtue itself is a reward, that good performance of duty will be rewarded, that we all have respect for the men on our right and left, and that credit is given where credit is due.

I'm most anxious as we go forward during the coming months and years in face of the difficulties and frustrations of life here, that we have a happy ship and team, and that the Indian down the hall realizes that like

Napoleon's soldiers, he has a baton -- not in his knapsack but in his briefcase; that a good idea can be advanced by anybody in this building and that it can reach the level of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of Army and perhaps affect the whole future of our Armed Forces. I have always been proud of the Indian because I think that encouragement of independent, vigorous, and bold recommendation has always been the spirit of the Army Staff. I hope it will always be that way. I remember a case several years ago when I was Deputy, sitting in on a briefing of the Chief of Staff and getting a reading for a JCS meeting. In the middle of the meeting someone passed a piece of paper to the briefing officer, who was the DCS (Plans), and he stopped and read it and then he said, "Gentlemen, we worry about our Indians becoming yes men. Listen to this: 'Dear General so-and-so: If the Chief of Staff undertakes to change paragraph so-and-so of the JCS slant so-forth and so-forth, resist him to the very end. Signed: Majors Miller and Mock.'" Well, as long as that spirit is in the hearts of our staff officers here, the Chief of Staff will make fewer mistakes, and I hope the rewards will fall where rewards are due on those fine officers who are willing to stand up and make their voices heard, whether they are majors or whether they are major generals. Gentlemen, that is all I have to say to you today.

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