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"FACE THE NATION"

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GUEST: GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chief of Staff
United States Army

MODERATOR: Stuart Novins

PANEL: Anthony H. Leviero
New York Times

Rowland Evans, Jr.
New York Herald Tribune

James R. Shepley
Time - Life

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VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT
OF
"FACE THE NATION"

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MR. NOVINS: During the last few weeks, the American people have heard some disturbing attacks on our defense program. The criticisms include questions that are raised by our atomic weapons development schedule, and also by the relative emphasis being placed on the three branches: the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force.

Today, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Maxwell Taylor, is here to FACE THE NATION, with his views on the military situation.

General Taylor, you seem to be sitting in a target area, and our boys have been storing up some ammunition, so let's fire away with:

Rowland Evans, from the Washington Bureau of the New York Herald-Tribune;

Tony Laviero, Washington Correspondent for the New York Times; and

James R. Shepley, Chief of the Washington Bureau of Time and Life.

Let's take the opening question from -- Mr. Evans.

MR. EVANS: General, what changes have taken place in the relative positions of strength between this country and the Soviet Union that make it safe for the Army to reduce its manpower by almost 30 per cent in 18 months?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It's very difficult to talk in terms of comparison, Mr. Evans.

Certainly political changes, economic changes, play an important role in deciding on the strength of our military establishment, also military developments have to be considered.

MR. EVANS: Could you -- could you just say what some of those changes are, sir, that have taken place?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Some of the changes, of course, have been the cessation of the active operations in Korea. There have been our ability to redeploy our forces so that we have a central reserve, which we did not have a few years back.

MR. NOVINS: Mr. Leviero.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Also the increased professionalism of our Army.

MR. LEVIERO: Well, General, isn't the change primarily due to the change in weapons? I recall President Eisenhower said, in his 1955 budget message, that we are going through a revolution in military concepts, and it was necessary to put primary stress on air power. Isn't that the basic reason for the reduced size of the Army today?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I can't answer all the factors which have led to these decisions, but certainly changes in weapons are important, and of course Army weapons have changed very fast, in a very important way.

MR. SHEPLEY: General Taylor, your immediate predecessor, General Ridgway, said that the Army was reduced in size, not for military reasons, but because the fiscal officials of

the Administration ordered the military budget held at a ceiling level. That was the last budget, the one we are operating under now.

How was the present budget, the one that you participated in, arrived at?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Mr. Shepley, the budget which I have, the one in which I took part, has been reached by a consideration of the Army's task, its requirements, and then pricing those tasks.

MR. SHEPLEY: And there is no compulsion on you, as Chief of Staff of the Army, to meet a ceiling of any kind in the formulation of this budget?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not upon me, so far as I am aware.

MR. LEVIERO: General, suppose you could forget the price tags, what size Army do you think we should have to meet today's commitments?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, Mr. Leviero, no Chief of Staff is ever satisfied with either the size or the quality of his Army, otherwise he should be fired; but I would say that perhaps if there were no other considerations, other than my own Army considerations, an Army of around a million and a half men, perhaps.

MR. LEVIERO: How many divisions would that be?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Oh, 27, 28, perhaps.

MR. LEVIERO: And we have 19 now?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR. NOVINS: General, -- excuse me.

MR. EVANS: General, you certainly have no doubt in your own mind as to the integrity and the honor of your colleague, your erstwhile colleague, General Ridgway, --

GENERAL TAYLOR: Certainly not.

MR. EVANS: That's not a loaded question.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Certainly not. He's an old, admired friend.

MR. EVANS: How do you explain his recent criticism, his very strong criticism that goes to politics, charges that military decisions had been based on political considerations? How do you explain that, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am afraid that's such a personal matter with General Ridgway that no one, certainly I'm not qualified to interpret it.

MR. EVANS: Have you taken issue with him on this publicly?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have not taken issue, one way or another.

MR. EVANS: Do you plan to, sir, or --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I do not.

MR. EVANS: You feel this is out of your --

GENERAL TAYLOR: It is inappropriate for me, as Chief of Staff, to become actively engaged in this matter.

MR. LEVIERO: General, I remember shortly after you succeeded General Ridgway, you expressed your views at the Quantico Secretaries Conference. What impressed me there is that your views and General Ridgway's closely coincided on the type of Army we should have today.

Perhaps you ought to summarize the kind of Army we have and what it should do, and what its commitments are.

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't think it is surprising that General Ridgway's military views and mine rather coincide because our experience has been very much in common. I have the same vision, I think, that General Ridgway had of a highly -- well-weaponed, highly mobile Army, capable of applying its power any place where the interests of the United States are at stake.

MR. SHEPLEY: General Taylor, that brings me to an area I'd like to ask you a few questions about, aviation.

Is the Army satisfied now with the tactical aviation support that it's getting from the Air Force?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, that, of course, is like being satisfied with the Army; we can never afford to be satisfied with any form of military strength. We must do better all the time.

I think my friends in the Air Force would certainly join me in that statement.

MR. SHEPLEY: Are you as satisfied with the Air Force

as you are with the Army?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't like to make comparisons. The difficulties of close air support obviously are very great, particularly in view of the increased performance of our airplanes, as time goes on.

MR. EVANS: General --

MR. SHEPLEY: General, several of your predecessors, both General Ridgway and General Collins, have said at one time or another in the course of their tenure as Chief of Staff that the Army would be better served if it had its own tactical air force.

Do you subscribe to these views?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am not sure that those gentlemen ever phrased it quite that way, Mr. Shepley. I will say this: At the present time I am still looking to the Air Force to provide close air support, and I am not seeking my own air force by any manner of means.

MR. SHEPLEY: What about your logistical air, the things that would make the Army highly mobile, that could make the Army the kind of Army that you and General Ridgway would like it to be; are you satisfied with the Air Force's role in this regard?

GENERAL TAYLOR: The Air Force has no role there. That is strictly an Army role, to provide the internal transportation necessary to move our men, our supplies and

our equipment on the battlefield. That's the purpose of our aviation program in the Army. It is not in competition with the Air Force.

MR. SHEPLEY: What about that --

MR. EVANS: Do you have your own transport now? I thought the Air Force controlled your transport.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not insofar as the fixed wing aircraft, the small ones, the helicopters, those things which we are --

MR. EVANS: I mean, if you wanted to transport a battalion or a regimental combat team to the Pacific tomorrow, don't you have to go to the Air Force?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes. That's a different kind of thing. That's a strategic airlift.

MR. EVANS: You don't control that?

GENERAL TAYLOR: We do not; we've got to request that --

MR. SHEPLEY: Suppose you want to transport a division from Fort Bragg to Fort Benning, you have to go to the Air Force for the air?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That's right.

MR. LEVIERO: General --

MR. SHEPLEY: I'm sorry.

MR. NOVINS: Mr. Leviero.

MR. LEVIERO: The way you put it recently is that the Army is a hitch-hiker of the Air Force. Now, does that imply some dissatisfaction with the amount of troop lift available?

GENERAL TAYLOR: There are two kinds of airlift that we usually talk about, in the relations between the Air Force and the Army: the kind which was involved in the landing in Normandy, in other words, the assault airlift in which we have to have specialized aircraft going in under fire. The other is the strategic kind, where you move large bodies of troops, as you say, from the United States to Japan, for example.

So, really, you have to distinguish between those two kinds before you discuss the subject.

MR. SHEPLEY: Well, let's talk about the kind that the Air Force supplies you, strategic air power.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Both of those kinds are supplied by the Air Force.

MR. SHEPLEY: Does the Air Force supply you enough airlift to move the divisions you would like to move by air, your airborne divisions? Can you move your airborne divisions by air tomorrow?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not simultaneously, no.

MR. SHEPLEY: How many of them can you move?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't like to state that on the air.

MR. SHEPLEY: Are you satisfied with the number you can move?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No; I would like to have more.

MR. SHEPLEY: And why, then, can't you have more? Is it

because the Air Force is not supplying the airlift you think you need?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, it's always a question of competing requirements, and the Air Force has a serious problem of meeting its budgets and its need. Plainly, they don't have all the types of combat aircraft they want, any more than I think they have all of the transport aircraft, I suppose --

MR. SHEPLEY: General, there have been reports recently that the Army is in fact planning a considerable increase in what it calls Army Aviation. Is this -- are these reports accurate?

GENERAL TAYLOR: We are most anxious to continue to progress in this internal transport field. That is the kind of organic aviation which we own, which moves our own people on the battlefield.

Yes, we have a six-year program ahead of us which I think is vital to the future of the Army.

MR. SHEPLEY: Would you discuss that briefly for us? I am not familiar with it.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes.

It's the continued development of a program which has been in existence for some time. It's to give us the low performance aircraft, aircraft with a short runway capability that can be right with our troops to give us observation from

the air, for our artillery, for our missiles, to move small bodies of troops, on reconnaissance, and that kind of thing, to move our supplies over rivers and mountains, if necessary.

MR. SHEPLEY: What are the numbers of aircraft that this six-year program envisions, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't have the exact number, but the order of four or five thousand --

MR. SHEPLEY: Four or five thousand aircraft?

GENERAL TAYLOR (continuing): -- little ones, and medium-sized, but all low performance, not of the type the Air Force has, or wants to have.

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MR. NOVINS: Mr. Evans.

MR. EVANS: General, I wonder if I could get into another field, for just a second.

Assuming for a moment that the next war does start off with an aerial bombardment by intercontinental missiles, if you could take that assumption for a moment, what would the role of the Army be in this nuclear age?

GENERAL TAYLOR: The deployments overseas, of course, would be immediately involved in the defensive role to keep Europe and the Far East from being overrun by the Communist enemy.

MR. EVANS: Do you feel that this kind of warfare makes a real de-emphasis of the role of the Army, the traditional role of the Army, as we have used it in past wars?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not fundamentally. I would say, rather, that it changes the role in point of time, that some of the things we would do early in the so-called conventional war, we would do later in this kind of thing.

MR. LEVIERO: General, we are committed --

MR. NOVINS: General, in relation to the Louisiana war games that occurred just a little while ago, I wonder if you can tell us, from your experience there and also based on your own considered judgment, is there any justification in saying that the probability is that in all-out war, such as Mr. Evans speaks about, that the man who hits first is the man who is

o2 going to win?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Certainly anyone who has the advantage of surprise with these new weapons we have, has a great advantage.

MR. NOVINS: What do you think of the ability of your Army to retaliate against, say, a 1500 mile missile that might bring any of your bases in Europe under fire?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Obviously, we have no such direct retaliatory capability now, except by the action of our front line troops deployed along the Iron and the Bamboo Curtains.

MR. NOVINS: Do you feel, sir, that there is a real urgency involved in our getting at that 1500 mile missile before the Russians do?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I wouldn't limit it to that. We must get on with our business rapidly in all of these important fields of defense.

MR. NOVINS: Are we going fast enough now, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: How much is enough? I know there are tremendous efforts being made.

MR. EVANS: Are you satisfied, sir, yourself?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am never satisfied, Mr. Evans, as I said before.

MR. NOVINS: Well, the President has said --

GENERAL TAYLOR: Never be complacent in these fields.

MR. NOVINS: The President has said, sir, that he

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has received information from his Chiefs of the Military that we are going as fast as we can go.

Do you agree with that?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I obviously agree with any statement from that source.

MR. SHEPLEY: Well, you are one of the sources that he cited, I would think.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Beg your pardon?

MR. SHEPLEY: You are one of his sources of his information. He said that his military advisers said we are going fast enough.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I'm not a specialist in the field to which he referred.

MR. EVANS: But he did say, sir, that his view was based on the advice he was getting from his military people --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am sure that it was.

MR. EVANS: How recently --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am sure that's correct.

MR. EVANS: How often do you talk military business with the President, yourself, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Intermittently, only when a special situation occurs.

MR. EVANS: Not regularly; you don't go in once a week with the --

GENERAL TAYLOR: No fixed time.

MR. LEVIERO: General, I'd like to get back to something

o4 important you said a while ago. You said that if you didn't have to worry about the price tags primarily; that you would like to have an Army of 27 or 28 divisions. That is quite a gap between 19 we are heading for now; as I understand it we have 18 and will have 19 by June 30th.

Well, maybe we should have more. Maybe you should have some more money.

Can you justify a gap of 9 divisions for budgetary reasons?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I might add -- I should say, of course, that if I were Secretary of Defense, quite likely I would not approve a 28-division Army. I have given you purely the optimum in which there are no known or provable soft spots in the Army program. Every program normally does have certain soft areas. If you would give me the ideal force, I would say I have plugged every gap I know of.

MR. LEVIERO: Well, now, you have said we don't have quite enough airplanes for a strategic air lift. Well, maybe we should have a few more divisions and actively deployed abroad.

Would you like to have some troops, say, in Southeast Asia? Isn't that a vacuum?

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GENERAL TAYLOR: That, of course, is a political question which would have to be looked at from many angles. Certainly, we should be able to resist aggression in Southeast Asia, or any place else where it might occur.

MR. EVANS: General, you said a second ago there would have to be soft areas in any over-all military policy, not everybody can be satisfied all the time. But, do you feel that, as Mr. Leviero points out, this nine-division gap between what you think is your requirement and what the Joint Chiefs have recommended and what you will probably get from Congress, nineteen divisions, eighteen or nineteen, do you feel that that is a safe level?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have ways and means of meeting these soft spots; whether they are adequate or not, I will have to have experience to see. As I have stated before that, not on this program but elsewhere, if I find that my devices are not sufficient, I will have to come back for help.

MR. EVANS: But isn't that waiting, sir, until you have had the experience and then it may be too late? Is that putting it too grimly, General?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't think so. I don't believe anyone can ask for the sums involved without having a good basis of experience to justify those requests.

MR. NOVINS: General, isn't it a fact that the mission of the Army seems to be expanding? There are more trouble

spots in the world, you have to be at more places, you are more sensitive to more potential problems?

How do you account for that, that while this expansion of commitment is going on, your manpower and your weapons program seems to be cut back?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I would say, Mr. Novins, on the other hand, that we have many means which are becoming available to us which we did not have a few years ago. If we have this mobility, which is so essential to us, I think we have a good reason to believe we can meet our obligations.

MR. EVANS: General, the question of mobility puzzles me. If you want to take some of your people overland, you have the tanks and the transport to do it; you own those, don't you? You control them?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That's right.

MR. EVANS: Well, why shouldn't you, by the same token, if you want to move in the air age, if you want to move men by air, why shouldn't you have your own air transport?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It seems, as a practical matter, that everybody can't own, himself, everything he might possibly need. Our requirements are intermittent, they are not everyday, so that obviously it would be uneconomical for us to tie up millions, hundreds of millions of dollars, in aircraft which we would need only occasionally.

MR. SHEPLEY: Could you tell us just a little bit more

about the kind of aircraft that you will have in this long-range program that you have just discussed?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, it's really more and better of the same types we have now, that is, reconnaissance planes which will carry our observers. I will point out in Korea I had to go 125 miles to the right flank of my line, and I could do it in less than an hour by going by an Army fixed wing aircraft down to the foot of the mountains, and then taking a helicopter, and going up to the OP that overlooked the battlefield.

MR. SHEPLEY: This is the small class called liaison airplanes?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That's liaison aircraft, and then we would like to be able to transport patrols, for example, reconnaissance groups, which in the past went on horses, or sometimes go in jeeps at the present time.

MR. SHEPLEY: And you'd move those by helicopter; is that --

GENERAL TAYLOR: Helicopter, and perhaps fixed wing, also. Then, we have vital cargo to transport in the rear areas, within the Army area, which may be, of course, a hundred miles or so in depth. We want to be able to move things around rapidly in our own back yard.

MR. LEVIERO: No chance for a horse to make a comeback, then; it's going to be the helicopter and the small plane, then,

for reconnaissance?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes; we think we can do a great deal with those things. I remember in the early days of Korea when our patrols had to climb these mountains. Now they can go up on the helicopters and do the job in a tenth of the time.

MR. SHEPLEY: General, if there were to be a brush fire war again, like Korea, and we all hope, of course, that there won't be; but I suppose your job is worrying about wars that might happen; could the Army do anything about it?

GENERAL TAYLOR: You bet your life it could, Mr. Shepley. That's one of our primary missions, is to get out there and do something as rapidly as possible.

MR. SHEPLEY: And you do have a mobile reserve force somewhere in the world today --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I do.

MR. SHEPLEY (continuing): -- that is available to go to a brush fire war?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Definitely.

MR. LEVIERO: General --

MR. SHEPLEY: Is that here in the United States?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Largely.

MR. SHEPLEY: And how would it get to a brush fire war?

GENERAL TAYLOR: By the best means of transport available, either air, ship, or by any other device, perhaps a shifting of troops already overseas.

MR. SHEPLEY: Could you move as much as a full regiment of troops with their modern equipment, by air from one part of the world to the other?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes. We transported a regimental combat team from Japan to the United States, and swapped one from the United States to Japan, in the course of ten days.

MR. SHEPLEY: Could you move a division?

GENERAL TAYLOR: If the aircraft were made available to us.

MR. SHEPLEY: Well, if the aircraft were, would you think that there were aircraft to be made available?

GENERAL TAYLOR: There are sufficient in the United States, if they can be detached from their --

MR. SHEPLEY: Where would they come from? Would they be from the airlines or would they be from the Strategic Air Command, or who would have to make those airplanes --

GENERAL TAYLOR: The Air Force would make that decision; probably from a variety of sources.

MR. NOVINS: Mr. Evans.

MR. EVANS: General, you got a new Reserve program through Congress last year. Are you entirely satisfied with the way that is working today? Are you going to recommend changes?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It's not going nearly as fast, Mr. Evans, as we would like, although there has been quite an

upturn lately. About a thousand in the last two weeks have volunteered for the program, raising it to about 13,000. Whether that's going to be adequate or not as time goes on, remains to be seen.

MR. EVANS: What is the goal, General?

GENERAL TAYLOR: We'd like to get 90,000 this year.

MR. EVANS: You have had 13,000 in how many months?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Really, in effective months, since about October. You see, we got off to a rather slow start.

MR. EVANS: Do you feel that this shows a basic weakness in the program that will need correction, and are you going to ask Congress for specific new authority, new changes in the Reserve program?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have just testified recently on the Hill. The Army is watching this program and will come back when it has the data necessary to prove the need for a change.

MR. EVANS: You feel you will need changes?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I think so.

MR. EVANS: Do you have any idea what form they might take, General?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No; the two areas which we are watching most closely, or which perhaps may be most susceptible to change, is inequality of pay between the National Guard trainees and the Reservists, and also the absence of any compulsory element in the program.

MR. EVANS: You think that the Reservists should get more pay?

(5) GENERAL TAYLOR: I think there should be equality.

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01 MR. LEVIERO: General, the Army's Redstone missile apparently has shown great promise and some officials have been saying it may develop into the 1500 mile range missile. I know it's a pretty sensitive question, but I have heard an Air Force General say that a B-47 is a pretty good intermediate range missile, too.

Now, how can a ballistics missile compete with an airplane with a human mind guiding it?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, maybe it can't, Mr. Leviero. I am not sure. I think only time can tell what will come out of our program.

MR. LEVIERO: But you do see a role for it, as long-range artillery, say?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Oh, yes, definitely.

MR. NOVINS: General, part of your mission, as I understand it, is the training of troops of other nations in the free area. I wonder if you could give us a fast status report on that, sir.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Mr. Novins, it's a big field, as you know. The American Army today is engaged in training, directly or indirectly, over 200 foreign divisions. I don't think the magnitude of the operation is entirely appreciated. That training varies from the very detailed kind we give in certain countries, as in Korea, to the very general, rather technical aid we give in certain other countries, or in Europe.

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MR. NOVINS: I wonder if you would feel a little happier, yourself, in view of some of the things you have said about the Army being a deterrent, if we had more troops stationed in Southeast Asia, where there seems to be a vacuum.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Whether that's necessary or not, I'm not prepared to say. Certainly I would like to feel there is more resistant ability in that sensitive area than there is, has been in the past.

MR. NOVINS: Do you think it would help that resistant ability if there were United States troops stationed there?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't like to pin it down to that area, but certainly wherever our soldiers are found, that's the American flag, as a symbol of our will to resist aggression in that area.

MR. SHEPLEY: General Taylor, you said on, just very recently, on the 10th of January, in a speech, "To be convincing, this deterrent concept must be based on reality; it cannot be mere talk, bluff, or threat. Instead, it must be based on visible evidence of our nation's military, economic, political and moral strength in being."

Insofar as the Army is concerned, is our deterrent concept based on reality, or is it based on talk, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It's based on reality within the limits of strength which we have. We have a good Army, an excellent Army, within the strength and size that we have.

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MR. EVANS: But that leaves the question, sir, --

MR. SHEPLEY: Is it convincing? You used the word "convincing;" is it convincing?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I hope it's convincing, because the intent and the ability to react promptly to any further aggression is definitely there.

MR. NOVINS: I think Mr. Evans has a question on that subject.

MR. EVANS: Well, when you answered Mr. Shepley's question, you left a question hanging, another one, which is -- what do you think personally, is it convincing?

You say it's good, what we have, and then coming right back to this question of 27 divisions, do we have enough, and how can you be so sure that we have enough, General?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, you ask is it convincing. That means, how does it appear in the mind of this other fellow across the way? I can't be sure, but certainly when he considers not just the Army, which must be considered in the context of the over-all national strength, I would think it would be convincing.

MR. EVANS: Have you been perfectly satisfied with the -- with the German effort on rearmament, and the role it's playing in the whole forward strategy concept of defensive Europe? Do you feel that this is going as fast as we were led to believe it would go, once they were admitted to NATO?

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GENERAL TAYLOR: There have been many reasons, as you know, Mr. Evans, for this delay, many difficulties, legal in character.

I believe now that, I'm told, at least, that these obstacles have been overcome, and I think now it will, the program will start moving forward.

MR. EVANS: Has the delay affected our plans, our troop quantities in Western Europe in the NATO complex?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No, our garrison in Europe has stayed, has been stable for several years.

MR. EVANS: Do you feel that France and the other NATO countries are doing their share in the whole NATO effort?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I wouldn't be critical of other people, Mr. Evans, because it's hard to know the other people's problems. Certainly we see France has many problems now in North Africa, for example.

MR. NOVINS: Mr. Leviero.

MR. LEVIERO: General, we are committed to the use of small so-called tactical atomic bombs in war now, and I know the Army is reorganizing its divisions for it and developing tactics of dispersion and control, but some of the observers in the recent sagebrush maneuver said that the use of atomic weapons as simulated there would have created absolute chaos and devastation on the battlefield and raised some doubt as to whether we could maintain order with the troops that survive.

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Could you give us some kind of report on that maneuver?

GENERAL TAYLOR: The sagebrush maneuver was a very complicated affair which involved many tests, some highly technical in nature. We've still not, I've still not received the final analysis, but we do know that we learned a great deal about the capabilities of our Army atomic weapons.

I think it's very difficult, Mr. Leviero, really, for our commanders to visualize the use of this great power that we have, and there is a great deal of additional thought and research and training required for us to be able to use these weapons properly.

MR. SHEPLEY: General, I refer briefly to this subject of missiles. It's been said in the past that one of the things that is wrong with our missile effort is that it's confused, and that there is competition between the services for the same kind of missile.

Now, as we understand it, the Army made a decision to press ahead, and this has been approved by Mr. Wilson, with a 1500 mile missile.

The Air Force is also pressing ahead with the same missile.

Why do both the Army and the Air Force have to make this missile?

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GENERAL TAYLOR: The justification is the need to press forward in several areas. I think that has been true in most of our research and development of important types. We have tried to have more than one arrow in our bow, hoping that one will be successful in a minimum period of time.

MR. NOVINS: General, if there is a breakthrough, and a missile, long-range missile is developed, will that be considered as long-range artillery, or as aircraft? Who is going to control it?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That remains to be seen. I think the first thing is for the nation to have this capability, then the services can decide how to use it.

MR. EVANS: But you feel that competition between the services in this respect is healthy, and you would not want a Manhattan type of project, which developed the atomic bomb, in the missile field?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not if I understand what you mean by the Manhattan type of project.

If you would break down the teams and organizations presently engaged in working for the various services, I know from the Army point of view it will be most disastrous to break up a very closely knit team of scientists we have working for us.

MR. LEVIERO: Well, General, the problem is different today, isn't it? The atomic bomb project could have --

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started from scratch, but now it's too late to do that; we already have three teams working, I hope -- without --

GENERAL TAYLOR: That's right --

MR. LEVIERO (continuing): -- duplication?

GENERAL TAYLOR: The Army has been in this ballistic missiles business for some time. We think we have considerable experience in it.

MR. SHEPLEY: But why, General, wouldn't the Army be working on, say, a 300-mile or 400-mile missile if the Air Force is working on a 1500-mile missile? I mean, why the Army and the Air Force both pick out this magic number of 1500 miles and say, "We are each going to build this missile"?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I don't know that it was picked out in that, in exactly those terms, but obviously if the Army has a capability to make the contribution to this important field, it should do so.

MR. SHEPLEY: General, perhaps the Air Force shouldn't be working on it. Why is the Air Force, then, working on it?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I can't adjudge all this, I can only speak for the Army.

MR. EVANS: General --

MR. NOVINS: Mr. Evans.

MR. EVANS: General, just one last question.

General, what chance is there ever of developing a hand rifle capable of firing an atomic bullet? Is that being

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researched?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That is beyond the ken of my eye.

MR. NOVINS: General, you have been described as a man who is very fluent in about eight languages. I am not sure whether you go along with that or not. Do you consider yourself fluent in those --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have often worried about that. I can assure you that is a product of my public information officer. I would hate to take an examination in that many.

MR. NOVINS: Let me assure you, sir, that in English, at least, you have been very fluent. We are very grateful to you for your answers, and thanks very much for coming here today to FACE THE NATION.

Thanks also to our panel of newsmen: James Shepley, of Time and Life; Tony Leviero of the New York Times; and Roland Evans of the New York Herald Tribune.

This is Stuart Novins.

We invite you to join us again next week at this time when we will be back with another edition of FACE THE NATION.

Our program today originated in Washington.

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