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3 27 JAN 1956

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1 Feb 56

STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RELATIVE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY BUDGET
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1957

I appreciate very much the privilege and opportunity of appearing before this distinguished committee today. My comments will overlap somewhat with those which Secretary Brucker has made. Such an overlap is not undesirable and indeed suggests the very close interlocking of our daily interests and activities.

The Budget requests which the Secretary has just outlined for you represent the cost of the Army's program for FY 1957. I should like to discuss in some detail the world military situation and its influence on the development of this program.

At the outset I would say a few words about the attitude of the Army toward its role in national defense. It regards itself as an indispensable member of the Army-Navy-Air Force team which, through a harmonious combination of mutually supporting capabilities of all Services, must develop the military strength necessary to deter war or to be victorious in war if the deterrent fails.



I would emphasize the importance which the Army attaches to the deterrent feature of its roles and missions. As time goes on and atomic weapons increase in power and destructiveness it becomes increasingly apparent that unrestricted nuclear war will be a total disaster for all participants. Consequently, every effort must be made to develop that visible strength in being which will convince any potential enemy that an aggression directed at the Free World will fail. This strength must be real and tangible--a facade of blueprints will not do.

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Moreover, this strength must be tri-dimensional on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. There can be no chinks in the armor of deterrence. Our over-all security against war requires that this armor be continuous and complete.

Before discussing the present ability of the Army to contribute to our national deterrent strength, we should first consider the enemy ground forces to which our Army, with those of our allies, is the counter-balance. For this purpose I should like to compare the strengths of the Free World with those of the Soviet Army, of Communist China and of the so-called satellites.

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In presenting this comparison, I would not suggest that the ratio of the number of enemy divisions to those of our side is a true indication of relative strength. There are too many

qualitative differences among these forces to validate so simple a method of comparison. I saw too much of the Communist Chinese in North Korea to be overly impressed by their numbers. It is a suggestive fact that by the time of the Armistice in Korea *22 US-UN-Korean divisions had beaten to a standstill 76 Communist divisions. This experience is indicative of the fact that US divisions and those organized on the US pattern have a much greater combat effectiveness. How much quality offsets a simple head count, I cannot say, but certainly the factor is a very important one. Quality results from such things as leadership, training, weapons, logistics, and--perhaps most important of all--the fighting heart. I believe that free men can be depended upon to maintain a superiority in these qualitative assets.

My comments on this subject may appear a debunking of the enemy's ground strength to the disadvantage of my presentation of the Army's needs to the Committee. To be perfectly clear, I would say that the enemy has formidable land forces which are a most serious threat, but I believe that the US and its allies have the capability, if they have the will, of producing ground forces able to counter the enemy divisions. There is no reason to say that we are hopelessly outnumbered and that our defense on the ground must be obtained indirectly from atomic superiority in the air. I am convinced that our Army, equipped with the weapons which

*12 ROK, 8 US, 1 Commonwealth, 1 Misc (Total strength - 932,500)

we are now developing and supported by well-trained allies, can maintain deterrent strength on the ground sufficient to hold the Communist Armies in check. It is essential to have such an Army if we are to have the required tri-dimensional deterrence of which I spoke.

Need for a Versatile Army

I would now like to discuss the need for versatility in the Army as it prepares itself for all types of future war. I am aware of the fact that many students of the world military situation regard only one type of war--the general nuclear onslaught--as being sufficiently important to cause much concern. I do not adhere to that view. I believe that as parity is approximated in numbers and types of atomic weapons between the East and West, every effort will be made on both sides to avoid the general atomic war. But, at the same time, I cannot believe that the Communist bloc will give up aggression as an instrument of policy. It appears probable that by pressure on the soft spots about the Soviet periphery through subversion, guerrilla action and coups d'etat; by small-scale wars; and the ever present threat of their large armies, the Communists will continue to seek an extension of their boundaries at the expense of the West. To fail to respond quickly and effectively to these types of warfare will permit the piecemeal loss of important areas belonging to friends and allies.

Such failure would create situations which might expand into the general war that all parties seek to avoid. Let us consider some of the trouble spots in the world today.

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As one considers this list of potential trouble spots, one is bound to reflect on the varied requirements for effective military action in these areas. Facts of geography, climate, ethnology, and politics would make every case a special problem. They have at least one characteristic in common--any military action therein will be essentially a land operation with a very limited role, if any, for heavy weapons of mass destruction. To deal with explosive situations in most of these areas, the first requirement is for reliable indigenous ground forces. We should be prepared to stiffen these forces with our own, if and when U. S. policy calls for active participation.

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It is the Army's view that, without derogating from the essential requirements of deterring general atomic war, the United States must be at the same time capable of deterring the small war, or of suppressing it quickly if it breaks out in areas such as I have indicated. Only after allocating the national resources necessary for those 3 purposes - of deterring general and local war and of winning local war -- should we proceed to satisfy the residual requirements for fighting a general war.

Army Roles and Missions

In consonance with the foregoing views on the likely nature of future conflicts, the Army has deduced the roles and missions for which it feels responsible as a member of the national security team.

First, the Army must act as a deterrent to general and local war by maintaining strong combat ready forces overseas.

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Second, the Army must maintain behind these overseas forces ready mobile emergency task forces, prepared in the case of general war to reinforce our deployments overseas; and in the case of local aggression elsewhere, to move rapidly to the ~~xxxxxxx~~ threatened area.

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Third, the Army must provide antiaircraft units for the air defense of the United States and our field forces. The growing strength and effectiveness of our NIKE units will cause an aggressor to count his probable losses before launching his planes in an atomic attack against the U.S. This defensive capability should continue to grow until it can give better assurance of reducing the air threat against us to an acceptable level of risk.

Finally, the Army should contribute to deterrence by continuing to develop the ground forces of our allies about the world. Situated along the Iron-Bamboo curtain they should be able, at a minimum, to insure the internal security of countries living under the guns of Communism and, as a maximum, to create strength on the ground to deter or delay a possible enemy attack.

The Army needs to be properly organized, equipped, and trained to perform the foregoing deterrent roles so that in conjunction with our sister services we will prevent general or local war. If these deterrent efforts fail, the Army must be prepared to perform its part in winning any war--great or small. For this contingency the Army must be backed by a Reserve structure capable of expanding into a complete mobilization of our war making ~~resources~~ resources.

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Army Capabilities

The foregoing represents the Army's concept of the duties it has to perform in deterring or winning war. Now with the indulgence of the Committee, I would like to enumerate the Army's capabilities to do these various tasks in FY 1957.

Overseas Forces

In Europe, a 5-division force will continue to be maintained in Germany. Its composition is being changed from the present 4

infantry and 1 armored division to one of 2 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 1 airborne division. The over-all numerical strength remains essentially unchanged.

In the Far East, we will continue to have 3 divisions, two of which will remain in Korea and one in Japan. The one in Japan will be at reduced strength. The regimental combat team on Okinawa will be inactivated prior to 1 July 1956, and replaced by elements of a Marine division.

There will be 1 division in Hawaii, a division minus in Alaska, and a regiment in the Caribbean.

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Quality of the Active Army

The quality of Army forces in Europe is excellent. The U.S. Army, Europe, is one of the finest peacetime fighting forces this country has ever had. In the Far East, there has been a progressive cutback and frequent shifting of Army forces. However, the Eighth Army, the U.S. component now a Corps of two divisions, remains the alert, combat-ready force it has always been. Furthermore, it sets the standard for the vastly larger South Korean Army which, alongside the Eighth Army, mans the main battle position.

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The Congressional action to improve the attractiveness of the military profession has paid great dividends thus far. The Regular Army reenlistment rate for FY 1956 to date is three times higher than the average rate for FY 1954. The proportion of Regulars now has reached approximately 61 per cent of total enlisted strength with a consequent reduction in the number of recruits who need to be trained annually.

Organization and Equipment

The capabilities of the Army are being increased through progress in organization and equipment. The present field Army is organized and designed for effective combat operations under conditions of either general war or small peripheral conflicts. The greatest change has been the advent of an Army delivery system for atomic weapons as a part of the field Army's weapons systems.

The Army has already developed and has in the hands of troops operational missiles--both defensive and offensive--of the general types needed in future war. Today, the CORPORAL guided missile, the HONEST JOHN rocket, and 280-mm

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heavy artillery with atomic

capability all provide for much of the increased firepower of the present field army.

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The Army is actively engaged in studies, tests and maneuvers to determine the best tactical organizations for future land warfare. The recent exercise SAGEBRUSH, involving 110,000 Army and 40,000 Air Force personnel was held largely for this purpose. We are of the opinion that the atomic battlefield will be broad and deep. Present and future organizations must be prepared to operate with wider dispersion. There is a requirement for greater flexibility to exploit the effects of our own atomic fire and to defend against that of the enemy. The trend is toward relatively small, self-contained units, with great firepower and mobility. This mobility must be internal, arising from ground and air transport organic to the Army; and external arising from the air and sea transport provided us by our sister Services.

Development of Indigenous Ground Forces

The Army continues to make progress in developing local forces in friendly countries. The magnitude of the Army effort in this field is rarely appreciated. Even this experienced committee may be surprised to know that we are today assisting foreign armies in developing over 200 divisions situated in 44 countries. Just as I would not overimpress the Committee with the number of Communist divisions facing us, I would be similarly cautious in evaluating the combat effectiveness of many of these indigenous units. However, the psychological effect of this program is probably as

important as the military. Many countries which would otherwise incline to neutralism are developing confidence in their ability to defend themselves. The presence of our U.S. soldiers on their streets is a reminder of our interest in their well being and our willingness to share in their problems.

Reserve Forces

I would like now to discuss our Reserve Forces. Because of the heavy losses likely in the initial stages of a general war, the active Army alone will not be sufficient for the task of fighting a general war. We must be able to generate new forces from the National Guard and the Reserve and to mobilize all of our national resources for a fight for survival.

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National Guard divisions and Army Reserve combat and service support units have been designated for early deployment. How much difficulty we will have mobilizing and deploying additional forces for general war is a matter for speculation. Enemy action may delay schedules and alter plans. These possibilities make it more essential than ever that the Army be well prepared to conduct an all-out war. I have often asked those who would plan ^{on} only/a short, quick nuclear war what they would think of a prize fighter who in preparing for a fight to the finish deliberately trained to fight only one round.

Mobilization Capability

In time of general mobilization the Army will depend for its equipment upon the war reserve in being and its mobilization production base.

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Conclusion

The Committee probably wishes to know my opinion of the adequacy of the Army's capabilities to discharge its essential roles and missions outlined above. My presentation has indicated that we have forces earmarked to perform all the principal missions for which the Army is accountable. Whether they are adequate to their respective tasks is largely a matter of judgment. It is difficult to make a definite determination, particularly in this new age when we are counting so heavily on weapons for the use of which there is little background of experience. If military considerations alone were to predominate, all of the Armed Forces undoubtedly would prefer greater resources than those made available to them. However, I believe that our present capabilities do permit us to perform our most important tasks at the moment.

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Our allies in Europe are not as strong as we had hoped, principally because of the delay in developing German divisions. However, the final obstacles seem to have been overcome, and we are on the way to developing that source of strength. On the other hand, we lost in ground strength through the transfer of a large portion of the French Army to North Africa.

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At home we are not developing our reserve forces at the rate which is required. The Army is properly grateful to Congress for the Reserve Forces Act. However, I would not disguise the fact that we have not found means thus far to attract volunteers in the numbers which are required. Since we have had only limited experience with the Bill, the Army is not yet prepared to propose any substantive revision of it.

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The Army is a flexible, versatile instrument of policy at the disposition of the Commander in Chief, the Congress, and the American people. It invites the scrutiny of this Committee to determine whether it is prepared to perform its indispensable role in our national defense.