

REMARKS BY
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
TO FIFTH GRADUATING CLASS
ARMY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT COURSE
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA -- FRIDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1955, 11:00 AM (EST)

GLAD OPPORTUNITY VISIT FORT LEE

ADDRESS 5TH GRAD. CLASS ARMY SUPPLY MGMT. CRSE.
ESTABLISHMENT THIS CRSE FRWD STEP;
FILLED GAP ARMY SCH SYST; LATTER EXTENSIVE, BUT
NEVER GIVEN ADEQ RECOGN TO LOG. AS
ART & SCIENCE IN MODERN WAR

I COME TO TESTIFY PERSONAL APPREC VITAL CONTRIB
BY YOU RESPONSIB FOR LOG SPT OF ARMY

IMPORTANCE OF LOG RESULT OF EXPER 8TH ARMY CMDR KOREA
FLD, MSHL, MONTGOMERY QUOTED: "WW II WAS 4/5 SUPPLY,
1/5 STRATEGY & TACTICS"

FOR KOREA, THIS PROPORTION IS UNDERSTATEMENT
ENTIRE KOREA, ELOQUENT TRIB TO G-4's & TECH SVCS
STORAGE & MAINT SUPP

TRANSP SYSTEM 3600 MI W/I 8TH ARMY

PIPELINES FOR MOTOR & FUEL OIL

PORTS FOR SEABORNE PIPELINES

REPLACEMENT CTRS

MAGNIF SYST EVAC HOSP, FINEST SURGEONS

ALL EVID QUALITY OF LOGSTCNS OF ARMY

SOLDIER, FRIED CHICKEN; GENERAL, DEPOTS; GRATEFUL TO
LOGSTCNS

I WARN EXPERTS, AVOID SWEEPING GENERALIZ FROM KOREA
DANGEROUS TO GENERALIZ FR NARROW EXP
ILLUSTRATE:

SOME DAY SOMEBODY USE KOREAN FACTORS FOR POT-
BELLIED STOVES

WON'T KNOW 45TH DIV IN MTNS 25-50 FT FR ENEMY
FILLED POT-B STOVES W/NAPALM

FIRED FR NAVY DEPTH-CHG LAUNCHER

HAVOC IN CHIN FOXHOLES

HOW MANY POT-B STOVES USED THUS, UNKNOWN
WHATEVER FACTOR QMG USES WILL BE ADULTERATED

IN MANY WAYS, LOGSTCL SYST SRVD 8TH A AMPLY, NOT WISELY
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS DOLLARS EQUIPM NOT NEEDED IN KOREA
ENJOYED COMFORTS, BUT LEVEL NOT SUSTAINABLE IN GEN WAR

PLETHORIC CONDITION NOT FAULT SUPPLY SVCS
SATISFY CUSTOMERS: VOCAL CMDRS, DMNDG MAXIMUM
SUPPLY MAN IN FLD TRIES MEET CUSTOMER'S WANTS

WHEN BATTLE JOINED, NOT FOR SPLY MAN QUESTION REQUIREMENTS
BUT HOPE THIS SCH PREPARES FOR LEVEL WHERE DEMANDS
CHALLENGED
WAR PLNG, PENTAGON, NEED LOGSTCNS WISE USE NATL
RESOURCES

THAT LEVEL, CUSTOMERS ARE (G-3's) STRAT & OPNL PLANNERS
LONG ARROWS, BIG MAPS, SEEK CONCURR FOR LOGISTICAL
SUPPORTABILITY
SEEK BRILLIANT MIL COMBN DESTR OF ENEMY
DIRECT FCS SHORTEST LINE TO ENEMY SOURCES
OVERLOOK SHIPPING, ARFLDS, PORTS, RR'S, & SIMILAR
LOGSTCL ASPECTS

REMEMBER WW II GP, PROPOSED INVADE BALKANS (SOFT BELLY)
INTRIGUING ARROW AT AXIS VITALS
LOST GLAMOUR WITH LOGSTCNS BLUE PENCILS: TONS, PORTS,
COMMUN

IN WAR PLNG, TRUE LOGSTCN NO DUTY TO "YES" CUSTOMER
MUST FORM TEAM W/OPNL PLNR; EFF USE RESOURCES FOR
MAX ON BATTLEFIELD

EFF. DEF PLNG: HARMONIOUS ADJ OF REQ G-3, AND CAPAB G-4
LITERARY FLAVOR, REFER TO COMBN DON Q. & SANCHO P.
DON Q. CHARGED WINDMILLS, RESCUE DAMSELS
PRACTICAL SANCHO HELD HIM BACK FR REPEATED FOLLIES
WE NEED SOME DON Q. THINKING IN MIL PLNG -- PROVIDED
IMAG KEEPS HEAT CONTROL

MUST HAVE HARD-HEADED SANCHO AT HAND, W/LOGSTCL FACTS OF
LIFE

NEED STRESS SIMPLICITY W LOGSTCL PLNG; NOT SPEC JARGON
IF YOU GET EAR OF SUPER, W/CONVICTION CAUSE DESERVES,
MUST EXPL. COMPLIC. THINGS IN SIMPLE, NON-TECH
LANGUAGE
DEV QUICK, ROUND-NUMBER ESTIM FOR PROMPT GENERAL-
MAGNITUDE REPLIES
LITTLE USE FOR OVER-METICULOUS LOGSTCN, SPENDS
MONTHS ON BUSINESS MCHNES, BEFORE FORECAST
GENERAL LIMITATIONS
MAY HAVE PLACE SOMEWHERE IN MIL BUSINESS, BUT BE
RIGHT IN GENERAL WAY INSTEAD OF DECIMAL-PT EXACT

YOU HELP ARMY ALSO W/SIMPLICITY IN SUPPLY SYSTEM
NEED 100 CENTS OF DEF FR EVERY DOLLAR
PRE-SUPPOSES REFINEMENT OF MIL RQMTS & REDUCT IN ITEMS
MUCH WORK ALREADY DONE: SINCE 1952,
TECH SVCS RED LINE ITEMS, FR OVER 1-1/2 MILLION,
UNDER 1 MILLION
ORD ELIM 2400 COMPONENTS TOOL SETS
QM ELIM 5300 GEN SUPPLY ITEMS
SIGNAL ELIM CAPACITORS FR 16, 000 TO 800

THESE SIGNIF IMPROV, YET FOLLOWING HAPPENED IN KOREA:
RAINY DAY, QM DEPOT SEOUL, POKED IN IMPRESSIVE STACKS
IN CORNER, PILE COVERED W/TARP; STRANGE PACKAGES
ASKED WHAT ARE THEY; DEPOT CMDT SAID TOBACCO STEMS
WHY? FOR PIGEONS IN BREEDING SEASONS
I WAS IMPRESSED W/FORESIGHT OF LOGSTCNS, BUT CONSIDER ELIM
TOB. STEMS

CONCLUSION, WELCOME YOU GRAD THIS SCH TO FAMILY OF LOGSTCNS
HOPE FAMILY GROWS IN NO., & ABILITY, & EXPER.
HOPE SANCHO P'S WILL GIVE SOUND ADVICE TO DON Q'S.

NEVER FORGET, YOU ARE ALL MBRS SAME TEAM
STRONG A ONLY IF SINGLE A, UNITED IN OBJ & TIES OF MEN
OF ARMS
NO SPEC., GUIDED CAREERS, MOS'S, OTHERS, SHOULD LOSE
SINGLE ARMY SENSE
ONLY BY COMB MANY TALENTS & TYPES EXPER, ARMY CAN DEV
EFFECTIVENESS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
I WISH ALL GOOD LUCK & FRUITFUL CAREER IN IMPORT FLD OF LOG.

-END-

QUESTION: Has the presence of United States troops served as an effective deterrent to Soviet expansive tactics or aggression?

ANSWER:

I can only repeat that no armed aggression has been initiated by the Communists within the range of the guns of the United States Army.

QUESTION: Are the Free World military alliances in strategic defenses strong enough^{now} to effectively halt aggressive moves?

ANSWER:

It is difficult to answer categorically "yes" or "no" to such a question. Certainly, the defenses of the Free World in recent years have become immeasurably stronger than they were at the time when we first discovered the true menace of Communism. With regard to the danger of general nuclear war, our strong atomic position exercises a great deterrent force. I am not entirely sure, however, [that] the armor of deterrence is without chinks. As Chief of Staff, I have often found occasion to express my concern over our relative inability to respond quickly and effectively to the eroding attacks of peripheral aggression. It behooves us of the United States to redouble our efforts to assure that our deterrent strength is complete and tri-dimensional -- in the air, on the sea, and on the land.

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TRANSCRIPT OF ADDRESS

BY

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Gen. Holbrook, Col. Allen, Ladies and Gentlemen:

*81st Graduating Class
Army Supply Management
Course
Ft. Lee, Va.
Dec. 16, 1956
11:00 a.m.*

I was very happy, indeed, to accept the invitation to come down this morning for graduation because it allowed me an opportunity to return to Ft. Lee for the first time since I returned as Chief of Staff. I remember a former visit here, and it is always a pleasure to see the signs of progress which two and a half to three years have brought to this post.

I was particularly glad to come down and talk to this group because I knew about the formation of this course some time ago; and I have talked to Gen. Palmer who, I believe, is regarded as the father of the project--and who is very proud of it, I might add--and also Gen. McGruder.

I looked over the prospectus--the syllabus--and I have discovered that we have been dealing in an area in which we have had many gaps in past Army instruction. In spite of our very expensive school in the finest military school system in the world, I never felt we came to grips, completely at least, with the logistic problem developed at an early date in officers' careers--the essential knowledge of logistics and supply management, which is so important to an efficient army.

I see before me many alumni of the Eighth Army and the operations in Korea. Certainly there we had an object lesson of a vital character of logistics in operating in an undeveloped area such as Korea was. I never moved about the Army area without thinking about it--logistic achievements of tech services and G-4's.

Field Marshal Montgomery was quoted as saying that World War II was four-fifths logistics and one-fifth strategy and tactics. I would say that in Korea that proportion is low in respect to recognizing the contribution of logistics

in that area. From the ports of the United States to Pusan and Inchon, the distribution system, the development of road maps, the development of pipe lines, of air fields, the construction of the battle position and the support of the battle position--all of that is a daily visual tribute to the work of our supply services and our logistics.

I have had occasion since returning to the Pentagon to warn our Deplog and our supply people against the danger of overgeneralization arising from the Korean experience. I am quite sure that Gen. Coleblazer and his officers have their squadrons out and are computing requirements for future operations in undeveloped areas and are making assumptions based upon what we learned in Korea.

Let me just illustrate the danger of that practice: In some dark shop in the Pentagon there are very earnest logistic officers who are looking over the consumption of the potbellied stove in Korea. They are making up the factors which will generate the requirements in the purchasing of the potbellied stoves in some other Korea, no doubt. They think they are being very scientific about this, but they don't know the facts that I know. They have forgotten, or never knew, that the Forty-fifth Division up in the fastness of Heartbreak Ridge was very close to the Chinese lines 25 or 50 yards sometimes. They were dug in on the other side of it and very hard to root out. Some bright lad discovered that by borrowing a depth charge launcher from the Navy and filling potbellied stoves with napalm you could really make it tough on the Chinese. How many potbellied stoves the Forty-fifth Division lopped across at the enemy I will never know.

Again, referring to our Korean experience, I was tremendously impressed with what we were able to do for the Eighth Army in terms of service rendered by the technical services. No Army was ever so well supplied or cared for in the field.

On the other hand, I could never look at what we did without wondering, can we ever afford this in global war? And I think the answer is "no." But certainly from the soldier on the front line with his ice cream and fried chicken to the general whose depots were always replenished in time for the operation we all had a debt of gratitude to pay to the technical services.

Now in the field in a place like Korea, the supply man's job is relatively easy although terribly hard. It is easy in the sense that all he has to do is satisfy the customer and the customer is always a very vocal commander asking a lot for his men. Now it is entirely appropriate to that commander to consider that the welfare and comfort of his men is the most important thing in the world. If he did not, he would not be a proper commander.

It is also appropriate to the supply man to say, "I am going to serve the troops and roll up my sleeves and give the commanders what they ask for." However, gentlemen, you, I hope, are receiving training which is a few levels above that attitude that the customer must be served and the customer is always right. I say this with this meaning: That certainly at the Pentagon level, and at high supply levels, we are greatly in need of sound logistical advice that will temper the unreasonable requirements of our using services. As a line soldier, I know myself how I frequently looked at a piece of equipment and said, "I want that," without any concern with what having that request filled would have upon the Army in general. We all have to have a growing feeling of responsibility for the proper use of our national assets, regardless of how attractive any bit of equipment or some new gadget in our supply system may appear. We must have a method which really relates that new requirement to the requirements of the Army recognizing that we will always have a finite number of dollars year after year to support our Army. Many things, no matter how good in themselves, we simply cannot afford. It is

that kind of comment, that kind of staff advice which we need desperately in our areas--set up requirements in the Pentagon and in similar senior staffs. I hope that you in your course here have kept that concept of showing responsibility in using our military assets to the best avail, that in the course of your service as logisticians and supply experts you will quickly be brought in contact with another kind of staff officer who is the operational man, the G-3 type.

We will never attain our maximum readiness unless the G-3 and G-4 and their supporting advisers work closely together so that we don't let the big R's of the G-3 on the map run away from the hard realities of logistics.

You all recall during World War II the battle that went on at high international levels over the best method of invading Europe. There was a Churchillian school of invading through the Balkans the soft belly of the Nazi vitals, the most attractive plan to the operational people because that area was on the straightest line to the vitals of the enemy. But it ceased to be attractive when the blue pencil of the logisticians were brought out, who computed boat capacity, rail capacity, tonnages and and all the hard facts, which every operator must recognize if he is going to have a successful campaign.

If I were to introduce a literary flavor to my remarks, I would say that this term of G-3 and G-4 of operational planner and logistic planner is something like the combination of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Cervantes has described for us. We have to have the Don Quixote who will tilt at wind-mills, ready to charge anything. But we also need Sancho Panza to hang on to the iron coat/tails of the knight to hold him back from folly.

I look to this school to produce the type of things which will inject the prudence of calculated wisdom of Sancho Panza into these Quixotic

ideas sometimes we develop in G-3 circles. I speak of G-3's that way because I have been one. I speak of the dangers of self-intoxication that can arise in our planning.

I would urge you, also, gentlemen, to look for simplicity in your business. I appreciate the kind words of Col. Allen about my understanding of logistic briefings. That is because I didn't ask any questions. The fact is that you have a most complicated job. All of you do--every representative of the tech services. And if you are going to be heard and understood and if your advice is going to carry weight in the councils where it should carry weight, you are going to have to learn to state your case simply and in a straightforward manner. Quite recently I put a second star on an officer of the tech service, and I remembered at the time that the reasons that he got recognition was the fact that at the time of the ammunition controversy he was the one man I could find who could speak and could explain so that I could understand what the situation was; and I thought he was definitely entitled to a promotion. You have to learn in this logistics business to produce a broad estimate rapidly. We are constantly in our planning being held up sometimes to the point that we don't get the right answer in time by the delay in getting logistical advice. I am constantly urging--as I did in the Eighth Army and I am now doing in the Pentagon--urging a development of round-numbers type of accuracy--broad logistic factors which will allow us a quick estimate of practicalities to be applied to plans before we get deeply into them.

In the past, I often heard the fact that we are so meticulous in our computations and our checking ledger, staff officers literally spend nights on estimates when really what we are looking for are round-numbers accuracy rather than that meticulous business-machine type of production and data that sometimes we seem to prefer.

So I hope you will all carry back to your jobs this idea: Can we simplify the story so that we always know the essentials and let the details more or less come along?

You can help the Army, also, by simplicity in the supply system itself. We have too many things in the Army, many of which I am sure we can do without. I used to look down the valleys in Korea and look at the equipment stacked up not in use (and sometimes almost never in use) and reflect on the fact that, at least for that war, we took there hundreds of millions of dollars in equipment 6,000 miles from home--equipment which we did not need because we had too many things on our supply list. Now we are aware that the technical services have been making great progress in this particular field according to my information since 1952, at which time we had line items of over one and a half million. We are now down to under a million. Well, that's fine; but that's still a lot. Ordnance, I am told, has eliminated 2,400 component tool sets. The Quartermaster has eliminated some 5,300 general supply items. Signal Corps has eliminated reduced capacities from 16,000 to 800. That is the proper trend, but we must continue always in the direction of simplicity. This illustrates again that even now there is room for simplifying our supply requirements.

Let me tell you another story from Korea and it refers to the Quartermaster:

One rainy day when I could not even helicopter out of Seoul I started to wander about some of the depots and went into the great Quartermaster depot in Seoul, which is always a very impressive place where great stocks of equipment are always carefully preserved and accounted for. In one corner I saw a tarpaulin over some strange objects and I went over and prowled into it. Here I found bags of something which I could not understand, and I asked the commander, "What is it?"

He said, "These are tobacco stems."

I said, "To what do we apply tobacco stems?"

He said, "Well you see our homing pigeons, just before the mating season, like to have tobacco stems with which to line their nests. We find they are happiest under those conditions."

I can't tell you how impressed I was by that evidence of logistic far-sightedness on the part of the Quartermaster Depot. I really went back and congratulated the Army Quartermaster. And I said, "Get rid of those tobacco stems fast before somebody else sees them!"

And I am sure we have other types of equipment in supplies just about like tobacco stems in our vast system, and let's get them out!

Well, gentlemen, in conclusion let me welcome you to the family of supply experts and logisticians. It is a family the welfare of which is tremendously important to the Army. I would just say, however, that sometimes I worry about the wheels within wheels--the societies within societies in the Army. Are guided careers of specialists and MOS training, etc., distinctive ways of slicing the Army into small bits? I worry about it because I want every man in uniform and out of uniform who belongs to the Army to feel an awareness that we are all in it, and everything we do must contribute to the unity of its success. So though branding you with the proud title as logistician, remember that first you are a soldier. And you, as civilians, who have given your lives to the Army, are just as professional soldiers as I am. We all serve one army and not several. This field in which you are going to operate is one of great value to the Army. We will never be better than the efficiency with which we use our resources given to us.

You must give the commander the advice. You must speak up and give the implications of operational decisions. If we can then combine the advice of the imaginative, creative Don Quixote, who will think of the ideal campaign, with the counsel of the prudent Sancho, who will fill in the hard logistic

facts of life, nothing can possibly fail.

So I congratulate you all. I wish you all success in this important field.

REMARKS BY
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
TO FIFTH GRADUATING CLASS
ARMY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT COURSE
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1955 -- FORT LEE, VIRGINIA, 11:00 AM (EST)

I AM GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT
FORT LEE AND ADDRESS THE FIFTH GRADUATING CLASS OF THE
ARMY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT COURSE. I CONSIDER THAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COURSE WAS A FORWARD STEP WHICH
FILLED A GAP IN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM. EXTENSIVE AS
THE LATTER IS, I DON'T FEEL THAT WE HAVE EVER GIVEN AMPLE
RECOGNITION TO THE DECISIVE IMPORTANCE OF LOGISTICS AS
BOTH AN ART AND A SCIENCE IN THE CONDUCT OF MODERN
WAR. I HAVE COME TODAY IN ORDER THAT I MIGHT TESTIFY
TO MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION OF THE VITAL CONTRIBUTION
TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY ON THE PART OF YOU WHO ARE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMY.

I TAKE THIS VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF LOGISTICS
LARGELY BECAUSE OF MY EXPERIENCE AS EIGHTH ARMY
COMMANDER IN KOREA. FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY HAS

BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WORLD WAR II WAS FOUR-FIFTHS
SUPPLY AND ONE-FIFTH STRATEGY AND TACTICS. I WOULD
SAY THAT FOR THE WAR IN KOREA SUCH A PROPORTION IS
PROBABLY AN UNDER-STATEMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF
LOGISTICIANS. EVERYWHERE IN THE ENTIRE KOREAN THEATER
THERE WAS ELOQUENT TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF THE G-4'S AND
THE TECHNICAL SERVICES. THE STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE
OF SUPPLIES, THEIR TRANSPORTATION OVER A MILITARY ROAD
NET BUILT BY THE ENGINEERS WHICH AMOUNTED TO SOME 3600
MILES WITHIN THE EIGHTH ARMY AREA ALONE -- THE PIPELINE
SYSTEMS WHICH DISTRIBUTED THE MOTOR AND FUEL OIL -- THE
PORTS WHICH RECEIVED THE CONTENTS OF THE SEABORNE
PIPELINE OF SUPPLY -- THE REPLACEMENT CENTERS WHICH
ACCOMMODATED THE SOLDIERS COMING AND GOING -- THE
MAGNIFICENT SYSTEM OF EVACUATION HOSPITALS MANNED BY

SOME OF THE FINEST SURGEONS OF THE WORLD -- ALL OF THESE FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS GAVE DAILY VISUAL EVIDENCE OF THE QUALITY OF THE LOGISTICIANS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY. FROM THE SOLDIER EATING FRIED CHICKEN ON THE MAIN BATTLE POSITION TO THE GENERAL SUPPORTED BY EVER-REPLENISHED DEPOTS IN HIS REAR, EVERY MEMBER OF THE EIGHTH ARMY HAD REASON TO BE ETERNALLY GRATEFUL TO THE LOGISTICIANS.

I WOULD WARN THE EXPERTS, HOWEVER, TO AVOID SWEEPING GENERALIZATIONS DERIVED FROM KOREAN EXPERIENCE, FOR GENERALIZATION DERIVED FROM A NARROW BASE OF EXPERIENCE IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WHAT I MEAN. SOME DAY THE SUPPLY PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING POT-BELLIED TENT STOVES ARE GOING TO ADD UP THE CONSUMPTION IN KOREA AND ESTABLISH CERTAIN FACTORS

WHICH WILL GUIDE THEM IN PROCURING POT-BELLIED STOVES
FOR SOME OTHER WAR. BUT WHEN THEY DO SO, THEY WILL
NOT BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS: THE 45TH INFANTRY
DIVISION IN THE MOUNTAIN FASTNESS OF HEARTBREAK RIDGE
WAS WITHIN 25 TO 50 FEET OF THE CHINESE ENEMY. THE
SOLDIERS DISCOVERED THAT BY FILLING POT-BELLIED STOVES
WITH NAPALM AND FIRING THE STOVES FROM A NAVY DEPTH-
CHARGE LAUNCHER THEY COULD CREATE HAVOC IN CHINESE
FOXHOLES INVULNERABLE TO OTHER WEAPONS. HOW MANY
OF THESE POT-BELLIED STOVES THEY LOBBED OVER AT THE
CHINESE TO THE PERMANENT DETRIMENT OF THE THEATER
SUPPLY POSITION IN THESE STOVES, I SHALL NEVER KNOW; BUT
I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WHATEVER FACTOR THE QUARTERMASTER
GENERAL ESTABLISHES FOR THIS ITEM WILL BE ADULTERATED BY
THIS USE OF STOVES WHICH WAS NEVER ANTICIPATED BY THE
PROCURING AGENCY.

IN MANY WAYS THE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM IN KOREA SERVED THE EIGHTH ARMY MORE AMPLY THAN WISELY. I NEVER HELICOPTERED OVER THE VALLEYS BEHIND THE MAIN BATTLE POSITION WITHOUT REFLECTING ABOUT THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF EQUIPMENT TAKEN TO KOREA WHICH WE REALLY DID NOT NEED. WHILE ADMIRING AND REJOICING OVER THE COMFORTS PROVIDED THE TROOPS, ONE COULD NOT HELP FEELING THAT THE ARMY WAS BEING SERVED AT A LEVEL WHICH COULD NEVER BE SUSTAINED IN TIME OF GENERAL WAR.

THIS PLETHORIC CONDITION WAS NOT, OF COURSE, THE FAULT OF THE SUPPLY SERVICES. THE LATTER PROPERLY FEEL THAT THEY ARE TO SATISFY THE CUSTOMERS, AND THE CUSTOMERS ARE VOCAL COMMANDERS ALWAYS DEMANDING THE MAXIMUM IN TERMS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, AND COMFORT FOR THEIR UNITS. A SUPPLY MAN IN THE FIELD RECEIVES

THESE REQUESTS WITHOUT QUESTION, ROLLS UP HIS SLEEVES,
AND DOES HIS UTMOST TO OBTAIN WHAT THE CUSTOMER WANTS.

WHEN THE CARDS ARE DOWN AND BATTLE IS JOINED, IT
IS NOT FOR THE SUPPLY OFFICER IN THE FIELD TO QUESTION
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS; BUT I HOPE
THAT THIS SCHOOL IS PREPARING YOU FOR LOGISTIC SERVICE AT
A HIGHER LEVEL WHERE CUSTOMER DEMAND DOES NOT GO
UNCHALLENGED. IT IS IN WAR PLANNING AT PENTAGON LEVEL
THAT WE VITALLY NEED THE REINFORCEMENT OF LOGISTICIANS
WHO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR A WISE AND EFFECTIVE USE
OF THE NATIONAL RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY.

AT THAT LEVEL THE SO-CALLED CUSTOMERS ARE THE
WAR PLANNERS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
PLANNING. THEY -- USUALLY G-3'S -- WILL DRAW LONG
ARROWS ON BIG MAPS AND ASK CONCURRENCES FROM YOU AS TO

THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORTABILITY OF THEIR IDEAS. THE
PLANNERS WILL SEEK A BRILLIANT MILITARY COMBINATION FOR
THE QUICK DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. THEY WILL WANT TO
DIRECT OUR FORCES ON THE SHORTEST LINE TO THE SOURCE OF
THE ENEMY'S RESISTANCE. THEY WILL BE PRONE TO OVERLOOK
SUCH QUESTIONS AS SHIPPING, AIRFIELDS, PORTS, RAILROADS,
AND SIMILAR LOGISTICAL ASPECTS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT IF THE ARROWS ON THE MAP ARE TO BECOME SUCCESSFUL
MILITARY OPERATIONS.

I REMEMBER IN WORLD WAR II A GROUP WHO CONSTANTLY
PROPOSED TO INVADE THE CONTINENT BY THE WAY OF THE "SOFT
BELLY" OF THE BALKANS. THEIR PARTICULAR PLANNING ARROW
WAS MOST INTRIGUING WHEN POINTED AT THE VITALS OF THE
AXIS FORCES ON THE CONTINENT, BUT THEIR PLAN LOST MUCH OF
ITS GLAMOUR WHEN THE BLUE PENCILS OF THE LOGISTICIANS

COMPARED TONS OF NECESSARY SUPPLY TO AVAILABILITY OF
PORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS.

IN THIS ENVIRONMENT OF WAR PLANNING, THE TRUE
LOGISTICIAN NO LONGER HAS THE DUTY OF SAYING "YES" TO
THE CUSTOMER. HE MUST FORM A TEAM WITH THE OPERATIONAL
PLANNER, AND WITH HIM DETERMINE THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE
OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM RESULTS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD.

EFFECTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING DEPENDS UPON THE
HARMONIOUS ADJUSTMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF G-3 AND
THE CAPABILITIES OF G-4. IF I WISHED TO GIVE A LITERARY
FLAVOR TO THIS TALK, I WOULD REFER TO THE COMBINATION
AS THAT OF DON QUIXOTE AND SANCHO PANZA. YOU REMEMBER
HOW DON QUIXOTE WISHED TO CHARGE WINDMILLS AND RESCUE
DAMSELS IN DISTRESS TO THE CONSTERNATION OF HIS COMPANION,

THE PRACTICAL SÁNCHO, WHO CLUNG TO THE KNIGHT'S IRON
COAT TAILS AND HELD HIM BACK FROM REPEATED FOLLIES.
WE NEED SOME OF THE DON-QUIXOTE TYPE OF THINKING IN OUR
MILITARY PLANNING -- PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT THE
IMAGINATION OF THE KNIGHT DOES NOT LOSE ITS HEAT CONTROL.
IN ANY CASE, WE MUST HAVE THE HARD-HEADED SANCHO AT
HAND, CAPABLE OF EXPRESSING THE LOGISTICAL FACTS OF LIFE
IN SUCH CLEAR TERMS THAT EVEN THE MOST FERVENT OPERATIONAL
QUIXOTE WILL HEAR AND UNDERSTAND.

I OFTEN FEEL THE NEED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF
SIMPLICITY IN OUR LOGISTIC PLANNING. IT IS A FIELD IN
WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZED JARGON IS PARTICULARLY
EASY. IF YOU GENTLEMEN ARE TO OBTAIN THE EAR OF YOUR
SUPERIORS AND CARRY THE CONVICTION WHICH THE IMPORTANCE
OF YOUR CAUSE DESERVES, YOU MUST LEARN HOW TO EXPLAIN

COMPLICATED THINGS IN SIMPLE, NON-TECHNICAL LANGUAGE.
YOU WILL NEED TO DEVELOP QUICK, ROUND NUMBER ESTIMATES
IN ORDER TO GIVE PROMPT REPLIES OF GENERAL MAGNITUDE
TO COMMANDERS SEEKING YOUR VIEWS. THERE IS LITTLE USE
FOR THE OVER-METICULOUS LOGISTICIAN WHO MUST SPEND
MONTHS OVER BUSINESS MACHINES BEFORE FORECASTING GENERAL
LIMITATIONS TO OPERATIONAL PLANNERS. THIS KIND OF
ACCURACY MAY HAVE ITS PLACE SOMEWHERE IN OUR MILITARY
BUSINESS, BUT I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU TO BE RIGHT IN A
GENERAL WAY AT THE COST OF A DECIMAL-POINT, TIME-CONSUMING
EXACTITUDE.

YOU WILL HELP OUR ARMY BUSINESS IF YOU BRING
SIMPLICITY NOT ONLY INTO YOUR PLANNING AND ESTIMATES BUT
ALSO INTO THE SUPPLY SYSTEM ITSELF. WE SIMPLY CANNOT
SPEND A DOLLAR WHICH DOES NOT BRING 100 CENTS OF EFFECTIVE

DEFENSE. THIS ECONOMY OF MEANS PRE-SUPPOSES A
REFINEMENT OF OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND A REDUCTION
IN THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ITEMS IN OUR SUPPLY SYSTEM.
I AM AWARE THAT MUCH WORK HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD
THIS END. I AM INFORMED THAT SINCE 1952 OUR TECHNICAL
SERVICES HAVE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS IN THE
ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM FROM MORE THAN 1-1/2 MILLION DOWN
TO LESS THAN 1 MILLION. AS A PART OF THIS PROJECT,
ORDNANCE HAS ELIMINATED 2400 DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN
TOOL SETS AND KITS; THE QUARTERMASTER HAS ELIMINATED
5300 ITEMS IN GENERAL SUPPLY; AND THE SIGNAL CORPS HAS
REDUCED CAPACITORS FROM 16,000 TO 800. THESE ARE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS, BUT NONETHELESS IT WAS
STILL POSSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT TO OCCUR IN
KOREA.

ONE RAINY DAY, I DROPPED INTO THE BIG QM DEPOT
IN SEOUL AND POKED AROUND AMONG THE IMPRESSIVE STACKS
OF SUPPLIES IN THE DEPOT. IN ONE CORNER I FOUND A PILE
OF OBJECTS COVERED BY A TARPAULIN, WHICH WHEN I EXAMINED
CLOSER, REVEALED STRANGE, PACKAGED OBJECTS WHICH I
COULD NOT IDENTIFY. I TURNED TO THE DEPOT COMMANDER
AND INQUIRED WHAT THEY WERE. I WAS INFORMED THAT
THEY WERE TOBACCO STEMS. "WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE
HAVE TOBACCO STEMS?," I INQUIRED. "YOU SEE," SAID THE
DEPOT COMMANDER, "THEY ARE FOR THE HOMING PIGEONS.
IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THEY ARE MOST CONTENTED DURING THE
BREEDING SEASON IF THEY HAVE TOBACCO STEMS TO MAKE THEIR
NESTS WITH BEFORE IT STARTS. HENCE, THE ARRIVAL FROM
THE STATES OF TOBACCO STEMS." I CANNOT TELL YOU HOW
IMPRESSED I WAS WITH THE FORESIGHT OF THE LOGISTICIANS IN

ANTICIPATING THE MATING URGE OF THE HOMING PIGEON, AND
I AM SURE THAT THE PIGEONS ARE GRATEFUL FOR THIS
CONSIDERATION. I DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT WE MIGHT
CONSIDER TOBACCO STEMS FOR ELIMINATION FROM OUR LIST
OF REQUIREMENTS IN THE INTEREST OF SUPPLY SIMPLICITY.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME WELCOME YOU AS GRADUATES
OF THIS SCHOOL TO THE FAMILY OF LOGISTICIANS. I HOPE THAT
FAMILY WILL GROW IN NUMBER, AS WELL AS IN ABILITY AND
EXPERIENCE. I HOPE THAT IN THE CHARACTER OF SANCHO
PANZAS YOU WILL GIVE SOUND ADVICE TO THE DON QUIXOTES
WHOSE ENTHUSIASM YOU MUST TEMPER.

BUT NEVER FORGET THAT YOU ARE ALL MEMBERS OF
THE SAME TEAM. OUR ARMY CAN ONLY BE STRONG IF IT IS
A SINGLE ARMY, UNITED IN OBJECTIVES AND BOUND TOGETHER
BY THE TIES OF FRATERNITY WHICH UNITE MEN OF ARMS.

SPECIALTIES, GUIDED CAREERS, MOS'S, AND OTHER DISTINCTIVE
DEVICES MUST NEVER CAUSE US TO LOSE THE SENSE OF BELONGING
TO A SINGLE ARMY. IT IS BY THE COMBINATION OF MANY
TALENTS AND MANY TYPES OF EXPERIENCE THAT THE ARMY CAN
DEVELOP THE EFFECTIVENESS NECESSARY TO SERVE THE ENDS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

I WISH ALL OF YOU GOOD LUCK AND A FRUITFUL CAREER
IN THE IMPORTANT FIELD OF LOGISTICS.

-END-