

*Supp Spots*  
*6x6*  
*RFA*  
*Recruit training*  
*Speed of deploy -*  
*Double duty of Reserve*

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY  
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON  
APPROPRIATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
RELATIVE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY BUDGET  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1957

*9 May 56*

*Compensation*  
*Red up of Korea*  
*6x6*  
*RFA*  
*Naval ops*  
*Professionals*

I AM MOST HAPPY TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS  
DISTINGUISHED COMMITTEE FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE  
BECOMING CHIEF OF STAFF. I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO  
EXTEND THE REMARKS MADE BY SECRETARY BRUCKER ON  
THE ARMY FY 1957 BUDGET, STRESSING THE OPERATIONAL  
CAPABILITIES IMPLICIT IN THIS BUDGET. IF I DUPLICATE  
SOME OF HIS REMARKS, SUCH DUPLICATION RESULTS FROM  
THE INEVITABLE, AND INDEED HIGHLY DESIRABLE ENMESHING  
OF THE DUTIES AND INTERESTS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE  
ARMY AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

THE BUDGET REQUESTS WHICH THE SECRETARY HAS  
JUST OUTLINED FOR YOU REPRESENT THE COST OF THE  
ARMY'S PROGRAM FOR FY 1957. AS THIS PROGRAM IS  
DERIVED FROM EVALUATION OF THE WORLD SITUATION

and the role

AND THE ROLE WHICH THE ARMY MAY BE CALLED UPON TO  
PLAY, I SHOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE SOME OF THESE BACKGROUND  
CONSIDERATIONS WHICH UNDERLIE OUR FINANCIAL REQUEST.

AT THE OUTSET I WOULD SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT  
THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARMY TOWARD ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL  
DEFENSE. IT REGARDS ITSELF AS AN INDISPENSABLE  
MEMBER OF THE ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE TEAM WHICH,  
THROUGH A HARMONIOUS COMBINATION OF MUTUALLY SUP-  
PORTING CAPABILITIES OF ALL SERVICES, MUST DEVELOP THE  
MILITARY STRENGTH NECESSARY TO DETER WAR OR TO BE  
VICTORIOUS IN WAR IF THE DETERRENT FAILS.

I WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE  
ARMY ATTACHES TO THE DETERRENT FEATURE OF ITS  
ROLES AND MISSIONS. AS TIME GOES ON AND ATOMIC

WEAPONS INCREASE IN POWER AND DESTRUCTIVENESS, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT UNRESTRICTED NUCLEAR WAR WILL BE A TOTAL DISASTER FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. CONSEQUENTLY, EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO DEVELOP THAT VISIBLE STRENGTH IN BEING WHICH WILL CONVINCED ANY POTENTIAL ENEMY THAT AN AGGRESSION DIRECTED AT THE FREE WORLD WILL FAIL. THIS STRENGTH MUST BE REAL AND TANGIBLE -- A FACADE OF BLUE-PRINTS WILL NOT DO.

MOREOVER, THIS STRENGTH MUST BE TRI-DIMENSIONAL -- ON THE GROUND, ON THE SEA, AND IN THE AIR. THERE MUST BE ADEQUACY OF STRENGTH IN ALL THREE DIMENSIONS -- PREPONDERANT POWER IN ONE WILL NOT COMPENSATE FOR A VACUUM IN ANOTHER. FOR EXAMPLE, IN SPITE OF OUR SUPERIORITY FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II ON THE SEA AND IN

the air,

THE AIR, COUPLED WITH A VIRTUAL MONOPOLY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, OUR MILITARY POSTURE DID NOT DETER HOSTILITIES IN SUCH PLACES AS GREECE, KOREA, AND VIETNAM. THE NEED FOR TRI-DIMENSIONAL DETERRENCE WOULD SEEM TO INCREASE AS MUTUAL PARITY IN THE ATOMIC AIR CAPABILITY IS ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OF OUR PRESENTLY DIVIDED WORLD.

BEFORE DISCUSSING THE PRESENT ABILITY OF THE ARMY TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR NATIONAL DETERRENT STRENGTH, WE SHOULD FIRST CONSIDER THE GROUND FORCES TO WHICH OUR ARMY, WITH THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, OFFERS A COUNTER-BALANCE.

COMMUNIST BLOC LAND FORCES

GROUND FORCES CONSTITUTE THE PREDOMINANT ELEMENT OF THE COMMUNIST MILITARY STRENGTH. AS IS WELL KNOWN,

THE SOVIET LAND FORCES ARE THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE  
WORLD TODAY. SINCE 1950, THEY HAVE RE-EQUIPPED THEIR  
ARMY WITH A COMPLETE FAMILY OF MODERN WEAPONS AND  
EQUIPMENT AND CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IT IN AN EXCELLENT  
STATE OF COMBAT READINESS. TRAINING, INCLUDING  
ATOMIC WARFARE TRAINING, IS APPARENTLY FIRST CLASS.  
KNOWN DISPOSITIONS INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET ARMY IS  
READY TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR WAR WITH LITTLE WARNING.

SATELLITE ARMIES IN EUROPE AND THE CHINESE ARMY  
IN ASIA ARE ALSO UNDERGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS  
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE U.S.S.R. WHILE THE RATE OF  
PROGRESS IS SOMEWHAT SLOWER, THEY REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT  
MILITARY STRENGTH.

THE COMBINED COMMUNIST ARMIES PRESENT A  
FORMIDABLE THREAT AND OUTNUMBER THE ALLIED FORCES

of the Free World

OF THE FREE WORLD BY A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN. HOWEVER, —  
I WOULD NOT SUGGEST THAT NUMBERS ALONE ARE A TRUE  
INDICATION OF RELATIVE STRENGTH. THERE ARE TOO  
MANY QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES AMONG THESE FORCES TO  
VALIDATE SO SIMPLE A METHOD OF COMPARISON. I SAW  
TOO MUCH OF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE IN NORTH KOREA  
TO BE OVERLY IMPRESSED BY THEIR NUMBERS. IT IS A  
SUGGESTIVE FACT THAT BY THE TIME OF THE ARMISTICE IN  
KOREA \*22 U.S. -UN-KOREAN DIVISIONS HAD BEATEN TO A  
STANDSTILL 76 COMMUNIST DIVISIONS. THIS EXPERIENCE  
IS INDICATIVE OF THE FACT THAT U.S. DIVISIONS AND THOSE  
ORGANIZED ON THE U.S. PATTERN HAVE A GREATER COMBAT  
EFFECTIVENESS. HOW MUCH QUALITY OFFSETS A SIMPLE  
HEAD COUNT I CANNOT SAY, BUT CERTAINLY THE FACTOR

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\* 12 ROK, 8 US, 1 Commonwealth, 1 Misc (Total Strength - 932, 500)

IS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE. . . . QUALITY RESULTS FROM SUCH THINGS AS LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, WEAPONS, LOGISTICS, AND -- PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL -- THE FIGHTING HEART. . . . I BELIEVE THAT FREE MEN CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO MAINTAIN A SUPERIORITY IN THOSE QUALITATIVE ASSETS.

MY COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT MAY APPEAR A DEBUNKING OF THE ENEMY'S GROUND STRENGTH TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF MY PRESENTATION OF THE ARMY'S NEEDS TO THE COMMITTEE. . . . TO BE PERFECTLY CLEAR, I WOULD SAY THAT THE ENEMY HAS FORMIDABLE LAND FORCES WHICH ARE A MOST SERIOUS THREAT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY, IF THEY HAVE THE WILL, OF PRODUCING GROUND FORCES ABLE TO COUNTER THOSE OF THE ENEMY. . . . THERE IS NO REASON TO SAY THAT WE ARE HOPELESSLY

outnumbered

OUTNUMBERED AND THAT OUR DEFENSE ON THE GROUND  
MUST BE OBTAINED INDIRECTLY FROM ATOMIC SUPERIORITY  
IN THE AIR. SUCH LANGUAGE SUGGESTS THAT WHEREVER  
AND HOWEVER CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND, WE MUST GIVE  
WAY OR RESORT TO ATOMIC BOMBING. I AM CONVINCED  
THAT OUR ARMY, SUPPORTED BY WELL-TRAINED ALLIES  
AND ALL THE WEAPONS NOW AVAILABLE OR BEING DEVELOPED,  
CAN MAINTAIN DETERRENT STRENGTH ON THE GROUND  
SUFFICIENT TO DISCOURAGE OR TO DEFEAT AGGRESSION BY  
THE COMMUNIST ARMIES. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE SUCH  
AN ARMY IF WE ARE TO HAVE THE REQUIRED TRI-DIMENSIONAL  
DETERRENCE OF WHICH I SPOKE.

NEED FOR A VERSATILE ARMY

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO DISCUSS THE NEED FOR  
VERSATILITY IN THE ARMY AS IT PREPARES ITSELF FOR ALL

TYPES OF FUTURE WARREN. I AM AWARE OF THE FACT THAT  
MANY PEOPLE TODAY THINK ONLY IN TERMS OF ONE TYPE OF  
WAR -- THE GENERAL NUCLEAR ONSLAUGHT ON THE FIRST DAY  
OF WAR. THE PROBLEM IS NOT THAT SIMPLE. ALTHOUGH  
THIS KIND OF WAR CAN NEVER BE RULED OUT, I BELIEVE THAT  
AS PARITY IS APPROXIMATED IN NUMBERS AND TYPES OF HIGH-  
YIELD ATOMIC WEAPONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST, EVERY  
EFFORT WILL BE MADE ON BOTH SIDES TO AVOID THE GENERAL  
ATOMIC WAR. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW  
THAT THE COMMUNIST BLOC WILL GIVE UP AGGRESSION AS AN  
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT BY  
PRESSURE ON THE SOFT SPOTS ABOUT THE SOVIET PERIPHERY  
EMPLOYING THE TECHNIQUES OF SUBVERSION, GUERRILLA  
ACTION AND THE GOUP D'ETAT, BY INTIMIDATION ARISING FROM  
THE EVER PRESENT THREAT OF THEIR LARGE ARMIES, THE

Communists

COMMUNISTS WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK AN EXTENSION OF  
THEIR INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE WEST. TO  
FAIL TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO THESE  
TYPES OF WARFARE WILL PERMIT THE PIECEMEAL LOSS OF  
IMPORTANT AREAS BELONGING TO FRIENDS AND ALLIES. SUCH  
A FAILURE WOULD CREATE SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT EXPAND  
INTO THE GENERAL WAR THAT ALL PARTIES SEEK TO AVOID.

AS ONE CONSIDERS THE POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS  
IN THE WORLD TODAY, SUCH AS, THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH  
VIETNAM, TAIWAN AND KOREA, ONE IS BOUND TO REFLECT ON  
THE VARIED REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE MILITARY ACTION  
IN THESE AREAS. FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE, ETHNOLOGY,  
AND POLITICS WOULD MAKE EVERY CASE A SPECIAL PROBLEM.  
BUT THEY HAVE AT LEAST ONE CHARACTERISTIC IN COMMON --  
ANY MILITARY ACTION THEREIN WILL BE ESSENTIALLY A

LAND OPERATION WITH A VERY LIMITED ROLE, IF ANY, FOR  
HEAVY WEAPONS OF GREAT DESTRUCTIVE POWER. TO  
DEAL WITH THE MILITARY SITUATION IN MOST OF THESE AREAS,  
THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS FOR RELIABLE INDIGENOUS GROUND  
FORCES. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO STIFFEN THESE  
GROUND FORCES WITH OUR OWN, IF AND WHEN U.S. POLICY  
REQUIRES OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION.

IT IS THE ARMY'S VIEW THAT, WITHOUT DEROGATING  
FROM THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF DETERRING GENERAL  
ATOMIC WAR, THE UNITED STATES MUST BE EVER READY TO COPE  
WITH LOCAL AGGRESSION, CONTRIBUTING TO ITS DETERRENCE  
OR ABLE TO SUPPRESS IT QUICKLY IF IT BREAKS OUT AND ONLY  
AFTER ALLOCATING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR  
THOSE THREE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES -- OF DETERRING GENERAL  
AND LOCAL WAR AND OF WINNING LOCAL WAR -- SHOULD WE

attempt

ATTEMPT TO SATISFY THE REMAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR  
FIGHTING A GENERAL WAR.

ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS

IN CONSONANCE WITH THE FOREGOING VIEWS ON THE  
LIKELY NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS, THE ARMY HAS  
DEDUCED THE ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR WHICH IT FEELS  
RESPONSIBLE AS A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM.

FIRST, THE ARMY MUST ACT AS A DETERRENT TO GENERAL  
AND LOCAL WAR BY MAINTAINING STRONG COMBAT READY  
FORCES OVERSEAS.

SECOND, THE ARMY MUST MAINTAIN BEHIND THESE  
OVERSEAS FORCES MOBILE STRATEGIC TASK FORCES READY,  
IN THE CASE OF GENERAL WAR, TO REINFORCE OUR DEPLOYMENTS  
OVERSEAS; AND IN THE CASE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE,  
TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO THE SCENE OF THE DISTURBANCE.

THIRD, THE ARMY MUST PROVIDE ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS FOR THE AIR DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR FIELD FORCES. THE GROWING STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR "NIKE" UNITS WILL CAUSE AN AGGRESSOR TO COUNT HIS PROBABLE LOSSES BEFORE LAUNCHING HIS PLANES IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

FINALLY, THE ARMY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE BY CONTINUING TO DEVELOP THE GROUND FORCES OF OUR ALLIES SITUATED ALONG THE IRON-BAMBOO CURTAIN. THESE INDIGENOUS FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE, AT A MINIMUM, TO INSURE INTERNAL SECURITY AND, AT A MAXIMUM, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROUND DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY OR GEOGRAPHICAL REGION.

THE ARMY NEEDS TO BE PROPERLY ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED, AND TRAINED TO PERFORM THE FOREGOING

deterrent roles

DETERRENT ROLES SO THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR  
SISTER SERVICES WE WILL PREVENT LOCAL OR GENERAL  
WAR. IF THESE DETERRENT EFFORTS FAIL, THE ARMY  
MUST BE PREPARED TO PERFORM ITS PART IN WINNING ANY  
WAR -- GREAT OR SMALL. FOR THIS CONTINGENCY THE  
ARMY NEEDS THE BACK-UP OF A STRONG RESERVE STRUCTURE  
CAPABLE OF EXPANDING INTO A COMPLETE MOBILIZATION OF  
OUR WAR-MAKING RESOURCES.

#### ARMY CAPABILITIES

THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS THE ARMY'S CONCEPT  
OF THE DUTIES IT SHOULD PERFORM IN DETERRING OR WINNING  
WAR. NOW, WITH THE INDULGENCE OF THE COMMITTEE, I  
WOULD LIKE TO ENUMERATE THE ARMY'S CAPABILITIES TO DO  
THESE VARIOUS TASKS IN FY 1957.

OVERSEAS FORCES

IN EUROPE, A FIVE-DIVISION FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED IN GERMANY. ITS COMPOSITION IS BEING CHANGED FROM THE PRESENT FOUR INFANTRY AND ONE ARMORED DIVISION TO ONE OF TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS, TWO ARMORED DIVISIONS, AND ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION. THE OVER-ALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED.

IN THE FAR EAST, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THREE DIVISIONS, TWO OF WHICH WILL REMAIN IN KOREA AND ONE IN JAPAN. THE ONE IN JAPAN WILL BE AT REDUCED STRENGTH. THE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM IN OKINAWA WILL BE INACTIVATED PRIOR TO 1 JULY 1956, AND REPLACED BY ELEMENTS OF A MARINE DIVISION.

THERE WILL BE ONE DIVISION IN HAWAII, A DIVISION MINUS IN ALASKA, AND A REGIMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN.

FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES

IN THE U.S., THE ARMY WILL MAINTAIN A TOTAL OF NINE DIVISIONS COMPRISED OF FIVE INFANTRY, TWO ARMORED, AND TWO AIRBORNE DIVISIONS. THREE OF THESE WILL BE ENGAGED IN REPLACEMENT TRAINING.

THE KEYSTONE OF THE NATION'S ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE WILL BE THE "NIKE" ON-SITE BATTALIONS. IN ADDITION, ON-SITE NATIONAL GUARD ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALIONS WILL BOLSTER THE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE.

QUALITY OF THE ACTIVE ARMY

THE QUALITY OF ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE IS EXCELLENT. THE U.S. ARMY, EUROPE, IS ONE OF THE FINEST PEACETIME FIGHTING FORCES THIS COUNTRY HAS EVER HAD. IN THE FAR EAST, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A PROGRESSIVE CUTBACK AND FREQUENT SHIFTING OF ARMY

FORCES, THE EIGHTH ARMY REMAINS THE ALERT, COMBAT-READY FORCE IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN. THE U.S. COMPONENT, A CORPS OF TWO DIVISIONS, SETS THE STANDARD FOR THE VASTLY LARGER SOUTH KOREAN ARMY WHICH, ALONGSIDE OUR TROOPS, MANS MOST OF THE MAIN BATTLE POSITION.

IN THE PERSONNEL FIELD, WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS

THROUGH OPERATION "GYROSCOPE" AND THE CONTINUED *-- that is, shifting of replacements key units rather than individuals --*

INCREASE OF REGULAR ARMY ENLISTMENTS. THE

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO IMPROVE THE ATTRACTIVENESS

OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION HAS PAID GREAT

DIVIDENDS TO THE REGULAR ARMY

RE-ENLISTMENT RATE FOR FY 1956

TO DATE IS THREE TIMES HIGHER THAN

THE AVERAGE FOR FY 1954. THE

PROPORTION OF REGULARS NOW HAS

Re-enlistment rates are quoted below:	
FY 1954 (Average)	21.1%
FY 1955 (Average)	60.2%
FY 1956 (through March actual)	61.6%

reached approximately

REACHED APPROXIMATELY 61 PERCENT OF TOTAL ENLISTED  
STRENGTH WITH A CONSEQUENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER  
OF RECRUITS WHO NEED TO BE TRAINED ANNUALLY. FURTHER  
REDUCTIONS OF THIS TRAINING LOAD WILL DECREASE THE ARMY'S  
TRAINING BASE AND ULTIMATELY ENHANCE THE COMBAT READINESS  
OF THOSE STRATEGIC RESERVE DIVISIONS CHARGED WITH THIS  
ADDITIONAL MISSION.

*... to say I am getting more  
effective strength to do the job... 30,000-man greater  
effective strength because of professionalization!*

I WOULD EMPHASIZE, THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANCE WE

ATTACH TO INCREASING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY  
CAREER. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATION BEFORE  
CONGRESS NOW IS ANOTHER NECESSARY STEP IN THIS DIRECTION.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUING INTEREST  
IN THIS SUBJECT.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMY ARE BEING INCREASED

THROUGH PROGRESS IN ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT. THE  
PRESENT FIELD ARMY IS ORGANIZED AND DESIGNED FOR  
EFFECTIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF  
EITHER GENERAL WAR OR SMALL PERIPHERAL CONFLICTS. THE  
GREATEST CHANGE HAS BEEN THE ADVENT OF AN ARMY DELIVERY  
SYSTEM FOR ATOMIC WEAPONS AS A PART OF THE FIELD ARMY'S  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE ARMY'S INTEREST IN  
MISSILES. VICTORY IN GROUND WAR HAS ALWAYS CONSISTED  
IN COMBINING FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY FOR THE DESTRUCTION  
OF THE ENEMY FORCES -- THE FORMULA IS UNCHANGED TODAY.  
THE ARMY VIEWS THE MISSILE WITH ITS ATOMIC WARHEAD AS A  
NEW AND VASTLY POWERFUL FORM OF FIREPOWER IN EXTENSION  
AND PARTLY IN REPLACEMENT OF ARTILLERY AS WE FORMERLY  
KNEW IT. THIS THOUGHT IS NOT NEW -- WE LEARNED PROMPTLY  
THE LESSON OF THE GERMAN V1 AND V2 AND DECIDED TO APPLY IT

to the needs of

TO THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY. IMMEDIATELY UPON THE  
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WE ROUNDED UP THE BEST  
GERMAN SCIENTISTS WHO HAD WORKED ON MISSILE PROJECTS  
AND BROUGHT THEM BACK TO THE U.S. THEY ARE STILL  
WITH US AS AMERICAN CITIZENS, WORKING ON THE "REDSTONE"  
AND "JUPITER" SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. AT AN  
EQUALLY EARLY DATE, REALIZING THAT BOMBERS WOULD SOON  
FLY TOO HIGH TO BE REACHED BY CONVENTIONAL AA ARTILLERY  
AND INTERCEPTORS, THE ARMY INITIATED PARALLEL EFFORTS  
TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE WHICH  
RESULTED IN "NIKE," NOW DEPLOYED AROUND OUR PRINCIPAL  
CITIES. "NIKE" IS THE FIRST OF A FAMILY OF INCREASINGLY  
EFFECTIVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES. NEW VERSIONS WILL FLY  
HIGHER AND FASTER CARRYING GREATER LETHALITY IN THE  
WARHEAD. TO CONTROL THESE MISSILES IN COMBAT, THE ARMY  
HAS DEVELOPED AND IS PRODUCING THE MISSILE MASTER, AN

ELECTRONIC DATA HANDLING DEVICE, WHICH WILL ADD MUCH  
TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE "NIKE" BATTERIES. I  
MENTION THESE FACTS BECAUSE IT IS SOMETIMES FORGOTTEN  
THAT THE ARMY IS THE PIONEER IN THE MISSILE FIELD AND HAS  
THE "FLYING HARDWARE" IN OPERATION. WE COUNT HEAVILY  
ON MISSILE FIREPOWER TO LIGHTEN THE COMBAT BURDENS  
OF THE FOOT SOLDIER AND TO LESSEN THE CASUALTIES WHICH  
HE IS ALWAYS CALLED UPON TO BEAR.

THE ARMY IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN STUDIES, TESTS  
AND MANEUVERS TO DETERMINE THE BEST TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS  
FOR FUTURE LAND WARFARE. THE RECENT EXERCISE  
"SAGEBRUSH," <sup>in Louisiana,</sup> INVOLVING 110,000 ARMY AND 40,000 AIR FORCE  
PERSONNEL, WAS HELD LARGELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE ARE  
OF THE OPINION THAT THE ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD WILL BE BROAD  
AND DEEP. PRESENT AND FUTURE ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE

prepared

PREPARED TO OPERATE WITH WIDER DISPERSION. THERE IS  
A REQUIREMENT FOR GREAT FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLOIT THE  
EFFECTS OF OUR OWN ATOMIC FIRE AND TO DEFEND AGAINST  
THAT OF THE ENEMY. THE TREND IS TOWARD RELATIVELY  
SMALL, SELF-CONTAINED UNITS, WITH GREAT FIREPOWER AND  
MOBILITY. THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION TO BE ORGANIZED  
LATER THIS YEAR IS REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR THINKING IN  
THIS DIRECTION. ITS FIVE REGIMENTAL COMBAT GROUPS  
ARE DESIGNED TO BE HARD-HITTING UNITS CAPABLE OF MOVING  
RAPIDLY TO AND WITHIN THE BATTLE AREA. THIS MOBILITY  
MUST BE INTERNAL, ARISING FROM GROUND AND AIR TRANSPORT  
ORGANIC TO THE ARMY; AND EXTERNAL ARISING FROM THE AIR  
AND SEA TRANSPORT PROVIDED US BY OUR SISTER SERVICES.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS GROUND FORCES

THE ARMY CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING

LOCAL FORCES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THE MAGNITUDE  
OF THE ARMY EFFORT IN THIS FIELD IS RARELY APPRECIATED.  
EVEN THIS EXPERIENCED COMMITTEE MAY BE SURPRISED TO  
KNOW THAT WE ARE TODAY ASSISTING FOREIGN ARMIES IN  
DEVELOPING OVER 200 DIVISIONS SITUATED IN 44 COUNTRIES.

THIS WORK TENDS TO DEVELOP THE CONFIDENCE OF  
THESE COUNTRIES IN THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.  
THE PRESENCE OF OUR U. S. SOLDIERS ON THEIR STREETS IS A  
REMINDER OF OUR INTEREST IN THEIR WELL BEING AND OUR  
WILLINGNESS TO SHARE IN THEIR PROBLEMS.

#### RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO DISCUSS THE RESERVE COMPONENTS  
OF THE ARMY. THESE FORCES CONSISTING OF THE NATIONAL  
GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARMY RESERVE ARE AN  
INDISPENSABLE PART OF THE ARMY. OUR ACTIVE FORCES

represent

REPRESENT THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY THE  
ARMY'S DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR LOCAL  
AGGRESSION OR A GENERAL WAR THE ACTIVE FORCES WILL  
REQUIRE EARLY AUGMENTATION AND REINFORCEMENT.

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS MUST PROVIDE THE TRAINED UNITS  
AND INDIVIDUALS NECESSARY TO MEET THE ADDITIONAL  
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMY IN TIME OF EMERGENCY.

THE ACTIVE ARMY IS FULLY COGNIZANT OF ITS  
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INSURING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE  
PLANNED READINESS OF OUR RESERVE FORCES. THE ENTIRE  
TRAINING PROGRAM IS UNDER CONTINUOUS STUDY, AND I HAVE  
PERSONALLY TAKEN STEPS TO IMPRESS ALL MAJOR COMMANDERS  
WITH THE NECESSITY FOR BRINGING THESE UNITS TO A MAXIMUM  
ATTAINABLE STATE OF READINESS IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE  
TIME.

WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD THE ATTAINMENT  
OF OUR GOALS. THE NATIONAL GUARD HAS JUST ABOUT  
REACHED ITS PROGRAMMED STRENGTH OF 407, 100 FOR FY 1956  
AND I FEEL CONFIDENT THEY CAN EXCEED THE 408, 100 PROGRAMMED  
FOR FY 1957. THE FACT THAT NATIONAL GUARD UNITS ARE  
CONTINUALLY ENGAGED IN INDIVIDUAL TRAINING DUE TO THE  
RAPID TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL CONSTITUTES ONE OF THEIR  
MAJOR PROBLEMS. AN EIGHT-WEEK BASIC COMBAT TRAINING  
PROGRAM WAS INITIATED LAST JULY TO ASSIST IN OVERCOMING  
THIS DEFICIENCY.

IF WE CAN ATTAIN THE PLANNED ANNUAL OUTPUT OF  
100, 000 TRAINED MEN UNDER RFA, THE ARMY RESERVE WILL  
HAVE CLEARED THE FIRST HURDLE. THE ARMY BELIEVES  
THAT WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE PROVISIONS  
OF THE LAW AND ARE CONVINCED OF ITS NECESSITY, THE MANPOWER

resources

RESOURCES WILL BE FORTHCOMING. TO THIS END THE ARMY IS ENGAGED IN AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM DESIGNED TO BRING THESE IMPORTANT FACTS TO THEIR ATTENTION. THERE WILL BE A REQUIREMENT FOR EXPANDED TRAINING FACILITIES, IF WE MEET THESE PLANNED PERSONNEL OBJECTIVES.

#### MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY

IN TIME OF GENERAL MOBILIZATION THE ARMY WILL DEPEND FOR ITS EQUIPMENT UPON THE WAR RESERVE IN BEING AND ITS MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION BASE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF FUNDS AVAILABLE, TO MAINTAIN OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO PROVIDE FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING STOCKS ON A CYCLE OF APPROXIMATELY 14 YEARS. THIS WILL PERMIT THE ORDERLY PHASING OF NEW WEAPONS INTO THE SUPPLY SYSTEM.

THE PRODUCTION OF MODERN WEAPONS IS BEING ACCELERATED TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE ARMY IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AN OPERATING PRODUCTION BASE, SOMEWHAT SMALLER THAN THAT CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE, FOR THE CONVENTIONAL CRITICAL ITEMS. HOWEVER, THE PRODUCTION LINES FOR SUCH IMPORTANT ITEMS AS MEDIUM TANKS AND AMMUNITION WILL PHASE OUT IN FY 1957.

CONCLUSION

THE COMMITTEE PROBABLY WISHES TO KNOW MY OPINION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE ARMY'S CAPABILITIES TO DISCHARGE ITS ESSENTIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS OUTLINED ABOVE. MY PRESENTATION HAS INDICATED THAT WE HAVE FORCES EARMARKED TO PERFORM ALL THE PRINCIPAL MISSIONS FOR WHICH THE ARMY IS ACCOUNTABLE. WHETHER THEY ARE ADEQUATE TO THEIR

respective tasks

RESPECTIVE TASKS IS LARGELY A MATTER OF JUDGMENT. IT  
IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE A DEFINITE DETERMINATION, PARTICULARLY  
IN THIS NEW AGE WHEN WE ARE COUNTING SO HEAVILY ON WEAPONS  
FOR THE USE OF WHICH THERE IS LITTLE BACKGROUND OF  
EXPERIENCE. I AM AWARE OF A NUMBER OF SOFT SPOTS  
IN OUR PROGRAM WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONSTANT WATCHING  
THROUGHOUT FY 1957. IF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ALONE  
WERE TO PREDOMINATE, ALL OF THE ARMED FORCES UNDOUBTEDLY  
WOULD PREFER GREATER RESOURCES THAN THOSE MADE AVAILABLE  
TO THEM. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT OUR PRESENT CAPA-  
BILITIES DO PERMIT US TO PERFORM OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASKS  
AS WE NOW SEE THEM.

THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY DEPENDS ON  
THE QUALITY OF THE PEOPLE IN IT. I AM GLAD TO REPORT  
THAT THE ARMY IS RICH IN DEDICATED SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS.

THE ARMY IS PROUD OF ITS VITAL ROLE AS A PART OF THE  
DEFENSE SERVICE TEAM THOUGH SOBERLY CONSCIOUS OF ITS  
GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN A WORLD OF TENSION. IT IS A  
FLEXIBLE, VERSATILE INSTRUMENT OF POLICY AT THE  
DISPOSITION OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, THE CONGRESS  
AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL  
FIND IT PREPARED TO PERFORM ITS PART IN OUR NATIONAL  
DEFENSE.

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