LECTURE BY
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Good evening, gentlemen.

Well, gentlemen, it's a pleasure to come back to West Point to talk tonight to the First Class. Before launching into the more serious subject which I have undertaken to discuss, I just want to tell you that among the chores of the Chief of Staff is appearing on many strange soap boxes. Last week I had occasion to address the National Press Club in Washington, and that's one of these unpredictable gatherings where some of the smart cookies in the public relations field pass questions up, hoping to get the Chief of Staff to put his foot publicly in his mouth. I had some very tricky curve balls to deal with until the end, when a particular one came up: "General, what is your estimate of the final score between Army-Notre Dame next year?" "Well," I said, "That's not a hard one, although I'd like to have prior consultation with Red Blaik. I can't quote the score, but after a very pleasant afternoon last November in Philadelphia, nothing's impossible. It's well in hand."

When I was Superintendent, a very happy period of time, I nevertheless had to counter some of my old friends whom I had asked back to talk to the First Class of the Corps of Cadets. I found some of them particularly troublesome -- including General Gruenther, our NATO commander -- who liked to come back and reminisce about how the Superintendent used to make illegal home brew in Highland Falls. I'm not going to expose General Bryan to this sort of thing -- although I could tell you a story or two. The fact is that, unlike the policeman's life, the life of the Superintendent at West Point is indeed a very happy one. Having enjoyed that experience for nearly four years, I can speak with some authority. In fact I've often announced myself as a candidate for a second tour, but I've received no takers.

In that connection, I recall that about 1946, the then Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, came up to pay his last visit and review Graduation Parade. After it was over, he sat on the porch of the Superintendent's house and started to reminisce about some of his aspirations during his military career. He said that, "One job I always wanted was to be Superintendent at West Point." He said, "They offered me the job of 'Comm'. I wouldn't want to be Commandant. You go around watching people's buttons and skinning cadets, and all that kind of thing. But I did want to be Superintendent, because then you could lean back and really indulge your eccentricities."

Well, gentlemen, I really enjoyed indulging my eccentricities as Superintendent -- in that respect Mrs. Taylor tells me that I have never entirely retired as Superintendent. But these remarks could not apply to the current Superintendent whom I have known and admired for many years. We first met in an environment not entirely conducive to normal social

amenities; we were both 'beasts' together in the same division of what we called Old South Barracks. The advantage of that association was entirely on my side. General Bryan, rather new Cadet Bryan, had just come from VMI, whereas I had arrived as a 17-year old, scared civilian from a Kansas City high school, who had never rolled a pack, knew nothing about the manual of arms, and had had no previous experience with people as disagreeable as the beast detail. New Cadet Bryan was a tremendous source of support to me in those days, and has been ever since. Knowing what he contributed to making something out of very unpromising beast material in 1918, I'm sure he has done much to develop perhaps more promising material in the Class of 1956.

One of my self-set chores as Superintendent was to talk in the Spring to the graduating class on the subject of leadership. Although I'm not sure how the 1st Class felt about it, I always enjoyed the encounter, even though the chore was not an easy one. Leadership is a subject particularly difficult to treat without falling into abstractions which are meaningless unless related to specific situations. For that reason, I always found it quite difficult to make a presentation to the 1st Class which I felt really carried conviction to them or to myself.

Most of us from boyhood have enjoyed reading the lives of military heroes. We have all speculated about what sort of people these great names really were. Many of you must have stood in the library in front of those magnificent portraits of Generals Lee and Grant, looked upon the faces of those two illustrious sons of West Point, and wondered about the reasons for their greatness. I had the honor to dedicate those portraits at the time of the Sesquicentennial. In so doing, I had occasion to comment, a little irreverently, that they both prove at least one point -- namely, that a fully-buttoned coat is not a requirement for military leadership.

But certainly these two men, different as they were in their private and public lives, must have had many characteristics in common. Certain similar elements must have existed to explain their common success in leading men in battle. Yet when one attempts to analyze their very dissimilar characters and personalities, one finds that, like electricity, the elements of leadership can be more readily explained by their effects than by a determination of their essential nature. The results of good military leadership may be assessed in terms of victories won, the enemy destroyed, and the missions achieved. However, it is another matter to dissect the character of the leader responsible for these effects and to hold up for inspection those characteristics which explain the results which he accomplished.

In my talk this evening, I am going to consider only American military leaders. There was a time when we usually looked abroad for examples of military leadership, when the Great Captains worthy of study included few, if any, of our countrymen. American military leaders, somewhat like American tenors, have been slow to gain recognition at home.

However, since the Civil War, the world-wide reputation of American soldiers has steadily increased with the achievements of American arms. Oddly enough, here at home we have been the last, perhaps, to recognize the reputation abroad of the American soldier. Although we are quick to boast of the highest waterfalls, of the deepest canyons, of the most automobiles, and of the tallest skyscrapers, very few of us ever extend our chests and extol the quality of American military leadership.

Yet the fact remains that American military leaders have far excelled the military feats of the greatest of foreign leaders. General Eisenhower liberated more territory than Caesar conquered. General Clark led to victory the troops of more foreign nations than Hannibal, whom history has regarded as the master of coalition warfare. Fourteen American generals in World War II had more troops under their command than were ever under the banners of Napoleon. The United States, in World War II, participated in campaigns which freed areas vaster in size and more widely dispersed than those conducted by any other nation in the world's history.

First a few words about some of the fallacies often expressed about leadership. It is said for example that military leaders are born and not made. I do not believe that for a moment. Our entire Army school system is a testimonial to the conviction that leadership can be taught, and the success of its graduates testifies to the fact that leadership has been taught. This school system begins at West Point, extends through the many service schools, and culminates in the Army War College and the National War College. It was this school system which developed our leaders during the lean years between World Wars I and II, when the Army had few units to command and offered little opportunity for young officers to gain tactical experience in leadership.

Another fallacy which one encounters is that leadership expresses itself in some mysterious way through flashes of genius. One hears of the intuition of Napoleon which led to the concept of the maneuver of Austerlitz. One hears of the tactical sense of Wellington in picking the right moment to order the decisive counterattack of Waterloo. I believe that a careful analysis of such situations will reveal no stroke of revelation. The good

general does not await a bright light, like that of Saul on the way to Damascus, to obtain a vision of the road to victory. If he has not behind him a lifetime of professional study, if he has not brought to his campaign diligent preparation, careful anticipation of all possibilities, and an Army of men believing in him as their leader, it is most improbable that he will receive a stroke of genius to bail him out in a crisis.

We hear sometimes that special gadgets or special formations -- tricks, as it were -- are responsible for successful leadership in battle. One reads of the magic of the double envelopment at Cannae as explaining the great success of Hannibal in annihilating the Romans. Similarly, the phalanx of Epaminondas or the oblique order of attack of Frederick the Great are sometimes cited as examples of military formations with an intrinsic capability of assuring success. I believe that an analysis of these examples would reveal that success depended on different and more important things.

Putting aside these fallacies and related considerations of what leadership is not, let us take the more positive approach and see if it is possible to agree on certain attributes which appear present in men who have evinced good leadership. If I were asked what were the most important characteristics of the great American leaders whom I have known, or have studied, I would be inclined to respond that these commanders all have had at least three characteristics in common. First, they had the gift of human understanding. Next, they were men outstanding for their obvious professional competence. And finally, they were men of strong and independent character. Now, let me talk about each one of these characteristics in turn.

I would remind you that the American leader has rarely had the opportunity to command professional soldiers in time of war. If you look back on our history, you will see that Washington, Lee, Pershing, Eisenhower -- all built their armies from citizen-soldiers. It has been the problem of providing leadership for the citizen-soldier that has confronted every great leader in all of our wars.

Hence, it is a wise provision that instruction at West Point is oriented primarily toward leading the citizen-soldier. It is toward his leadership that all of our Army methods of instruction, training, and conditioning must be directed. This attention to techniques appropriate to the citizen-soldier is not new at West Point. General Schofield had such a soldier in mind when, in 1879, he spoke to the Corps those words on discipline which are engraved on the walls of Central Barracks. I bespeak you to pause occasionally as you pass by, ponder his words, and regulate your methods of command in accordance with his precept.

Perhaps we should consider some of the characteristics of this civilian who in time of war must be converted into a soldier.

In the first place, he usually joins the Army either reluctantly or with considerable trepidation. He knows little about military life and what he has heard isn't good. Once in uniform he finds himself in a strange environment. He misses his family and his friends and feels alone among strangers. Surrounded by strange institutions and customs, he feels vaguely threatened by the unfamiliar present and even more by the uncertain future. His conception of war and battle has been distorted by misleading literature, radio and television. At such a troubled time, the citizen-soldier needs someone in whom he can have confidence, someone who will build up the feeling that he is a protected human entity. That someone should be his military leader.

If his commander does not have the capacity to fill this need, he will never get the most from the recruit. I believe that, if you will read the pages of our history carefully, you will find that no American commander ever rose to greatness who did not have this capacity -- the ability to convince his citizen-soldiers that he put them first and prized them above all else.

Few leaders in all history have had the wholehearted support of their men to the extent that the Army of Northern Virginia was devoted to their Commander, Robert E. Lee. While much of this support can be attributed to the professional qualities of General Lee, a large measure of his success was due to the fact that the Army knew that General Lee did his best to provide for their welfare. He was loyal to them, and they were loyal to him. When he ordered them to dig entrenchments -- work which all soldiers hate -- they knew that the work was necessary and was done to protect their lives. They knew when he ordered them into battle that he had wisely planned so that they could succeed with minimum losses. Soldiers were not "cannon fodder" to General Lee. They were comrades associated in the common enterprise of defeating the enemy and serving a cause to which they were all devoted. Furthermore, his soldiers knew that this comradeship was no mere lip service, for General Lee lived just as simply as they. His table was no better than theirs and often worse. The devotion which his conduct engendered in his men accounts more for his success, I believe, than the brilliance of his tactical maneuvers. General Lee enjoyed the gift of human understanding.

Our successful American leaders, through their gifts of understanding people, have demonstrated the art of welding individuals into units, where their separate strengths are multiplied as parts of a greater whole. From the time the citizen-soldier joins a unit, he must be made to feel that the unit is his home, that his fellow soldiers are his comrades. This work of

indoctrination must start from the first day of a man's service. That is the moment the alert commander will seize to convince the recruit that he is in the best outfit in the Army. He will learn its history and quickly come to feel that it is a great honor to belong to such an outfit. He will hear daily the theme: "You, the recruit, are joining a proved outfit which is glad to have you. It will look after you, but you must repay this protection with loyalty. The blood of our killed and wounded has purchased its proud record. It is up to you, the recruit, to extend the record of these men who have made its history."

Propaganda without substance will fail. The recruit must be able to verify in his daily living that the unit is as good as he has been told. The commander must show by his behavior that the "Old Man" is always on the job, that he sees that the rations come up in time, that the mail is never delivered late, and that he is always looking for better conditions so as to improve the lot of his men. If on all sides there is this common tie of service -- of the commander serving his men, of the men serving the commander -- this will be a unit truly formidable in battle.

After World War II, many studies were made to determine why men fight. Although many reasons were discovered, the outstanding one was simply this: A man fought and refused to run away because of his own self-respect and the attendant desire to retain the consideration of his comrades. Although I commanded a very proud division, the 101st Airborne, I always discovered in my conversations with my men that it was not the division's reputation particularly which stirred them to action. It was rather Baker Company, or Charlie Company, of some particular regiment, and the nexus of personal relationships between the men of the squad, of the platoon, and of the company.

I always talked to the recruits who joined this division, particularly anxious to discover why they had volunteered for parachute duty. I would go along the line talking to each man and asking why he had volunteered. Usually I got some chesty kind of reply, but on one occasion I received one which truly appealed to me. I asked this young parachutist did he like to jump out of airplanes. He came back quickly, "No, Sir!" Surprised, I asked, "Well, then, why did you volunteer to jump out of airplanes?" He said, "Sir, I like to be with men who do like to jump out of airplanes." I shook hands with him and said, "Soldier, that makes two of us." That response is a good answer to the question of why men fight. Men fight, not because they would not like to run away, but because they prefer even more the association and respect of men who choose to stay and fight.

A clinching evidence of the possession of human understanding on the part of a successful leader is his ability to treat men as individuals and not as Army serial numbers. American troops, in particular, resent any suggestion that they are without individuality, that they are ciphers and not people. They want to be known for themselves and will resist any effort to mold them into an anonymous pattern.

Every great soldier has succeeded in convincing his men that he knows and respects them as individuals. To accomplish this end he goes among his men, freely mingling with them and giving the soldiers a chance to look him over and size him up. An officer who barricades himself behind his rank is properly suspected of having weaknesses to conceal -- probably more than he really has. The successful commander claims no infallibility and is not afraid to expose himself to close view. Instead, he is often seen among his men. He learns their surnames and calls them by name at every opportunity.

He goes out of his way to explain the need of his orders and the reason for the actions required of his men. During the last war, most successful generals went to great pains in explaining their detailed plans in advance of asking troops to execute them. In our American landings in North Africa, in Sicily, at Salerno, and in Normandy, commanders were most careful to brief their men thoroughly on what to expect and why. They remembered the words of General Von Steuben, who wrote back to Germany from America during the Revolution: "The genius of this American nation is not the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this' and he doeth it. But I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that' and then he does it." This explaining of "why" to the troops goes beyond the need for an explanation of individual battles or campaigns. It should cover the entire question of, "Why we fight." Nothing keeps a man going in war like a strong belief in his cause. We need only recall the fervor which sustained the Southern states in the Civil War. It was the Confederate soldier's love of his cause that kept him going for four long years, when he was poorly equipped, seldom fed, and nearly always fighting against great odds. It was only when a similar spirit became common among the armies of the North that the tide of victory turned.

I think that this discussion of the need for human understanding as an element of successful leadership can be summed up by saying that it is the exercise of common sense in human relations. There are times to be stern; there are times to be lenient; there are times to be exacting; and there are times to be tolerant. This feeling for the right course of action to be taken with men appears, sometimes, to be instinctive in some leaders and often lacking in others. But it can be cultivated and developed by all.

The second of the trio of virtues of the successful leader is personal professional competence. The leader must know his business and the men must know that he knows. War is a terribly serious matter and our citizen-soldiers want their lives protected by experts. There may be the tendency to belittle the professional soldier in time of peace; but when war comes, our citizens want to feel that their destiny is in the hands of professionals. To become this professional, an officer must devote his life to constant study and self-improvement. He will need to prepare himself by study, by actual command of small units and, most importantly, by unending reflection on the exacting requirements of professional leadership in future war.

In this period of transition in warfare, when the introduction of atomic weapons and delivery systems of great depth and flexibility are changing concepts of tactics and strategy -- in such a time of change the requirements imposed upon our military leaders are constantly expanding. In commenting on the mounting requirements for professional competence in the military services, Dr. Conant, when he was President of Harvard, once stated: "As I look over the fence at the task which confronts our military men, I am appalled by the job. In purely technical terms, to plan the production and use of weapons not yet developed and to anticipate with any certainty the technical progress of a potential enemy in a rapidly moving area, seems almost humanly impossible. I should like to record my deepest sympathy for those who will be charged with the responsibility for the defense of the country in the period which lies ahead."

The Army looks to West Point to lay the professional foundations for the careers of our future leaders who prepare themselves to discharge this responsibility of which Dr. Conant speaks. With the growth of military technology, it may be fairly said that the slide rule will become a more

adequate symbol of the Army than the sword. No successful leader can be without some comprehension of the language of science if he is to be capable of enlisting scientific and engineering resources in support of his tactical and strategic requirements.

But we can overstate the importance of the technological aspects of the military profession. Our military leaders will be inadequate if they have scientific knowledge alone. They must be students of warfare, with an imagination capable of projecting forward the principles of the past to the specific requirements of new situations. They must be able to visualize the effects of new weapons and to devise tactics and organizations appropriate to the battlefields of the future. All this will require work and sweat and endless devotion to duty. In the section rooms and in the lecture halls of West Point, our cadets must acquire habits of work and study as an indispensable part of the essential equipment needed in the exacting career which they will follow.

But our officers will not be completely prepared if they are merely scientists and military students. They cannot be without a certain knowledge of the hard facts of economic life, because dollars and materials too will be the stuff of their future lives. The Army runs manufacturing plants, depots, ports, transportation systems. It is involved one way or another in almost every form of industrial activity. It has capital assets worth over $52 billion. No longer can a soldier be without some business judgment and appreciation of the contribution to security of a sound national economy. Thus, our Army schools cannot limit their teachings to tactics, strategy, and the use of weapons, but must also give the officer corps a basic concept of such subjects as industrial mobilization, manufacturing methods, and production problems.

But the Army cannot think only in terms of preparing its officers for the fields of science, for the combat roles of the Army, and for the economic problems of national defense. It is safe to predict that you gentlemen and your brother officers will live much of your lives abroad, serving in unusual situations for which you have not been directly prepared. At present, the Army has military missions in 44 countries of the world, where their members are required to speak foreign languages, to know foreign history, to understand foreign psychology, and to be able to represent the United States with ability in trying and complicated situations. It is with reason that the curriculum at West Point stresses foreign languages and international relations to an outstanding degree.

When I was superintendent, I indulged my interest in this question of the origins of leadership in trying to analyze the causes for the successful careers of some of our generals of World War II. I arrived at some rather interesting, though perhaps not final, conclusions. The first was that it was only a limited advantage to have graduated in the upper half of the class rather than in the lower half. This does not mean for a moment any encouragement to you gentlemen to return to barracks and start losing tenths. I was particularly interested in those men in the lower half of the class -- way down among the absolute goats -- who, to the surprise of all concerned, turned out to be some of our most distinguished generals of World War II. Having known most of them, I felt qualified to reach the following conclusion: That among these successful men who had had undistinguished careers as cadets there always seemed to be a factor present which, perhaps, accounted for their subsequent records. In most of the cases which I have personally known, these officers were slow in starting but were sure and steady in progress. They were men who never ceased to

grow and expand. Their minds were constantly reaching out as their experience increased. I believe that this capacity to grow is a most important factor in graduate success, and one difficult to evaluate in undergraduate days. Hence, no one should conclude in a moment of discouragement that he cannot become a competent leader of men. To be a slow starter may not be a sign of weakness but rather an indication of latent power.

Even with the gifts of human understanding and of professional competence arising from careful training, our military leader will not be complete without the third attribute of greatness; namely, character -- character which reflects inner strength and justified self-confidence. To give an impression of strength, a leader must consider his personal appearance, his physical condition, his tone of voice, his method of life -- all of those things which give an impression of his character to those who follow him. This does not mean the development of an artificial personality. All of us have certain basic traits which are given us at birth. We all have a core of personality which cannot be tampered with but which can be constantly developed. A facade of sham will not serve. If you would have your troops believe that you are strong, you must be strong. If you would teach them to be rugged, you must avoid the soft life yourself. If you would have your men be brave, you must yourself set an example of valor.

To bring the full force of his character to bear effectively upon his men, a leader must resort to every device of personal leadership. I have heard it said that the day is past in modern war when the leader can place himself in front of his men and inspire them to action in the tradition of the Civil War brigadiers who charged on foot or on horseback at the head of their men. I do not believe this for a moment. Personal leadership is

still possible within limits, and within those limits it is the duty of the commander to supply it. General Doolittle electrified a discouraged allied world by his personal leadership when he flew his B-25 off the flight deck of the Hornet in the first retaliatory air attack on Japan. General Patton was a model to his officers and men by his personal intervention on the battlefield; there was no point on the front where he, an Army commander, did not go and show himself to this troops.

Where a Patton impressed his character by dash and flamboyant gallantry, a Bradley was equally impressive in an entirely different way. I always remember General Bradley's final conference with his generals at Bristol in England before the take-off for Normandy. He reviewed our plans for the campaign, conducted the tactical discussions himself, and displayed a surprisingly intimate knowledge of the proposed actions of the smallest units of his Army. He gave a suggestion here and offered help there, and showed the entire gathering the extent of his personal competence as a high commander. When the meeting came to a close, he obviously felt that some words were needed to launch the greatest military enterprise in history. But General Bradley, great man that he is, is no great orator. He stood up before the gathering, clasped his hands behind his back, looked the group over, and gulped his adam's apple. His eyes got a little damp as he looked about him; and then he said quietly: "Goodbye. Good luck." That was all. But his commanders went off determined to win a victory for Bradley in Normandy.

I would stress the urgency of the West Point mission in developing leaders of character for the modern Army. Never before in our history has such responsibility been placed in the hands of military men as at

present. For this reason, never has there been greater need for men of integrity, selfless men without ambition, disdaining political advantage and personal preferment. Only such men of character can make their voices heard at the council tables of our nation, where sound and responsible military views are so important in guiding our national policy. In the last analysis, the requirement for character in our military leaders arises from the awfulness of the weapons which they now control. Only men of the highest principles and standards of conduct should be allowed to make these decisions which may involve the destiny of all mankind. Thus, the influence of West Point has renewed importance in discharging its secular role of developing men of character and reliability as a fundamental objective of its educational system.

As I view the future needs of the Army, I am impressed with the growing requirement for West Point graduates and of men imbued with the principles taught at West Point. At the present time, out of the officer corps of 110,000 in the active Army, only 6 percent are West Point graduates. This proportion is definitely not enough; and I would sincerely hope that, by a prudently phased increase of the facilities at West Point, the size of the corps can be somewhat increased. I consider that any expansion must be a moderate one, feeling that quality is always more important than quantity, and that over-saturation of the present area might well lead to some deterioration in the product.

I speak about the need for additional West Pointers, thoroughly aware of the fact that the West Point method is far from being the only way of producing good officers. The Army is filled with too many outstanding non-graduates to suggest that West Point has a monopoly on the production of leaders.

But the West Point way should be in a sense the easier way, because it is designed for this specific purpose. The curriculum of the Academy represents 180 years of Army experience. It has been developed by able professors who have given their lives to West Point, and by the contributions of thousands of officers who intermittently serve as instructors and tactical officers, bringing to the corps the breath of the active Army. It is a tribute to our military educators that they have attained in the West Point curriculum compatibility between the broad requirements of a military career and the established principles of liberal education.

I have now discussed at some length the three qualities which I think all successful leaders have had and must have: human understanding, professional competence, and strength of character. What can the leader accomplish who develops all these attributes in felicitous combination?

First and foremost, he can expect to get the best out of his troops. And American troops at their best are without equal. No foreign Army can compare with ours when the latter is properly led. American soldiers have courage, physical vigor, initiative, and dash. All of these are rich talents which they bring and place at the disposal of the commander who knows how to unify them with the catalyst of true discipline. The discipline I mean is that which binds in fellowship -- the kind which produces the willing and cheerful subordination of the individual to the success of the team. Do not confuse this kind of discipline with the external appearances of conventional discipline, the salute, the knock on the orderly-room door, or the formula of deference to superiors -- in short, military courtesy as it is prescribed in regulations. The latter has its place, particularly in a peacetime Army. But they are not the indices of discipline which really

counts. Perhaps both the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac would have rated very low in military discipline in this restricted sense. They would never have won a "first line" at a review; but by their spirit, they won a place among the great fighting units of all times -- alongside of Xenophon's Ten Thousand, Caesar's Tenth Legion, and Napoleon's Old Guard. American troops with their natural qualities, plus such discipline, are irresistible.

Having achieved this true discipline among his men, the successful commander will be victorious in battle. Victory feeds upon itself and soon creates the feeling of invincibility and pride of organization, which together magnify the intrinsic strength of the command many-fold. The troubles of the commander are at an end when the threat of dismissing a man from his unit becomes a punishment more dreaded than court-martial. He needs to have no concern for his future when the soldiers of his command brawl in the taverns to defend their boast of being in the 'best damn outfit in the Army.'

In closing, I always wonder if I have painted in too dark colors the problem of becoming the successful leader of American soldiers. If so, I have indeed overstated the case. For, as for all duty well done, the rewards which fall to the American officer who has learned to integrate into a unified team all of the potential capacity of American soldiers are very rich indeed. American troops led in this spirit will bring fame and fortune to the officer who has known how to use their talents. They will put stars on his shoulders, and ribbons on his chest, and make his name live in the pages of history. And beyond these material rewards, to have commanded troops in battle who have rendered conspicuous service to the Nation will give the

commander an abiding sense of accomplishment in having brought to the bloody business of war its redeming virtues of human loyalty and fraternal devotion which bind fighting men together -- officers and men alike -- in mutual respect.

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We have time for some questions.

Q. Sir, how often do you see the President?

A. Well, working for the Commander-in-Chief, I see him every time he asks me to come over.

Q. Sir, how soon in the future do you think airborne units, paratroopers, will be replaced by other modes of transportation, specifically helicopters?

A. I have often said the worst vehicle in which to arrive on the battlefield is a parachute, and I would look forward to its replacement when we are able to develop some improved method. The thing about the man in the parachute is that he can come down in darkness, can come down in great numbers; whereas the helicopter is still a very vulnerable vehicle. Frankly, I can't answer your question, except that I don't view the helicopter as the answer. Perhaps some method of gliding in by detachable, pod-type glider aircraft may be the answer. For the moment, the parachute is with us for some time to come.

Q. Sir, will you comment on General Gruenther's statement on NATO's weakness?

A. General Gruenther is far better qualified to comment than I am. I have the greatest respect for General Gruenther. You see, I have been facing "Youth Wants to Know"; so I am prepared for most of these questions.

Q. (Approx) If you had a difference of opinion with the other Joint Chiefs, how far would you feel justified in going in presenting your views?

A. Well, you have raised a very good question there and one which really deserves a lecture in itself. As Chief of Staff, I often startle civilians by saying I command nobody except Colonel Howard Snyder -- who, I think, is here -- and stenographers. I am entirely a staff officer responsible to my Secretary for advice with regard to the running of the Army. However, I also have another hat. I'm a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is a corporate body responsible for advising, not my Secretary, but the Secretary of Defense -- the boss of my Secretarial opposite number -- the National Security Council, and the President. So, really, a Chief of Staff has a dual responsibility;

he operates in two different worlds, slightly different, although there are overlapping aspects.

In the first capacity, like any other advisor, he is responsible for giving the best advice he knows how to give; if the Secretary of the Army doesn't follow my advice, I then have the choice of doing what you gentlemen will have to do when you're in various staff positions -- you just say, "Yes, Sir," and hope for the best.

On the other hand, in this serious business in which the Chief of Staff is involved, at the level at which I operate, if you're really concerned about it, your final answer then is to retire, or resign just like any member of the Cabinet.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it's somewhat different. I can have a difference with the majority of my comrades, and the advice of the corporate body goes up against my view. Again, I have the right to carry my personal view to the Secretary of Defense and then to the President, which I would do -- which I think any Chief would do -- if he feels his interest is vitally concerned or the nation is vitally concerned. At what point he says he is in such vital disagreement that he resigns is a problem which faces all men in public life: "Shall I decide to turn in my suit?", so to speak, or "Is it better to stay and gradually influence the course of events in the direction to which I think is for the national welfare?"There is no easy answer, except to say the requirements for integrity and honest expression of view is always with us; and as far as I observe among my colleagues and the group among which I operate, it is present today.

Q. (Approx) How can we best present the Army's viewpoint to the civilians?

A. I think we have a constant requirement in the Army to talk articulately about our problems. The Army has been a lagging service, I think, throughout the history of the Army, perhaps in presenting its case articulately to the people who ought to hear about it. We have had the feeling that virtue is its own reward and that all we have to do is perform a good job and that will be recognized. That's true up to a point, but I am personally very much involved in trying to extend the activities of the Army in this field of explaining to civilians country-wide what we're up to. I do it by personal activity, and then by passing the word out to all of our commanders to make themselves available to the communities in which they serve. We chuckle a bit about making speeches at Rotary luncheons and that kind of thing, but there is not enough of that being done in the Army, and has not been in the past. I hope you gentlemen -- through your English Course which Colonel Stephens directs with such skill, and the Debating activities in which I was very much interested when I was Superintendent -- I hope all of you gentlemen have thrown away any fear of getting on your feet and looking the public in the eye and talking about things you know about. On the other side of the coin are the people who talk about things they don't know about; and they're as dangerous as not saying anything.

Q. Sir, according to the newscast tonight, President Eisenhower takes a stand in the Middle East. How do you think it will affect the Armed Forces?

A. You're ahead of me by one newscast. I'm not sure what you refer to. I don't want to be evasive on a subject which is of great importance, but I hope you gentlemen -- I know you reflect on what is going on in the Middle East and various parts of the world -- I am often struck, and I am sure you are, with the fact that many times there is no direct military reply to some of these situations. I think our military programs in this country are generally proceeding very well; but I see no immediate role in the Middle East -- unless highly complicated by political, economic, and ideological factors -- no immediate role for, let's say, an atom bomb, or a carrier task force, or a landing on hostile shores. Many of these problems our country faces today are only indirectly within the range of our military weapons. And where we should give, in my judgment, greater thought as a nation, particularly at the high levels in Washington, is how to integrate all of our resources -- military, economic, political, ideological, and financial -- so that we can meet, perhaps, the social threat, or meet the sociological threat with an economic weapon, or a military threat with an ideological one. In other words, how can we best pool all of our resources together into a closely knit, integrated national strategy? We have made progress in that field, but we still have a long way to go.

Q. (Approx) How much inter-Service rivalry is found at your level of operation?

A. There is inevitably a great amount of rivalry at the Washington level. I have always said there is nothing that unifies the Services like an enemy bullet. When you get out where the shooting goes on, none of this exists; there are fine relationships between our Services. But you can hardly expect that at the Washington level, where all of us compete for the national resources as represented by the annual budget. All of us, whether we're Air Force, Navy, Marines, or Army, are always sure that we have programs that are vital to the security of the nation. And we all inevitably fight for them just as long as we can until a decision is made. To a degree, I don't think that should be a matter of concern. It's only when it takes the form of really backbiting or trying to play down another Service, small things which do appear from time to time -- not at the level of the Chiefs, but among the very partisan "indians" who back us up -- that is bad; but I think we have to accept the fact that we'll always have a finite budget, finite resources, allocated to national defense. All of us leaders who feel that our programs are vital to the nation are always going to have to fight for them.

Q. Sir, what is your opinion of our present Civil Defense set up?

A. That again is really a subject of a lecture in itself. Having just appeared before the Hölifield Committee in Washington, I am prepared to give my comments on the Army part of it. Considering the Services first, there is a great tendency to push this very difficult problem toward the Army. Nobody has an answer really to Civil Defense, if you mean to include in Civil Defense

all the extent of a disaster which might arise from a general nuclear attack. Our civilians who are charged with this job by law really feel completely overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem, and I don't blame them. So there is always a tendency to look around to find some strong back to carry this load, and the strongest back to carry this load, and the strongest back that's visible is that of the Army; there is a tendency to say, "Let's pass it to the Army." Actually we must resist this at all costs, because the Army is made to fight; it's made to go abroad; it's made to discharge those war plans which represent our international commitments. So, I say, we will never accept, willingly, the pre-allocation, the pre-planned assignment, of Civil Defense responsibilities. On the other hand, if disaster occurs any place, any time, the Army resources in that area will immediately be put at the disposition of the civil community, and we have worked out our plans that way throughout the country. The territorial army commanders are very closely in contact with the local civil defense people. If disaster comes on a given day, we'll do what we can as of that day; but we decline to accept Civil Defense as a formal mission of the Army.

Q. (Approx) Is the present budget enough to maintain the Army as it is today?

A. Well, we have always raised the question of "How much is enough?" in this business. If I could answer that one, I would have very few troubles in discussing our budget.

Yes, I think that we are too thin in many critical parts of the world. The question is, of course, will we be challenged, and by whom? Inevitably, a certain amount of calculated risk must go into this business. If every Service had everything they felt they needed, this country would have a military budget of about 80 billion per year -- something on that order. I have appeared before Congress this year and said that the budget for the Army is marginally sufficient, under present international conditions. If international conditions change, then we will have to reappear and defend additional support to the Army. We are never sure of what is finally enough, but I would say this: that the Army is stronger this year than it was last year; and with the increased professionalization of the Army -- that is, the higher percentage of professional soldiers as opposed to the Selective Service -- I feel that next year we will go forward even though our numerical ceiling does not change.

Q. Sir, in the same light, do you believe it is very likely that we will disarm in the near future?

A. I would say that disarmament is a black cloud presently no longer than a man's hand, but it may grow very rapidly. The position of the Joint Chiefs on disarmament is "Yes, we would like to be able to disarm this world." The bi-polar situation of two heavily armed camps, both sides equipped with nuclear weapons, is certainly not pleasant to contemplate either in the present or in the future. But what the Joint Chiefs have insisted upon -- and the Department of Defense has always supported our position -- is that before we talk about disarmament, we must set up an accepted, proved inspection system.

We have gone through this question of an armistice in Korea, and you have seen how impossible it is to verify the compliance of the other side with the terms of the agreement; so that at the present moment, to agree to disarmament would be fatal unless we had preceded that agreement with an effective inspection system, in place, operating in Russia and in the satellites. That must come first; then we'll talk about disarmament. Whether we can keep that order of events in front of our leaders who make the ultimate decision -- frankly, I don't know.

Q. Sir, do you think there is a possibility of Red China becoming a more prominent enemy than the Soviet Union?

A. The future of Red China is very hard to predict. Certainly, that country has come forward more rapidly, particularly in its military capacity, than anyone who knew the country a decade ago or two decades ago would ever have predicted. The Chinese is an awfully smart fellow; however, he found out over long history that war, by and large, doesn't pay, and I would suspect that he would become a more philosophic member of the international community as time goes on. I don't think he has that inherent requirement for expansion which characterizes the Soviet part of the Communist movement. That is one man's guess, however.

Q. Sir, in peacetime what good substitute is there for actual combat or fighting spirit in the Army?

A. You mean the problem of developing fighting spirit without actually a fight? Well, I think you can develop it in a lot of ways. I saw a very fine exhibition of fighting spirit there in Philadelphia last fall. Actually, you look at the record of the people who made great names for themselves in World War II, and you'll be surprised how little direct military experience, how little fighting experience, they had. They had virtually none; yet something they had gotten from this place or elsewhere in the Army had carried out into their lives in military units in which they served and in the schools which they attended. Certainly, they left nothing to be desired, insofar as their ability to meet in first-class style the first battle they had ever had. I think you'll find your career will take care of that pretty well, because you'll be guided by that experience of 180 years which has never failed to produce great American fighting men at the right time.

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If I had the ability, General Taylor, I'd probably deliver a lecture telling you just how much we have enjoyed and appreciated this tonight. Speaking for the 480 members of the class, thank you very much.

General Taylor: I look forward to seeing the Class of 1956 on Graduation Day.