TRANSCRIPT OF
REMARKS MADE BY
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THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Secretary and Gentlemen:

As a postlude to yesterday's discussions, I wish to synthesize the Army and its mission. As Chief of Staff, one of my jobs is to explain the role and mission of the Army, and to ask that very legitimate question to which all our citizens want to know the answer, namely, "What is the Army up to?" The fact is that the Army is "up to" a lot, and here you have seen just one segment of the many activities of this modern Army. Obviously everything we do in the Army, every action we take, should contribute directly or indirectly to the security of the United States. We often say that by what we do in one way or another, we must be capable of "putting blood on the enemy's shirt." Now I am aware of the fact that we sometimes do things which are rather hard to explain in terms of this principle.

I would like to illustrate by a story the point that it is very hard to be sure that you are always using your means to put blood on the enemy's shirt. One rainy day in Seoul when I was in command of the Eighth Army, I decided to inspect a Quartermaster Depot. I spent a couple of hours ranging through that vast installation which illustrated the tremendous attention the Quartermaster Corps was paying to the needs of our fighting troops. In one corner of a building I saw a pile of sacks. I asked the commanding officer, "What is in those bags?" "Tobacco stems," he said. "What are they for?" "For homing pigeons." "Do they smoke?" He replied, "No. It is this way. Our Quartermaster research has found that at mating time homing pigeons are happy if they have access to tobacco stems because they line their nests with them." I was really impressed! I could see General Magruder's logisticians in the Pentagon figuring out with their slide rules the order lead-time necessary on tobacco stems, reserving the shipping, obtaining the bills of lading, and moving all those tobacco stems 6,000 miles around the world to arrive just one week ahead of the pigeon mating season in Korea.

It taxes my ingenuity to relate the combat activities of the Eighth Army to tobacco stems. Sometimes we are a little embarrassed to find where we are spending our money and buying our resources. Fortunately, I believe those cases are comparatively rare, because we have built our activities on a philosophy of what the Army owes to the country and how we propose to discharge this obligation.

Let me go back to some of the fundamentals to which Secretary Brucker referred in his opening address. Your Army conceives its primary mission as that of deterring war. The Army is a part of the tri-service team whose primary efforts should be bent not on winning war, but on keeping war from happening. Furthermore, as we look at the tremendous weapons of destruction which are now entering the arsenals of at least two of the great nations, we are impressed with the fact that the day has come when general nuclear war can mean nothing but disaster to any participant. Thus, the great objective of our fighting forces is to see to it that we never resort to general nuclear war.

If this is the basic premise, then it follows that right after the deterrence of this great general war, the next thing likely to menace us, and with a greater probability of urgency, is the small war. We call it the "brush fire war," a very poor name if we mean a Korean-type conflict, because that was the fourth largest war we ever fought. At least it was not general nuclear war. Rather it was a local or "brush fire war." Because the Soviet Union recognizes that we can devastate the homeland of Russia with nuclear bombs if we are attacked, it seems improbable that the USSR will resort deliberately to the general nuclear war.

But it does not at all follow that the Communist movement will renounce aggression as an instrument of policy. Dynamism is essential to any such movement, and once it ceases to expand, it is likely to die. Consequently, according to my reasoning, the greatest military danger lies in the field of local aggression, an outward thrust in some peripheral area about the Soviet Union. Hence, it behooves us to be ready. First, we must prevent that from happening; we must show in advance that such an aggression will fail. Second, if the attempt is made, we must suppress that aggression; we must stamp out that fire rapidly, lest it grow into the great conflagration of the nuclear war which we are trying to avoid.

This is the line of reasoning which the Army follows: first, contribute to the deterrence of general war; next, be visibly ready to move rapidly anywhere in order to resist aggression, and to assist such allies as we may find there. By dealing quickly with the small war, we hope never to permit the great war. Committed to that philosophy, we ask ourselves: "What are our requirements? What do we have to have available to do the job?"

In strictly military terms, our fundamental requirement has always been to develop fire and movement on the battlefield. As long as men have fought each other on the ground, fire and movement (or missiles and movement in the days of the stone or sling) have been the combination which achieved victory. That same combination is indispensable today.

I am giving you this background because I am moving toward what you saw yesterday at the White Sands Proving Ground. There you saw the development of a new form of fire, which will go with the movement of tomorrow. The missile today is the artillery of the future. With our operational missiles such as CORPORAL and HONEST JOHN, it may be said that to a degree the missile is the artillery of the present. Hence, we are tremendously interested in missiles -- not only to develop firepower on the ground, but also to destroy that other enemy of ground forces: the manned airplane and the surface-to-surface missile.

Movement is essential if we are to exploit the devastating firepower which we now have and will have. We visualize the atomic battlefield as a great void in which there are islands of either offensive or defensive power represented by relatively independent, small units of about battalion size. Behind this formation, which must be dispersed or it will invite destruction by the enemy's nuclear weapons, we visualize a base of fire consisting of long-range missiles well to the rear. For this reason, we are interested in all surface-to-surface missiles, regardless of their range.

Sometimes, I am asked: "What does the Army want with a 1500-mile missile?" Well, it does not want it necessarily to shoot 1500 miles in front of the front line -- if we have a front line under the terms which I am considering -- but we may want it far to the rear. Well protected and concealed, it will be able to fire with great flexibility across the front, supporting airborne movements and the like without displacement of the base of fire. In front of this base of fire we will have relatively small units which must move rapidly over great distances. They must be prepared for all-around defense. They must be able to supply themselves and move their weapon systems rapidly; otherwise they will invite destruction.

That is the reason we are so insistent on improving our internal mobility, as opposed to that external mobility which is provided for us by the Air Force. Secretary Brucker has mentioned our demand for increased strategic mobility with which to move troops from here to Japan, or to southeast Asia. But that is not the kind of movement I am talking about for the moment. Strategic mobility is highly important; it is indispensable. We have to depend upon the Air Force for it, and we are not seeking organic transport for this function. Neither am I speaking about the Air Force's assault-type transport which is required for airborne operations and is capable of delivering men onto the battlefield under enemy fire as was done in Normandy,

Holland, and elsewhere in World War II, when we moved airborne troops behind enemy lines. There again, we look to the Air Force to give us that specialized kind of transport.

The mobility I am talking about is that which is internal to the Army itself, as represented by the Army Aviation Program. This is a terribly vital program to us, one which is not well understood. I often have occasion to say we are in no way competing with the Air Force in its rôles and missions. We are trying to give the Infantry means of moving its patrols rapidly by helicopter. We are trying to give the Artillery means of observing the fires of its artillery and missiles. We want to give the Transportation Corps ways of moving supplies faster. All through the Army, through some eight arms and services, we are expanding that internal air mobility which is so essential to us. I ask your understanding and your support to this program because at present it is not understood. I read articles frequently which give the impression that the Army is trying to do something evil in using aircraft to make its Infantry, its Artillery, and its fighting men safer and more effective on the battlefield.

The second kind of firepower I mentioned is that which attacks the hostile airplane. Yesterday you saw NIKE I, the first and only operational land antiaircraft missile in the country today. I know that Dr. Martin is going to discuss in greater detail the elements of the missile program, so I will just make this one point. NIKE is not a missile; it is not a weapon; it is a family of weapons -- a family which can grow as naturally as the modern Ford motor car grew from the Model-T into an eight-cylinder vehicle. Thus, we hope to develop from NIKE, weapons which will move in a natural evolution from the excellent missile you saw yesterday to something vastly better in the years to come.

Now, I am often asked this question: "Is the Army big enough?" Secretary Brucker was asked this question and he answered in words better than mine. I would like to extend the discussion in a little more detail. The Army is, I think, marginally capable of discharging its functions today -- in the sense that we have elements allocated to do all the principal jobs which we are called upon to do. The first of those is, of course, to maintain our overseas deployments. We regard our forces overseas as our principal contribution to the deterrence of large war, because we have these forces deployed along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, those vital areas of Europe and the Far East which must be constantly guarded. The presence of our soldiers there is a constant reminder that if the Communist world undertakes aggression in those strategic areas, it will be met at once by the armed might of the United States. Furthermore, the presence of our troops in those areas is a tremendous factor in developing local morale, since we

remind these nations which must live under the guns of Communism that we are willing to share their lot. So our first requirement is to be sure that we can support those troops, to maintain them in first-class condition and, in case of attack, to reinforce them. We have the means to do that -- not as many as I would like and not as much backup as our logisticians desire -- but we think we can have a powerful force in the field in a comparatively short time if air and sea transport is made available to us.

Now, in addition to maintaining our overseas forces ready for general war, we must have at home a ready force in the Strategic Reserve. Our Strategic Reserve is composed of nine divisions in the United States, a number of which we maintain in instant readiness to meet the outbreak of the "brush fire" conflicts to which I referred earlier.

Obviously, if we become involved in another "Korea," we will be strategically in a bad situation if we do not have, in addition to those forces in the United States, other troops which are capable of discharging the general war mission. In other words, the divisions we have now must "double in brass." They have to be ready to go into a "brush fire" type of conflict, yet they might be critically needed elsewhere if general war broke out while they are on brush fire duty. We have to run this risk with the forces which we now have.

We are now depending upon our reserve forces more than ever before. We have undertaken to prepare a number of National Guard divisions for early overseas deployment. We give them preferential treatment by pre-assigning trained men to them, so that on mobilization these Guard divisions will have ample men to raise quickly those divisions to war strength. We hope, by additional training and the allocation of equipment, to reduce the time which has always been required in the past to prepare Guard divisions for overseas service. This is perhaps a soft spot in our program, but one in which we are vitally concerned and determined to make successful.

Thus, when we say the present Army of 19 divisions is sufficient, we have to qualify the statement. It is marginally sufficient, but it has certain recognized soft spots which the Secretary and I have reported to Congress.

In an ideal world, with no concern for the practical considerations of budgets, we could think only in terms of an Army and the military requirements for security. I have been asked this question: "What would you want then?" Well, I would want about one million and a half men, something on the order of 28 divisions -- an expensive force, the absolute necessity of which I would have trouble defending under the conditions present today. But that is what I call the optimum force -- a force which would allow us soldiers to sleep more soundly at night.

I would now like to comment on civil defense and the Army's attitude toward it. I appeared recently before the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, which is wrestling with this very tough problem of civil defense. I was asked what can the Army do about this. It was expected, I discovered, that I was to say that the Army was prepared to take over civil defense. Some of you may think the Army should be ready to do that job. However, when you analyze what that means, you will soon conclude, I hope, that to undertake such a task as an official, pre-assigned role of the Army, would call for a tremendous increase in the Army. It would call for such a conversion of our structure that it would be utterly destructive to our combat mission. Recognizing that no one is going to give us a million more men or ten billion more dollars for civil defense -- and it is in these terms that we would have to talk -- we must resist accepting any official assignment of a civil defense mission.

Perhaps this sounds unsympathetic, but that is certainly not the case. The record shows that in any sort of disaster the Army has always come forth immediately. I need cite only the floods in the Northeast and in California this past year. When the time comes, we drop everything, roll up our sleeves, and pitch in to relieve civil disaster. We shall do it again under the same terms. However, it is impossible for me to tell the civil defense people exactly what we can do. For example, a committee member says, "When a bomb drops on Los Angeles, what are you going to do, General? What are you going to send there?" The answer is that I frankly do not know, because I do not know what I will have available at that time. The Army might be deployed overseas so extensively that little of it would remain at home except troops in training and in our antiaircraft command. All we can say is that our intentions are sincere. However, we are unable, first, to accept a pre-assigned role, and secondly, to predict in advance exactly what the Army contribution will be. I hope that you will pass along this thought. We are doing everything that we are capable of under the terms of our present mission.

I have talked about the military requirements of the Army in military terms. We need fire and movement as interpreted by our new weapon system and our new aviation program. However, the Army will be no better than the people that make it up. We need personnel, number-wise and quality-wise, but I stress quality more than number. There is a tendency in this country to measure military strength by the number of people in it. We say we have a million-man Army, but that does not accurately interpret our strength. You must look inside that million men and see what kind of people fill the coats, what kind of brains are in the caps of the people who make up that million. Then the difference between a million of our best people and a million aggressors may give us the difference between victory and defeat. The "numbers game" simply does not tell the whole story.

I am happy to report that we are making real progress in the quality of our people. These figures illustrate the fact. We are becoming a more professional Army. Our percentage of professional soldiers is increasing drastically. During the Korean War the Army consisted of about 50 percent Regulars, whereas now they number nearly 70 percent. The selectee component is declining. Furthermore, we are getting extremely good re-enlistments among our Regular soldiers in contrast to the other Services. During FY 1955 the Air Force secured 23.5 percent re-enlistments from among those eligible; the Marines 20.6 percent; and the Navy 14.2 percent. But the Army obtained 59 percent, an extremely encouraging figure. It is so good I worry a little about it. I intend to mention this point to the Army commanders to insure that they re-enlist good men. We obtain some extremely fine soldiers from among the selectees, and consequently we have a typical cross-section of the United States. We have PhD's, Phi Beta Kappas, and college graduates in a good proportion. But we could reach the point of becoming so professional that we might eliminate that real source of strength which now we have in the minority of selectees. I want to insure that in the process of obtaining 59 percent re-enlistments, we do not dilute ourselves by taking men who really should not be allowed to re-enlist. Furthermore, our estimated re-enlistment rate for the next quarter is 66 percent, so the tendency is to go up all the time.

Now let us look inside the people we have, in terms of their mental qualifications. The figures I use were produced by the Department of Defense. We divide our soldiers into four classes in descending order of their mental capacity. Let us look at the extremes, because they are the significant groups. In Class I, the high I.Q. category, the Marines have 4.7 percent of their strength in this category; the Navy 5.5 percent; the Air Force 7.8 percent; and the Army 8.9 percent. We are number one in the "number one" category.

On the other side of the medal are the men whose mental ability make them marginally acceptable. We are not quite so well off here. While we would like to have the smallest figure, actually we have the next to the smallest figure. The Navy has 37.2 percent; next, the Marines with 32.2 percent; and then, the Army with 26.8 percent. The Air Force has only 18.0 percent. Nevertheless, I think those figures are very encouraging. They show that quality-wise our personnel are improving -- there has been progress during the past few years.

The fact that we have had such an increase in our proportion of professionals has many practical advantages to it. It means that next year we will not have to induct and train so many recruits. Thus, we require fewer trainers than would otherwise be engaged. I estimated and reported

to Congress that although our numerical strength is not to go up this next year, we would actually have an Army 30,000 men stronger, because that many men would be saved by the increased professional composition of the Army. We secure real value when we pass from the selectee basis to the professional.

Having reported perhaps a favorable condition, I would not give the impression of any complacency within the Army as to its readiness to execute its roles and missions. We are never sufficiently ready; we are always capable of vast improvement, and we are trying by all means in our power to continue this progress which I have reported.

In the field of personnel, I am particularly in need of your assistance because you represent leaders throughout the country. You have a vast influence in your home areas with which to develop interest in this Army. We are all very proud of it, but unfortunately the Army's activities are largely invisible. With 40 percent of our Army overseas, with many of our activities at relatively remote parts of the country, our people just do not see and understand what we are doing. We need competent interpreters of our roles and missions, people willing to "talk up" our business when we are not around. This will aid the Army in attracting the right kind of people. We need men of all types, descriptions, and capacities.

We need the young men for our six months' Reserve Program. The Army has something to offer a young man who wants to plan his career and know what his future holds for him. Anything you can do to assist him by carrying that word to the parents and to the young men of 17 and 18, will be of great assistance to us. We need your help among the college-age group. There are many fine young men going to college today who are not in the ROTC system. There is always competition in our colleges where there are Navy and Air Force representatives. But we like to feel that on every campus the best boys are represented in the Army ROTC. Assist us here and you will aid in developing that indispensable quality of personnel which the Army needs.

Finally, as the Secretary has already mentioned, we need your help in developing the Corps of Cadets at West Point. Here we need the finest young men we can obtain. There is no crisis with regard to the quality or number in the Corps of Cadets, but the quality can never be too good. I would like to feel that there are 20 competent young men competing every year for each vacancy at the Military Academy.

It has been a great pleasure to describe and discuss the requirements of the Army, and to relate the specific things you have seen here with a broad picture of the Army's responsibilities. I often have occasion to say

that this Army for which the Secretary and I are responsible is not our Army -- it is your Army. It will be only as good as the people of the United States insist that it be. We can do a great deal by our own talent, by our own means within the Service; but we are critically in need of popular support, not just in terms of the dollars for the budget, but sympathetic understanding of the Army's mission today. It is our job in uniform to tell you, and to show you, what we are doing. We hope you will see it, observe it, and report it in that sympathetic way which is indispensable to the progress of our national defense.

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