

ADDRESS BY  
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Ladies and Gentlemen:

At a time when the Federal Budget is very much a current topic, it occurred to me that it might be of some interest to describe to this group the way the Army goes about determining its requirements and allocating its resources. In other words, how do we ~~determine~~ *decide* the best way of applying the resources in men, money, and material, made available to us each year? The Army budget itself tells the story in financial terms but it is a dull and ponderous tome in which only the recondite can find much meaning. Even they, the budget experts, regard it in fiscal line items, such as Pay of the Army, Maintenance and Operations, Military Construction, and that kind of thing. It is very difficult, indeed, for the interested bystander to study the budget -- and have any real idea of what the country is obtaining in terms of military security.

This problem is a very real one for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, who must know what kind of Army with what kind of capabilities a given budget will obtain. They must know this in order to inform themselves, the Department of Defense, and the Congress as to the part the Army may be expected to perform in a given period of time with the assets made available to it.

Obviously, every action in which the Army engages should contribute, directly or indirectly, to the security of our country. All of our resources should in one way or another contribute to "putting blood on the enemy's shirt," in the event of war. Now I know how often we are caught in seeming violation of this cardinal principle. I recall a few years ago the excitement caused by the discovery that the Army had stockpiled a ten-year supply of ping pong balls. The relationship of ping pong balls to the blood-on-the-shirt principle may be a little hard to establish. Whatever the truth about the ping pong ball incident, I would like to tell you a story on my own Eighth Army in Korea -- just to take the curse off my subsequent remarks which might seem to indicate complacency about the discharge of the Army's business.

One rainy day when I was in command of the Eighth Army, I found myself weatherbound in Seoul. So I undertook a tour of several of the depots in the city, beginning with the large Quartermaster Depot. Its contents were a very impressive reminder of the completeness and thoroughness with which the Quartermaster Corps was supporting our

fighting men. But toward the end of my tour I spotted a pile of non-descript material in one corner and inquired of the commander just what was in this particular pile of sacks. "Tobacco stems," he replied. "For Heaven's sake, what are they for?" I queried. "Oh, they're for the homing pigeons." "Homing pigeons? Do they smoke?" "Oh, no, not at all, but our research has developed the fact that at the mating season the homing pigeon is most happy if he has access to a supply of tobacco stems to line his nest. The mating season starts next week."

Needless to say, I was really impressed by the consideration and foresight shown by our logisticians in this particular case. I could see them with their slide rules in the Pentagon estimating the consumption of tobacco stems, ordering with the proper lead time, reserving the shipping space, and moving the tobacco stems half way around the world to arrive in Korea just in time to make the pigeons happy.

On the other hand, I am not particularly impressed with this expenditure of the Army's resources, nor can I establish any direct connection between the morale of the pigeons and the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army. Put on the defensive by my own story, I must add that the Army is a business with assets worth 52 billion dollars, which operates on an annual budget of 8½-9 billion dollars. I'm afraid there are always going to be cases of expenditures which fall into that zone of error *beyond* about the 99.44 percent level which, as Secretary Wilson says, is pretty good for ivory soap but not *line* good enough for Washington.

The Army makes a serious effort to verify each year that its resources are being applied to constructive ends and to identify the funds which support its primary missions. This year we were successful to the degree that Secretary Brucker and I went before Congress prepared to identify, in general terms, the dollars which we sought in terms of the specific combat and defense functions of the Army. We were able to relate our intended allocation of resources to the performance of those essential activities which in their totality represent the Army's contribution to the deterrence of war, or the winning of war if the deterrent fails. I would like to talk to you about the priorities which we followed in developing our plan. These priorities are not preclusive -- that is, none of the activities which I mention can go entirely unsupported. They are all musts but in graduated urgency.

I think it is quite obvious that the Army's first concern must always be for our troops overseas. The Army today has in Europe five divisions constituting the Seventh Army, and in Korea one corps of two divisions as the U.S. part of the Eighth Army. The Army maintains these deployments on an indefinite basis, facing the Communist Bloc along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. These forces are an important part of the deterrent strength of our national defense establishment, for their presence is a

constant reminder that an aggression in these vital areas will be resisted by the armed might of the United States. If war should occur, these forces will immediately be engaged in heavy combat. Obviously, it is our responsibility to see that all provision is made for their support.

This support takes two forms -- first, the assurance that the units are at 100 percent strength in personnel, that they have the best equipment which we can provide, and that they have every advantage in improving their training and assuring their combat-readiness. In addition, we must maintain behind them in Europe and Japan ample reserve stocks of ammunition and essential equipment to permit them to fight successfully in the period which will elapse before reinforcements can reach them from home.

These reinforcements from home are in our Army Strategic Reserve in the United States. We must budget for this stockpile of reserve strength immediately behind the provision made for our deployed forces themselves. Only in a slightly lower priority we place the remainder of our Strategic Reserve forces at home. These comprise nine divisions in all, and are needed not only to reinforce our overseas deployments but to discharge our NATO commitments in case of general war, and to provide the ready forces prepared to meet sudden aggression in other parts of the world.

The Army attaches great significance to these preparations to meet local aggression. It is my feeling, which many I believe share, that with the increasing destructiveness of the atomic stockpiles about the world, the deliberately planned, atomic general war becomes, fortunately, less likely to occur with the passage of time. However, the threat of local aggression is always with us. While one is inclined to believe that the Communist Bloc will avoid general nuclear war, it is yet to be proved that the Communist movement has renounced aggression as a tool of policy. Consequently, it appears to me that it is the small war, the misnamed "brush-fire," which becomes a major threat capable of causing the erosion of the Free World and the loss piecemeal of those things which we are pledged to defend. Furthermore, a local war will be extremely dangerous because of the possibility of its expansion into the unplanned, unwanted general war which is to the interest of the entire world to avoid.

It is for considerations such as these that the Army is bending all its efforts to improve the readiness of its divisions in the Strategic Reserve at home. It is for this reason, also, that the Army is concerned over the mobility of these forces. The Army is dependent upon the Navy for shipping, and upon the Air Force for aircraft, in order to move these forces rapidly about the world. We are most anxious that we do our utmost in lightening our equipment and reducing our tonnages, in order to make our movement less a burden for our sister Services. At the same time, we are constantly urging the importance of our transportation requirements and recommending increased attention to the readiness of our plans and to the effectiveness of our joint training.

In addition to providing support for our overseas forces and for their backup in the Strategic Reserve, the Army should, and does, expend considerable effort in developing indigenous strength in countries which are our allies. The Military Aid Program is not, of course, a part of the Army budget. The Army, however, is vitally concerned with this Program, its size, and in the placing of its emphasis. We make our direct contribution to the Program through the military aid groups and military missions scattered about the world in some 44 countries. Their total numerical strength amounts to only six to seven thousand officers and men. However, they represent a particularly valuable commitment of trained personnel. Necessarily, they must be carefully selected. The head of a military mission must not only be a competent soldier, but he must have personal attributes of tact, diplomacy, judgment, and breadth of view. Although we have not reared our officer corps with this kind of politico-military service in mind, I am often impressed with the fact that we do not do too badly in finding competent people to fill these important jobs. Not only must the senior people be qualified, but all the way down the line to the junior officers and noncommissioned officers, we must have men who are professionally qualified, whose deportment is exemplary, and who can teach without offending -- not always an easy task abroad.

These far-flung responsibilities in many countries have placed a requirement for the development of a cosmopolite army, one accustomed to living abroad, adapting itself quickly to the unusual situations. This requirement has placed a heavy load upon our linguistically-gifted members. We never have enough people who speak foreign languages to fill the jobs where language skill is important. I have often had occasion to emphasize to our young officers, to our cadets at West Point, the tremendous importance of language skill in an officer's career. It will pay any ambitious officer dividends to make the study of one or more foreign languages a life-long hobby.

I think that the extent of the Army's effort in helping to train foreign troops is not generally appreciated. Today, we are training, directly or indirectly, over 200 foreign divisions. In some countries, our Army is intermingled with the local forces, as in Korea. There, on the field of battle, under the fire of the enemy, our Army developed the present Korean Army. As a result, there is a big brother-little brother relationship between these two forces which has great significance militarily, politically, and psychologically. On Taiwan, under somewhat different circumstances, an Army mission assists in the training of the ground forces of Chiang Kai-shek. In Vietnam, our instructors have been making considerable progress in helping to develop sufficient local strength to assure the internal stability of that threatened area. In these countries which I have mentioned, and in many others, the Army effort is directed toward developing, at a minimum, local forces which will provide local stability and some measure of security against Communist

*Internal*

aggression. There is no doubt that these forces contribute to that deterrent effect which is the ultimate object of all of our military efforts.

The foregoing high priority activities have all been directed at developing military effectiveness overseas. We obviously have an important concurrent mission to fulfill at home in continental defense. The provision of anti-aircraft defense is one of the most important missions assigned to the Army. We have had this job for some forty years, during which we have conducted our side of the critical duel between the defensive weapon on the ground and the offensive aircraft in the air. Fortunately, we have always been able to keep a little ahead of the airplane as performances have increased. Ten years ago, the Army gave thought to developing the world's first operational guided missile, NIKE I, which by now has been effective against every type of drone, missile, and aircraft made available to it as targets. Today, the NIKE emplaced around the critical points of our Nation can operate effectively against any currently operational aircraft, regardless of height or speed. Behind this missile, an improved NIKE, the NIKE B, is coming along which anticipates the capabilities of even higher-performance aircraft. I would emphasize that NIKE is not a single weapon, but a family of weapons in which the new evolves naturally from the experience gained with the old. Each new version uses a part of the equipment and sites of the preceding one, so that the family grows with maximum economy.

I would pause here and point out that the forces which I have enumerated thus far have been forces in being. Certainly, in the present era, such forces are more essential than ever before. This fact is recognized by the size of our present military establishment, the largest ever maintained by the United States in time of peace. The Army would be ill-advised, however, if it did not make prudent provision for the organization and training of reserve forces. These forces are necessary in time of war to fill the gaps in our ready forces, which in peace are never in perfect balance, to replace losses, and to provide for the generation of additional strength at a maximum rate. On the other hand, no reserve unit is justifiable if its existence does not permit a telescoping of the time which would otherwise be required to form completely new forces after the initiation of hostilities.

As you know, the Reserve Forces Act passed by the last Congress is now being implemented. The program got off to a slow start primarily because of the time required to publicize its provisions and to get the word to the grass roots. I am happy to report that for the last five weeks, we have been obtaining from 1500 to 1800 recruits each week.



This number is still not as many as we would like, but it is a very encouraging sign and a gratifying reward for the efforts which the Army has put into the program. It is our belief and hope that the best salesmen will be the young men who are alumni of the program. If they return home and tell their friends that this was indeed six months well spent, I would hope that the volume of recruits would materially expand.

In addition to reserves of manpower, the Army must also expend considerable funds in developing stockpiles of war materials. Stockpiling is very expensive business and for that reason must be held to a minimum. I get the impression that some people think we try to accumulate everything that we expect to consume in the course of a war. That, of course, is not the case. The objective of our stockpiling is merely to fill the gap in the logistic system between the initiation of hostilities and the time when new military production can produce end items. Even on this reduced scale, however, the cost is very considerable, and we are obliged to allocate our funds only to those items of real importance.

Related to the stockpile requirement are provisions for expedited war production. As you know, the Army owns plants and equipment, many of which are mothballed awaiting the time when mobilization will require their activation. The justification for this war production base is, again, the telescoping of the lead time of production in contrast to that time required for completely new facilities.

Thus far I have explained the general priorities by which the Army apportions its resources -- first, to the support of its overseas deployments, next, to its Strategic Reserve, third, to the development of indigenous forces and the continental defense, and finally, to those elements of reserve strength which we consider necessary to back up our active Army. I have not discussed one highly important area which must be supported at all costs -- namely, research and development, our insurance against the obsolescence of our equipment, of our organization and tactics, indeed of our ideas. The Army allocates about 4-5% of its annual budget to R&D, and certainly it would be most disturbing if that percentage ever dropped much lower.

Our major development effort today is in the field of missiles in which we have a vital interest. I have already discussed the importance of the surface-to-air missile and the NIKE family. Additionally, we have a vital interest in the surface-to-surface missiles -- an interest which existed in armies before the day David's sling-propelled missile was brought to bear on target Goliath. The incorporation of these modern projectiles with warheads of great firepower and of various guidance systems enables the Army to extend radically the range of its familiar artillery techniques against surface targets. We already have in operation units built around the HONEST JOHN and CORPORAL, and

REDSTONE units are just being formed. The Army's requirement for support from surface-to-surface missiles extends from the front line to any distant target capable of influencing the sustained ground combat for which the Army is responsible. Missiles are vital to us as an important weapon to destroy the ground forces of the enemy, in short, to discharge the primary mission of the Army.

Along with research and development in support of our missile program, the Army spends a considerable part of its available funds to improve its mobility. Military effectiveness depends upon two essential ingredients -- firepower and mobility. Through the missiles, with improved warheads, the Army is developing very destructive firepower. We lag, however, in the field of mobility. I speak, for the moment, not about that mobility which we must borrow from the Air Force and the Navy -- in other words, the strategic mobility for long moves. The kind of mobility which we are seeking by our own means is that internal mobility which results from improved organic vehicles, both surface and air.

I often feel that there is considerable misunderstanding about Army aviation and its objectives. It is in nowise competitive with the roles and missions of the Air Force. It, rather, attempts to obtain for the units of the Army mobility based upon the low-performance, fixed-wing airplane and the transport helicopter. These vehicles do for us in the air what trucks do for us on the ground. They are not formed into an Air Force or an Air Corps, but rather are scattered through eight of our combat arms and services. For example, the Artillery, the Infantry, the Transportation Corps, the Medical Corps all have their need of this type of air transportability to adjust fire, to expedite reconnaissance, to move supplies and to evacuate the wounded. Particularly on an atomic battlefield which, as we visualize it, will be characterized by the great dispersion of units, we will need air transportation for many vital components of the Army system of weapons and equipment.

I have gone through the exercise of listing in a very general order of overlapping priorities the functions and activities which the Army feels must be supported. It then becomes our duty to cost these activities and determine their requirements in terms of men, equipment, and units. By this procedure we hope to verify that we put first things first and hold down on the ping pong balls and tobacco stems. We will never eliminate some factor of error in our extensive business but will stint no effort to get the most defensive strength from the men, money, and materials entrusted to our use.

But we cannot do this <sup>Army</sup> job alone -- the Army will be no better -- will be no more effective in the long run -- than the support which it receives from the country which it protects. This support is more than a matter of budgetary support; it is reflected in interest and sympathetic understanding.

This is YOUR Army which I lead, one in which your forefathers have served and in which your grandsons -- and mine -- will doubtless serve again. The Army is inevitably a reflection of the entire Nation which produces it and in which its manhood serves. It is designed to deter or win war and will succeed in this vital mission only to the extent that this Nation joins us in feeling that a strong and ready Army is one of the most important and essential institutions in our country today.