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ADDRESS BY  
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY  
AT LUNCHEON OF THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB, NEW YORK, N.Y.  
MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1956 -- 1:15 P.M. (EST)

*Corrected to show changes in delivery.*

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GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
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THE ARMY AT HOME AND ABROAD

Gentlemen:

~~I have looked forward to joining you at this luncheon gathering, and I was happy to receive the Union League Club's invitation to speak again to New York friends. Knowing the Union League's sincere and long standing interest in the Nation and its security I appreciate this opportunity to address you concerning your Army.~~

I should like to talk a bit of Army shop with you today. I don't apologize for my subject, because I presume you asked the Chief of Staff because of an interest in the Army for which he shares with you the responsibility. If I appear to thump the Army tub a trifle loudly, bear with me, for I cannot have worn the Army uniform all my life without a sense of pride in the Army and in the Army mission.

In spite of the fact that the Army has been about for some 181 years, during which time it has successfully defended the country in all of its wars, the mission of interpreting the Army is not necessarily an easy one. I often feel, as I travel about the country in the course of my duties, that the Army's purpose is not clearly understood. I remember that when I returned as a cadet from West Point to visit my grandfather, a Civil War veteran, he posed a question which I am sure many citizens ask today, "Son, when there's no fighting going on, what do you soldiers do?" Well, the reply takes a little time and many citizens don't have the time to listen.

One reason that the Army is difficult to explain is its very complexity. It is one of the largest business operations in the world, having capital assets in real estate, supplies, equipment, and various holdings to the value of over 52 billion dollars. The hardware which represents the equipment and supplies in the hands of our troops and in our depots

amounts to about 22 billion dollars, and we have the problem of obsolescence of materiel at an annual rate of over a billion dollars. In terms of personnel, the Army has on its payroll some million soldiers and around 430,000 civilians. It is a global Army, scattered about the world with some 40 percent of it serving overseas in 73 countries. Our current expenditures which support Army operations under conditions of peace such as now exist amount to between eight and nine billion dollars.

The breadth of activities supported by this budget I can illustrate only by giving you a brief travelogue through a few of the areas abroad and at home where the Army is engaged in the defense of the country.

Let me start this travelogue in the Far East. If you were to visit Korea today, you would find a portion of the Army, a reinforced corps, helping our Korean allies to guard the fortified hilltops along the demilitarized zone. In rear of this frontier of freedom, you would find many diverse Army operations, some of which might surprise you. For example, throughout all of rural Korea you would find handfuls of Army soldiers with pieces of heavy engineering equipment engaged in assisting in the rehabilitation of that long-suffering country.

These detachments are assisting Korean civilians in rebuilding schools, churches, hospitals, irrigation projects, repairing bridges and roads, and generally helping not only the government but also the little man to repair the damage of war. While there have been only 20 million dollars allocated to this Armed Forces Aid to Korea Program, it is estimated that the money invested by the United States will produce benefits for Korea totalling more than 60 million dollars. In these operations the Army has contributed engineer and medical supplies, the use of heavy equipment and the over-all supervision which the Koreans could not themselves provide. For their part, the Koreans have contributed raw materials such as lumber and stone, also the unskilled labor which has been necessary for these projects. Thus this AFAK Program has had the great merit of being a cooperative effort between the Armed Forces and the Korean citizens. It has been no give-away, but rather the joining together of friends and neighbors in the spirit of the log rolling days of the American frontier. For this reason, the program has tended to draw the soldier and the civilian together in a comradeship which is unique in those areas where our armies have fought. I am quite sure that the ideological and political effect of this program will far outweigh its material worth.

In Japan, you will find the Army engaged in training its troops and in maintaining depots, ports, and supply facilities necessary to support any recurrence of military activity in the Far East. One important duty is the training mission designed to assist the Japanese in developing their own forces.

On Okinawa, as in Korea, you would find elements of the Army working with Okinawans in an effort to improve the economy of that island. Events frequently remind me how often the Army is charged with repairing the damage of war after participating in a military victory. It has been our lot in Italy, Germany, Austria, Japan, Okinawa, and Korea to implement and support major programs of economic and social rehabilitation designed to restore the areas devastated by the war.

Moving southward to Taiwan you would find members of the Army Military Mission, advising and training the Nationalist Chinese forces on that island. Similarly, further south in Viet-Nam, you would find Army forces preoccupied with the development of native troops capable of deterring further Communist aggression in that area.

As we continue our travels overflying Army missions in Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, we arrive in Western Europe, where the principal strength of the overseas Army is deployed. Here the Seventh Army is a powerful component element of the NATO force. In the Mediterranean area, we have the Southern European Task Force or SETAF organized around HONEST JOHN and CORPORAL missile units. Stationed in Italy, SETAF bolsters the defenses of the southern flank of NATO. In every country of this European area, as in the Far East, you will find Army missions helping to give these countries the capability of defending themselves. We never lose sight of the fact that the United States Army does not want to stay abroad indefinitely, that our goal is to help other people to help themselves and then to come home. I am free to admit that the home-coming date is presently beyond the range of determination.

Now before we return to the United States, let's sum up the meaning of what we have seen abroad. What is the Army doing overseas in the course of the discharge of these varied missions? First and foremost, it is being a deterrent force -- deterring war wherever the Army is deployed. The presence of American troops along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, ready to fight if necessary, is a constant reminder to any potential aggressor that he will be met promptly by an American soldier. That fact is a sobering reminder of the serious consequences which an aggressive

adventure would entail. As an additional deterrent, the Army is creating local strength often in areas where present American military strength does not exist. We hope that these national forces will discourage any aggressor seeking gain without a fight.

The aggregate strength of indigenous and U.S. Army forces in vital strategic areas such as Western Europe must be sufficient to provide a strong forward shield, capable of repelling either a surprise or deliberate attack by Communist bloc armies. Trip wire or token ground forces for this vital mission will not do. They are needed in significant strength to prevent a forward surge of hostile land forces seeking safety from our atomic weapons by a quick intermingling with our defensive units. They are needed to retain the battlefield and the beaten zone of atomic weapons outside ~~of~~ the friendly lands which we are charged to protect. They must be strong enough in defense to gain us the reaction time needed to ready our retaliatory blows against the enemy. Finally, land forces are needed in quantity to convince our allies that their defense does not rest exclusively on the use of heavy atomic weapons but provides other less drastic possibilities more appealing to <sup>allied</sup> the peoples ~~of our allies.~~

~~So, wherever the Army is found, wherever the American flag flies abroad, our allies see that we are willing to share with them the problems of mutual defense.~~

Now take a look at what the Army is doing at home. Here training is our primary business. We expect to give basic Army training to about 320,000 men in the course of the current fiscal year. I might remind you of the tremendous turnover of personnel which faces the Army annually. For example, the Army entered Fiscal Year 1956 with 1,110,000 men. In that year, we lost 460,000 and gained 376,000 ending with a total strength of 1,026,000 men. Just imagine the effect upon your own enterprises if you were forced to turn over almost half of your personnel in one year, and to do that every year.

Not only do we train recruits but we run the schools for everything from the lowest grade, short-term specialty to the requirements for the intellectual and professional development of our senior officers. The Army's educational system embraces a total of 35 schools ranging from West Point to the Army War College with a wide variety of technical and specialist schools in between. A total of 500 courses are taught by these schools from which over 140,000 students graduated during the last fiscal year. These schools also train allied military

students representing some 48 foreign nations. Aside from the professional education which we are giving these many allied officers, there are many collateral benefits. These foreign officers return to their homelands with a better understanding of Americans and of the United States because they have lived with us. In their subsequent careers, ~~some~~<sup>many</sup> of these American trained officers ~~may~~<sup>will</sup> rise to key posts in their own respective governments. Wherever I go about the world, I am met by graduates of the Infantry School, the Artillery School, the Armor School, and the Command and General Staff College who are obviously future leaders in their home countries. Their presence in top positions will augur well for our future intergovernmental relations.

In the United States, the Army is engaged in many logistical activities related to supporting the present Army and preparing for the possible necessities of war. In 65 depots and storage activities, we are storing, processing, distributing, and rehabilitating Army equipment and supplies. In 22 permanent Army arsenals, we are developing weapons and equipment required either today or by the possible exigencies of the future.

But it is to the American industry that the Army looks for the primary quantity source of its hardware. Last year, in factories and similar private enterprises, the Army placed 1.7 million contracts totalling 4.4 billion dollars, representing the current production requirements of the Army. In laboratories and similar enterprises, the Army in the same period has placed almost 2,500 contracts of \$10,000 and over totalling 393 million dollars to support the research and development requirements of the Army of the future.

As we did in the case of the overseas activities, let us pause for a moment and ask ourselves what these complex operations at home represent. By and large, they are designed to create reserve strength to support the Army's requirements in peace and in war. They are activities directed at developing the sinews of war, capable of supporting our national policies today and in the future. They are activities directed at getting the most defense out of the men, money, and materials placed at the disposition of the Army. They are activities aimed at giving us lasting power -- the ability to endure -- if the disaster of war should befall us.

Added together, Army operations abroad and at home, complex and varied as they are, have an extremely simple purpose. In synthesis, they represent the efforts of a million and a half soldiers and civilians all working to develop an Army which will deter war but <sup>which</sup> if the deterrent fails, ~~which~~ is ready to fight.

I doubt that any of us would argue with the statement that in general it is our national objective to assure that our people live securely, prosperously, and <sup>happily</sup> at peace with the world. We have no designs on anyone nor any desire to possess anything in the hands of another nation. Our leaders seek to devise political and economic arrangements capable of bringing happiness to our people but which do not, at the same time, produce violent collisions with other nations <sup>with</sup> bent on similar objectives. Our military forces have the primary mission of deterring the outbreak of war, not only the big kind but the so-called small war as well, because the small war may lead to the big war and the big war <sup>will</sup> not only exterminate the loser but may bring the victor to disaster.

What do I mean when I say that it is necessary for military programs to deter war? I mean that these programs must create in the mind of any potential aggressor the unqualified acceptance of a concept; namely, that aggression <sup>contains</sup> inimical to the interests of the United States and her allies of the Free World will be contested and will lose in the end. If he believes we can beat him ~~if he starts a war~~, he is not likely to start <sup>a war</sup> one. This deterrent concept, in order to be convincing, must be <sup>founded</sup> based on reality; it cannot be mere talk, or bluff, or threat. Instead, it must be based on visible, tangible evidence of our country's military, economic, political, and moral strength in being. It is a visible Big Stick of integrated strength, rather than a heavy tread, which carries conviction.

Furthermore, this military strength, to be effective and impressive, must be balanced strength applicable to any likely situation. By balanced strength I do not mean, as the term is sometimes interpreted, equal strength of Army, Navy, and Air. <sup>It is a balance which</sup> Nonetheless, it should be recognized that too much of one type of strength eventually encounters the law of diminishing returns. Balanced strength means flexible proportioned strength, including military means in various forms appropriate to deter or to fight small wars as well as big wars, <sup>to conduct military operations</sup> wars in jungles or mountains, <sup>ready for</sup> wars in which atomic weapons are used, or ~~wars~~ wars in which atomic weapons are not used. Balanced strength includes the means to put out brush fire wars promptly before they can spread into general war.

I would like to expand upon the danger of situations short of general war as I see it. Following World War II, we understandably bestirred ourselves to prepare against the possibility of nuclear World War III with all of its dreadful implications. In so doing we created a great retaliatory atomic striking force, thoroughly capable of impressing any potential enemy of the consequences to him if he attacked us in similar

proportions. This retaliatory force has undoubtedly done much to maintain the Big Peace -- to restrain general atomic war -- but it has not been sufficient to maintain the Little Peace -- to restrain local aggression. Our predominant strength in the atomic retaliatory field contributed nothing to a favorable decision in the Civil War in Greece, or in the Communist aggressions in Korea and Viet-Nam. It did not restrain the Red infestation of Malaya or deter Communist brutality in Hungary. It is providing no direct assistance to solving the current problems of the Middle East. These facts are a reminder of the possibility of small war situations occurring under the umbrella of mutual deterrence in the massive atomic field and the need for an adequate means of dealing with them quickly. For, if undeterred or unsuppressed quickly, they present the hazard of running into the Big War which it is our purpose to avoid.

It is this so-called small war danger or "one alarm fire" requirement that rests heavily on the conscience of the Army. To discharge its responsibilities in this respect the Army maintains a Strategic Reserve at home. This force of several divisions is ready at all times for prompt deployment to any place where local aggression may occur because the limited war must be stopped quickly and effectively before it grows into the general war which we seek to avoid. To improve its readiness for movement, we streamline everything from the plans for its operations to the design of its organizations and equipment.

*Related to readiness to meet local aggression*  
I have already alluded to the work of the Army in ~~helping to~~ develop the forces of our allies. It performs an important role in helping to teach the indigenous forces of 44 free countries how to use and maintain the equipment made available under the military aid programs, and in assisting them to develop over 200 combat divisions. While this effort is creating strength in many areas where a power vacuum would otherwise exist, it is a time-consuming process which will require men, effort, and patience for a considerable time. But it all represents an important contribution to deterrence.

Behind the active Army units at home and abroad, the Nation requires an effective reserve of civilian soldiers. Since the United States can never afford to have, in being, all of the military units required for a total military effort, it must possess a back-up of reserve units and individuals ready for emergency employment. In contrast to World Wars I and II, however, any ~~next~~ <sup>future</sup> conflict of equal proportion would not allow us the luxury of arming deliberately behind the protection of ~~our~~ allies. Hence, the Army makes continuing efforts to improve the readiness of the Reserve Components, represented by the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

Another important deterrent role which the Army plays is in the area of anti-aircraft defense. Regular Army and National Guard units are on 24-hour guard around New York as well as at other major cities and centers. We are constantly trying to improve the weapons which would destroy enemy airplanes attacking our homeland. You all have heard of the NIKE missile, one of the few operational guided missiles that we know about in the world today. It is capable of finding and tracking down aircraft with the relentlessness of a bloodhound and with an intelligence almost human. This missile is only the start of a family of anti-aircraft missiles which we hope will make our skies so inhospitable as to discourage attack by any potential aggressor. The Army, a pioneer in missile development, makes wide use of American science and industry in order to improve these powerful weapons. Progress in missiles is progress in deterrence.

I have talked at some length about the war-preventive effect of the Army. It might well be asked how deterrent strength is related to winning strength, the ability to fight successfully if the deterrent fails and war ensues. It might be assumed that those elements which contribute to ~~deterrent~~ <sup>winning</sup> strength are also those which give ~~winning~~ <sup>deterrent</sup> strength, but that is not always the case. Our over-all military potential is somewhat like an iceberg which, as it floats in the Arctic Sea, presents only about a ninth of its body above the surface of the water. It is this visible ninth which warns the mariner and induces him to change his course. In the same way, it is only a certain portion of our military establishment which is visible to an enemy or is knowable to him which induces him to adjust his course of action in our favor. Our winning strength is represented by that deeper, submerged part of the iceberg which is not seen but from which we draw strength for the long pull. This strength is concealed in our atomic igloos, in our factories, in our economic and industrial and financial structure, in our political code and governmental organization, yes, and most importantly, it is concealed in the hearts and the wills of our citizens. Only insofar as this strength can be divined does it contribute to deterrence. Thus, deterrent strength is not entirely synonymous with winning strength; provision must be made for both; both require special study and analysis in order to assure that in proper combination they provide security for our Nation.

Finally, I would ~~not wish to talk today as though~~ <sup>emphasize the thought that</sup> military strength ~~does not~~ <sup>does not</sup> provide the sole deterrent to war. Our military deterrent strength will be of little value if other peoples are not firmly convinced that we have the will and capability to use it, wherever necessary, to defend the principles

for which we stand. It will be difficult to convey this impression if we do not have real convictions on important issues and the unfeigned intent to support those convictions. We cannot be fence-sitters with respect to world issues if we are to impress others with our firmness of purpose. Hence, a general understanding of the purposes of our government is an indispensable contributor to our over-all deterrent posture. There must be no doubt in our own minds as to what we stand for, what we live for, and what we will fight for.

If we have this understanding of our national problems, it is quite likely that we will be willing to bear the burdens which are implicit in our deterrent military program. The burden of security is not presently light nor will it be materially lightened by any wonder weapon or device which I know about. We are facing a long period of tension wherein our deterrent posture must be maintained even if at great effort. We have assumed responsibilities in world leadership which we cannot put down. In the terms of the athletic field we must be in training throughout the entire year -- not for a season but this year, next year, and henceforth for the indefinite future. The maintenance of national security is not a seasonal ~~sport~~ *exercise*.

The deterrence of war in this age of high yield weapons is the greatest challenge that this Nation has ever faced. It is no longer a task that can be entrusted solely to the soldier, the statesman, or the diplomat, because the deterrence of conflict rests on the concerted efforts of all Americans. If we are to deter the great catastrophe of another world conflict, we can do so only by the unified efforts of all of us -- each contributing according to his station. Only by merging all of our strength -- military, economic, political, and moral -- in harmonious and effective combination, can we ensure the future of America and the peace of the world. Militarily this integrated effort requires not one single form of military force, but a tri-dimensional balance of forces applicable to objectives on land, at sea, and in the air. It demands a political-military strategy flexibly adjusted to the needs of unforeseen situations, not geared to any single weapons system or a single concept of future war. In short it should embrace all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war, and at the same time contain the potentiality of waging any war, large or small, in such a way as to achieve our national objectives. It is in such an integrated national strategy that the Army prepares itself to play ~~an~~ <sup>any</sup> essential part.

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