

*Edited Transcript of Remarks*  
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Distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen. I should confess at the outset that I came to this meeting not to bring you answers to all of your questions, but to have you tell me how to solve some. I can assure all of you who have been discussing matters of national defense, and their diversified implications, that you are studying in a field in which I also have a tremendous interest. Therefore, I hope that you have arrived at a conclusion which I think you should; namely, that there are many difficult questions in this area for which there are no present, final answers. So it is with humility that I appear before you tonight to talk about some aspects of national defense as I see them as Chief of Staff of the Army. I am going to talk very informally and hope that we can extend our discussion later, because I feel that the close meeting of minds on these subjects is far more profitable in the long run than any formal disposition.

A short time ago, Mr. Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense, boarded a plane for Augusta, Georgia, to take to the President his budget -- his recommended budget for the fiscal year of 1958. Mr. Wilson's budget represents the bill which he proposed to the President as the price of national security for another fiscal year. I can assure you that his brief case was heavy. Now, what he was

doing is no more than what other Secretaries of Defense are doing throughout the Western World -- or throughout the Eastern World, for all I know -- in presenting to their government leaders, and eventually their countries, the heavy price of security, or what approximates security in the times in which we live.

Today, many countries are making soul-searching examinations of their national military programs. They are doing so in an atmosphere which is unusual, in fact, unique in the history of governments. In the first place, throughout the Western World government leaders are aware of the complexities of military technology, the mounting costs of weapons and weapons systems which are becoming possible, and perhaps indispensable, in the arsenals of the nations concerned. They see the price which must be paid to keep modern -- if that is the word -- in the area of national defense. And they see it in relationship to all of the other requirements in running governments and balancing budgets.

Our friends in the Western World who face these problems also are disturbed by serious questions involved in determining the type of war for which to prepare, or in other words, what kind of menace threatens us in military terms? It should be a question which we in uniform could answer, but unfortunately we cannot; for we see so many variations and possibilities requiring different types of responses, responses which differ both politically and militarily. Shortly after World War II when the atomic weapon suddenly appeared as a reality with which we had to cope, there was a tremendous concentration in this country,

and perhaps to a lesser degree elsewhere, on the fact that we had to prepare ourselves to meet the atomic threat. This country expended billions of dollars to become extremely strong in the atomic field. Our allies shared our pre-occupation and encouraged us in our efforts to strengthen ourselves in this all-important area. But in the meantime, since 1945, events have occurred which have raised serious questions at home and abroad as to the ultimate effectiveness of our military program. It became apparent that although the "big peace" had been kept since 1945, the "little peace" had not. Since World War II there have been at least 12 small wars, seven of which involved the Communist bloc. While our great efforts to prepare ourselves in the atomic field resulted in the continuation of world peace in the general sense, it was not sufficient to maintain peace in many quarters of the globe. We only have to think of Greece, Korea, Viet-Nam, of the Middle East today, and the tragedy of Hungary.

Now, in addition to the obvious fact that peace has not been maintained by concentration on atomic weapons since World War II, our statesmen who deal in national defense and face the difficult decisions also are reminded of a new development. I would refer to this development as the growing condition of mutual deterrence in the atomic weapons field. It becomes more and more apparent to us and to our friends and our allies that the Soviet bloc also is moving forward rapidly in developing a capability of destruction similar to our own.

That thought is a basis for meditation not only here, but in every capital of the Western World. We and our friends see that as we approach a situation where, let us say, N atomic weapons delivered means destruction to either bloc, the possession of 2 N weapons does not materially change the situation. Yet the knowledge that a potential enemy has N weapons certainly will bear heavily upon our diplomatic and political posture as well as our reaction in time of crisis. Consequently, our friends abroad, particularly our allies in Europe, are faced with two difficult considerations. First, if atomic weapons are used by one side or the other under this condition of mutual deterrence, our allies see very little encouragement for them other than possible annihilation between the upper and the nether millstone. On the other hand, as our allies see it, the opposite extreme may occur -- the case that the United States and the Soviet Union will be reciprocally deterred by the danger of mutual destruction with the result that these weapons may never be used. Hence, the outcome would have to be decided essentially by those conventional weapons from which our allies believe we have turned away. So, our friends can see the condition arising in which the West will not be inclined to respond unless a very high level of provocation has been reached -- a level which they fear may be too high to assure the protection of their own countries.

As a result of these considerations of uncertainty as to the type of war for which to prepare, the rising cost of weapons, and the uncertainty as to the

effectiveness of our atomic deterrent, there is great uneasiness throughout the West. Foreign ministers and defense ministers are trying to decide how to tackle these very difficult problems. And I hope you ladies and gentlemen realize how involved and how intricate some of these questions are.

Now I am here tonight, not to offer you a solution, but rather to suggest an approach to some of the problems of national security which we have at home, and abroad. If I were asked to define this approach, I would describe it as the establishment of a national defense policy based upon what I would call "balanced deterrence." If you will go along with me for a moment, I will develop the line of thought which would guide such a program of deterrence.

I think that all of us would agree that the greatest disaster that could befall the world would be Atomic World War III in which weapons of great destruction were used without restriction by both the Western and the Communist blocs. If we agree, then, that our national military policy should have as its purpose the deterring of such a general war, we can move on to the next point and say that as both sides approach equality in destructive ability, certainly neither side will deliberately and knowingly embark on direct atomic attack as a matter of national policy.

But I, for one, do not believe for a moment that because we accept that fact, we can say then the Soviet World will renounce aggression as a matter of policy. We have seen too much of the Communists; we have seen how they have

grown up in an atmosphere of subversion. They were born of conspiracy, and the indirect method fits far more to their psychology and their general technique than does direct military action. I think that we can say safely that in most cases they decided on direct military action only when they thought it was the easy and the natural way to do so. They have never taken warfare as an overt method of accomplishing a purpose doubtful of accomplishment. So I would say that it is a non sequitor to believe that because conditions now discourage general atomic war we cannot anticipate Communist aggression in different forms such as subversion or the underhanded technique of infiltration, the coup d'etat, and actions short of general war.

Our next step, then, would be to design a national military policy which not only must deter the general atomic war but also must deter any form of aggression less than general war or defeat it quickly if deterrence fails. I stress the importance of quick suppression because of the obvious danger that the local war may easily expand into that great atomic holocaust which it is our over-all purpose to avoid. To sum up the general philosophy of deterrence, our military forces should be so designed that they deter general war by their obvious readiness to retaliate, and that they include quick and ready means to meet those conditions short of general war which are much more likely to occur than is direct recourse to general war.

Now if you have followed me this far, and I hope you have, then let us

stand back and ask ourselves, "What kind of military forces should we construct which are consistent and compatible with the philosophy of deterrence I have outlined?" I do not think any of us would argue for a moment with the primordial need for a strong atomic retaliatory force in being, obviously ready to go. We have such a force today. It is made up of that very efficient and competent Strategic Air Force which General LeMay commands, ready to go at any time. It is supplemented by our naval forces, the carrier task forces with their airplanes capable of delivering atomic weapons. Eventually missiles, both mid-range and long-range, will reinforce the bombers. And finally, included at the present time, are the air forces in Europe and the other parts of the world which also are ready to extend the range or to reinforce the Strategic Air Force -- in the aggregate a tremendously powerful force in being, ready for action; and it must always be that way.

Related to the atomic air retaliatory forces are those means we have in the United States to insure against surprise attack. I am reminded of the great disaster at Pearl Harbor when our fleet was attacked by surprise. I can remember the impact of that day very vividly, as I was on duty in the Chief of Staff's office as a major. But a far greater disaster would be to have a surprise attack ever eliminate or seriously weaken our air retaliatory force here in the United States. Hence, before we pass from this category of forces, I would refer to our need to defend our retaliatory force against surprise. In our Continental

Air Defense Command we have the means to do just this.

That command is made up of several important components. First, the Air Force provides manned interceptors as its contribution to the defense of the United States. Another very important element, and one which is growing in importance, is the Army contribution of its antiaircraft units which are increasingly becoming surface-to-air missiles. At the present time, these missiles are the so-called NIKE I or NIKE-AJAX, which was the missile we started developing right after World War II, and which became the first operational missile in the Free World. The NIKE-AJAX is being replaced progressively by a new version which will fly higher and carry atomic warheads. Thus, the defense of the United States by missiles is increasing constantly.

In addition to the airplane and the missile elements of our continental defense, we have an indispensable adjunct in the warning service located well to the North and out to sea. The radar stations manned by the Air Force in the Arctic coupled with the radar-carrying ships of the Navy provide the timely warning essential to air defense. Altogether, airplanes, missiles, and warning service add up to form a force structure essential to avoid surprise and to prevent the quick destruction of our retaliatory force.

In addition to the deterrent forces I have mentioned, we must also have deterrent strength on the ground. These forces are represented largely, although not entirely, by Army forces; and they are in two categories. We must have our

overseas deployments -- our divisions in Europe, and our divisions in the Far East. Our combat-ready units in Europe are particularly important, because they provide the hard core for the NATO defense of Western Europe. In addition, they assure that any surprise movement on the ground will be met at once by the armed might of the United States; and the very fact of their being there convinces our NATO friends that we are prepared to share the hazards of living under the Communist guns. In the Far East, in Korea we have a related situation in which we stand shoulder to shoulder with our Korean friends facing three quarters of a million armed Communist troops. Here again our troops are a constant reminder that further aggression in that important strategic area will be met at once by our forces on the ground.

In addition to our Army forces facing the points of possible strategic danger in the areas I have mentioned, we must have here in the United States mobile, ready forces prepared to go anywhere, at any time, to meet a Communist threat of aggression. Recent events in the Middle East have reminded us of our vulnerability to the requirements -- unscheduled, unplanned, and unexpected -- which demand the rapid projection of strength on the ground to threatened spots around the world. For that purpose, as we list the deterrent forces we must maintain, we must include here in the United States a strong, strategic Army force, ready to go by sea or by air, or any combination thereof, to respond quickly to the challenges of unexpected aggression.

Also, to get to these critical areas we must, of course, control the seas and the air. I have already mentioned the Navy's important contribution as a supplement to the atomic deterrent capability in terms of its carrier forces. The Navy has a very difficult problem in the growing submarine threat; however, this submarine fleet is more of a general war threat since no country other than Russia can threaten our sea lanes. At the same time, we look to the Navy to keep the sea lanes open for us, not only in time of general war, but also to insure the unrestricted movement of commercial type shipping so that we can go rapidly to our destination in situations short of general war.

Now before we end the listing of the types of forces we must buy in order to have the deterrence which I think is essential, we cannot fail to think in terms of our allies overseas. Particularly in the deterrence of local aggression, there are many countries in which it is in our best interests to give a certain modicum of local strength whereby these countries can maintain internal order or at least put up some resistance. Our military aid program, then, must be related to our national military program because together they make a coherent plan or pattern which represents a thoughtful balance of deterrence of the kind which I am discussing. Our allies overseas contribute not only manpower and equipment but also, in many countries, the sites where we must have bases if we are going to utilize our weapons and our own forces to maximum capability. Thus, the forward strategy which is related to having loyal allies who contribute according

to their means is an indispensable part to the program of balanced deterrence.

Now let me pause for a moment to recapitulate and remind you of the elements which I think are necessary to our national military program. We must have a strong, ready, retaliatory air capability. We must protect that, reasonably at least, by the Continental Air Defense of the United States. We must have ground deterrent forces deployed in areas which are of greatest strategic interest, these forces being backed up by those which are ready to go to areas where the threat cannot be constantly anticipated. We must have sea and air forces capable of keeping open the sea and air lanes overseas so that we can reach those points to which we may have to project our military strength. And finally, we are very much interested in having allies who can look after themselves and can join with us, if necessary, in their own defense or contribute to deterrence of aggression elsewhere beyond the confines of their own country.

In our military discussions in the Pentagon and elsewhere, it is quite easy to get agreement on the types of forces required for deterrence. However, to have these forces there must be an adequate allocation of national assets. The hard nutcracking comes when it becomes a question of meeting all the requirements within a finite budget which falls well below the total bill generated by these requirements. I again repeat, I have no complete solution to this, but I would like to talk through an approach which I believe is a reasonable way of deciding where our dollars should be spent, or in other words, where the emphasis should fall.

Let us go back to the number one item, our strategic air retaliatory force.

Is there any way to say how much is enough in that important area? I would say we have never agreed as to what is enough, but I maintain that it is not at all impossible to evaluate sufficiency in this area or, indeed, in any other military area. It is quite true that this evaluation may not be entirely correct and facts may prove us wrong in matters of exact percentages. However, I am reminded, based upon the engineering education which the Military Academy gave me, that there are few problems in which a slide rule does not help. When the engineer starts to build a bridge, he evaluates all the stresses and strains, the winds, and the various things which might affect that bridge. Then he adds them all up to be certain that his material will meet those requirements. Next, he will pull out of a hat a sound factor of safety, such as three, and put it in and say, "That for my money is enough, and I will stake my reputation and that of my company that the bridge will stand." I think we can take a similar approach to most of our military problems. It is entirely possible for us -- knowing the tremendous destructive power of our present atomic and nuclear weapons, the hazards of delivery, the chances of human error, and other related factors -- to determine the necessary equation to destroy the enemy by that particular weapons system. Then, I would be quite willing to multiply that figure by two or three or four, or any other reasonable factor, and end up with a computation which I feel would give us a reasonable estimate of adequacy.

Probably the most difficult area in which to reach a formula for sufficiency is in the second category of forces, namely, our Continental Air Defense. How much should we spend year after year on the chance that we may be attacked by air? Well, certainly we should spend enough to insure that we have an effective deterrent to a surprise air attack -- there is no question about that. In evaluating the hazards of attacking the United States, a potential enemy should have to ask himself what the price in bombers will be. How many will get through? Will they be enough to do the job to the point that he does not have to fear the United States anymore? Certainly we must have adequate defenses so that the answer in the enemy's mind should reveal a cost so great that in view of all the other factors which discourage him, he will find no solace in the openness of the skies of the United States. But, on the other hand, it is quite easy to let air defense requirements snowball to the point where we should defend every hamlet and village in the United States with the tremendously expensive air defense weapons which we have. This, I would say, is perhaps the most difficult field in which adequacy can be evaluated in terms other than just good common sense. We must have something; we must have considerable. But it would be a great error, in my judgment, to overextend ourselves in this purely passive form of military defense.

In respect to the ground deterrence which I have mentioned, I think it is fairly easy to say that insofar as our overseas deployments are concerned, we

have about enough now. We have five divisions in Europe and three divisions in the Far East. It seems to me that those forces are enough to encourage our allies to match them in terms of the necessary standard of military readiness and proficiency. To reduce the number of divisions to any degree would be a tremendously shaking event. Certainly we have seen in recent months in Germany, for example, how Chancellor Adenauer reacted to the speculation that there might be a substantial decrease in our overseas deployments.

With regard to our strategic mobile reserve at home, we certainly need to have a substantial number of divisions -- four, five, six, something of that order -- ready to go, so that the Korean-type war can be met quickly and far more efficiently than we did in the case of Korea. I often have occasion to say that the Communists in choosing Korea for attack picked probably the only portion of the earth's surface where we could respond in time. We could respond because of the proximity of our forces in Japan, unready as they were. It would be folly to gamble on such a situation happening again. Consequently, the maintenance of real readiness on the part of a good hard corps of striking forces here in the United States is an indispensable part in reaching adequacy in deterrence.

With regard to the requirements of sea deterrence, certainly the growing threat of the Soviet submarine force gives our Navy a fairly good measure of what they might have to face, some idea of general war requirements. The sea deterrence requirement for general war, I think, is sufficient because the

requirement for conditions short of general war hardly exposes us to any threat of the loss of control of the seas.

Turning to the question of how much is enough in helping our allies to build their own deterrent strength, I can only cite what we have done thus far. It is very substantial. From 1950 to 1956 the military aid program has amounted to 19 billion dollars, and in the NATO area 12.5 billion dollars of the over-all figure. Certainly, judging our aid program by hindsight, we perhaps could have done better. But I am tremendously impressed, as I go about the world, with the strength-in-being resulting from our military aid program. Today, the Army itself is engaged in training or assisting in the training of over 200 foreign divisions, a very significant force. Consequently, sometimes when we say that the enemy has us outnumbered on the ground by such a margin that we could not compete with them, we are wrong. It just is not so. We have very substantial strength on the ground. The main question is do we have the will and the desire to use it?

Now, I have just stepped very briefly through the consideration of how much is enough in allocating our resources to these categories of forces which I feel are necessarily part of our military program. I will just point to one or two additional significant facts. At the outset I made the statement that the great threat in the terms of probability is not the big deliberate war, but something short of the big war -- something which might well lead to the big war. However,

only a small proportion of our budget and our efforts go specifically to meet the threat of conditions short of general war. Let me remind you, the Strategic Air Command with all of the supporting forces capable of striking the Soviet Union with an all-out atomic effort is a primary deterrent to general war. However, considering the numerous local wars in the past decade, I pose the question: How much does it contribute to conditions short of general war?

Let us take our Continental Air Defense. Although it is an important deterrent to general war, not a dollar we spend on it contributes one cent to our ability to react to situations short of general war. Nobody but the Soviet Union can send a plane against us. Similarly, our deployments overseas -- the Army in Europe and in the Far East -- are only limited contributions to conditions short of general war. We can detach forces from these locations to peripheral areas, but they are not deployed specifically for that job. Similarly, the part of the Navy which is designed to counter the very serious general war threat of the submarine adds little to the requirements for conditions short of general war. So far as I can determine, ladies and gentlemen, as I analyze our military budget, only a relatively minor proportion of it can be found to apply specifically and purposely to suppress situations short of general war. I raise the question whether that is an ample allocation of resources. You perhaps will ask me, "Why is that the case?" I would answer that it is because of a certain doctrine or approach which I call "the doctrine of

the worst possible case." It has a certain emotional attraction to it, as you will appreciate as I state the doctrine. It runs as follows: Since general atomic war is the worst thing that can happen to us, if we prepare for that we should be ready to take care of anything less than that. Well, that is a little bit like a doctor who says that since tuberculosis is the worst of all diseases, if I have one medicine that cures tuberculosis, it will take care of the common cold. However, it just does not turn out that way; and a little reflection, I believe, will indicate that is the case. If we prepare only for the worst possible case, we will buy more big bombers, we will buy more big bombs, and we will put more into continental defense. Furthermore, here at home we will disperse our people from the cities and go into igloos. We will live underground; we will stockpile great stocks against the losses we anticipate from bombing attack. We will do all of these things which will completely channelize our efforts to the point where we are muscle-bound in this one single area of deterrence, and which may still fail to deter the local war.

Let me remind you what the effects of that will be, if we follow that line of thinking to a logical conclusion. Our allies, our friends overseas, are very observant of what we do. If they see that we are preparing for that kind of war, this strategy will hold no attractions for them. It invites them to the neutralism which results from the fear of the consequences of our making a fortress out of America and ceasing to interest ourselves in the direct protection

of their homeland. With the loss of allies, it will be the end of forward strategy and the institution of the concept of "Fortress America."

Now in closing, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to pull together a few remarks which I think are implicit all the way through my comments. I believe there is an approach which is not astronomical in its financial implications to defending America and to defending the Western World. It is believing in and buying balanced deterrence. It is believing that it is important to examine everything we do so that we relate our activities to deterring war and winning war only as a last resort. It is believing and showing our belief by execution that those things we do, those forces we put into our military structure, are aimed primarily at convincing the enemy that direct attack will not pay. Also it is convincing the enemy that even the small aggression will be promptly suppressed. Meanwhile, we must convince ourselves that the safety of the world is not at the water's edge of the United States, but project ourselves forward in a common alliance to which we contribute according to our means and according to our capacities. In doing this we will erect a homogeneous body of military, economic, political, and ideological strength capable of resisting whatever may befall us. Above all, I believe that here in the United States our military policy must never be tied to a single weapon, to a single weapons system, to a single concept of war. Rather, we must maintain a flexibility of strength so that we can respond adequately

with appropriate means regardless of the challenge presented to us. That to me is the policy of "balanced deterrence"; such a policy gives the indispensable strength to our leaders so that they might choose the right response at the right time, and at the right place.

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