

31 + E Film
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MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY

COLONEL HORNER: General Taylor, we're certainly honored to have you with us this afternoon. Our curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College devotes some time to the study of the organization, missions, capabilities and limitations of each of the Armed Services -- the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. We feel that a complete understanding -- basic understanding -- of each of the Armed Services is essential to the education of a Joint Staff Officer.

Our discussion this afternoon concerns the Mission of the United States Army.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Gentlemen, I'm very glad to have a chance to have this discussion with you. I always enjoy this kind of thing. I'm quite sure that what I'm going to tell you is not news, but I would like to make a sort of general, preliminary statement, which will outline the philosophy of the Army as it approaches the discharge of its mission as a part of the Tri-Service Team.

I think the more we reflect upon the nature of future war, particularly of general atomic war, the more we are convinced that no party can really win in such a conflict and consequently, that the purposes of all the Services should be primarily the prevention of that war -- the deterrent to war. I hear that

word "deterrent" used more and more in our serious discussions of the Roles and Missions of the Services.

So I would say that first, then, everything that the Services do -- and certainly everything the Army does -- should contribute directly or indirectly to the deterrence of this great atomic war. I think we all agree on that, but there is a corollary to it that sometimes I don't believe is entirely appreciated -- that, as the obvious lack of "profit" (for want of a better term) to either side in general atomic war becomes very clear, that neither party is likely to embark deliberately upon general atomic war. On the other hand, I for one, am not willing to say that this means that militant dynamic Communism will give up aggression as a deliberate instrument of policy. I would rather expect to see the Communists continue to push in the soft spots about the world, using subversion, coups d'etat, political infiltration, and actions short of general war as a means for expanding the sphere of their power. So I would say that the corollary that flows from the increased infallibility of general atomic war emphasizes the danger of action short of general war. And, furthermore, I would say that our preparations must be geared to the deterrence of that kind of thing, or the suppression of that kind of thing, as a matter of primary importance, because obviously, if we can't arrest this kind of nibbling aggression, we may lose the free world piece-meal. Or, if we try to suppress it by half measures, it may

smoulder and grow into this great conflagration we are so anxious to avoid. So I stress, in talking to our Army Programmers, the need to verify that we're ready to react promptly, with a minimum of time, to this kind of action short of general war.

I feel that we must increase Army mobility, aided by the Air Force, aided by the Navy, so that we can get to these trouble spots very quickly. And I don't put the problem of this mobility only on the sister Services to help us. We, in the Army, at the same time must streamline our organization, streamline our equipment, to make our mobility easier and our requirements less onerous on the other Services. So much for what I would call the "general philosophy" which we put behind our Army Program.

Now you ask about the Army Mission. Well, if I were to try to define the Mission of the Army in minimum words, I would probably say that the Army exists to defeat enemy land forces and gain control of the land and of its people.

Now let me go back and pick up two or three of those phrases and amplify just a moment. I would say first: Emphasize that we are talking about enemy forces -- that the objective of the Army is to destroy the enemy armies. As we look at the modern weapons which we have in the Army which include, of course, atomic weapons, we're impressed with the great destructiveness of those weapons. In almost any situation I can imagine, we will be going to help our friends. Consequently, the great importance of selectivity, of being able to adapt our weapons to the require-

ments of a given situation, argues for me a great spectrum of weapons; a yield so that we will be assured of having the appropriate size for the appropriate situation.

Another phrase which I would like to underline in the Army Mission is "enemy land forces." The enemy of the American Army is the enemy army, wherever found. I say that because sometimes there is a reluctance to concede the primary interest of the American Army in the hostile army off the battlefield, let's say. There's been a tendency to confuse "strategic" and "tactical" as meaning -- "tactical" of interest to the Army, "strategic" as interest to the Air Force or to the Navy. I don't agree with that interpretation, frankly, although I will add quickly the recognition of the fact that the more distant armies -- army type forces -- will often be the target of the Air Force, or of the Navy, because Army weapons will not reach those particular forces. But I'm always very naturally interested in increasing the range of Army weapons, so that we can strike distant targets, at least farther away from our immediate front than we ever have in the past. Hence our great interest in missiles!

Now, the final phrase in that mission -- which I will repeat again -- "to defeat enemy land forces and gain control of the land and its people." The final phrase I want to underline is "control of the land and its people." I feel there's something particularly conclusive or definitive about the action of the

Army in the ultimate stages of any war. Regardless of the nature and the duration of the preliminaries which will precede the final action which ends the war -- regardless of those characteristics -- the Army Mission finally has that conclusive character of closing with the enemy, of sitting on the final source of his war-making capabilities, which is his homeland. Hence, whatever the Army may have contributed to placing itself finally in the enemy homeland, of course, is important, but the ultimate conclusive sign of victory is the occupation of enemy land and the subjugation of the hostile people.

I believe that's a rather long preliminary, gentlemen, but I wanted to get that off my chest, just as a springboard. I'm sure I've said some things many of you don't agree with, and I hope you'll come back at me hard.

COLONEL HORNER: We certainly thank you very much for a very clear picture of what you feel the Army to be today. I have the first question here, I think, which concerns the problem that confronts us at the Staff College all the time, comes up every class and that is: Which is going to occur -- which is most likely to occur -- limited war or a general war. Would you expand a little on that point, Sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I think I rather anticipated your question in my initial statement. Certainly, it seems to me that we are approaching a period of mutual deterrence. By that I mean that both sides evaluate the probable striking power of the opposite

atomic -- air atomic -- capability, and conclude rather quickly that there can be no real profit gained from a general exchange of atomic blows. It's entirely possible, however, that you can back into an atomic war by a series of actions and interactions preceding a deliberate decision which, indeed, may not be deliberate, but rather a desperate act of fear, trying to anticipate a hostile act -- a hostile initiation of this kind of thing.

So one can see, there's certainly possibilities, but by and large, on balance, as a deliberate decision, certainly I would not anticipate any power deliberately to initiate general atomic war. On the other hand, situations much less than general war are going to arise all the time; We have one in Suez right at the present moment. So, on the basis of probability, I would answer -- something less than general war is more probable. But we certainly cannot give up any preparation which might deter the great general holocaust.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Blakefield, I believe you have a question.

COLONEL BLAKEFIELD: General, is the kind of military strength for local aggression, or a limited war, the same type of military strength we would need to win a general war?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I'm glad you asked that question, because I frequently encounter the view that if we prepare for the worst possible case, namely the general atomic war,

we've prepared for everything. Now, in my opinion, unhappily, that is not the case, because if you analyze the requirements for the two, you will see that they do not necessarily super-impose, one on the other.

In a case of general war, what do we need? Well, of course, we need a powerful SAC, -- Strategic Air Force. We need to be able to deliver very rapidly a very heavy atomic blow. In addition to that, we could use almost unlimited resources allocated to Continental defense to prevent the success of the enemy bombers. Added to that, we would need billions, perhaps, for civil defense, in order to make ample provision for disaster in many communities. Likewise, we could justify a large expenditure for stockpiling in anticipation of bomb damage. Those would be the main areas of our effort, if we knew the next war is going to be the big atomic war.

Now, let's consider the local aggression. What do we need there? Well, in the first place, we need local indigenous strength as created, generally speaking, on the ground. Our efforts in that field are reflected by our Military Aid Program. Next, we need highly mobile forces, ready to move quickly into the area of threatened aggression. That means all Services are involved in that kind of force, the Air Force particularly being of the tactical Air Force type rather than the heavy bomber. So you see, by that very quick analysis there's a great difference between the requirements of the

big war and the little war. I would point out, however, there's nothing of use in the little war not applicable to the big war, but the reverse is not true.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Wimsatt.

COLONEL WIMSATT: General, despite some facts to the contrary, there seems to be a growing feeling of invincibility attributed to the armies of Soviet Russia, China, and the Satellite countries. Some of our allies believe that possibly we could not counter and defeat these armies. What are your views with regard to the Army being able to counter and defeat the land army of the enemy?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I don't share that feeling of the hostile invincibility, for a minute. I saw enough of these fellows in Korea to know that they're not invincible by any manner of means. For example, when the war ended some twenty-two equivalent divisions on our side, including Americans, United Nations, and Koreans, had licked to a standstill about three times that many Communist divisions. I wouldn't suggest that that's necessarily a formula for equating military strength, but there's nothing invincible about these people, if we have the will to create the necessary ground forces.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Lloyd.

COLONEL LLOYD: This is a related question, General. How does the manpower of the West -- trained manpower -- compare with that of the Communist world?

GENERAL TAYLOR: If we're correctly informed -- and, of course there are wide gaps in our knowledge about the Communist world -- the Communists definitely have a head count advantage. The head count, of course, isn't the whole story. Quality, as I implied by my reply to the previous question, is far more important than numbers. But I would point out that we -- the United States Army and the other Services -- are working, developing indigenous strength of our Allies. In the case of the Army, we are training, directly or indirectly, over two hundred friendly divisions. That's a very sizeable force, but it still doesn't match the division count probably of the Communists, but it's still a very sizeable, off-setting ground force.

COLONEL HORNER: Commander Nuttman.

COMMANDER NUTTMAN: General, if international agreements are ever reached banning all use of nuclear weapons, to what extent would the Army's combat capabilities be effected?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It would, of course, be reduced, because we are planning to use atomic weapons tactically and are putting them into units starting with the division. The corps and the Army will also have atomic-capable units. Thus far, in the case of the division, the weapons we are counting on have a dual capability. They're fired with either atomic or conventional projectors. I would say that the Army would not be effected as drastically as other Services, particularly the Air Force, but nonetheless, it would be a reduction of our capabilities.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Blakefield, do you have a question?

COLONEL BLAKEFIELD: General, would you care to expand in a little more detail on the role of the Army today as a deterrent to war?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would be glad to list a few activities which I would call "deterrent" activities. First, I would call attention to the effectiveness of our overseas employment. Certainly, they are a deterrent force, at least in two ways. First, they encourage the local country where they're stationed to develop comparable strength. They set a standard, let us say, for the local effort in developing ground strength which is so indispensable to form a deterrent barrier on the ground. Next, they are clear reminder to the enemy that any aggression on the ground will be met by the United States Army, and that the consequences are very likely to be either general war or a very drastic reaction on our part. So, overseas employments certainly are deterrent in their effect.

Jumping back to the United States, I would say that the Strategic Army Reserve which we hold in readiness, either to reinforce our overseas deployment in case they're attacked or to go to any spot of local aggression, -- they, too, are a reminder of the rapidity of our reaction and our intent to come quickly to the help of our friends. I think we can very fairly count the guided missiles units of the Anti-Aircraft Command, for example, as a deterrent component, because they

are a reminder of the price which an aggressor air force would have to pay, if it attacked the United States.

The overall posture of the Army -- its obvious readiness to react, its professional capacity -- all of those things, I would say, should very well be put in the column listed "the deterrent assets" provided by the Army.

COLONEL HORNER: Yes, Colonel Wimsatt.

COLONEL WIMSATT: General, the Armed Services and the Army are actually instruments of national power. Could you tell us what characteristic of the Army is more obvious than the role of national power?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I think I probably answered that by underlining the definition of the Mission of the Army. Its primary characteristic is its ability to fight, to engage in sustained operations on the land, to occupy the land, and to subdue its people. That is its fundamental characteristic. In order to do that, however, it has to have a wide flexibility of power, another characteristic which I mentioned as being very important. I think the fact that our weapons extend from the pistol of the MP to the kilo-ton blast of some of our larger weapons suggests the flexibility which is available to us in terms of Army units.

COLONEL HORNER: Yes, Colonel Lloyd.

COLONEL LLOYD: General, there's been some recent public discussion concerning the possibility of a major shift in our policy towards keeping a large Armed Force in overseas

barracks. As I understand it, the new trend would be to keep on a small, or very token, force in those areas, and threaten to attack the enemy homelands of anyone molesting them. Would you care to comment on that?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, first, I would like to make it very clear that the Army has no desire to stay overseas. I think sometimes in our arguments it sounds as if we had in mind that the Army should never come home, about 40% of it being overseas at the present time. That is certainly not the case. We want to come home just as soon as the situation justifies a withdrawal of our forces.

But token forces, to me, are not the answer, for at least two reasons. First, there is always the possibility of surprise ground attack. When I was in Europe I felt -- and I was joined in the feeling -- that probably the greatest danger to us on the ground was a sudden movement west, without any preparation, by the Communist forces. They could become so entwined in combat with us so very quickly that our heavy atomic weapons simply could not be used. That danger of being overrun quickly on the ground will exist unless you have sizeable forces able to supply the necessary buffer.

Now next I would say that the trip-wire concept just doesn't make much sense to me, nor -- do I believe -- to our European friends, who will hardly believe that, when we reach the point of mutual deterrence. In other words, when general

atomic war will mean destruction to us as well as to the enemy. I think there would be a real doubt as to our reaction if we had only trip-wire forces at stake, as to whether we would engage in general war to save trip-wire forces. I think we have to have a force of real strength out there to gain the time, and also to give the assurances that we will utilize the full strength in order to support those forces.

COLONEL HORNER: Commander Hildreth, I believe you have a question.

COMMANDER HILDRETH: General, the opinion has frequently been expressed that the Army of the future will require fewer men to carry out its role in peace and war. Would you give us your views as to the future manpower requirements of the Army?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't think that it's a justified conclusion, based upon what we know now, that the Army will need fewer men in the future. Certainly, there will be a redistribution of manpower in a geographical sense, let's say. I would expect that in the forward areas there will be a considerable reduction. Certainly, all thoughts on new division structures indicate the tendency to have smaller divisions. On the other hand, technology generally imposes an increased load in the rear -- on the supply systems, maintenance systems, that kind of thing. I would just point out that the Continental Air Defense requirements are really brand new, resulting largely from new weapons which we think the enemy has. There's an

entirely new area which is calling on us to make substantial commitments of manpower and of money.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Kinney.

COLONEL KINNEY: General, the Army's future requirements in the guided missile field, along with those of the other Services, are the subject to which we are giving considerable attention. In that regard, is there some theoretical missile range beyond which the Army has no interest?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would say, theoretically, there is no limit. Certainly there are practical limits, but as I indicated, the Army is interested in enemy ground forces wherever found. If we have a weapon that will strike them of course we're very happy about it. On the other hand we recognize, practically again, that we have a great Strategic Air Arm of which we're very proud, and which we will call on many times to reach those distant targets for which we do not have a weapon of our own.

COLONEL HORNER: Yes, Colonel Blakefield.

COLONEL BLAKEFIELD: Sir, in this age of unparalleled destructiveness of weapons, what wartime controls do you visualize our political leaders might place upon the military in the use of atomic or theremo-nuclear weapons?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It's very hard to answer, and, of course, we give a great deal of thought to those possibilities of restriction. Certainly, I would hope that our own interest would indicate the choice of weapons at any given time. Obviously, the

political factor will be present. The only answer, from our point of view as military men, I believe, is to be prepared to accept and operate under any decision made by the appropriate political authorities.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Johnson.

COLONEL JOHNSON: General, in order to exist on a battlefield today with atomic weapons, it appears that the Army will have to take a widely dispersed formation. Yet to have any effect on the enemy, we'll have to mass our forces in order to develop sufficient fire power. Can you give us any solution for this dilemma?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would make two observations on that. First, I believe that one of the primary purposes of ground combat will be to discover, or to develop, targets for our weapons, so that if we are successful in doing that we can virtually destroy any target on our front, so that our movements thereafter will largely be in the nature of exploitation. The movement, however, will have to be rapid in order to gain the advantage in a decisively short period of time. That argues for internal mobility on the part of the Army forces -- cross-country mobility and also mobility resulting from the Army organic aviation.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Wimsatt.

COLONEL WIMSATT: General, with the progress made in converta-planes and helicopters, will this development cause a limited need in the requirement for air-borne troops in the

future?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No, I don't think so, because the type of aircraft you mention, which are organic to the Army, are primarily for the internal mobility on the battlefield itself, whereas the air-borne troops -- the air-borne divisions which your Troop Carrier Command carries into the battle -- go considerable distances. We in the Army have no aspiration to take over that kind of aviation. We look to the Air Force to continue to provide that for us, so there's really no competition between the short-range, low-performance type of Army aircraft -- helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft -- and the troop carrier. We want the Air Force to go head with all their plans for troop carrier.

COLONEL HORNER: Commander Nuttman.

COMMANDER NUTTMAN: Sir, there has been considerable discussion in the press and among various individuals lately concerning the Army Aviation Program. Would you please tell us a little bit about the Army's objective in its Aviation Program?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I rather alluded to that in the answer to the previous question, but I'll be glad to put on record once more, if necessary, that the Army is not in competition with the Air Force. Instead, we wish to have within a number of our branches -- the artillery, transportation, the infantry, almost in every branch of the Army -- we feel the need for some internal air transportation -- either for observation, for the

limited movement of supplies, for movement of our wounded in the battle area, for a thousand and one uses -- the need for which we've verified in our career experience. Now, these are all low-performance aircraft. They all have the characteristic of being able to live with the troops. That is essential. We must have our Army Aviation right alongside the commander who's likely to need it so that responsiveness to the local Army Commander is an indispensable attribute to Army Aviation. Obviously, I'm not thinking in terms of jets, or high-performance planes of the type the Air Force has. So I say there is no competition between us. We're in different fields, both of which are very important.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Lloyd.

COLONEL LLOYD: General, in this relatively mobile type of warfare, the atomic age, would you cover generally the effects we can expect on organization of the major units?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes, I think we have to re-plan and re-cast our major units in order to give greater flexibility in two senses. First, we must have the ability to live dispersed more easily than is the case under the present Tables of organization. Next, we must streamline our units so that we can pick up relatively small, self-sustained units by air, or by surface transport, and move them rapidly about the battlefield. We are now recognizing this in the Army in the reorganization of our air-borne division, and I would suspect that our infantry

division will follow suit shortly.

COLONEL HORNER: How does the recent reactivation of the 101st Airborne Division fit into this picture?

GENERAL TAYLOR: It's part of the program to which I referred. The 101st was activated just a few days ago, and I had the great pleasure of attending. It is organized on pentagonal lines. Instead of having three large regiments, it has five large-size battalions which have, organic within the battalion, virtually all the necessary weapons, except for artillery. I consider that the 101st is really the prototype for the reorganization of all air-borne divisions, and I am sure it will greatly influence our decision with regard to the Infantry Division.

COLONEL HORNER: Yes, Commander Hildreth.

COMMANDER HILDRETH: General, the Army is responsible for providing forces for joint amphibious operations. Now, the feasibility of conducting large-scale amphibious operations as we knew them in World War II has been questioned. Would you give us your views on the nature of future amphibious operations?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would say that amphibious operations will suffer the same disabilities as any large scale military operation in this sense -- we are not going to move large bodies of troops on the land or on the sea, or large masses of aircraft in the air, until a certain neutralization has been accomplished with regard to the enemy's atomic

power. I would not think that amphibious operations will suffer from the effect of these new weapons any more than any other large scale military operation, but certainly, the first requirement is going to be to neutralize the enemy atomic capability in the air, the missile field, before we go any place in large quantity.

COLONEL HORNER: General Taylor, in an atomic war I think it's obvious that our Army's transportation system is going to have to be revamped slightly, in that it must be more flexible, that is, in transporting personnel and supplies from the Zone of the Interior to the users. Can you tell us what your views are on what the Army is doing along the lines of improving our transportation system?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I couldn't give you a complete answer to that question, but I would say that our logisticians are giving a great deal of thought to the requirements for foreign transport in time of atomic war. For example we are working hard at improving our ability to get along without the big ports -- across-the-beach operation type of movement of supplies. Also, of course, we would like to supplement land-lines of communication by airlift to the extent possible. Then we have a very interesting test going on in Europe which has, as its objective, keeping back in the United States those items of supplies which are not needed all the time, so that we stockpile in depots forward only those items which we need very frequently. Then by tele-communication we are able to send back rapidly --

communicate rapidly back to the United States requesting those additional supplies that need to be flown in by air. We think we can avoid excessive forward stockages in areas which might be bombed out, and at the same time maintain a flow of supply, in accordance with the tempo of operations.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Kinney.

COLONEL KINNEY: General, relative to air transportability, what progress is being made in reversing the normal trend toward heavier weapons, vehicles, and equipment?

GENERAL TAYLOR: We're trying to overcome that trend which I agree has existed in the past. We've talked a good game about lightening our equipment but, unfortunately, haven't done too much about it. I would say that our operations are taking two forms, one of which I already mentioned; namely, streamlining our organizations so that they, in turn, have a lesser requirement for heavy type equipment. Then, insofar as equipment itself is concerned, we are urging our research and development people to give every possible thought to lightening our equipment, either by reducing its actual size, or utilizing new metals which offer promise of giving us equal strength for less weight.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Johnson.

COLONEL JOHNSON: General, this question concerns the organizations and personnel engaged in administrative and logistical support. If we can decrease the number of people

involved in those activities, then we can increase our combat power. What's being done along that field?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I agree with your statement, up to a point. We have worked very hard in the Army since World War II, attempting to increase the combat ratio and decrease the support ratio. Frankly, I think we've gone just as far as we can, and I predict that the pendulum will swing the other way, for reasons which I alluded to at the outset.

These new weapons, while reducing the forward requirement of combat troops, are going to increase the logistical requirement for a variety of reasons. It isn't necessarily good to say that our support percentage is low. It may be that it's so low that we are leaning on a reed to the rear. So we have to achieve balance. I think we've had it thus far, but I'm sure there are factors at play now which are going to reverse the trend.

COLONEL HORNER: Commander Hildreth.

COMMANDER HILDRETH: The Army, as well as some of the other Services, expend a great deal of time and money in training personnel to handle these very complex weapons systems and equipment. Now, would you discuss the problem of retaining these specialists in our Armed Services in light of the competition from civilian industry for their services?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, as you say, Commander, we have exactly the same problem that you do in the Air Force and the Marines. It's very discouraging to put all this work

into developing specialists and then have them slip thru your fingers. We're always proud of the fact, we think, that we improve our young man by service in the Army, but we hate to see him go immediately into civil life and take away the skill which we have trained into him. On the other hand, the Department of Defense has taken the lead in the last Congress -- and has received excellent support -- in trying to improve the attractiveness of a military career. We think we're making progress in the field, but it's still a problem that remains with us.

COLONEL HORNER: Commander Nuttman.

COMMANDER NUTTMAN: Sir, no one has mentioned the Reserves. What role will the Army's Reserve and the National Guard play in future wars?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Reserves certainly are important, and I'm glad that you raised the question. We have never in our military history had an Army completely balanced, ready to go, in terms of having all the men and all the skills in it at one time in a period of peace. We probably never will have. That is not an unsatisfactory situation, if we have a ready Reserve that can fill the chinks in our regular Army structure very quickly, and then give us the follow-up strength to form new units quickly to send overseas.

We think that we are getting a greater level of readiness out of our Reserve System now than we ever had in the

past. We have great hopes as to the ultimate operation of the Reserve Forces Act passed last year. I would say that we consider the Reserve indispensable. We think we are making progress, but we are far from complacent that the situation is ideal, as yet. We want our Reserves to all be ready in the first six months of war, if that can be possible.

COLONEL HORNER: Colonel Kinney.

COLONEL KINNEY: General, we're studying joint operations. Therefore, would you care to discuss your views on any new trends on joint operations that might be leading toward unification?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I know of no particular trends that I would refer to. It seems to me our concept of joint operations is entirely sound. We tested it in World War II, and where I was I found nothing wrong with our method of mounting joint operations or their execution. Certainly, when the three Services together in time of war have a concrete problem to solve, we do an awfully good job solving, it seems to me.

COLONEL HORNER: General, I have one last question here, which I think will interest all of us, and that is: Is there any formula for victory for our land forces that you could mention, Sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I would say -- I probably sound a bit reactionary in saying the formula has not changed over what it has been during the century that preceded the present ^{era} ~~area~~. Victory in battle today on the ground depends upon three

things, in my judgment: Fire power, and we have it in the terms of our new weapon, and our conventional weapons; mobility, which we're trying to improve all the time; but finally, good people. The Army must be filled with the best -- some of the best -- of our citizens, if it's going to be able to perform its indispensable role as a member of the Defense Team.

COLONEL HORNER: General Taylor, I want to thank you on behalf of these officers here for participating in this Conference this afternoon, and so clearly and concisely giving us your views on The Mission of the Army.

GENERAL TAYLOR: You gentlemen have listened very patiently to a lot of Army shoptalk this afternoon. It's been very stimulating for me, and I hope you gentlemen have enjoyed it as much as I have.

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