

ADDRESS BY

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

AT THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THURSDAY, 25 OCTOBER 1956 -- 1:15 P.M. (EDT)

THE STATE OF THE ARMY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF

THE UNITED STATES ARMY:

Progress since Branning Report

I AM IMPRESSED WITH THE GREAT PROGRESS WHICH THIS

ASSOCIATION HAS MADE SINCE ITS FIRST MEETING. THE ARMY

AND ITS ALUMNI HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY SLOW, UP TO NOW, IN

FORMING A UNIFIED ASSOCIATION, BUT, HAVING DECIDED TO DO SO

A SHORT YEAR AGO, ITS PROGRESS HAS BEEN MOST ENCOURAGING.

THE GROWING MEMBERSHIP, THE VIGOR, AND THE DYNAMIC OUTLOOK

OF THE ASSOCIATION ARE INDICES OF THE STATE OF MIND OF THE

COMMUNITY OF FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

THIS ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE, AS THE UNITED STATES ARMY
MUST BE, DEVOTED TO THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. AL-
THOUGH DIRECTING ITS INTEREST PRIMARILY AT THE ARMY, IT
SHOULD NEVER BY ITS ACTIONS SUGGEST A SERVICE PARTISANSHIP
UNRELATED TO THE NEED FOR BALANCED STRENGTH ON THE LAND,
IN THE AIR, AND ON THE SEA. BY BALANCED STRENGTH I DO NOT
MEAN AN EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS BUT RATHER A COORDINATED
EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A TRI-DIMENSIONAL DETERRENCE OF WAR.
THROUGH ITS MEETINGS, ITS MAGAZINE, ITS DISCUSSIONS AND ITS
STUDIES, THE ASSOCIATION PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN
INTERCHANGE OF IDEAS ESSENTIAL IN THESE DAYS OF CHANGING
STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL CONCEPTS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT
THE ARMY ASSOCIATION WILL PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT
ROLE AS A WELL-INFORMED NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF THE ARMY

TO THE PUBLIC OF OUR GREAT NATION.

THE AGENDA FOR THIS MEETING AMOUNTS TO A REPORT BY THE ARMY ON ITS HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

Progress during past year Theme

THIS EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURE IS APPROPRIATE ON THE OCCASION OF THE TRANSFER OF THE ASSOCIATION TO THE HANDS OF ITS

CIVILIAN MEMBERS. IN ADDITION TO ITS ROLE IN INTERPRETING

THE ARMY'S MISSION TO THE PUBLIC, THIS ASSOCIATION SHOULD

EVER BE A QUALIFIED CRITIC OF THE ARMY. TO BE A CRITIC IS

TO CARRY A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR BEING WELL INFORMED.

THE ARMY IS CHANGING RAPIDLY. TECHNOLOGY IS OPENING UP

VISTAS OF NEW POSSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF NEW WEAPONS, NEW

EQUIPMENT, AND NEW TECHNIQUES AT A RATE WHICH CHALLENGES

THE CAPACITY OF THE BEST MINDS AND MOST VIVID IMAGINATIONS.

THE ASSOCIATION SHOULD FOLLOW THESE CHANGES CAREFULLY

AND BE ALERT TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH

/attend them.

ATTEND THEM. | THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE
ASSOCIATION AND THE ARMY STAFF SHOULD NOT STOP WITH THIS
MEETING NOR FOR THAT MATTER BE CONFINED TO ANNUAL
MEETINGS. | I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
PROPRIETY AND SECURITY, A CONTINUOUS AND CLOSE FLOW OF
LEGITIMATE INFORMATION CAN BE ESTABLISHED. | DURING THIS
MEETING I UNDERSTAND THAT MEMBERS OF THE ARMY STAFF WILL
DISCUSS WITH YOU A WIDE RANGE OF ARMY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
THE REQUIREMENTS OF MODERN WARFARE. | AS A BACKGROUND
FOR THE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION WHICH GENERAL EDDLEMAN
WILL CONDUCT, I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU SOME OF THE THOUGHTS
WHICH UNDERLIE THE ARMY'S APPROACH TO THE DISCHARGE OF ITS
DUTIES IN THE FUTURE.

PERHAPS THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM WHICH THE ARMY
FACES TODAY IS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF ATOMIC-BEARING MISSILES

AND PROJECTILES ON THE NATURE OF THE LAND BATTLE AND, THEN,
TO EFFECT A PROPER ADJUSTMENT OF ORGANIZATION, TECHNIQUES,
EQUIPMENT, AND WEAPONS. THERE IS A SIMULTANEOUS NEED TO
EVALUATE THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR SO-CALLED CON-
VENTIONAL WEAPONS. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH TALK ABOUT THE
IMPOSSIBILITY, MOSTLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EXPENSE, OF
MAINTAINING ONE SET OF "OLD FASHIONED" FORCES TO FIGHT
NON-ATOMIC WARS AND ANOTHER SET OF ULTRA MODERN FORCES
TO FIGHT ATOMIC WARS. I DO NOT INTERPRET THE PROBLEM IN
THESE TERMS. IT IS POSSIBLE, INDEED ESSENTIAL, TO INJECT
INTO A SINGLE SET OF FORCES AN EITHER-OR CAPABILITY, AN
ABILITY TO USE ATOMIC WEAPONS OR NOT AS THE SITUATION RE-
QUIRES AND AS PROPER AUTHORITY DETERMINES, IF THE ARMY IS
TO BE ABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS ROLE IN FUTURE WARFARE.
THIS DUALITY -- THE BUILT-IN CAPABILITY TO USE ATOMIC AND

/non-atomic weapons

NON-ATOMIC WEAPONS IN ANY COMBINATION -- IS NOT A
STRADDLING OF THE ISSUE BUT, RATHER, A BASIC NECESSITY

FOR ARMY FORCES. | THERE WILL NEVER AGAIN BE A WAR

INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS WITHOUT THE USE OR THE THREAT

OF USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. | UNTIL THEY ARE USED, THE

THREAT WILL HANG OVER EVERY ENGAGEMENT, AND WILL IM-

POSE A REQUIREMENT FOR CONSTANT READINESS FOR AN ATOMIC

SURPRISE. | A SURE WAY TO ENCOURAGE AN ENEMY TO USE

ATOMIC WEAPONS WOULD BE TO CONFRONT HIM WITH A FORCE

UNPREPARED FOR ATOMIC ACTION. *Break*

THE ATOMIC WEAPON, COUPLED WITH THE MODERN MISSILE,

PERMITS THE MASSING OF FIRE WITHOUT REQUIRING THE MASSING

OF GROUND FORCES. | THIS IS A NEW ASPECT OF GROUND WARFARE. |

THE ARMY WHICH ADAPTS ITSELF FIRST TO IT AND DEVELOPS

SOME RELATIVE ADVANTAGES FROM IT WILL PREVAIL IN MODERN

BATTLE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, ARMY FORCES MUST NOT BE COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON ATOMIC WEAPONS. | THERE ARE MANY CONCEIVABLE SITUATIONS WHEN IT MAY BE TO OUR OWN INTEREST TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF THESE DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS. | IT IS A SUGGESTIVE THOUGHT THAT IN THE RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION WE ARE LIKELY TO FIND OURSELVES IN A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WHERE WE HAVE COME IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FOR HELP. | WE WILL HAVE EVERY REASON TO WISH TO CAUSE MINIMUM DESTRUCTION TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MILITARY ENDS. | AS I HAVE SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE ARMY WILL ALWAYS HAVE OCCASION TO ELIMINATE THE SNIPER IN THE STEEPLE WITHOUT DESTROYING THE CHURCH, THE BISHOP, AND THE WHOLE DIOCESE. | HENCE, THE INDISPENSABLE EITHER-OR CAPABILITY. *IN our faces* //

IN DEVELOPING FUTURE ARMY FORCES ADAPTABLE TO THE ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD, WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH THE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH FOUR THINGS.

FIRST, WE MUST INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO LOCATE ATOMIC
TARGETS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

SECOND, WE MUST INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO DELIVER
ATOMIC FIRES.

THIRD, WE MUST REDUCE OUR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DETEC-
TION BY THE ENEMY.

FOURTH, WE MUST INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO EXPLOIT OUR
OWN FIREPOWER.

LET US DISCUSS EACH OF THESE PROBLEMS IN SOME DETAIL.

I STATED THAT WE MUST DEVELOP AND HOLD A RELATIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE FIELD OF SO-CALLED TARGET ACQUISITION.

WITHOUT THIS ADVANTAGE, RELATIVE SUPERIORITY IN ATOMIC

WEAPONS HAS LITTLE MEANING. | PAST DIFFICULTIES IN

LOCATING TARGETS FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN

COMPOUNDED IN THE CASE OF THE VASTLY MORE EFFICIENT

ATOMIC WEAPONS. | THE EXPENSE OF THESE NEW WEAPONS,

THEIR GREAT DESTRUCTIVENESS, AND THEIR POTENTIAL HAZARD TO OUR OWN FORCES ARE POTENT REASONS AGAINST THEIR PROMISCUOUS EMPLOYMENT. / FURTHERMORE, THE RANGE OF THE ATOMIC-BEARING MISSILE FAR EXCEEDS THE RANGE OF CURRENT ARTILLERY AND ADDS TO THE ACQUISITION -- OBSERVATION DIFFICULTY.

THUS, LONG-RANGE TARGET ACQUISITION IS TECHNOLOGICALLY ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX OF THE MAJOR SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE ARMY. / WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE FUNDS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IS BEING ACCELERATED IN THE FIELDS OF RADAR, INFRARED, ACOUSTICS, PHOTOGRAPHY, AND GENERAL ELECTRONICS. / WE FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING EFFECTIVE LOCATION DEVICES WHICH WILL VASTLY EXTEND THE ARMY'S PRESENT OBSERVATION CAPABILITIES. / AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE

/requesting the Air Force

REQUESTING THE AIR FORCE TO REINFORCE ITS EFFORTS TO HELP US

FIND ALL TARGETS WHICH FALL WITHIN RANGE OF OUR IMPROVED

ARMY WEAPONS. | THIS IS THE FIELD IN WHICH THE AIR FORCE

CAN PROVIDE IN THE FUTURE ^a ~~THE~~ MOST USEFUL FORM OF CLOSE

SUPPORT.

IT WILL PROBABLY ALWAYS BE DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER

TARGETS AMONG THE FORCES OF AN ALERT AND WELL-TRAINED

ENEMY. | THE EFFORTS OF TECHNOLOGY WILL NEVER SUFFICE

ALONE; THEY MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY TACTICS DESIGNED TO

CAUSE THE ENEMY TO CREATE REMUNERATIVE TARGETS. | IT

MAY BE NOT TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT THE PURPOSE OF LAND

MANEUVER ^{will} TENDS TO BECOME THAT OF FINDING OR FORMING

SUITABLE ENEMY ATOMIC TARGETS, THEN OF EXPLOITING THE

EFFECT OF ATOMIC FIRE. | THUS, IT IS THAT THE ATOMIC

WEAPONS AND THE FORCES WHICH THEY SUPPORT ARE COMPLETELY

INTERDEPENDENT. / ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THEMSELVES ARE IN-
CONCLUSIVE. | IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, SIZEABLE GROUND FORCES
MUST BE USED IF THE ENEMY, HIS PEOPLE, AND HIS LAND ARE TO
BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. / ATOMIC WEAPONS TO BE EFFEC-
TIVE MUST BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH LAND OPERATIONS. /
THIS FACT IS BASIC TO THE ORGANIZATION OF MODERN ARMIES AND
IS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE MISTAKEN CONCEPT THAT
ATOMIC WEAPONS CAN SOMEHOW REPLACE GROUND FORCES,
WHEREAS IN ACTUALITY THEY ONLY SUPPORT THEM.

NOT ONLY MUST WE IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO DISCOVER
TARGETS, BUT ALSO WE MUST HOLD AND INCREASE OUR CURRENT
ADVANTAGE IN RELATIVE ABILITIES TO DELIVER ATOMIC FIRES. /
THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF A WIDE RANGE OF LOW-YIELD
TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS AND DIVERSIFIED DELIVERY MEANS
IS ESSENTIAL. | GENERAL GAVIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL HAVE

/considerable to say

CONSIDERABLE TO SAY ABOUT MISSILES UNDER DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL, IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, ADD GREATLY TO THE ARMY'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. | THE TACTICAL MISSILE FAMILY IS ALREADY REDUCING THE ARMY'S REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE COMBAT AIR SUPPORT. | THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE, ITS PACE ^{being} ~~WILL BE~~ DETERMINED LARGELY BY THE RATE OF PROGRESS IN TARGET ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES.

WHILE ON THE SUBJECT OF MISSILES I WANT TO REMIND YOU THAT THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATION IS READILY ADAPTABLE TO THE SUPPORT OF MISSILE OPERATIONS OF ALL KINDS. | IT HAS ALREADY IN ITS STRUCTURE MOST OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO RECONNOITER AND SURVEY MISSILE SITES, TRANSPORT MISSILES THERETO, CAMOUFLAGE THEIR POSITIONS, AND DEFEND THEM FROM HOSTILE INTERFERENCE ON THE GROUND. | ALL OF THESE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS ARE INDISPENSABLE, ^{and} THE

ARMY NOW HAS UNITS ALREADY IN ITS ORGANIC STRUCTURE TO DISCHARGE THESE FUNCTIONS. / LET ME AMPLIFY THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CONSIDERATION AS IT AFFECTS THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

THE ABILITY TO LOCATE, OCCUPY AND SUPPORT CONSTANTLY SHIFTING MISSILE SITES IN REMOTE MOUNTAIN, JUNGLE OR FOREST AREAS REQUIRES AN EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION. | THE ARMY POSSESSES THE MOBILE LAND TRANSPORT, SUPPLY, ORDNANCE, AND MEDICAL ECHELONS TO SUPPORT MOBILE OR REMOTELY DISPERSED MISSILE UNITS OVER LARGE LAND DISTANCES.

THE ARMY'S ENGINEER ORGANIZATION IS UNIQUELY EQUIPPED TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION WORK AT MISSILE SITES AS WELL AS THE MAINTENANCE OF ROUTES TO THOSE SITES. | PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE ENGINEERS POSSESS THE CAPABILITY FOR BASIC LOCATION SURVEY ON WHICH THE

/accuracy and, therefore,

ACCURACY AND, THEREFORE, THE ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE MISSILE SO LARGELY DEPENDS.

IN ORDER TO COMMAND AND CONTROL WIDELY DISPERSED
MISSILE UNITS, A REQUIREMENT FOR MOBILE AND HIGHLY RELIABLE
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IS APPARENT. | THE KIND OF
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED IS THAT WHICH THE ARMY HAS AL-
READY DEVELOPED TO A HIGH DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY FOR THE
SUPPORT OF ITS FAST-MOVING BATTLE GROUPS.

IT IS LIKELY THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS MISSILE
SITES MAY BE SUBJECTED TO EITHER GUERRILLA OR AIRBORNE
ATTACK. | THE REQUIREMENT FOR LOCATING LAUNCHING SITES
IN REMOTE AREAS *with suitable* ~~WHERE~~ COVER, *and* CONCEALMENT AND ~~DECEPTION~~
~~WILL BE FACILITATED~~ MAY EXPOSE SUCH SITES TO PARTISAN
INTERFERENCE. THEREFORE, SOME FORM OF GROUND PROTEC-
TION MUST BE PROVIDED LOCALLY. THE ARMY IS READY TO
PROVIDE GROUND PROTECTION AT WEAPONS SITES.

may
THERE ~~WILL~~ ALSO BE A REQUIREMENT FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT PROTECTION, PROBABLY BY MOBILE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE UNITS.

THE ARMY HAS A POINT DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN ITS MOBILE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES WHICH CAN BE COUPLED WITH THE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE UNITS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACK. | LASTLY, THE OVER-ALL SECURITY OF THE MISSILE UNITS DEPENDS ON THE ABILITY OF THE ARMY FORCES TO HOLD THE GROUND AREA IN WHICH THE MISSILE FORCES OPERATE. | THE

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL ARMY CAPABILITY.
For all these reasons the Army is ready for the nuclear era.

PARALLELING THE INCREASE IN ITS ATOMIC CAPACITY, THE ARMY MUST SEEK WAYS AND MEANS OF REDUCING ITS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DETECTION ~~BY AN ENEMY WHO~~ *We must assume that an* ~~WHO~~ MAY POSSESS THE ATOMIC MEANS TO DESTROY ANY IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR FORCE WHICH HE IS ABLE TO FIND.

MODERN ARMIES, WITH THEIR ELABORATE EQUIPMENT, ARE

/difficult to conceal,

DIFFICULT TO CONCEAL, AS ARE THEIR LOGISTIC SUPPORTING
ECHELONS IN THE REAR. | IN THIS RESPECT THEY ARE AT A
SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGE WITH RELATIVELY PRIMITIVE FORCES
SUCH AS THOSE WE FOUGHT IN KOREA. | SUCH FORCES HAVE
INHERENT CHARACTERISTICS WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THEIR
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DETECTION. | THEY HAVE A PROTECTIVE
COLORATION WHICH RESULTS FROM THEIR LESSER DEPENDENCE
UPON ELABORATE AND MASSIVE SUPPORTING ELEMENTS, THE
AUSTERITY OF THEIR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND THEIR NATIVE
CUNNING AND PATIENCE. | THESE CHARACTERISTICS PERMIT
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THE ADVANTAGES OFFERED BY JUNGLES
AND MOUNTAINS IN AREAS WHERE PERIPHERAL WARS WOULD MOST
LIKELY BREAK OUT, AND THUS ENHANCE IN SUCH PLACES THE
DIFFICULTIES OF TARGET ACQUISITION.

LACKING THESE NATURAL ASSETS AND UNWILLING TO

DECREASE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DETECTION BY "GOING PRIMITIVE"

AS IT WERE, WE ARE FACED WITH A GREAT CHALLENGE TO OUR

INGENUITY TO CONTROL OUR OWN TENDENCY TO PRESENT LUCRA-

TIVE ATOMIC TARGETS. REJECTING DELIBERATE RETROGRES-

SION AS A MEANS TO SAFETY, WE MUST SEEK A SOLUTION IN THE

PRINCIPLE THAT "SAFETY LIES FORWARD," TECHNOLOGICALLY AS

WELL AS TACTICALLY. THE IMPROVEMENT OF CROSS-COUNTRY

MOBILITY HOLDS FORTH THE BEST PROSPECTS OF REDUCING THE

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ENEMY DETECTION OF ARMY COMBAT FORCES.

THIS MOBILITY MAY EVENTUALLY BE ATTAINED TO A LARGE

DEGREE BY LOW-FLYING AIR VEHICLES. THE SUSCEPTIBILITY

TO DETECTION OF OUR LOGISTIC BASES IS A PRIMARY PROBLEM

WHICH DESERVES OUR UNREMITTING EFFORT TO REDUCE BY ANY

AND ALL MEANS. AUSTERITY IN SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IS

ESSENTIAL BUT AUSTERITY ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. AERIAL

/transport, nuclear

TRANSPORT, NUCLEAR ENGINES, SOLID FUEL -- THESE ARE THE
DIRECTIONS IN WHICH WE MUST GO. | THE ABILITY TO DISPERSE
- AND HIDE, COUPLED WITH THE ABILITY TO CONVERGE AND FIGHT,
REQUIRES MOBILITY OF A KIND WE HAVE ONLY BEGUN TO
APPRECIATE. | TOO OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE MOBILITY WE
SOUGHT AS PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC FIRES SIMPLY INCREASED
THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT IN THE
BATTLE ZONE AND, BY SO DOING, CREATED FOR THE ENEMY THE
POTENTIAL TARGETS WE SEEK TO AVOID.

A FINAL CONSIDERATION RELATED TO THE COMPELLING
NECESSITY TO REDUCE OUR VULNERABILITY TO ATOMIC FIRE IS
THE NEED TO EXPLOIT RAPIDLY THE EFFECTS OF OUR OWN FIRE. |
INCREASED TACTICAL MOBILITY AND INCREASED MECHANIZATION
OF THE LOGISTICS SYSTEM ARE TWO DEVICES ALREADY MENTIONED
WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THIS END. | RAPIDITY OF OFFENSIVE

REACTION MUST STEM NOT ONLY FROM AN INCREASED MOBILITY AND STREAMLINED COMMAND ECHELONS, BUT ALSO FROM THE ABILITY OF SMALL BATTLE GROUPS TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY FOR LONG PERIODS OVER GREAT DISTANCES, COUPLED WITH AN ABILITY TO LIVE DISPERSED AND TO CONCENTRATE RAPIDLY TO FIGHT.

THUS, THE MODERN ARMY MUST SHOW PROGRESS IN THE FOUR CRITICAL AREAS I MENTIONED. IT MUST HAVE AN ORGANIC TARGET ACQUISITION CAPABILITY, ORGANIC ATOMIC FIREPOWER, AND BE HARDER TO FIND AND MORE DIFFICULT TO DESTROY. IT MUST BE HIGHLY MOBILE TO EXPLOIT ITS OWN DESTRUCTIVE FIREPOWER. WE DO NOT TODAY HAVE ALL THE IDEAL EQUIPMENT FOR SUCH AN ARMY. WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, HOWEVER, AND WE DO KNOW WHAT WE WANT AND OUR RESEARCH EFFORT IS DIRECTED TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVES.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT NOTHING WE HAVE DIS-
COVERED OR NOTHING THAT WE EXPECT TO DISCOVER WILL
REDUCE THE NEED FOR RUGGED MEN TO FIGHT OUR BATTLES UNDER
CONDITIONS OF HAZARD AND HARDSHIP. / NEW WEAPONS AND
MACHINES WILL SERVE OUR SOLDIERS WITHOUT REPLACING THEM. /
THE ATOMIC WEAPON IS AN IMPRESSIVE NEWCOMER TO THE
BATTLEFIELD; HOWEVER, IT POSSESSES FEW INDEPENDENT
VIRTUES. | THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ATOMIC FIRES DEPENDS UPON
THE CONTINUING ABILITY OF THE COMBAT FORCES TO INFLUENCE
THE ACTION TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED TO SHIELD THE ATOMIC FIRE
UNITS, HOLD VITAL AREAS, CREATE LUCRATIVE ATOMIC TARGETS,
AND EXPLOIT THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC FIRES. | IF ARMY FORCES
ARE UNABLE TO PERFORM THESE ESSENTIAL MILITARY TASKS,
THEN THE BATTLE ^{is likely to} WILL BE LOST REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF
ATOMIC SUPPORT UNITS INVOLVED. | THE ATOMIC WEAPON,

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE, AND ALL THE PANOPLY OF NEW MILI-
TARY WEAPONRY ARE MEANS FOR APPLYING POWER, TO BE
INTEGRATED INTO BUT NOT SUBSTITUTED FOR THE MODERN
ARMY.

-END-