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ADDRESS BY
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
BEFORE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE WORLD WARS
ST. MARY'S HIGH SCHOOL AUDITORIUM, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
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THE VETERAN AND THE ARMY

Admiral Pownall, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

I very much appreciate the opportunity to come to Annapolis today and to address this annual convention of the Military Order of World Wars. I recognize before me a distinguished body of American citizens, all of whom have served this country in the military uniform of its Armed Forces. I know that here I have an audience sincerely interested in the security of the United States as well as in the well-being of the Armed Forces and, furthermore, an audience which is competent to evaluate their problems and to assess their difficulties. I have often talked to veterans groups such as this and am always impressed with their sincere desire to be helpful to the Armed Forces. Usually the question is, "What can I do?", "What can I say?", "How can I influence the situation to the benefit of our Armed Forces and of national security?" Today I would like to give you at least a partial answer, particularly as the reply relates to the Army.

As Chief of Staff I often am requested to mount a soap box and talk about the business of the Army. Often I feel a little reluctant to talk Army shop to our civilians, feeling that it is imposing upon their good nature. Today, however, I feel justified to assume that I have been invited because you would like to hear the Chief of Staff say something about our modern Army. I am happy to respond because, as I indicated at the outset, I know that here is an understanding audience.

If I were asked, "How can the veteran best assist the Armed Services in times like these?", I would reply that it is by maintaining his status as a competent critic of the Services. In the communities where you gentlemen reside you are known to be a veteran of one of the Armed Services. As such, your civilian colleagues inevitably regard

you as something of an expert on the subject of national defense. Now to be an expert is to carry the responsibility of really "knowing your stuff." Inevitably, the experience which you have acquired while wearing the uniform of the Services gradually becomes outmoded. Our Armed Forces change -- for the better, we hope -- as time goes on. Although it is true that our basic problems are generally the same, the specific answers thereto are constantly undergoing adjustment. Change is particularly evident at this time when technology is opening up new vistas of possibilities for the Armed Services in terms of new weapons, new equipment, and new techniques. Consequently, if you gentlemen are to perform your indispensable role of interpreting the requirements of the Armed Services, it behooves you to study these changes and to appreciate what is taking place.

If you will allow me, I would like to utilize my time on the platform today to bring you up to date, as it were, on the Army of the present and on its hopes for the future. I cannot by any manner of means do so in detail because developments in the Army are so numerous, and so many changes are taking place in so many areas that I can make only a very general report to you. Hoping to dissipate some of the confusion which arises from the very number of reports on military developments, I am going to begin with a review of a few of the fundamentals which guide the Army in the development of its programs.

At the outset I would like to emphasize that the Army regards itself as a member of an Armed Forces team which as a whole is designed for the prevention of war. The more we visualize the disastrous consequences of a general atomic war the more we are impressed with the fact that such a war must be avoided if humanly possible. Consequently, more and more thought is being expended on developing deterrents to war -- in particular, stressing those actions which will tend to convince a possible aggressor that general war will not pay and, if undertaken, will bring disaster to him.

All Services have an indispensable part to play in deterring general war. The Air Force-Navy nuclear retaliatory force, the Army-Navy-Air Force continental defense forces, the Army's overseas deployments and Strategic Reserve at home are examples of the many components which make up our strength designed to provide tri-dimensional deterrence on the ground, in the air, and on the sea.

Going one step further, we see that it is not sufficient to deter only the big atomic war. It is equally as important to be able to deter or quickly suppress any limited aggression which may threaten

any part of the Free World. We reason that such an aggression, if not challenged, will permit the piecemeal attrition of the West. If challenged, it must be promptly suppressed -- otherwise, if it is allowed to smolder, it may develop into that great world-wide conflagration which it is our purpose to avoid. Consequently, we in the Army are constantly reflecting upon our need to reduce the time required for prompt reaction to small war situations and, for this purpose, to increase the mobility derived from our organic means and from the transport provided by our sister Services. We can no longer wait months, as we did in Korea, to develop adequate ground strength to repel a local aggression. The Army requires great mobility -- far beyond anything we have contemplated in the past -- based upon both air and sea transport. For this transport, we rely upon the Air Force and the Navy, but the Army itself can make an important contribution by streamlining to the maximum its requirements for transport.

With the purpose of improving our own transportability, the Army is examining its organizational structure in an attempt to produce formations which, without loss of combat effectiveness, will be easier to transport by air and by sea. A recent example of our efforts was provided by the activation of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell last month. This division will require only about half as much air transport as the former airborne division and, I believe, when completely ^{outfitted} equipped with modern equipment, will be equally combat-effective.

So much for the subject of deterrence and the Army's concept of the role which it must play as a part of the deterrent team. Now if deterrence fails, what is the mission of the Army in case of war? Stated in its simplest form, it is to defeat hostile land forces and to gain control of the land and of its people. That is the fundamental purpose of our Army and it is with that end in mind that we organize, train, equip, and prepare to fight.

Let us take a few moments to analyze this mission of defeating enemy land forces and of gaining control of the land and its people. First, I would emphasize that the Army takes as its goal the destruction of enemy military forces. We are constantly impressed, as we view the destructive effect of modern weapons, with the need for discrimination in the use of those weapons. All of the Services are deeply aware of the need for versatility so that we can apply military force appropriately, according to the circumstance. For this reason, the Army will always require so-called conventional weapons in quantity because there will be many situations for which an atomic weapon, even if available, is not the appropriate response. I have often had occasion to say that the

Army must have weapons which will destroy the sniper in the church steeple without destroying the bishop and the entire diocese.

We are additionally impressed with the need for a discriminatory capability because of the likelihood that we may be called upon to fight in friendly countries which are the victim of aggression. Hence, it will be important for us to be able to conduct military operations with a minimum cost to our friends and their property.

A second point with regard to the Army mission relates to the term "land forces." I would underline that the Army is concerned with hostile armies, wherever found. There has been a tendency in recent years to feel that the Army should interest itself with tactical rather than strategical objectives. This, in spite of the fact that ever since the days when a Greek Army commander was called a "strategos," strategy has always been an important word in the vocabulary of armies. In the jargon of the military, strategical is generally taken to refer to military operations away from the battlefield; tactical to refer to those activities which take place in the presence of the enemy. Obviously, all of the Services have both strategical and tactical interests. Certainly the Army is vitally concerned with the strategic land forces of an enemy which may later appear before us as our tactical enemy.

Thus it is that the Army has always been very much interested in developing weapons of increased range. As a pioneer in the missile field, we are having encouraging success in developing weapons of this type. We do not seek weapons which will duplicate those of the Air Force or the Navy. We recognize that the Army will often depend upon the other Services for distant fire support. All the Services are always prepared to help one another. The Army can attack and occupy enemy airfields when they are within range of its operations, in assistance of the Air Force. It can occupy enemy harbors or destroy enemy shore facilities to assist the Navy when such targets are within range of Army forces. The waging of war is a cooperative operation, and every Service contributes to the successful outcome according to its capabilities.

One final comment upon the mission relative to the phrase, "to gain control of the land and its people." Inevitably, there is a uniquely conclusive character to this mission. Regardless of the nature and duration of the preliminary operations of a war, final victory will fall to the side which can occupy the ultimate source of the hostile war-making capability. There are those who think that because of the destructive ability of our new weapons, the ⁵⁻⁴⁻⁴⁴ occupation of the enemy's territory may be little more than a triumphal entry followed by military occupation.

If control of the enemy land and its people comes about this way, all well and good. But on the other hand, the final decision may not be reached until we have destroyed the enemy forces -- even though remnants -- in the tough, ~~sweaty~~, bloody, dirty, and hazardous business of sustained ground combat which many of you gentlemen know so well.

After this somewhat lengthy introductory discussion of our concept of the importance of deterring war and the mission of the Army in case the deterrent fails, I would like to ask the question, "What are the requirements for the Armed Forces, and in particular of the Army, in order to do this job of deterring war or of winning war?" I would like to enumerate a few of the elements which the Army considers indispensable in order to perform its role in national defense.

One of the most important considerations is the maintenance of military technological superiority over the Communist bloc. We cannot long remain secure if we do not have the potentiality of outstripping an enemy in the quality of our weapons, ~~systems~~. The Army missile program springs readily to mind as typical of the exploitation of technology to extend its capabilities. We can never afford to relax our efforts in this technological field, feeling sure that our adversaries are doing their best to equal or outstrip us.

In addition, a combat-ready Army contributes to deterrence through its strength in being, trained and ready for action anywhere, anytime. With 40 percent of its members overseas, the Army today has in Europe five divisions constituting the Seventh Army, and in Korea one corps of two divisions as the United States part of the Eighth Army. The presence of these deployments along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains encourages our allies by our willingness to share the hazards of life under Communist guns. Likewise, they serve as a constant reminder that an aggression in these vital areas will be resisted on the spot by the armed might of the United States.

The deterrent effect of our own Army forces overseas is supplemented by that of indigenous armies which we assist. I think that the extent and importance of the Army's mission in helping to train foreign troops is not generally understood or appreciated. Today, we are training, directly or indirectly, over 200 foreign divisions. These divisions are an important factor in their respective countries in resisting the favorite Communist techniques of infiltration, subversion, and the coup d'etat. They are essential components of the defense of vital strategic areas.

Thus far, I have mentioned as important elements of the Army's contribution to deterrence, technological superiority, overseas deployments, and assistance to indigenous Army forces. In addition, we maintain a Strategic Reserve force composed of nine divisions of the active Army located in the United States, a number of which we keep in instant readiness to meet the outbreak of conflict should we become involved. Behind them is another visible deterrent, our reserve forces, which will provide the indispensable reinforcements necessary in an emergency to support our overseas deployments and to expand the structure of the active Army.

Finally, the Army contributes anti-aircraft units to the Continental Air Defense Command. These include an increasing proportion of NIKE missile units which are far more effective than the conventional anti-aircraft artillery of the past.

Early in my talk I mentioned the need to go back to fundamentals in understanding the issues of national defense. At the danger of being called reactionary, I would like to express the view that in spite of the progress in the development of new weapons, equipment and concepts, the basic ingredients for success in warfare have remained essentially unchanged. They are firepower, mobility, and good people. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen learn from the start of their careers as a matter of creed that victory in battle results from these three interdependent factors. There is no reason to change that creed today.

To improve its firepower, the Army needs a wide span of guided missiles to extend its firepower horizontally and vertically, increasing in both planes the ranges of this type of new artillery. We have a vital interest in surface-to-surface missiles, with warheads of great firepower and of various guidance systems, to enable the Army to extend radically the range of its familiar artillery techniques against surface targets.

These targets will be found on a battlefield which will probably differ widely from those which you have known. Such a battlefield probably will be characterized by great emptiness interspersed with islands of offensive or defensive power, represented by relatively independent combat groups. Their primary purpose will be to find enemy forces without being found themselves, then to call down destructive fire upon the ^{advantage} enemy. On such a battlefield a target found probably will be a target destroyed. These Army forces will need both atomic and conventional firepower if they are to be able to apply force with appropriate flexibility.

In addition to the surface-to-surface missile the Army has developed and is using surface-to-air missiles to fulfill its continental defense mission at home. The provision of anti-aircraft defense is one of the most important missions assigned to the Army. Since the airplane first made its appearance, the Army has been charged with the anti-aircraft defense of the continental United States. During these forty years, fortunately, we have always been able to keep a little ahead of the airplane as performances have increased. Ten years ago, the Army started to develop the world's first operational guided missile, NIKE I, which now is emplaced around many of the critical points of our Nation. It can operate effectively against any known operational aircraft which an enemy may send against it.

Behind this missile, an improved NIKE, the NIKE B, is coming along which anticipates the capabilities of higher performance aircraft than those presently operational. I would emphasize the NIKE is not a single weapon, but a family of weapons in which the new evolves naturally from the experience gained with the old.

So much for the subject of improved firepower. Firepower, as important as it is, is not enough unless it can move rapidly into position and destroy the enemy. The improved firepower of an Army equipped with atomic weapons must be accompanied by greater mobility if that Army is to exploit effectively its new assets.

Mobility is usually recognized in two forms. First, there is strategic mobility where the Army relies upon its friends in the Air Force and the Navy to permit the movement of Army units freely about the world. I shall speak not of ^{the} mobility required for long moves, but of the second form of mobility, tactical or battlefield mobility -- the ability to shift striking power on the battlefield.

On the battlefield we are usually concerned with moving military units and their equipment for relatively short distances. But firepower itself may have a certain attribute of inherent mobility. Through our modern techniques we can shift the fire of artillery, guided missiles, and rockets about the battlefield without displacement of men or equipment. Obviously, the greater the ranges, the greater the flexibility of this maneuver by fire alone.

In both aspects, the battlefield movement of troops and the flexibility of firepower, the Army's tactical mobility is being steadily improved. On the ground it has been improved by new tanks and armored personnel carriers for the rapid movement of heavy guns and supporting infantrymen over fireswept areas. In addition, the entire family of Army track and wheel vehicles is under constant scrutiny with an eye to developing new or improved designs at lower costs.

Our improved mobility, however, is not limited to the increased ranges of our weapons and the ground movement of our men and equipment. One of the most striking improvements in the Army's mobility is the development of Army aviation. I often feel that there is considerable misunderstanding about Army aviation and its objectives. It is in no wise competitive with the roles and missions of the Air Force. It, rather, attempts to obtain for the units of the Army battlefield mobility based upon the low-performance, fixed-wing airplane and the transport helicopter. These vehicles do for us in the air what trucks do for us on the ground. They are not formed into an Air Force, but rather are scattered throughout eight of our combat arms and services. For example, the Artillery, the Infantry, the Transportation Corps, the Medical Corps all have a need for this type of air transportability to adjust fire, to expedite reconnaissance, to move supplies, and to evacuate wounded. Particularly on an atomic battlefield which will be characterized by great dispersion of units, we will need air transportation for many vital components of the Army system of weapons and equipment.

We are interested in air mobility to overcome not only combat problems but also what General Bradley called "The tyranny of logistics that overshadows any tactical movement in war." Time and again, tactical achievement has been limited by logistical weakness. We have often heard it said that Patton's Third Army was halted in its task across Western Europe by running out of gas. This is not quite accurate. We had the gas, but we couldn't get it to him. Fundamentally, a lack of the means to transport gas caused the difficulty. In any case, logistics stopped the Third Army when the enemy could not.

Thus far I have talked about the ingredients for success in ground warfare in the military terms of fire and movement. We need fire and movement as represented by our weapons system and our aviation program. However, the Army, as well as the other Services, will be no better than the people that make it up. We need personnel, number-wise and quality-wise, but I stress quality more than number. There is a tendency in this country to measure military strength by a head count. We say that we have a million-man Army, but that does not accurately interpret

our strength. You must look inside that number and see what kind of people fill the million uniforms forming the ranks of the Army. The difference between the quality of our people and that of an aggressor may be the difference between victory and defeat.

The Army is convinced of the preponderance of the factor, man, in any future war. The strength of the Army in the past has always been in the depth of quality in its officer and non-commissioned officer corps. Although each year we lose some of the famous names known to all the Nation, such as Gruenther and McAuliffe, behind these men who leave the ranks there has always been a new generation of young leaders coming forward. This new generation has been trained both in the Army school system and in the harder school of one or more wars. Within their broad theoretical and practical experience, they stand ready to fill the gaps in the ranks as they occur. We must never allow this present condition to disappear. This year the young men who are entering the Service Academies and the Reserve Officer Training Corps of our colleges represent the leaders who must be ready for heavy responsibilities two decades hence. It is of the utmost importance to the Nation that this generation contribute a strong increment of talent if we are to maintain the tradition of quality in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps of our Armed Forces.

In closing, I would repeat as I often have in the past, the Army will be no better -- in the long run -- than the support which it receives from the country which it serves. This support is more than a matter of budgetary support; it is reflected in interest and sympathetic understanding. As the military experts of your civilian community, I urge you veterans to watch the Army continually and to keep current with its problems. At the same time, you should demand that the Army be second to none in quality. You gentlemen know from experience that there are no second prizes in war. Our Army has never come in second yet, but it will remain in front only if our citizens are as one in recognizing that a combat-ready Army is one of our most important and essential institutions for peace.

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