

**SUMMARY OF
REMARKS BY
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
AT QUANTICO CONFERENCE
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My comments this morning will deal largely with the problems of organizing and equipping Army forces best suited to the deterrent requirements of the future. Army forces best suited to the requirements of deterrence must be organized around the demonstrated principle that success in land warfare in the future will depend on the proper combination of fire, movement and people. In the future, the Army's heavy firepower will be provided by rockets and guided missiles. This improved firepower will be maneuvered on the battlefield with improved mobility obtained from better basic combat organization and lightweight equipment.

Because dispersion must be the rule on future battlefields where discovery may mean destruction, the Army is looking for an increased cross-country mobility on the ground by planning for thin-skinned troop and weapons carriers. In the air, Army aviation will provide air transport for the movement of men, supplies and equipment within the battle zone. The Army does not see a need for types of aircraft that will compete with the Air Force. Army aviation must be forward in locations where it is immediately responsive to the needs of the Army commander and thus must be able to operate from unprepared airfields. And though battlefield mobility will be provided from within the Army, the Air Force must provide strategic air support to improve the Army's strategic mobility. The Army must help the Air Force in this task by improving the air transportability of Army equipment. Thus reaction time can be decreased for the intervention of Army forces in peripheral aggression about the world.

Within this future structure the Army, like the other Services, has a mounting requirement for good people. The Army needs men who can develop, operate and maintain this new equipment. Above all, the Army needs men who can use this equipment with wisdom and judgment, to the end that the United States either deters war or wins the war which cannot be deterred.

Three new factors influencing military preparations between now and 1960 deserve mention. The first is the increased cost of weapons systems which is the price of modernization. It appears inevitable that if present force levels are to be maintained and at the same time modernized with the equipment technology can provide, then the defense budget must be materially increased. The only alternatives to this upward trend of military spending will be the acceptance of a delay in modernization or a reduction in force strength.

The second factor is the effect which can be anticipated from forces tending to disturb the equilibrium of our military programs. It is highly important that these programs remain stable over the next few years and be pursued with firmness of purpose.

The third factor arises from the condition of mutual deterrence which may arise from the possession in quantity of nuclear weapons by the two major power blocs. This condition, while deterring general war, may have the effect of stimulating local aggression and peripheral infiltration as a tactic of expansionist Communism.

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