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ADDRESS BY
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TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR
AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

Gentlemen, the Army is most happy to welcome this large gathering composed of leading citizens representing many walks of American life. The fact that you have been willing to attend this seminar is evidence of the importance attached to the subjects proposed for discussion. The fact that the Army has invited representatives from so many areas of our national activity suggests recognition by the military that, as Clemenceau liked to say, "War is far too serious a business to be left to the soldiers." It is recognition of the fact that we need to integrate every facet of our national strength in order to produce a national strategy appropriate to the present situation.

I have chosen as my topic the role of the Army in national strategy. I propose to address myself to the subject in the following way. Recognizing that no single Service can be considered in isolation, I am going to take considerable time in developing what I would call an adequate national military program, one designed to support an integrated national strategy compatible with our over-all national aims. Having developed the components of a properly balanced national military program, I will then consider the role of the Army within such a program.

In undertaking to construct the outlines of a proper national military program, I do not suggest that we presently are without one. Actually, I believe that we are doing quite well with our military preparations for the present. I am more concerned about the future as the burden of armaments increases with the rising cost of modern weapons systems. Then it will be increasingly important to have a methodology to assure that we are putting "first things first" in our budgets, and neither underbuying nor overbuying in the various categories of our military preparations. We will need clear methods for determining how much is enough, and when we have reached the point of diminishing returns in developing deterrent strength. Considerations such as these have led me to try to identify the essential elements required for an adequate military program, and then to assemble them in a balanced relationship.

The most serious problem confronting the United States today is how to remain secure in the face of the Communist Bloc threat, without at the same time destroying ourselves and our way of life through the weight of our military preparations. Withal, the basic objective of our national security policy is the preservation of the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. In furtherance of this basic objective, our government seeks, by all means acceptable to the American people, ways of altering the international Communist movement to the end that it will no longer constitute a threat.

Experiences since World War II have impressed us with the need of an integrated national strategy blending all of our assets in a proportion best suited to the needs of the bi-polar situation. We recognize that an adequate response to Communist expansion is by no means exclusively military -- we must use our political, economic, and ideological assets as well. In recognition of this need for an integrated strategy, we have built up a rather impressive organizational and procedural system for dealing with the problem. The National Security Council is the focal point of this system, where all Federal agencies involved in security-related matters bring their views to the council table. From this council table the national security program is developed as the point of departure for the national military program for which the Department of Defense is responsible.

It is difficult to identify a formal national military program in documentary form. Such program as we have exists, somewhat like the British Constitution, in a mass of decisions, directives, precedents, and standard operating procedures existing within the Department of Defense and the subordinate Services. I should like to show how we might go about giving more formal expression to a program designed to meet the needs of the next few years.

A word about deterrence, which is inherent in any discussion of a national military program. The deterrent strength which we seek is that combination of force, physical and moral, which will produce in the mind of a possible aggressor recognition of the certainty that any action that threatens the security of the United States will bring unacceptable consequences. The credibility of the probable reaction of the United States is an important part of the matter, and involves both demonstrable capabilities and intentions.

Not only must our deterrent reaction be credible but it must be potentially tri-dimensional in character. I feel reasonably sure that our atomic-air retaliatory capability today is sufficiently impressive to deter a direct atomic attack on the continental United States. The Russians are

quite convinced that, in the latter case, we would respond at once in kind. This retaliatory capability has obviously not been sufficient, however, to deter local aggression in Greece, Korea, and Vietnam. As a result, our atomic deterrent capability has been effective only in one dimension. The atomic deterrent capability has been defective in that it is not tri-dimensional, lacking elements providing a suitable, credible response to aggression on the ground, in the air, and on the sea, any where, and all the time.

Now, to get on with the business of developing an outline for a national military program. Such a flexible program is easy to conceive in principle, but difficult to develop when it gets down to specific cases involving crucial decisions in allocating resources.

To be adequate, the national military program, as I conceive it, must make properly weighted provision for deterrence of general war, deterrence of local aggression, defeat of local aggression, and victory in general war -- victory of the kind which leads to a viable peace. This four-pointed program is fundamental to the theme which runs through my following remarks.

My reasoning goes something like this. As it is inherent in our principles that we do not accept the concept of launching a preventive war, then the primary purpose of all military -- indeed, all governmental -- activities bearing upon security is to prevent war, particularly general atomic war. Accepting that basic thought, I then move on to this corollary: as both sides in the bi-polar world accept this fact of the profitless character of general nuclear war, it becomes increasingly unlikely that either side will deliberately initiate such a war. However, that does not mean for a moment that Communism will renounce aggression as a tool of policy. Inherent in the nature of the Communist movement is a need for dynamism if it is to continue as a significant world force. Therefore, the threat of subversion and local aggression tends to become the most serious threat to world peace. These forms of attack are particularly dangerous, because the small aggression, if not arrested, may lead to the erosion of the Free World and to our piecemeal loss of that which we are pledged to defend. If resisted, it must be defeated promptly. Otherwise, the smoldering "brush fire" may lead to the general conflagration, to that general atomic war which it is our purpose to avoid. Consequently, I place immediately after the deterrence of general war, the mission of deterring, or winning quickly, any local aggression which may break out about the world. Only after meeting these requirements are we justified in attempting to satisfy the almost astronomical requirements, beyond the needs of deterrence, of fighting the big war. There is no such thing as absolute safety. Safety carries a connotation of unqualified absence of risk which is simply not compatible with the requirements of living in this uncertain world for which we must provide leadership.

I would now like to consider the essential elements of a national military program designed, in order of priority, to deter general war, to deter or win local war, and finally to win a general war. What should be the components of such a program, and where should the emphasis be placed? Recognizing the danger of establishing priorities, I would like to enumerate what I consider to be the essential ingredients of this ideal program -- following an order of priority, but emphasizing that this priority cannot be preclusive. In other words, we must provide in some degree for all the component elements of the program, which I shall outline.

Always bearing in mind that our goal is reasonable security and not 100 percent safety, I would say that the first element of an adequate program must be the maintenance of military technological superiority over the Communist Bloc. We cannot long remain secure if we do not have the potentiality of outstripping the enemy in the quality of our weapons systems. The missile program, so much discussed at the present time, springs readily to mind as typical of the exploitation of technology to extend the tactical and strategical capabilities of armies, navies, and air forces. We must never relax our efforts, being sure that the enemy is doing his best.

Next, it is hardly necessary to emphasize the requirement for an atomic delivery system, capable of effective and rapid retaliation against any enemy who initiates general atomic hostilities. At the present time, this atomic delivery capability resides only in the long and medium-range bomber, but it will be reinforced in the course of the coming years by the long and medium-range missiles now under design and development. So obvious is the need for this element in our program that we run the danger of considering that it is sufficient in itself for national security. I hope that my subsequent remarks will dispel any such thought. As the President said in his State of the Union Message of 6 January 1955: ". . . we must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our armed forces balance and flexibility adequate for our purposes and objectives." There are many situations to which an atomic bomb is no appropriate response. What, for instance, is our atomic superiority doing to solve current problems in the Middle East? We will be derelict in the use of our tremendous potential for guiding this world if our military means of suasion are limited to the threat of all-out atomic bombardment to gain our point in international debate.

The obvious ability to strike hard and decisively against the sources of enemy strength should be accompanied by an equally unmistakable capability to inflict heavy losses on enemy bombers if they attack our own homeland. This requirement calls for a continental defense system, including both active and passive measures strong enough to discourage any enemy from attempting to strike a crippling blow at our country. In the missile field, the Army is expending vast sums of money and allocating considerable numbers of personnel to improve the defense of our most vital centers. At the same time, the Air Force is improving its fighter-interceptor defense. Continental defense is an area in which it is difficult to know how much is enough in meeting the needs of deterrence and the domestic peace of mind. It is easy to go overboard in spending for continental defense to the detriment of other important offensive aspects of our military program. Any serious effort to avoid any risk, and to be perfectly safe at home could have disastrous results to the balance of our program.

Now, a few specific words about the Army's role in continental defense. The Army has been in the antiaircraft artillery business for some forty years, during which time it has acquired considerable experience with conventional artillery, and since 1945, experience with antiaircraft missiles. It is in the missile field that we are placing the principal emphasis today. I often have occasion to comment upon the farsightedness and the breadth of vision of certain individuals -- some Army men, some civilian scientists -- who in 1945 drew up the original specifications for the first antiaircraft missile. It was in 1945 that the present NIKE I had its inception. In the subsequent years, this project was carried to fruition, so that under the impetus given by K. T. Keller, in 1953 we began placing on-site operational units of the first successful guided missile in the United States. Today, we have battalions deployed about 17 cities of our country. We are preparing to deploy NIKE battalions. Behind the NIKE I is the rapidly developing NIKE B, an improved version of NIKE I. NIKE B will have great lethality against enemy aircraft.

The agency which discharges the Army's antiaircraft mission in the United States is the Army Antiaircraft Command with headquarters at Colorado Springs. This command is a subordinate element of the Continental Air Defense Command, also with headquarters at Colorado Springs, under General Partridge of the Air Force. He has over-all responsibility for the air defense of the United States under a directive issued to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Corresponding to the Army Antiaircraft Command is the Air Force interceptor element called the Air Defense Command. Thus, General Partridge is a joint commander exercising operational control over an Air Force component and an Army antiaircraft

component. It is his duty to integrate these components into an effective defense of the United States. Generally speaking, the concept is that the interceptor aircraft will meet enemy planes as far out as possible and take their toll as the hostile formations approach critical areas of the United States. As they reach the local point defenses of our cities and industrial centers, the Army's batteries, principally NIKE, will engage and destroy the remnants of the invading force. The Army Antiaircraft Command consists of officers and men who have devoted their entire career to the study of the antiaircraft problem. They are backed by extensive research and training organizations designed to assure continued progress in Army antiaircraft defense.

In enumerating the deterrent components of our national military program, let us now consider the vital element represented by our Armed Forces deployed abroad, ready for sustained combat in the discharge of our international obligations. These forces deployed along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains are a constant reminder to the Soviet Bloc of our determination to defend in place. It is true that these forces are not large in number, but they are sufficient to provide this essential reminder and at the same time to maintain the morale and confidence of those countries which live constantly under the Communist guns.

The Army forces represented by these deployments are the Seventh Army in Europe and the Eighth Army in Korea. In Europe we have a force of five divisions and supporting troops, the hard core of the ground defense of Western Europe. These units are among the best in our Army, in fact in any army. They are always up to strength and they have the latest and most modern equipment. We see to it that their commanders are second to none. The same comment would apply to our corps of two divisions in Korea which, alongside the South Korean Army, continue to face a very large Communist force just north of the demilitarized zone. Korea still represents a fine training ground for our officers and laboratory for our tactical and organizational tests. While the guard on this front is a lonely one, the morale of our troops remains high and the officers returning attest to the professional value of this service.

While the presence of these forces abroad is essential to the deterrence of war, they are to a degree potential hostages if the deterrent fails and war occurs. If suddenly attacked, these forces must immediately fight for their lives, as they will be under heavy pressure by superior forces from the outset of hostilities. Consequently, we must maintain as a part of our national military program ready forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in reserve, capable of reinforcing rapidly the areas where our forces are presently deployed. All of our forces, those deployed and those in reserve, must have the capability of employing atomic weapons in the manner authorized at the time. Behind those forces, we shall need a logistical back-up, readily available to support them in action for an indefinite period of time.

The ready forces of which I speak should be stationed either at home, or in forward areas strategically related to possible areas of conflict. They will be ready not only to reinforce our present deployments, if the latter are attacked, but also to move to localities in which aggression may occur. In short, these forces "double in brass" both as reinforcements in the case of the outbreak of general war, or as "fire brigade" forces ready to suppress new conflagrations.

In preparing to meet the challenge of new aggressions in peripheral areas, the Army carries a heavy responsibility. In order to discharge this responsibility we are constantly urging greater attention to the requirements for the successful waging of small wars. We feel that our plans should be geared to the following sequence of events: We must first be prepared to develop as much indigenous strength as possible through aid programs. I shall discuss this matter later. Then, in case of apparent imminent attack, we must reinforce our allies with competent and numerous military advisors to aid them in preparing for combat and to help in leading their troops if combat occurs. Next, since even with these preparations the indigenous forces may be overrun, we must have highly mobile forces ready for movement to reinforce our allies under attack. The first kind of unit we would like to deploy would be small, air-lifted atomic-capable forces, We have developed such a task force which can be moved with all equipment in C124 aircraft. We demonstrated such a movement in the recent exercise FIRM LINK in Thailand. In this case, the Army in the Far East moved an atomic task force from Tokyo into Thailand and demonstrated that in a matter of hours atomic firepower could be applied in remote areas.

With such atomic firepower provided by our Army in support of our allies, the latter, we would hope, might be able to resist aggression without further Army commitments. Such an assumption, however, is always an uncertain one. Hence we should be prepared to bring in additional Army troops as rapidly as possible to achieve the desired military and political objectives.

The time factor always concerns us. I have often had occasion to observe that when the Communists attacked in South Korea, they did so in the only area in the world in which our response on the ground could have been sufficiently rapid to frustrate the aggression. Not only was Korea near enough for us to get ground troops there in time, but it was also close to Japan where our military establishments provided an indispensable communication zone in support of operations on the Korean Peninsula.

As we consider other possible areas of small war, we find less favorable relationships between the possible areas of conflict and American overseas deployments. Consequently, the time-space factor will be far more disadvantageous in another peripheral war than it was in Korea. Hence it is that we look about the world for possible forward areas in which we might keep American ground forces, or at least, deploy heavy equipment so that the air and sea requirements would be minimized in case of crisis.

I believe we can and should improve our readiness to react quickly to surprise local aggression. The Army itself does not have the organic strategic mobility to provide its own movement overseas. For overseas transport, the Army is a hitch-hiker, dependent upon the Navy for ships and upon the Air Force for aircraft. The sea transport requirements of the Army are not particularly hard to meet, but exclusive dependence on that form of transport sets limits to the rapidity of our reaction. As for strategic air transport, we need integrated plans for the movement of sizeable Army forces to such potential trouble spots as Southeast Asia and the Middle East, utilizing not only the organic transportation of the Air Force but also the resources of civilian aviation. On paper, we have considerable assets in four-engine civil aircraft which could be made available for such movements. I recognize, of course, the objections to a disruption of civil air transport, which would be justified only in time of real emergency.

Our national military program must make some provision for military and economic aid to essential allies. Aid programs must be closely related to our military requirements, although political considerations cannot be completely ignored. Generally speaking, we desire one of three levels of military strength in the countries which we assist. As a minimum, we want all these countries to have the necessary military strength to assure internal stability and order. Beyond this minimum level sought in all countries, we wish in some instances to develop the capability of self-defense against local military aggression. Vietnam and South Korea are examples of this category of country. Finally, in a rather restricted group of countries, largely those of the NATO Bloc, we seek to develop allies who can make a significant and prolonged contribution in case of general war.

It is easy to be critical of our military aid programs and of their effectiveness. Undoubtedly, with the benefit of hindsight, we could have improved these programs and obtained greater results for the effort and money expended. However, I would remind you that we have developed important indigenous strength in many countries. Today, the Army is engaged in training, directly or indirectly, over 200 foreign divisions. I would not overstate their military value, because they vary widely in

quality from country to country. But this strength, in the aggregate, is an important asset, particularly as a deterrent to subversion and local aggression.

The role of the Army in developing indigenous forces becomes more important each year. Although the individuals involved in this training are not particularly numerous, about 6,000, the talent required for this mission is a very important diversion of our personnel resources. From the head of the mission to the last enlisted man, the individuals must be picked for their professional competence, their character, and their adaptability to life in foreign lands. Not only must they themselves be acceptable representatives of the United States, but their families also must be adaptable to foreign ways. Most of all, they must have the ability to teach foreign nationals with understanding, and in such a way as to avoid offending -- not a particularly easy thing to do. The requirement for considerable numbers of individuals with these attributes and characteristics places a heavy burden upon our personnel authorities. In particular, they find it increasingly difficult to find officers and soldiers with linguistic qualifications desirable in these assignments. I often have occasion to stress to young officers the tremendous value of making a hobby out of language study. Certainly it will pay any ambitious officer to study and maintain a competent knowledge of at least one important foreign language.

In time of peace the people on our military missions have the primary duty of supervising the use of our American-provided equipment and training local forces so as to increase their combat capability. In time of war their role becomes vastly more difficult and more important. Based upon our experience in Korea we know that the performance of indigenous troops will be largely influenced by the quality and the strength of the American Army Mission. During the critical days in the last two months of the war in Korea, when the Communists made their tremendous efforts to break through our lines against the ROK II Corps, it was necessary to increase the number of advisors so as to have competent American officers down as far as battalion level.

At this point, I would call your attention to a significant fact; namely, that except for our research and development efforts, the top priority elements of the national military program which we have discussed thus far have all been forces in being. Let me enumerate them once more: the atomic-delivery system, the continental-defense system, our overseas deployments, our ready forces to back up these deployments and to meet local aggression, and finally the indigenous forces supported by our aid programs. All of these items represent visible, tangible strength, which in their totality, we hope will create the deterrent which is the primary objective of our entire military effort.

In my opinion, we should spend our defense money so as to make thoroughly ample provision for these forces in being. If supported by such non-military factors as a sound economy, clear national objectives, and resolute leadership, the resulting military posture should give us a reasonable assurance of maintaining the peace on acceptable terms. But, if we are prudent, we will not cut off our national military program at this point. It may turn out that we have under-estimated the requirements of deterrence, and that local or general war does, in fact, ensue. We cannot be sure of the duration or ultimate requirements of such a war, whether large or small. Arguments about the duration of future war usually center about the question of when and how atomic weapons will be employed. There are those who feel that any significant war will be initiated by an atomic attack on D-Day, that the first few hours and days will be decisive, and that the aftermath will be only the picking up of the pieces. Such an atomic attack -- if it takes place as described -- would indeed entail vast destruction and would preclude an orderly mobilization and the deployment on schedule of military forces earmarked for overseas. I do not contend that this is not a possible concept, but I discount it as an exclusive concept and as the exclusive basis for military planning. I have often had occasion to say that to direct all of our effort into the preparation for this short, violent type of nuclear war would be to behave like a prize fighter who enters a fight to the finish prepared only to fight one round.

Plainly, if we are prudent, we must have some back-up strength to meet the other variations of war which may well occur. For example, even if nuclear war does develop, it is not certain that the great atomic attack will come on the first day, or that atomic weapons will be used without some restrictions. I am often reminded of the "phony war" which lasted from September 1939 until April 1940, during which time, for reasons of self-interest shared by both sides, the Germans, the French, and the British maintained a self-imposed restraint of active conflict until Germany determined that it was to her interest to break the tacit armistice. Similarly, it is entirely possible in some future situation that both sides will restrict the employment of atomic weapons so that there would be little or no damage to our mobilization base at home. Finally, we may never fight the big atomic war at all; the critical military problem may quite possibly be the prompt suppression of local aggression. In the latter case, a so-called "conventional" mobilization would proceed undisturbed. Consequently, I say that we must, as an element of our program, make some provision for reserve forces and their logistic support.

The Army reserve forces are represented by the National Guard of 27 divisions and the Organized Reserve consisting of 10 divisions and numerous miscellaneous-type units. The present strength of the National Guard is about

400,000; the Reserves who receive annual training number about 190,000. The weakness of the Army Reserve has always been the insufficient number of enlisted men. There have been adequate numbers of officers but not sufficient men in the ranks. This situation, we hope, will progressively improve under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Through the operation of this law, which became effective only last fall, we have recruited some 37,000 young men for the various programs offered under the provisions of the law. This number is not as many as we would like to have. We had hoped to get 50,000 in the first six months. This hope, however, was perhaps unrealistic since time was required to publicize and explain the new law. Beginning in August of next year, all Selective Service men released after two years' service in the active Army will be required to serve in the reserve forces. Hence, we believe that, progressively, the Army will develop an adequate reserve structure to add to the deterrent effect of its active forces, and to provide reinforcing strength in the event of war.

With regard to reserve strength in the field of production, the Army maintains a modest mobilization base which the Army either owns or in which the Army owns the equipment. The number and size of this production mobilization base is related to the quantity of war reserves which we seek to accumulate from year to year. The optimum stockpile should be that quantity of supplies and equipment necessary to tide us over during the early months of combat while the reserve production base is being made active.

I hope that in my talk I have made clear how the Army fits into a national military program, designed to deter war, both general and local, and to win local war quickly. I have the feeling that if one accepts the general method which I have outlined, it would be a useful exercise for all Services to undertake a similar analysis of their part in the national program. It might, perhaps, aid in developing an objective approach to the very tough problems involved in building up the defense budget.

The decision as to how to apply resources becomes more difficult as time goes on. The extreme costliness of the weapons systems which we are developing creates staggering charges against the Federal treasury. In making these decisions, I know of only one method of guidance; namely, to adhere to the principles and priorities which we have developed in our discussion of the national military program. Our paramount effort must go to those forces which add to the deterrent effect of our military posture.

Only after assuring the requirements of deterrence are we justified in attempting to satisfy needs predicated on the possible failure of deterrence. We must believe in deterrence, otherwise we will be tempted to hedge our position to the extent that we will destroy our economy and our way of life.

If we do not believe in deterrence, we will try to satisfy the endless requirements of the strategic air arm, of continental defense, of civil defense, of stockpiling to meet bomb damage, of dispersion of government agencies and of industry -- all justified requirements if we lose faith in deterrence and accept the inevitability of general atomic war. If we adopt this defeatist attitude, we should in logic retire behind Maginot air defenses, bring home our overseas deployments, say goodbye to our allies and remake our domestic way of life. Although any course of action is fraught with some risk, I prefer to take as our objective the maintenance of peace through adequate deterrent strength rather than to pay the staggering price of full provision for a dubious survival in and after general atomic war.

To support the deterrent philosophy, the Army -- indeed the entire national military program must be suitable for flexible application to unforeseen situations, not frozen to any one concept of future war. It cannot and should not be geared to any single weapons system, strategic concept, or combination of allies. It must be capable of supporting our national policy in all situations. It should attract rather than repel essential allies. It should include all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war. Finally, our Armed Forces should have the potentiality of waging any war, large or small, in such a way as to assure a better world than the one which existed before the fateful decision to resort to arms.

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