

ADDRESS OF GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

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THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET

General Ennis and gentlemen. As your commandant has explained I practically forced myself onto your platform today. I did so because I remembered the pleasure of former years in appearing here and the stimulation of discussion and debate which always follow a prepared talk.

I am sure I would have done much better had I come here the day before yesterday. In that case, you might have steered me clear of some of the pitfalls into which I fell in the course of the Senate Hearings yesterday. Having come from a foreign country where one doesn't attach nearly as much importance to Washington business as people in Washington do, I was not entirely prepared. I hadn't done all my homework. I hadn't had the excellent staff preparation which some of you gentlemen used to give to me before I appeared before Congress as Chief of Staff.

For example I was not entirely prepared to face the question of why we believe one kind of intelligence today and a different kind yesterday. One of the Senators asked me: "Are you an intentions man or a capabilities man?" Well, I told him I only knew what I read in the newspaper but all this discussion about the change in intelligence reminded me of an old story -- the story of the absent-minded professor who came into his class at the end of the academic year and passed out the examination papers. The students picked up the papers, looked at them and let out a yell. "Why professor, these are the same questions

you asked us at Christmas." Well the professor hesitated a moment, then came back strong: "Children, it is true that the questions are the same as at Christmas, but this time the answers are different." I have the feeling this story has some pertinence to the present debate over our changed intelligence.

I reassure you in advance I have no prepared text. I thought perhaps I would chat with you for ~~perhaps~~ 10 or 15 minutes, then enter upon the part which I have always enjoyed the most, namely the discussion period. Much of what I will present to you, you already know. It is the theme which I have developed in the course of four years as Chief of Staff and which I have been rash enough lately to commit to writing.

I would say at the outset that it takes time to crystallize one's views on a subject as broad and as important as our national defense. I would also say that if one is sincere to himself and to his associates, he will change his views as experience grows. Certainly what I have concluded after four years as Chief of Staff I would not have endorsed after the first year, and it may well be that my views will continue to undergo change. I, for one, don't believe in living in a straight jacket of consistency.

The main theme which I am advancing is that a time has come for a complete reappraisal of our national strategy. Although there have been apparent changes since 1945, really there has been a consistent adherence to a strategy of massive retaliation. Occasionally this statement has been disputed, but I would point to the evidence of the expenditures of our defense budget. Where our dollars have gone there our interest has <sup>reported</sup> ~~been~~, I think an examination of our military budgets will show that inevitably and regularly we have expended our principal funds

for those forces related to massive retaliation and the support thereof.

Yet, I would say, without much fear of contradiction, that events have changed since 1945 and particularly since 1953 -- changes which would suggest that we should at least look where we are going and ask ourselves whether our course as designed in the past is still pointed to the proper goal.

What are some of these changes which I have in mind? I would say first and foremost there is the obvious loss of technological lead to the Soviets in many important military and scientific fields. Not so long ago, in our national planning we put as the top priority of our national effort the maintenance of technological superiority over the Soviets. I think the record shows, gentlemen, that in many important areas we have lost that lead. As a partial consequence, the placing of major reliance on weapons of massive destruction has lost all justification with this evidence of the progress of the Soviets in both atomic weapons and in long-range missiles. For a long time, many of us had felt confident that the mere fact that we had these weapons and no one else did would allow us to police the world, that by their use or even the threat of their use we could impose the Pax Americana. Yet, history has shown that the fact was otherwise even at a time of our monopoly. Hence if we have not kept the peace before, we cannot hope to do so now as we reach this period sometimes referred to as mutual deterrence, sometimes as an atomic impasse. At such times, reliance upon this single strategy will be even less capable than in the past of coping with rising level of communist provocation which we have anticipated and which we can now verify in the new self-confidence of the Soviets resulting from the possession of the lead or at least parity in atomic weapons.

A second reason for reappraisal of our strategy is the evidence that the trend of relative military strength is running against us. Today we have a preponderant strength in atomic bombers of the Air Force and the Navy -- a very large number of delivery vehicles to carry a very impressive stockpile to hostile targets. Unfortunately, this asset is a dwindling asset. The time will come (you gentlemen can argue the date) when our bombers can't get through or will suffer prohibitive losses if they attempt to penetrate.

Meanwhile, we have moved comparatively slowly in developing a long-range missile force. The one we have today is extremely small. It is uncertain as to reliability and perhaps most important of all it is exposed on fixed, known bases. We have no anti-missile defense in being or in sight. I say that in spite of the very encouraging progress made by the Nike Zeus Program, but our government still resists the recommendations of the Department of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff to put Zeus into production.

Finally, we have no national program of civil defense -- not even a minimum fallout program which I believe we military men should support as a contribution to deterrence.

Now these foregoing conditions indicate a downward trend through which we are losing or at least weakening our capability to deter deliberate atomic war. Unhappily, this decline of deterrence strength in the field of general war continues to be accompanied by a neglect of our ability to deter something less than general atomic war -- in other words in the limited war field -- so that in both areas the situation is unfavorable. The trend is downward in our deterrent capability against general war. Our capability remains low in the area

of limited war. This situation adds up to a general decline in military strength at a time we are approaching Summit Conferences of the utmost political importance.

Those then, gentlemen, are some of the reasons why the time has come to reappraise our military policy. You may not agree with how I would change it. You may resist violently some of the argumentation which I would advance, but I don't see how any of us can resist the need to take a real look across the boards to see how we are doing in national defense.

Now, unhappily, based upon my experience in the Pentagon I am afraid that the kind of reappraisal I am talking about as a practical thing will be extremely difficult. It will be difficult because of the past ineffectiveness of our strategy-making machinery. What are the elements in that machinery? First, the National Security Council, then the Department of Defense and finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my observation, gentlemen, these three elements have not done the job which is required to give us a clearcut strategy which we can all understand and which we can all execute. Take first the National Security Council. This council was designed to bring together the representatives of all the principal federal agencies involved in national defense. The thought was that its members all bring various assets to the table where they would be properly combined to utilize our political, economic, psychological and military strength in harmony to constitute an effective national strategy. I would say that the Council has not succeeded in effecting this synthesis. Once a year it revises the Basic National Military Policy paper which is the document which

should provide the fundamental guidance for the military services. Each year that document is argued over, debated, and watered down or diffused in its terms. As a result the end product means almost anything to any reader. I always felt I could find paragraphs that justified my point of view on strategic matters, and I am sure that my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff who disagreed with me felt that they were on just as sound ground as I did. By the very nature of the compromise character of the important documents of the National Security Council, the Pentagon has never received that overall guidance which is so essential to a proper planning of strategy.

Within the Department of Defense I do not think we have done too well, and when I make these critical statements I accept my share of the responsibility <sup>in</sup> ~~as~~ having contributed to this situation. Generally speaking, the problem has been in two areas. One has been the tendency of the Chiefs of Staff to split on many of the important issues. ~~Sub~~Division in itself is not bad. I don't see how four conscientious men, even with the same sets of facts, could ever reach honest unanimity on many of these defense issues. Furthermore I think it would be unsound and unsafe for the nation if indeed the Chiefs did not bring to bear differing approaches to many of the problems. But, when they have produced opposing views, the subsequent decision making has been woefully slow. The Secretaries of Defense whom I have known, able men, patriotic men, have had a ~~perhaps~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> natural reluctance to step in and settle these military issues which they have recognized to be ~~points~~ of tremendous national importance. In view of <sup>the</sup> ~~their~~ military character, <sup>of these questions</sup> the civilians have tended to back away from them. I have not agreed with this reluctance because I have always felt there is no major military problem

that cannot be phrased in such simple language that any intelligent civilian judge can understand and decide it. The Judges of our Courts constantly pass on highly technical questions with no personal background because they have able attorneys who analyze the problem into terms which can be understood. It is a major responsibility of the Joint Chiefs to phrase these military issues in lay language for decision by the Secretary of Defense. Whether failure of the Chiefs to do this or whether inherent indecisiveness on the part of the Secretaries have been major factors, the records show that the decisions have not been taken in time.

The other area which has been a handicap in our strategy-making has been the defense budget and its manner of formulation. There we have still retained the traditional method of budgeting by Army, Navy and Air Force -- the so-called vertical method. Now I am not going to take much time on this subject which is somewhat technical and which many of you gentlemen know well. But I am obliged to repeat my conviction that we will never know exactly what we are buying with our budget and hence whether or not the approved strategy is being implemented until we redo our budget in functional sense. We must be able to determine how many dollars we are spending on our retaliatory capability, how much on our air defense, how much for forces which could be used for limited war, how much for strategic transport and the like. As you all know, we don't do our business that way now. Hence, we never know when we have enough or too little in operational forces. We settle these important matters by service hunch or predilection.

These are some of the difficulties we would encounter in a kind of a strategic reappraisal I am suggesting. I don't say, mind you,

that we should stop everything, tear the Pentagon apart and put it together again before we face up to some of these urgent problems. I consider the situation far too serious to wait upon reorganization. I think we can and should proceed with what we have while we reexamine the machinery at our leisure to see if we can't make it easier by organization for good men to do a better job. In particular, I think there are some immediate steps which we could take now while we initiate the longer term measures with greater lead time. I have referred to these sometimes as "quick fixes". It is not a very happy term but it suggests the idea of plugging something up while waiting for something better.

As a first quick fix, in our readiness for a limited war, by better organization, by improved joint planning and training, by developing a feeling of true cooperation between the three services, we could improve our limited war picture very significantly with the forces we have presently available.

Then, we have the question of the missile gap which in my judgement is not a gap of numbers as much as a gap in weapons systems. I don't know how many ICBM's we have not. Deliberately I have not looked at any classified information since leaving the job of Chief of Staff, but I would say the number, while an important factor, is not as important as others. Reliability, accuracy, rapidity of reaction and protection are certainly factors just as important in the missile situation as numbers. In my opinion, the fact that our missile system as now designed is exposed, immobile on known locations is a far more serious disadvantage than the fact that we probably have fewer operational missiles today than the Soviet Union. Can we do anything to change the situation in the near future? We certainly can in a number of years, but not quickly. There is however one short range possibility. Thus far, we have never

exploited the Jupiter intermediate range missile as a mobile field missile as it was intended. The mobility feature was taken out of the missile by direct order of the Air Force. That feature can be put back in a short time. It can be used as a mobile missile, and as such it has potentialities in assisting to a degree in closing the so-called missile gap.

At the same time I am very much impressed with the problem that SAC faces in this period. As I told the Congress yesterday, I feel an airborne alert of some sort should be planned and put into effect on an agreed date. I am not sure it is needed today or next month but I am sure it will be needed in this critical period which faces us starting about 1961.

As a final quick fix, I think that we should begin a modest, sensible fallout program for the United States for reasons to which I alluded before, namely that the complete absence of protection for our people certainly is an invitation or encouragement to the Soviet war planner. On the contrary to have some reasonable fallout protection for our population would be an internal morale advantage and also would add to our over-all deterrent posture. So much for the quick fixes which could be done in short order.

The longer term measures are the more important ones and of course will take more time. To start with, we should reject the fallacy that a strategy of massive retaliation provides all that is necessary for national defense. The record shows that it has not provided across-the-board protection in the past or present, that instead we need a Strategy of Flexible Response which gives adequate attention to limited war while retaining the ability to cope with general war. A very important part of our new strategic planning will be to get agreement on how much is enough in the functional categories

exploited the Jupiter intermediate range missile as a mobile missile as it was intended. The mobility feature was taken out of the missile by direct order of the Air Force. That feature can be put back in a short time. It can be used as a mobile missile. The missile has potentialities in assisting to a degree in closing the intermediate missile gap.

At the same time I am very much impressed with the problems that SAC faces in this period. As I told the Joint Chiefs, there should be an airborne alert of some sort should be planned and put into effect on an agreed date. I am not sure it is needed today or at any time. I am sure it will be needed in this critical period which begins starting about 1961.

As a final quick fix, I think that we should have a sensible fallout program for the United States for some time. As I alluded before, namely that the complete absence of protection for our people certainly is an invitation or encouragement to the war planner. On the contrary to have some reasonable protection for our population would be an internal morale advantage which would add to our over-all deterrent posture. So much for the quick fixes which could be done in short order.

The longer term measures are the more important. The course will take more time. To start with, we should avoid the fallacy that a strategy of massive retaliation provides the only necessary for national defense. The record shows that it has provided across-the-board protection in the past. Instead we need a Strategy of Flexible Response which gives attention to limited war while retaining the ability to fight general war. A very important part of our new strategy will be to get agreement on how much is enough in the event of a limited

of forces. Strangely enough, gentlemen, we have never set goals for ourselves in these categories. We have never decided how many bombs or missiles on target are necessary on the part of our atomic deterrent force. Up to quite recently we have never tried to define air defense in any scientific terms of density of defense around specific targets. We have never yet agreed on the number of divisions we should be able to project overseas and close in a given area in a given period of time in the discharge of our limited war responsibilities. In antisubmarine warfare, no one has ever undertaken to define our goal. What is enough? How many ships, how many planes, how many submarines do we need? I would say a definition of our goals is an essential undone part of strategic planning, one which has <sup>been</sup> never executed in the past. I have already mentioned the need to revise budget-making in consistence with this line of thinking because only then will we know what our dollars are procuring in terms of operational forces.

Finally, and this is the area in which I have had more trouble with myself, there is the need to redefine the roles and missions of our three services -- the Army, the Navy and the Air Force with the Marines included under the Navy. It is very easy to stand by our traditional definitions and say the Army should be that force organized and trained for sustained combat on ground. We obviously must always be ready to fight on the ground where <sup>the human race is</sup> ~~our basic interests~~ are rooted. I think that statement still defines the Army and we should be loyal to it in all our preparations, in all our procurement of weapons, and in all our developments of Army tactics. By the same token the Navy is that force organized and trained for sustained combat at sea. It is so organized now and my subsequent discussion will

contain no proposals for a change in naval roles and missions. But with the Air Force — shall we continue to define it as the force organized and trained for sustained combat in the air? It is easy to say yes but that answer proposes some very serious problems which the Air Force shares with the Army. The plight of the Army has been that it is a split personality. It does not have an autonomous capability to fight on land - indeed it has deliberately accepted a dependence on the Air Force. That relationship has not worked. After a decade of trial, for the Army I will say it has not worked and I believe that many of my Air Force friends would agree. The Army should have all the weapons it needs to engage in sustained combat on the land, under the land if that is conceivable, and in the air over the land. Such a requirement calls for the return to the Army of the aircraft or other weapons which perform the role of close support aviation. I would not take over what the Air Force has presently in inventory. These planes are obsolescent. But the Army should take over the close-support mission and therewith the development and procurement of the new weapons needed to do the close-support job.

When I take this position, I hesitate then as to how to define the role of the Air Force. I would say that we should redefine the Air Force as that force organized and trained to perform the atomic deterrent mission from the ground, both the offensive and the defensive components. In other words gentlemen, I am saying that the missiles and the bombers of SAC should be protected by missiles and aircraft belonging to the Air Force, thus pulling together a split role which has caused great difficulty between the Army and the Air Force in the past, to the detriment in the efficient air defense of the

United States. In making this suggestion, I emphasize that I am not speaking for the Army. Many of my closest friends in the Army would not agree with this proposition, but to me its logic is inescapable. I maintain that a final long-term fix is to redefine what we mean by the Army, by the Navy and by the Air Force and then to give them all the means and weapons necessary to discharge these clarified missions.

Now to close my introductory remarks, for both the short-term and the long-term measures which I suggest the time for decision is now. We are not presently defenseless by any means. We have a tremendous military organization in being which has served us well, but the trend of the times is against us as our forces are presently organized and conceived. The lead time of the decision in these matters is one of years. Hence, it is not enough to say that we are doing all right today or next year or perhaps even the year thereafter. We must decide today the kind of forces we will have in the future two, three, five years ahead of us. Hence, I think I am justified in saying that the time has come to make basic decisions and to take heroic measures now to get on with the business. The changes I am suggesting will not only take time and thought and decision, but they will also take men and money and sacrifice. I have been asked to cost this kind of program. What kind of military budget do I have in mind? As a shotgun answer, I would say 50 to 55 billion a year for the next few years until we readjust our posture. I don't think that is a preposterous figure in the slightest. We are now spending something like 8.7%, I believe, of our Gross National Product for national defense. With the anticipated growth of our country, our industry and our Gross National Product, within three or four years, although spending no more on a percentage

basis than we are today, we will be in the 50 to 55 billion budget range. I say it is time there to advance the rate of expenditures and establish in the 1961 budget a base of departure to accomplish the aims which I have recommended.

What is the alternative of continuing as we are now going? The inevitable alternative, gentlemen, is military inferiority -- military inferiority at a time when the decision as to whether the world will go free or communist -- is still undecided ; at a time when momentous political decisions face our country and our allies. To be militarily inferior and to talk from weakness at such a time will endanger our safety as a nation. While many doubts assault us I am sure of at least one thing. There can be no long-term living with communism as an inferior.

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