

"NEED FOR A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY"

AIR WAR COLLEGE - 20 MAY 1960

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I. Why the need?

a Important changes since 1945 and 1953.

- (1) Loss of monopoly. Mutual Deterrence.
- (2) Rise of Missile Gap. Bombers dwindling asset. No AMM. No fall-out defense.
- (3) Proliferation of limited wars. Acceptance of inferiority.

b Trend against us. Need for reappraisal.

II. Difficulty of reappraisal

- a Unclear guidance of NSC BNSP. Uncertainty as to kinds of war, strategy, forces and funds. Policy on A-weapons, civil defense, overseas deployment.
- b Inadequacies of Sec.Def./JCS. Unclear guidance to services, Absence of goals. Commitments vs. capabilities. Service splits. Failure of JSOP's.
- c Budget procedures. Lack of relation to approved strategy and operational forces.
- d Nevertheless reappraisal. Gates.

III. Possible outcome of a reappraisal- My hope.

- a Mass Retaliation discarded for Flexible Response.
- b Increased emphasis on limited war.
- c Redefinition of roles and missions.
- d Budget-making on operation lines
- e New guidance for NSC

IV. Content of New Guidance.

*Speech  
file*

APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

It has often been said that the guidance provided by the National Security Council to the Department of Defense has in the past been inadequate and unclear. The question arises as to what kind of new guidance is required to produce Armed Forces of the size and kind necessary to do the will of the Commander-in-Chief, assuming that he desires a wide freedom of choice in any future crisis. The following statement suggests the kind of guidance needed ~~from the National Security Council~~ to produce a strategy of Flexible Response.

"The objective of the military preparations of the United States is to create respect for the military strength of the United States without creating fear of its misuse. ~~The~~ respect should be sufficient to deter military attack on the United States and to discourage aggression in any area of U.S. interest. If deterrence fails, our strength should be sufficient to impose appropriate punishment upon the aggressor.

In short, U.S. military strength should be such as to impress possible enemies and encourage friends and neutrals. It should not inspire fear arising from the nature of its weapons or from the character of the strategy which directs its use.

To achieve this kind of military strength, the Department of Defense will conform to the following guidance:

- a. The Armed Forces of the United States will be so organized and trained as to have the capability of deterring a general atomic attack on United States and of dealing a crippling

second-strike against the aggressor if deterrence fails. The weapons system for retaliation will consist primarily of long-range missiles with atomic war heads, firing from mobile or concealed positions removed from important friendly targets.

- b. Concurrently, and with equal priority of effort, the Armed Forces of the United States will be so organized and trained as to have the capability of sustained combat on the ground and at sea, placing primary reliance on the use of non-atomic weapons, and upon strategic and tactical mobility to permit prompt and timely intervention in any area of vital U.S. interest.
- c. The three service departments will be reorganized and their roles and missions restated in consonance with the following principles:
  - (1) The Department of the Army is that service charged with raising, equipping and training all forces required for sustained combat on and over the ground.
  - (2) The Department of the Navy is that service charged with raising, equipping and training all forces required for sustained combat on, over and under the sea.
  - (3) The Department of the Air Force is that service charged with raising, equipping and training all land-based strategic missile forces and the anti-aircraft, anti-missile and early warning elements necessary for their <sup>own</sup> protection and <sup>for the</sup> defense of the Continental U.S.

- d. To support the foregoing forces, the Department of Defense will plan upon the use of 10% of the gross national product to provide for the annual military budget. It will submit to the President annually a five-year military program for overall approval. This program will define and justify goals for all categories of operational forces. These goals will be based upon the estimated military threat and <sup>the</sup> extent of the political commitments of the United States which have military implications. The Department of Defense will justify its annual budget in terms of operational forces required to meet the approved goals.
- e. The Department of Defense will plan and implement the military strategy in conformance with the following statements of policy:
- (1) It is the policy of the United States not to use atomic or lethal chemical or biological weapons except in retaliation or upon clear indication of intended use by an enemy.
  - (2) It is the policy of the United States to withdraw progressively from overseas bases and to reduce overseas deployments. In replacement therefore, the United States will assist the development of conventional indigenous forces in selected areas. It will establish stockpiles of heavy military equipment at points of strategic logistical importance and will otherwise enhance the strategic mobility of its forces. It will use these forces for the prompt support of threatened

overseas areas of interest to the United States.

(3) It is the policy of the United States to support a program to provide fallout shelters for the civilian population.

f. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense will make an annual report to the National Security Council on the adequacy of the military forces in being in relation to the current military threat and to the current commitments which may require the use of military forces for their fulfillment."

It is believed that guidance such as the foregoing if faithfully implemented by the Department of Defense would result in producing forces appropriate to our requirements and applicable to the many forms of military threat which may arise. These forces would not be dependent upon any one weapons system but would permit a strategy of flexible response offering many alternatives to our responsible leaders. Moreover, it would assure that we put first things first and that we know what kind of security we are buying with our defense dollars. — something

*we do not know today.*

POLITICAL COMMITMENTS VERSUS MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The United States has undertaken political commitments with 44 nations, which carry a promise or an implication of military assistance under certain conditions. ~~They express an obligation or an intention to pursue a certain line of conduct under a certain circumstances. Some of these commitments are public, others secret or implied. In some instances the beneficiary may not even be aware of its existence. The actions required of the United States by these commitments may be political, economic, psychological, military or combination of all. The problem is to be sure that we have the means to support these commitments as they arise.~~

The military actions <sup>arising</sup> ~~resulting~~ from these commitments <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ take the form of general war, limited war or cold war.

General war is most likely to arise from commitments undertaken in the NATO area. The reaction required <sup>in that case</sup> is covered by the general war plan. This plan is predicated on the unlimited use of atomic weapons, while ground forces act as a shield to prevent the invasion of Western Europe. It is visualized that the initial decisive action will be short and violent. Following the initial atomic exchange, there will be an indeterminate aftermath, the form of which is difficult to predict. It is equally difficult to anticipate how such a war would begin, whether by surprise attack or by progressive development from successive lesser military actions.

Elsewhere in the world the military requirements arising from our political commitments are likely to take the form of

limited war. For these situations there are no specific plans at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the other hand the unified commanders have many contingency plans for the limited war situations which may arise in their areas of responsibility. However, there is no review in the Department of Defense to verify that the forces available are adequate to support these plans as they may arise. There is no balancing of the books to verify that our military resources match our political commitments. This deficiency is a serious flaw in our political-military procedure at the governmental level.

MDT/smf