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A BLUEPRINT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

California Institute of Technology
October 12, 1960.

President Du Bridge has done me a great honor in asking me to lead off this series of lectures dealing with national policy and international relations. My only regret is that I cannot take part as a listener in the subsequent lectures and seminars, for I am sure that much profit will derive from the contributions of so many speakers of broad and differing experience.

I have tagged my remarks to-night with the title "A Blueprint for National Security" and will stay within the context of a broad outline of the orientation which I feel should be given to our defense efforts. In concentrating on this defense topic, I recognize that soldiers and ex-soldiers are suspected - not without cause - of viewing all the world's problems in terms of their solution by military force. Additionally, ^{very} ~~the~~ ^{fact} that this first lecture deals with military security may suggest ~~an exaggerated attention to~~ ~~that the thought is about~~ the military element of national policy, ~~and should be regarded as having preeminent importance.~~ Personally, I regard ^a ~~strong~~ ^{national} national defense as an indispensable element of ^a policy, but not an end in itself. The very word, security, like safety, conveys a defensive, negative thought whereas national policy should be a blending of dynamic forces directed at the attainment of the ultimate objectives of the nation. ~~These forces are political, economic and moral in nature~~ ~~as well as military.~~ The unresolved problem so far has been to

effect this blending of dissimilar ^{elements} forces in an appropriate way to utilize all of our assets ^{- political, economic, moral and military -} to the best effect, for reaching ~~national~~ goals.

The failure of our policy-making machinery in this respect is now being recognized in many quarters. A conspicuous effort to appraise the problem is being made by Senator Jackson's Sub-committee on National Policy Machinery which has accumulated an impressive volume of testimony from witnesses representing many fields of competence. However, just as we are doing tonight, the inquiry appears to be placing primary emphasis on an examination of the ~~effectiveness of governmental~~ machinery for making and executing security policy.

This Senatorial appraisal will undoubtedly make a signal contribution if it produces useful suggestions for improvement in this one important field of security. But the question still ^{remains} arises as to whether we can plan effectively for our security without first reaching agreement on overall national objectives and the ^{national} strategy for attaining them. These important preliminaries ~~certainly~~ appear necessary if we are to fit military policy into proper relation with other and equally important aspects of national policy.

But the fact is that we have no agreed national goals to guide our planning. Although most of us have an instinctive concept of what the U.S. stands for, except for the writings of Founding Fathers, there is little recorded guidance as to where we are headed ^{or should head} as a nation. It was in recognition of this omission, I presume, that the President's Committee on National Goals

was established some months ago with the mission of ^{determining} giving expression to the goals which the nation does or should pursue. I am told that the Committee will submit its report at the end of this year. If this study results in establishing ultimate goals, the N.S.C. will for the first time have an adequate starting point for the formulation of a rational national strategy.

But, if all these preliminaries are ^{insufficient} ~~essential~~ to effective security planning, it raises the question of whether we can await upon them. I do not believe that we can. The requirements of security bear inexorably upon us now for immediate resolution. The world ^{balance of power} is changing fast and to our disadvantage.

Herndon
Among the changes which I have in mind is our loss to the Soviets of the lead in many important military and scientific fields. Not so long ago, in our national planning we assigned top priority ⁱⁿ of our efforts to the maintenance of technological superiority over the Soviets. ^{In the past} ~~Always~~ we have assumed our ability to stay ahead in war-making strength, particularly in the ^{of general atomic war} ~~general war~~ field. I think the records show, gentlemen, that in many respects we have lost our lead in these fields and how has it come about? The Soviets have simply devoted relatively greater efforts than we to their military forces and to their research efforts, and in so doing they have shown careful selectivity in using their resources. Although they are a nation with a Gross National Product less than half of our own and although their standard of living has been estimated at about one-third of ours, they have been spending at least as

much as we on military ^{preparation} matters. And they have more to show for their work in the ^{area} fields where they have concentrated their efforts. Reasonably certain that we would not use our preponderant bomber strength in a first strike, they deliberately declined to try to match us in bombers and threw their efforts into missiles instead. They leapfrogged into the missile lead and avoided expending large resources on obsolescent manned aircraft. Thus, at the start of this decade, they are achieving, if they have not already achieved, equality with us in deliverable destructive power. But the significant point is that their delivery means will be primarily the missile, whereas ours for a ^{considerable} long time will be primarily the bomber.

As a consequence of this Soviet progress in atomic weapons and long-range missiles, it makes no sense for the United States to continue to place major reliance for maintaining the peace on weapons of massive destruction. During the time that we had a substantial superiority in atomic weapons and delivery means, many of our leaders felt confident that our possession of these weapons would allow us to police the world, that by their use or even the threat of their use we could impose a Pax Americana.

Yet even in this period of virtual monopoly, we ^{witnessed} say a proliferation of limited wars and many instances of Communist aggression which our atomic superiority was unable to prevent. Now in 1960 the Soviets have just as good atomic weapons as we and in all probability their means of delivery will soon be better than ours. They have developed a strong air defense for the Russian homeland as well as ~~air-raid~~ shelters for the civilian population. By these latter measures, they are creating

an effective defense tending to neutralize our bomber strength while they build a powerful offensive missile force for which the United States has no defense.

As a consequence, the United States' superiority in manned bombers is a dwindling asset. Our planes are exposed to surprise missile attack on fixed air bases known to the enemy. The effect of their numerical superiority steadily diminishes with their increasing vulnerability. Nevertheless today, I would say that while the Soviets in a first strike could damage our retaliatory forces seriously, ^{even a} surprise attack could hardly hope to prevent our forces from responding with a powerful retaliatory blow. In other words, the Soviets do not have today a reliable first-strike capability. Thus, it appears unlikely at this moment that the Soviets would deliberately embark on general atomic war - the atomic stand-off is still with us.

This consideration of strategic nuclear forces, however, is only half of the defense problem. The other half relates to the so-called limited war or conventional forces available to the respective power blocs. Here the situation is vastly different. The United States and its allies have deliberately accepted inferiority in conventional ground forces and their supporting services. They have adopted the defeatist attitude that Communist manpower cannot be met on the ground and hence we must rely upon weapons of mass destruction. Actually, this inevitable inferiority in manpower is a myth, but it is one which has been carefully fostered and perpetuated. We have acted as if it were true and allowed our ground forces to

dwindle. While the ratio of 175 Soviet divisions, the strength of their Army, to 14 American divisions, the strength of ours, is hardly a true measure of relative ground strength, nonetheless, it is suggestive of the relative effort and attention paid to that kind of military strength which is essential to cope with situations short of general atomic war. And in an atomic stalemate, that is the form of warfare most likely to occur.

It is considerations such as these which lead me to feel that there is an urgent need to reappraise our strategy without delay and ^{to} recast our military policy in the light of the changing power situation in the world. I think it can be done - must be done - ^{without awaiting} ~~in spite of the absence~~ of more specific guidance from on high. Let ^{us} ~~we~~ try this evening to develop the blueprint of a revised defense program ^{which will take into account} ~~to serve as a basis for our subsequent discussion.~~ ^{the changing power situation and will offer the promise of restoring it in our favor.} Regardless of what political and economic goals our government may pursue, we can without hesitation set the goal of an adequate military program as the maintenance of peace. Deterrence of war has always been the accepted purpose of our defense efforts but, for too long a time, it was assumed that readiness for a general atomic war would not only deter the big war but the little ones as well. I heard that argument seriously advanced in the Pentagon as late as 1958 in spite of its clear implausibility in the light of the Soviet progress in atomic weapons and the advent of ^{a situation of} mutual deterrence. Nonetheless this fallacious argument accounts in a measure for our ^{present} lag in limited war capability, ~~which needs to be corrected if we are to achieve~~

Reorganize

~~deterrence across the spectrum of possible military threats.~~

The military program must also take into account the continuing threat of the cold war conducted by the Communist Bloc against the U.S. and its friends. It required little reflection to appreciate that our cause may be lost in the cold war just as surely as in a "hot" one if we allow Soviet intrigue, cajolery and threats to undermine our will to resist and to sap the confidence of our Allies in us and in themselves. This cold war must be won and the military program should be such as to contribute to the victory. While military strength in being will be an important part of this contribution, the nature of the U.S. military strategy and the kinds of weapons with which we arm our forces can also exert a great influence in ^{the} winning ~~the~~ ~~cold war~~.

In planning for our security we must not forget the economic facts of life and assume unlimited resources for the military program. It will compete with many other national programs directed at goals other than security and, hence, must withstand the hard scrutiny of the fiscal ^{authorities} ~~with~~ ^{of} the government. It can do so only if it is based on verifiable military requirements with a demonstrable relation to the deterrence or winning of war - ~~ncold~~, limited or general.

In summary, by making a few common sense assumptions which will be valid under any set of national goals, I feel that security planning can proceed with reasonable assurance of being pointed in the right direction-even in the absence of more refined guidance.

After a decision has been taken to proceed from ~~this prag-~~^{such a}
~~matic~~ base of departure, it becomes largely a professional
military matter to ~~develop~~^{draw up} the outline of a military program
which will provide guidance to the Armed Forces in developing
a proper set of fighting forces and ~~in providing the ground-~~
~~work~~ for the defense budget to support these forces. To be
consistent with the substance of ~~the~~^{our} preceding discussion,
such a program should make provision for the following elements:

- a) An invulnerable, long-range missile force with a second-strike capability, i.e., the ability to inflict crippling damage on an enemy even after absorbing a surprise nuclear attack.
- b) Adequate and properly equipped mobile forces to cope with limited war, i.e., conflicts short of general atomic war between the two nuclear power blocs.
- c) An effective system of alliances.
- d) Procedures for assuring the most effective use of the ~~financial~~ resources committed to the program.

To show why these elements are necessary, let me ~~discuss~~^{take them}
~~them~~^{up} in order:

The purpose of our preparations for general atomic war is to assure that no such war will ever be fought. This purpose can be achieved provided there is an approximate balance of destructive capability between the two power blocs which makes the deliberate choice of general atomic war unthinkable ~~to~~^{by} either side. We have such a balance today but it has begun to incline in favor of the Soviets because of our lag in developing a reliable, protected missile system. Consequently, the security program which we are designing must stress as a matter of

urgency the achievement of such a system to restore the equilibrium which is being lost. To do this task, our strategic missiles must include ^{among} in their characteristics reliability, immediate readiness for launching, and protection from surprise attack. *This latter point of protection is particularly important.*

Reliability in a missile can be obtained only after the patient, prolonged elimination of innumerable mechanical "bugs". Under the pressure to close the missile gap as fast as possible we have often had a tendency to declare operational, missiles which are far from having proved reliability. In former old-fashioned days, a new field artillery piece was test-fired with hundreds of rounds of service ammunition before being considered operational and ready to be put in the hands of troops. Now, after a few launchings, optimistically termed successful, it is quite usual to proclaim operational a new, enormously complicated missile carrying the life of a city in its war head. If their records were fully known, I doubt that by disinterested judgment many of our current missiles would be considered sufficiently tested to deserve the rating of reliable. A few press notices of successful firings are not to be confused with the attainment of a truly reliable missile system.

The necessary readiness for prompt launching requires missiles of the solid propellant type. All of our presently operational long-range missiles use a liquid propellant and require hours of preparation before launching. However, the next generation, such as the Minuteman, Polaris and Pershing missiles, are designed to use a solid propellant.

To have protection against surprise attack, our new missiles need the attributes - singly or in combination - of mobility, concealment and hardening. Major launching areas should have the protective cover of an active anti-missile defense such as that which the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile would afford. To avoid the needless destruction of centers of population, all launching sites should be far removed from our cities. The Polaris submarine-launched missile when operational will have all of these characteristics of mobility and concealment whereas our present land-launched operational missiles presently do not.

The fact is that
While we are often inclined to stress numbers in our efforts to close the missile gap, we usually fail to recognize the ~~importance~~ ^{indispensability} of the ~~defensive~~ ^{protective} elements of a "second strike" missile system. Actually a few hundred reliable long-range missiles are all we need ~~for defense purposes~~, provided they are invulnerable to surprise attack. While complete invulnerability will never be attained, if we employ all ^{possible} ~~the~~ defensive measures ~~mentioned above~~ in intelligent combination, there can be a reasonable expectation of having enough missiles to survive a surprise attack and ~~of still being~~ ^{to be} able to strike a crippling blow in retaliation. That is to say, we will have achieved a second-strike capability.

One can hardly overstress the need for an antimissile missile for the tight defense of a limited number of vital areas. In an emergency, such a weapon would allow us to hold our retaliatory fire until we were sure that we were truly under hostile attack, secure in the knowledge that most of our protected missiles could still get off the ground and on to ^{the} target. The United States has been woefully remiss in not pressing the pro-

duction of the "Nike-Zeus"^{anti-missile} missile in order to obtain this critical advantage. We may expect any day to find that the USSR has beaten us to such a weapon, and has thus ^{accentuated} disrupted ~~once more~~ the ⁱⁿ stability which we are seeking to ~~give~~ ^{convert in} the opposing nuclear ~~determent~~ systems.

The second element of our security program, adequate and properly equipped mobile forces to cope with limited war, is of equal importance with the invulnerable, atomic missile force. Unless we find reason to believe that Communism has renounced the use of all forms of military force to achieve its ends, the need for such a mobile force increases as the danger of deliberately planned general atomic war recedes, ~~before our visible readiness to retaliate in kind.~~ But, despite the clear evidence of the rising incidence of limited war, the United States has deliberately restrained the development of "adequate and properly equipped mobile forces" in order to pay the ever increasing cost of general war weapons.

Our weakness in this field of limited war has been obscured by the fact that there has never been an agreed procedure for determining what forces are needed for limited war purposes - indeed, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff there has been a positive resistance to studies designed to make such a determination. Although we have undertaken military commitments to more than 40 nations, we have never established a procedure for verifying that our military capabilities have a reasonable chance of meeting these obligations if they fall due.

Apart from the question of their size, the modernization of the equipment of limited war forces has lagged because of inade-

quate fiscal provisions. The Army's financial requirement for modernizing its equipment has been estimated at about 3 billion dollars a year for five years. There is a corresponding bill for the modernization of those portions of the Air Force, Navy and Marines which could be used in limited war. No such funds have been forthcoming. As it is, the Army is still equipped largely with World War II equipment and has not been able to afford the means for the improved ground and air mobility obtainable from equipment now available for production. Nor has any great sense of urgency been shown in pushing the production of very low yield atomic weapons which are the only atomic weapons with a likelihood of use in limited war.

While there is much to be desired to improve the tactical mobility of our limited war forces, it is in the field of strategic air lift that we need to make a major effort. At present, our available aircraft for that purpose are obsolete, inadequate in numbers and unprepared to move significant numbers of troops on short notice.

Our security planners will have to give much thought to this need for strategic mobility for limited war forces. They will have to reconcile the considerable cost of a replacement program for obsolete transport aircraft with the financial demands of other parts of ^{the} ~~his~~ program. They may well conclude that the stockpiling of heavy military equipment in certain strategic points about the world will promote both economy and rapidity of military reaction.

The United States since World War II has come to recognize the global nature of ^{its} ~~our~~ security problems and the consequent

need for effective allies joined to us by common goals and interests. We have long since abandoned the idea of going it alone in the face of the threat of the World Communist Bloc. An adequate security program, then, should have the collateral effect of strengthening our alliances, reducing the causes for disagreement and division among our friends and enhancing their confidence in us and in themselves.

To achieve these results, we need to make our military commitments to our allies only after careful thought, but then in unambiguous language. A vague promise to help "in accordance with our constitutional provisions" or similar terms is not very encouraging to a country living on the Communist periphery thousands of miles from the United States. But even explicit promises will not suffice unless the military preparations of the United States show clearly an ability to come quickly with help of a sort which will save but not destroy. This fact is an additional reason for the "adequate and properly armed" mobile forces which our security planners have placed high on their priority list. "Properly armed" from the point of view of threatened allies means without dependence on the use of atomic weapons, particularly without dependence upon those with an indiscriminate capacity for mass destruction, ~~the effect of which in contemplation often makes surrender seem less terrible than rescue, through their use.~~ Thus, a prerequisite for our limited war forces is an ability for prolonged combat without the use of atomic weapons.

The self-confidence of our allies will depend upon their ability to defend themselves, at least long enough for our help to arrive. The primary purpose of military aid programs should

be to provide the means to establish this self-confidence. Our planners should verify that all the military aid which they recommend will contribute to this purpose, bearing in mind that there will never be enough to go around for all claimants.

In seeking to strengthen our alliances, the security planners will recognize that a frequent cause for friction between us and our allies is the presence of U.S. bases and garrisons on their soil. Particularly, bomber and missile bases for use in general atomic war are increasingly unwelcome as Khrushchev rattles his missiles and threatens to direct them against these targets among our friends. U.S. ground forces are somewhat more popular abroad as they promise the help of conventional weapons and afford day-to-day evidence of our willingness to share with our friends the hazards of living under the Communist guns. Nevertheless, they too provide their share of local incidents to perturb normal relations abroad. The fact is that all of our overseas deployments are very expensive and should be progressively reduced and withdrawn as they lose military justification.

As a matter of policy, our security program should require an annual review of the overseas bases and a defense of their continued necessity by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As our long-range missiles based in the United States and at sea achieve reliability, the need for overseas bases for bombers and missiles tends to disappear. Likewise, when we have limited war forces properly trained and equipped for rapid strategic movement, the need for overseas garrisons at present levels of strength will diminish. Our policy on this subject should be clearly and openly

stated and the withdrawals of forces effected as voluntary acts well in advance of the development of local pressures.

Up to this point we have tried to determine the proper nature of our own military preparations and to find ways and means of strengthening our ^{military} alliances, ~~by military means~~. Now we are obliged to consider the ^{cost of} financial risk which our program will represent in terms of the defense budget. Here we run afoul of the long-standing defects in our traditional way of formulating this budget.

The fact is that up to now it has been very difficult to find out what kind of defense the U.S. has been buying/ because of the way in which the defense budget is constructed. In spite of the fact that modern war is no longer fought in terms of a separate Army, Navy and Air Force, we still budget ^{directly for} ~~vertically~~ in these services ~~terms~~. Yet if we were called upon to fight, we would not be interested in the services as such. We would be interested rather in task forces, those combinations of Army, Navy and Air Force which are functional in nature, such as the atomic retaliatory forces, overseas deployments, continental air defense forces, limited war expeditionary forces and the like. But the point is that we do not keep our budget in these terms. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not know what kind and how much defense we are buying with any specific budget.

Not only we do not know what our ^{we} ~~military~~ posture will ^{have} be in the future, ^{but} we usually are unaware of our actual strength in being at any present moment. We might expect some such appraisal of current war-making capacity to be a routine act of the executive branch-but it is not. Although we have undertaken

political commitments to many nations, all of which carry serious military implications, there is no accepted procedure for evaluating military strength in being in relation to ~~our~~^{these} obligations. We lack a system of politico-military bookkeeping to assure that commitments and capabilities are kept in balance.

I am aware that arms control will be an important subject in later discussions here. Without getting into the ^{substance} merits of the important topic, I would point out how important it is ^{before we start to disarm} for us to know what our commitments are and what our military strength is in relation to these commitments, ~~before we start to disarm.~~

Unless we know, for example, what is the minimum missile force ^{which will} ~~have~~ with a second-strike capability / we are hardly ready to start reducing strategic missiles. Unless we have a pretty definite idea of the ^{current} capability of available limited war forces, it is an act of blindness to impose limitations upon them. I make these points not as objections to arms reductions but as an additional argument for the need of a more rational defense program which establishes how much is enough in the various operational categories of forces.

We have now come to the point where we should try to pull together the substance of our talk up to now and produce that blueprint of national security which we have taken as ^{our} an objective. ^{I would suggest some such direction as the following to define} I believe ~~the following might serve at least as an outline to~~ ~~serve defining~~ the kind of forces we need and the strategy to guide their use:

- a) The Armed Forces of the United States will be so organized and trained as to have the capability of deterring

a general atomic attack on the United States and of dealing a crippling second strike against the aggressor if deterrence fails. The weapons system for retaliation will consist primarily of long-range missiles with atomic war heads, firing from mobile or secure positions removed from important friendly targets. To add to its deterrent effect as well as to its capability of survival, the system will be provided with an active air and antimissile defense.

- b) Concurrently and with equal priority of effort, the Armed Forces of the United States will be so organized and trained as to have the capability of sustained combat on the ground and at sea, placing primary reliance on the use of non-atomic weapons. These forces will have strategic and tactical mobility to permit prompt and timely intervention in any area of vital U.S. interest.
- c) The roles and missions of the military services will be redefined to fix clearly service responsibility for the organization, equipment, and training of the forces required under subparagraphs a) and b) above.

"To support the foregoing forces the Department of Defense may plan upon receiving an annual sum approximating 10% of the Gross National Product. For mid-range fiscal planning, it will submit to the President annually a five-year military program for overall approval. This program will define and justify goals for all categories of operational forces required in this period. These goals will be based upon the estimated military threat and

the extent of the political commitments of the United States which have military implications. The Department of Defense will justify its annual budget in terms of operational forces required to meet the approved force goals.

"It is the policy of the U.S. to continue to furnish military aid to allies on a selective basis related to the strategic requirements of the common defense. As its strategic missile force grows and the strategic mobility of its limited war forces increases, in consultation with its allies, the U.S. will progressively reduce its overseas bases and deployments.

"The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense will make an annual report to the President on the adequacy of the military forces in being in relation to the current military threat and to the current commitments which may require the use of military forces for their fulfillment."

At first reading, the foregoing prose may not seem particularly significant but it actually contains much of substance. Buttressed by supplementary decisions on such matters as the conditions for the use of atomic and chemical weapons, civil defense and the levels of reserves in men and material to be maintained, such an outline directive should produce with maximum economy the ^{elements} forces which we have determined to be needed - a compact, invulnerable missile force, modernized mobile limited war forces, and the support of effective allies. It would implement a strategy providing a flexible response to many forms of military threat. It would lay adequate stress on the protective elements of the strategic missile force, ~~particularly on the protective elements of the strategic missile force,~~ particularly on the need for the early production of the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile. It would

leave no doubt as to the importance of preparing for limited war without reliance on the use of atomic weapons.

The directive would help security planning by giving some idea to the Department of Defense of the availability of funds to anticipate. With such an indication in terms of a percentage of the Gross National Product, it would be possible for the Department of Defense to produce a mid-range defense plan for the guidance of the military services.

The proposed directive imposes on the military services a requirement to obtain approval of force goals in terms of operational functions. These goals would take into account the estimated military threat and the extent of the political commitments of the United States which have military implications. The annual defense budget would then be justified in relation to the military forces required to meet the goals. A joint review by the Secretaries of State and Defense to verify that military forces in being are consistent with current commitments would become an annual event on the calendar of the National Security Council.

Thus I hope, the implementing actions flowing from such a directive would eventually produce forces appropriate to our military needs and capable of supporting the attainment of those national objectives which depend upon our military strength. Such forces would not rely on any one weapons system but would permit a strategy of Flexible Response offering many alternatives to the civilian leadership. Most important of all, the building of those forces would get under way without further delay in awaiting better guidance and more sophisticated procedures. Once in being, they would go far to assure that respect for the military

power of the United States which is indispensable for the long-term maintenance of the peace.

MDT/smf

Limited War

The University Club
One West Fifty-Fourth Street
New York 19, N.Y.

I Why talk about limited war? concept of

- a. Growing differentiation between general & limited war.
- (1) Fatality in general war
 - (2) Clausewitzian definition applies to limited war - not general war.
 - (3) It is general war which needs to justify its claim to the use of the word, war, at all.

b. Growing differentiation of weapons systems.

- (1) General war - negative war heads.
long range missiles.
- (2) Limited - conventional weapons.
tactical atom weapons.
Either/or requirement.
Growing need for independence for A-weapons.

c. Competition for the budget.

- (1) Concentration on general war weapons.
- (2) Neglect of L.W. weapons.

II Limited War Requirements

a. Size of forces - what kinds are they?

- (1) Derivable from political commitments and war games.
- (2) Allied forces.

b. Equipment of forces.

- (1) Modernize conventional weapons.
- (2) R+D in small A weapons, improved frag, chemical.
- (3) Improve mobility.
- (4) accentuate elite principle.