

THE NATION'S FUTURE

Saturday, February 4, 1961

NBC TELEVISION

MODERATOR: John McCaffery

GUESTS: Gen. Maxwell Taylor
Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr.

McCAFFERY: Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. Our debate tonight raises a vital issue: Is our nuclear arsenal sufficient to insure the survival of this nation? It is a question set into sharp focus by the announcement today of a spectacular Soviet space launch. In orbit above the earth now is a new Sputnik, a 7-ton Soviet Sputnik. This is the heaviest object ever put into space; it is two and a half tons heavier than any previous Sputnik. There is no conclusive evidence one way or another but the conjecture has been made that the vehicle contains animals and perhaps even men. The launching of the Sputnik makes it even more urgent the kind of appraisal of our nuclear arsenal that we will make this evening.

Our first speaker, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, will participate from a studio in New York. As many of you have seen in our earlier news special, the Eastern seaboard has been hit by one of the severest storms in history and it has kept

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General Taylor in New York. He was during World War II commander of the 101st Airborne Division. In Korea he was the commander of the 8th Army, and Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959. He is currently president of the Lincoln Center for Performing Arts in New York City. He is the author of "The Uncertain Trumpet," a penetrating analysis of America's defense posture. General Taylor, would you give us your position, please?

TAYLOR:

Mr. McCaffery, Mr. Lanphier, first I want to apologize for not being with you in New York. I am a victim of that blizzard of '61 which you just saw in the newscasts. I am very glad to express my views on this subject tonight: The adequacy of our nuclear arsenal. I suppose first we probably should define what we are talking about, or what we are thinking about. When we say our nuclear arsenal in the context of this discussion I am thinking about our bombers and their big bombs, the fissionable material which they carry, the long-range missiles and their megaton warheads, and I would also have the large carriers of the Navy and the submarines which soon will be capable of launching long-range missiles. All of these constitute our nuclear arsenal.

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Now I have the feeling that the stating of the question tonight rather concedes two very important points of my thesis. When we say our nuclear arsenal, how much is enough? that implies to me two things. One is there must be some finite limit to this arsenal we are talking about. There must be some limit which men of common sense or good judgment would accept as being sufficient. And then by the nature of the question, I would say it implies that no one has, indeed, determined how much is enough. That was my experience for four years as Chief of Staff, the inability to get criteria set for the adequacy of our armed forces, particularly for this nuclear arsenal. Instead, we went ahead and have gone ahead since, in continuing to accumulate these weapons of vast destruction when plainly we should decide where we are going. What is indeed our goal?

Now it is more than merely a matter of wasting of our taxes, let us say. It is far more serious because it bears a very important influence on our safety posture. How secure is the nation? Because meanwhile, while we have been committing these vast resources to our nuclear arsenal the Soviets also have accumulated weapons of vast destruction. They too have the ability of destroying our nation, everything worth preserving just as we have the ability to destroy theirs.

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In other words, we have arrived at a period which is commonly referred to as one of mutual deterrents. But meanwhile certainly the Soviet bloc has not given up aggression as a tool for advancing their political objectives. We have had many examples of limited war. We have today many trouble spots which certainly offer the possibilities of limited war. I could mention Cuba, Laos, the Congo, and always Berlin. But while we have been expending, say, two-thirds of our efforts and our resources on these vast weapons of great destruction without deciding how much is enough, we have necessarily restricted the resources applicable to those forces that could fight limited wars, and resist limited aggression. I refer to the Army, the Marines, certain parts of the Air Force and of the Navy. All of these forces have been neglected deliberately in order to favor these weapons useful only, only in great international exchanges of atomic destructiveness. That I say is wrong. That I say is dangerous, and it is highly important that the new Administration face up to the requirement of a reappraisal of our military strategy and insisting that certain goals be set, and there be no doubt as to how much is enough in the case of our nuclear arsenal.

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I think that is all I would like to say, Mr. Lanphier, as an introductory comment, and I pass the word to you.

McCAFFERY:

Thank you very much, General Taylor. Our second speaker, Mr. Thomas G. Lanphier, served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force on Research and Development, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. He has also served as President of the Air Force Association, and Chairman of the National Aeronautics Association. At the present time he is President of Fairbanks-Morse and Company. Mr. Lanphier, your position.

LANPHIER:

Mr. McCaffery, Gen. Taylor, from one snowbound terminal of this debate to the other, I think rather than launch into a statement of a position, per se, I will just begin with rebuttal to various elements of yours, if I may. How much of a nuclear arsenal is enough? I would assume you agree, I hope you do, that we certainly ought to have enough of a nuclear arsenal of the appropriate balance to deter attack upon the homeland, first of all. I acknowledge and I agree with you that we ought to have, in addition, long since developed some sort of a policy position and the material forces to support it to deter

LANPHIER:
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aggression of the so-called limited sort. However, I am afraid that I cannot agree with the implication of your opening remarks, to wit, that we already have more than enough of a nuclear arsenal to deter the Soviets from possible attack upon our homeland, let alone enough to deter for that purpose plus the allocation of additional forces to deter limited aggression, either nuclear war or otherwise. We, as a people, over the past fifteen years have had experience that has been historic. We have had a couple of opportunities that we have not actually taken full advantage of in terms of progressing towards the objectives we at least inherently believe in -- we do not openly state them. For about five years after World War II while we had a so-called nuclear monopoly we made a good try but not an effective try, to establish some sort of disarmament establishment in terms of nuclear power. The Baruch Plan, et cetera. Meanwhile, we continued to build our nuclear power in the one vein that you refer to, our Strategic Air Command, but we did not seem to be able to adapt it to the war we got into in Korea appropriately enough, at least in terms of the expenditure we put into it. Then our monopoly was neutralized with the advent of the hydrogen bomb almost at the same time in

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the arsenal of the Soviets as well as our own, and another major technological hard upon the heels of that, the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and what they in turn lead to in terms of a whole new regime in which military as well as national objectives can be advanced in space; and of course a whole new regime in terms of military defenses in terms of the timing, the collapse of the timing that these missiles bring to consideration on each side. During these fifteen years since World War II while these things have been happening we on our side have not done too well integrating -- as you observed yourself from your professional point of view, a job of collating the technological opportunities we had to the policies that we, as I have indicated, we have not too clearly spelled out but we as a people seem to be in, we professionally in terms of building our military strength, have not had too good Intelligence to rely on in terms of what the enemy has been doing for fifteen years. We have not related our Intelligence on a formal basis to our defense planning year in and year out. We have restricted ourselves in terms of a budget ceiling for fifteen years under Mr. Truman and under Gen. Eisenhower, and distorted, therefore, our military considerations to an arbitrary budget ceiling rather than to the facts of life

LANPHIER:
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as posed by the threat a la the Soviet Union. We have, of course, as a matter of policy allowed them the initiative, which is a tremendous advantage in terms of what you have to spend and how you have to establish yourself in the vis a vis situation we are versus communism. We have, I am afraid, seriously underestimated the enemy as a result of this haphazard approach to figuring how strong he is and what his intentions are. I am afraid that as a result of the sort of exercise that the services have to go through to get money in this restricted budget situation we have overadvertised a lot of our weapons systems to our own people and they have the impression that many systems that are still in a testing stage are out there defending them. The enemy knows better. I am afraid we are in a perilous situation because we have underestimated him, overestimated ourselves and that this situation is going to last for a couple of years and we do not have by any means enough of either the nuclear forces to deter him from attacking us or under way the sort of thing you espouse and which I agree we should have in the terms of mobile forces not only for deterrent but for deterring limited aggression.

McCAFFERY: Thank you very much, Mr. Lanphier.

And thank both you gentlemen for your statements. Now we have a spontaneous period of cross examination, cross-country examination, I might say, and commentary between our two speakers. General Taylor, would you like to begin.

TAYLOR: Well, I would like to make clear of course that I yield to no one in my recognition of the essentiality of having a strong nuclear deterrent force. The question is how big should it be? At the present time we have a mixture of bombers of all sizes and descriptions, short and long-range, and we are now coming more or less rapidly into the missiles field. I would certainly feel that today that striking force is thoroughly ample.

What I am worried about is as we look down the road, say, two or three or four years hence have we planned our missile program with sufficient foresight to be ready for the threats of that period? Now there again when we get into purely the missile era, when our striking force is essentially one of reliable missiles with heavy warhead, launched some at sea, some from land, then I would say that the finite quality of the requirement is very clear. You do not need very

TAYLOR:
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many of these if you are sure of getting them on target. Unfortunately, this kind of requirement yields to scientific analysis far more easily than almost any other military problem I know. Because one can decide what targets have to be destroyed then figure back from that point, injecting all the factors of mechanical and human error, all the probable errors which may occur, then throwing in a thoroughly ample factor of safety and come up with some goal which is thoroughly reasonable. I insist on the need of a rational basis for this sort of thing. I have often said that the Pentagon plans frequently are like the engineer who goes out to build an engineering structure and then has no idea what factor of safety he has put into this structure. Any engineering concern would soon go broke on that basis, and the Pentagon will too unless they change their methods. I say we must look ahead and decide how many weapons on target are required, and then perhaps with equal importance to decide how to defend and protect our launching sites and our weapons so they cannot be destroyed before takeoff.

In other words, invulnerability of this striking force is just as important as numbers. Numbers themselves can mean nothing if they are vulnerable at takeoff. So I think we have neglected the

TAYLOR:
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defense of this force and overemphasized the numbers required, and I think that both should be tied up and bulked together all in response to the answer to the question how much really is enough.

McCAFFERY:

Well here, gentlemen, you have a question of agreement in terms of how much nuclear deterrent we have to have, and that we must always maintain that enough both to retaliate and protect the homeland. Could we win a war if we got into a war, either kind of war? Can we win it, Mr. Lanphier?

LANPHIER:

I do not believe -- you are assuming they attack us first?

McCAFFERY:

Yes. Isn't that a basic assumption?

LANPHIER:

That is our national assumption, and we are certainly not qualified to attack them first, by any means, physically, even if we morally decided it was something we wanted to do.

McCAFFERY:

We could not wipe out the Soviet Union the first time?

LANPHIER:

Not without being wiped out in return, certainly not. Presuming their force to be what we understand it is.

McCAFFERY: Could they wipe us out?

LANPHIER: If they launched a surprise attack on us? I would not say I know that for sure. I have a feeling we must assume nationally they would be able to now and for the next couple of years, and ought to be able to do a number of things the General alluded to. We must take advantage of the nuclear weapons. They are one thing by number, but more important is whether you can visit them back upon the target if necessary. We have a couple of thousand bombers standing by to defend us -- I have heard that figure used. That is probably true, standing by. But there are a very small fraction on the alert, and an even smaller fraction actually airborne, actually in the invulnerable state he referred to. The few missiles we have here and abroad are standing nakedly above ground completely vulnerable to attack either from local perimeters or overseas. I agree with the General we should do something more than we have been doing, and it looks like we are beginning to better consider some of the nuclear means sure to be used in retaliation if we are attacked.

I agree with the General also there ought to be an acceleration of some of the development of these mobile systems which will better -- in two

LANPHIER:
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or three years hence, not now but two or three years hence -- better insure us of a deterrent capability the enemy has got to expect because he does not know where it is altogether and therefore has to have more of them in his arsenal to be sure he can grope them out and find them. I am afraid I still cannot, I still must insist that there is a lot of work yet to be done in the fundamental job of insuring over the next couple of years while we are still in the business of the primitive missiles that are not yet really operational that the manned bombers can do a good job of being airborne.

I cannot argue with the General we must be doing some of the other business in order to be sure in a year or so we have the mobile systems. Another point he has not alluded to but I am sure he agrees with, I mentioned earlier one of our great weaknesses is we do not really know in terms of Intelligence what the enemy has in large measure in a lot of his homeland, and I am afraid a good deal of our basic estimates are made on the assumption what we don't know he hasn't got. At least that was so up until a year or so ago, and I am afraid I suspect it may still be partially true.

McCAFFERY: Can someone win? The balance is such that no one can win, and that is a deterrent itself.

LANPHIER: No, I do not agree with that. I do not think any such feeling of terror actually exists. I have been trying to see if there is a real possibility and I doubt it. The enemy may feel sometime in the next couple of years that he can successfully destroy us enough and still suffer what retaliation we could visit upon him that would be a threshold he could accept. If we were to exchange nuclear blows at the moment and not destroy each other totally he profits by that, he loses less than we do by virtue of the very sort of society he has versus ours. This very fact we are having the debate from one city to another rather than being together as a result of a natural phenomenon of the moment. We are an earthbound, delicate society that gets tied up in a minute by either natural engendered or manmade holocaust.

McCAFFERY: Do you agree, Gen. Taylor, that in the case of the two strikes, one retaliatory, no matter who strikes first, the Soviets have a better chance of victory than we?

TAYLOR: I do not think either side has any chance for victory. I think victory has to be redefined in terms of this international exchange. I would

TAYLOR:
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like to move on to a point which grows out of this discussion, the suggestion that the Soviets, for example, are able to absorb these things and be more willing to contemplate this form of international suicide than we would. In other words, they are harder to deter, let's put it that way, than we would be from the use of these weapons.

I would be inclined to argue the other side of that. It seems to me there are more reasons for the Soviets never to get involved in this kind of warfare than even we have, and we have plenty of reasons to oppose it. In the first place, I would say that the Soviets know what war is; they suffered tremendous losses in World War II. They have, I am sure, without ever having been there, they have that same war weariness which the Japanese and the Germans had, and I visited both those countries, lived there after the war. I think their enthusiasm for this kind of warfare is nil.

McCAFFERY: What do you feel about that, Mr. Lanphier?

TAYLOR: Let me finish here. I have got two other points. Number two, they really believe their leaders that they are going to win this international struggle without fighting. They think that by

TAYLOR:
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historical logic or the inevitability of history communism will be superior, so why run the gamble of this kind of warfare? And finally, just think how they would regard their neighbors, all of whom are enemies, the satellites ready to escape from their bonds; Red China probably ready to jump on them. Would they take this great loss which would lay them low for the next decade? I doubt it very much. I would say they can be deterred more easily than we can.

LANPHIER:

I have to argue rather vigorously against that point of view. I think it is a mistake to assume that the Soviet leaders have any concern, real moral concern or war weary concern about committing the lives of 20, 30 million of their people if that seems to them essential at the moment. Certainly they did not on the Chinese side; I am sure more Chinese died at the hands of Chinese communists than did at ours, and certainly the history of the Soviet Union in the last thirty years has been that they have had no compunction about murdering a great number of their own people if it were politically necessary. I think it would be a very dangerous thing, General, if the policy leaders of our nation assumed that these people were not as tough as history has every reason to dictate and indicate that they

LANPHIER:
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have and will be. I am talking about their leaders. I have no doubt that any individual of the Soviet Union would rather not die.

In extension of your argument about whether or not the satellites would turn on them if they are fighting with us in a nuclear action, I do not think it is their nuclear armament at the moment that is keeping their satellites in bounds as it is. I suspect the more conventional forces, the overwhelming conventional forces that they have are doing that job for them and that their nuclear arsenal to the extent they have it, is aimed and is actually of course perfected to the extent it is in juxtaposition to ours.

McCAFFERY:

Now, gentlemen, we have committed ourselves to defend Berlin. We certainly would hope not to defend her by using nuclear armament of any kind. Do you believe, General Taylor, we could effectively maintain ourselves in Berlin with conventional warfare?

TAYLOR:

I do not think that is really the question. I think Berlin is so vital to us -- it is perhaps a unique area in the world where our commitment is so clear and unqualified. Namely, we, the British and French have said that an attack on Berlin is an attack on ourselves. I would say we

TAYLOR:
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will have to pay any price to make good on that prospect. I would certainly feel we should be prepared to use conventional forces first in order to verify the determination, the real intent on the part of the communists, either the Eastern Germans or the Soviets themselves to commit aggression against Berlin. I would never let us be bluffed into another blockade as we were in our previous experience. When the cards are down in Berlin it is really a blue chip and we have to be ready to go all the way.

McCAFFERY:

Well now doesn't that mean that the loser would always be prepared to go all the way if he lost in conventional weapons?

LANPHIER:

I would like to comment further on Berlin, if I may. Let us say that the Soviets move through the East Germans some time this spring. And let us say that we resist with so-called conventional forces we have at hand. I think no one would argue -- I do not think General Taylor would argue -- before long, maybe a matter of days or weeks, it would be obvious we would have to resort to some other force to win the situation in Europe, not in Berlin alone, we would have to resort to something more than conventional force if we wanted to withstand the Soviet action either through its catspaw or support of it once

LANPHIER:
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it began. As far as we are concerned of course at the moment that is a nuclear strike upon their homeland. I am afraid that for the reasons I observed before, once they have alerted themselves to the fact this might come by moving in Berlin our chances of negating them as a political element without suffering mortal damage ourselves are rather nil. I agree with the General, however, the Soviet Union had best understand on behalf of us as a people, and I believe it is the hope of our nation, and our leaders, that they understand we are willing to risk our national life in support of the principles in Berlin. I would hope the Soviets believe this in order that they are not inclined -- and I hope the General is right too, or by implication he is right, they are less prepared to exchange with us than I think they may be in that event.

McCAFFERY:

Well now could we win against their overwhelming numbers, General Taylor, against the Russians in Berlin or in Europe?

TAYLOR:

Let me just make this point which I think is very timely. Mr. Lanphier has made exactly the point that worries me, the fact is that we have so mis-armed ourselves throughout the years that today, faced with Berlin, we do indeed have very little to offer in conventional weapons; but we have

TAYLOR:
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absolutely no reason why that situation should continue if we changed our policy and changed our strategy.

LANPHIER:

You can have all the weapons systems in the world but if your policy is something else where you do not use them they do not do too much, a la Korea and the nuclear force we had at that time. However, I must say again it is not a question of misarming ourselves. I do not think we have armed ourselves enough to be perfectly safe for the next couple of years from attack upon ourselves and therefore I think that makes them all the more dangerous in a situation like Berlin where they finally get to the point they say we have got them, if it comes to neutralizing them we know we have them so let's move. And they would not dare attack unless they could get away with it.

McCAFFERY:

Not the nuclear then?

LANPHIER:

No. And I do believe we long since should have begun to develop a deterrent to limited war. But not as I seem to understand some people are proposing in the city these last few months, for more and larger numbers of divisions to match divisions. There are electronically available to us if we simply put the emphasis on it -- incidentally, I understand that on the emphasis

LANPHIER:
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there are devices, mechanical devices, systematic approaches to deterring limited aggressing in limited way that can and should be developed. This could be a very effective deterrent if we do not resume nuclear testing in some areas. There are such things as gasses, communications devices and peculiar kinds of destructive devices that can be developed, given mobility and applied, demonstrated, advertised and applied therefore as deterrents to limited situations.

McCAFFERY:

General Taylor, do you believe we need more divisions to implement this?

TAYLOR:

Well, I agree with Mr. Lanphier we certainly should modernize our ground forces, something we have never done since World War II, but I certainly do not believe we will ever be able to hold the West together by devices. You never hold back brave, determined men by machines. You have to have brave, determined men on your side and you have to have plenty of them. I have never been convinced that the modernization necessarily reduces the manpower requirement. We like to think so because it is a dirty, hard, dangerous job to fight on the ground, but all of that has been used to explain our refusal to make adequate preparation to solve this tremendously important problem of holding the West. How did Western

TAYLOR:
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Europe defend themselves throughout all the centuries in the past? Did they have atomic weapons?

LANPHIER:

I guess the best way I can comment on that is to say that I can think of a device we have been discussing as the subject of this program that can obliterate hundreds of thousands and millions of brave, determined men, and has done so in a couple of cities of our own experience. I am sorry, but I think a fundamental point is at stake here. We seem as a people too much inclined to drift along and not calculate on behalf of ourselves in the future. Not program and plan policies and supporting elements to those policies as a people and resort at the last minute to what is unquestionably a great deal of fortitude, courage, guts under fire. And we have gotten away with this in the past. The timing now implicit in these new weapons systems and the terrible power of them and the possibility that men of a political level, not comprehending what they have at hand did make a mistake and engender the use of these things negates all the wonderful heroism that we have at hand and that our allies have at hand in a split second if we are not intelligent enough to have planned in advance, and I know the General agrees with me we have not done enough and should be doing more of it.

McCAFFERY: Mr. Lanphier, may I ask you this then, what is deterring the Soviet Union if we do not have an adequate deterrent?

LANPHIER: From what?

McCAFFERY: Attacking us.

LANPHIER: Physically attacking us? I think it is fairly obvious, the point the General made on the one hand. I think they are doing fairly well, politically, on a limited basis so far without the major risk involved in a strike upon us. I also am not positive -- I have said I have a feeling based on experience shared by a number of people I know that this year, next year or possibly the year after they will reach this point where they have a demonstrable edge in modern, quick-moving nuclear power that they might feel given the political situation of the moment not satisfactory to them they might feel they can get away or feel they are perfectly willing to go into it over Berlin, if we are willing to fight over Berlin.

TAYLOR: You surprise me. We are not deterring the Soviets. They are attacking us every day. They are attacking us in the world war, they are pressing us in many areas of the world; they have used violence in many situations; they are definitely

TAYLOR:
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on the move. But they are using the means which are most appealing and most effective from their point of view, namely, limited war, infiltration, subversion, compromise of various sorts. The war is on. We should not be fooled about this thing. We are simply not -- they have been wise enough and will stay with us enough, I hope and believe, not to risk their whole future on this nuclear exchange which appeals to nobody.

McCAFFERY:

Gentlemen, you have given us a very stimulating discussion and I am sure our audience here has many questions they would like to ask, so I will go to our audience. Please, no speeches, when you ask a question raise your hand and when I recognize you tell us your name and to whom is your question addressed.

ATKINSON:

Jim Atkinson, Professor, or perhaps more honestly I should say I am being used as associate professor of government at Georgetown University. My question is addressed to General Taylor:

General, in connection with the limited war capacity that you were speaking about, is it possible that we have not prepared sufficiently in this area for the reason that perhaps we think we are engaged in an international popularity contest and possibly we have never determined

ATKINSON:
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whether we really want to win? Is that perhaps the reason why we have not been willing to prepare a broad spectrum of capabilities of defense?

TAYLOR:

It may well be a factor, Professor. I have often felt that politically at least we do want to win popularity contests, but I think it goes farther than that. I think at first we were convinced with the appearance of the atomic bomb that we had found a cheap and easy mechanical way to be safe. The hard way on the ground does not appeal to anybody. The cost of the new weapons was very high, indeed. It seemed questionable whether we could pay the bill for both kinds of armament and all those factors thrown together have made us say, well, we won't do it without really analyzing the problem and recognizing in fact we must do it.

LANPHIER:

I have to take issue again with the implication behind the General's method of stating the case where he says we have seemed to resort nationally to the cheap and easy way the nuclear weapon seems to afford and are not willing to undertake the tough hard road of the guy with the gun on the ground.

In the first place I do not think you would disagree, General, we very well should have and

LANPHER:
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continue to have as much of that cheap and easy way as we need to deter on behalf of our national homeland. Technically I think you would also agree that if there had been more money over the past ten years allowed your service that you might not have been so exasperated with the expenditure of money for the cheap and easy route had you been allowed to prosecute those weapons systems which you correctly feel you should have been prosecuting over the last five or six years. I want to refer to one of my opening remarks. We have gotten ourselves in a box in this country where we have a certain amount of money each year we are going to spend for defense and over the past seven years the pattern, as you point out in your own book, the pattern remained exactly the same for the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, how much you can spend within the box even though the threat has changed in space and over the globe in the last seven years in a revolutionary way. I have to keep insisting I do not think you should imply to people it is a mistake to have built the nuclear deterrent against attack upon this homeland even though meanwhile we were not doing enough about the other areas of your interest which in large part I share.

TAYLOR: I accept that but I would point out the problem goes back again to the fact we never decided how much was enough.

WENDT: I am General Wendt, Marine Corps, Retired, faculty Johns Hopkins University. My question is directed to General Taylor:

With regard to the subject, our nuclear arsenal, how much is enough, in your opinion, General Taylor, is the subject applicable to the so-called tactical nuclear weapons?

TAYLOR: I have not been thinking of those primarily, as I indicated in my original statement. To me, really, the tactical weapon, the very small weapon which is now a possibility, is really not included in that arsenal because it is not of the indiscriminate destructiveness which these big weapons have. I feel that our conventional weapons, if you want to call them that, the Army, the Marines, should have these very small weapons but be ready to fight without them. I always insist it is the either/or capability -- with atomic weapons or without atomic weapons, is the proper formula for equipping of our ground forces.

LANPHIER: In this area in general I have to agree with the General in large part. I would observe that the Marine General asked the question of the Army General, the Army General answered it, and I am agreeing with his general answer. Except to observe that I would like to pick up a point he made and he qualified it in there -- no, he did not. He said you have the nuclear and you have the so-called conventional, but you be prepared to use either one. I would put it another way. You have them both and the enemy knows you have both so he has got to be prepared for the use of either one, but you have both so you do not have to use either one. I do not believe in a situation like Berlin, leave aside something like Laos -- a different situation geographically and politically -- but I do not believe in a situation like Berlin you could engage in limited war that would stay limited as soon as one side or the other starts to lose. No one as politically sensitive and with such a policy invested as that.

ALLEN: I am Mrs. Donna Allen, a mother of four and a housewife, and I have a very important question to ask about how much is too much, and it is this. It really is addressed to both of them, covering an area I do not think either one has satisfactorily answered:

ALLEN: Do you agree with President Kennedy that we have not yet organized ourselves at the government level for a serious effort to negotiate disarmament?

LANPHIER: Answering the question of the mother of four, as a father of five, no, and I think the basic reason we have not is that we do not have yet enough nuclear strength and other strength to be in a position to negotiate with an adversary who will respect us, and also to be in a technological position which is five, ten, fifteen years away if everywhere there might be some sort of so-called parity or -- I forget the phrase that is in vogue in town now, but apparent parity that you can begin to negotiate about at least. For the moment I am afraid the Soviets will continue to want to talk for propaganda purposes but I do not think until we are much stronger than we are in the appropriate relative ways the General and I are discussing, until we are that much stronger years hence they are really going to consider disarmament, but I do believe everything in defense begins in uniform and I know all of the time they are in the business to see we get as strong as we can, so we can discuss in the long term the intelligent resolution of the incredible stupid situation we find ourselves in now.

TAYLOR: I would agree with Mr. Lanphier, we are not organized to deal with disarmament but for a different reason. I would say that until we know how much is enough we cannot afford to disarm. We do not know where to cut. It is an act of blindness to disarm if you do not know what goals you have set and how near you are to attaining those goals. I would say an additional reason for analyzing our military requirements, particularly in the nuclear arsenal field is the necessary preparatory step to engaging in disarmament.

McCAFFERY: Now, gentlemen, do you think the new Sputnik changes things at all with its tremendous power, enough to get up seven tons? Does that change anything as far as either of your concepts are concerned?

TAYLOR: No, not for me. It simply shows again that the Russians have made great progress in the high thrust rocket propellants. We knew this and it simply shows they are indeed good. They made great efforts in the sector of it that implies this strength also in the long-range missiles field.

LANPHIER: I would like to comment I agree with the General. This is simply an endorsement of a fact that

LANPHIER:
(Cont'd)

became for the first time apparent three or four years ago in the skies that they have a lead on us in many major areas. There has been an inclination by the previous Administration of our government to dismiss the fact that they excell us in propulsion by arguing, however, we are doing a better job of keeping track of what is going on in our lesser propelled devises out there. The fact is propulsion is a fundamentally important element of any weapons system and it is obvious right now in space today we are conjecturing as to whether or not they have a man or two men or animals in that device that's orbiting right now; whereas, the best we can put up at the moment and until this summer at least, is not going to leave anybody any room for conjecture. We cannot put people in. We do not have the power to put significant elements up yet relative to theirs.

DUPUY:

Col. Dupuy, Retired Army officer, writer and research analyst. I have a question which I think either Gen. Taylor or Mr. Lanphier might want to answer. Both of you seem to agree that our organization is such that we are not able to intervene effectively in local wars in Europe at least, save with nuclear weapons. I wonder if we were to be faced with a war in southeast Asia, for instance, and if we had to use nuclear weapons

DUPUY:
(Cont'd)

there, if this would not be likely to escalate, using a term of the city, into an allout thermonuclear exchange between the two countries?

TAYLOR:

Certainly the danger is always there whenever we use atomic weapons in any field, the possibility of this escalation you mention is certainly a possibility. I think we will never know until the time comes whether it will be wise to use those weapons, but I certainly would have them available and be guided by the military and political situation existing at the time.

HIGGINS:

Marguerite Higgins, Herald-Tribune. Question for both. Gen. Taylor, I'm sorry you weren't airborne tonight as you usually are. Your topic is our nuclear arsenal: how much is enough? How can we discuss this intelligently without taking into consideration the national will to use your nuclear arsenal? In the years 1945 to 1950 Russia expanded all over the world and took all of her Eastern Europe, East Germany, much of Asia. We had an atomic monopoly but the enemy did not think we had the will to use the bomb. How much is the capacity to let the enemy know that we have the will as well as the way important? How much does psychological impact matter in these things?

McCAFFERY:

Mr. Lanphier; we are in the last few minutes.

LANPHIER: I think it is all-important. I mentioned it earlier. I think it is all-important. It makes no difference how much of a physical force we have if the enemy does not feel we have the will to use it. It is relatively less important that we have a lesser force if he is quite certain we are willing to use that and thus cause him considerable pain. I think it is all-important.

TAYLOR: I would agree entirely, all the military preparations are simply for the purpose of putting an instrument in the hands of our leaders. No one can guarantee the character of those leaders in advance.

MATTHIE: Timothy J. Matthie of Boston. Gen. Taylor said we are in a war and I agree that we are. However, all the contests whether they be subversiveness, infiltration, economics, pschyo-political, all the contests are being taken outside of the Soviet empire. How can we gain the initiative because the Soviets feel if they lose a round and win a round they are still ahead. How can we gain the initiative?

TAYLOR: I think it is very difficult to answer your question because it is largely political. All I would say is we must have such visible military strength that our political leaders have no doubt, no fears as to the use of force on the part of the enemy. With freedom I would hope they could indeed show greater initiative.

LANPHIER: I would also like to observe the new Administration shows encouraging attention to the various elements, less talking about it, and seems to be prepared to at least try to fight on other fronts than the physical-military in an affirmative way which has been long neglected.

McCAFFERY: Thank you gentlemen. I think you have strengthened our knowledge of an extremely complex subject, one which we certainly all have to make up our minds on, and we need the kind of information you have given us. I thank you for being here, especially Gen. Taylor for your noble efforts up there in New York, and you, Mr. Lanphier, for your efforts down here. Thank you very much. This is John McCaffery. Good night.
