

"The resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons. Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets.

"In the future it may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile or so placed as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt. In contrast with the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade, the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can

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possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus, instead of non-aggressors having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war. "

Spring 58. Area defense. 2 yrs.

Pentagon

A Military Strategy for NATO

(CFR - 12 April 1961)

- Pre a full*
1. Why a mil. strat. for NATO? Coherent part of W. world strat. Importance & sensitivity. Berlin. Satellites.
  2. U.S. reappraisal. Flex. strat. A-deterrent. Imp. of convent. forces.
  3. Past NATO strategy.  
Lisbon 52/46. Mass. Ret. Trip wire.  
Sword & shield. *57-58*  
Loss of conf. in M.R. Dulles. Tac A weapons.  
No change by IKE.  
*Timely to review*
  4. Obstacles to New Strat.
    - a. Unwill. to spend & pool. Let U.S. do it. Logistics.
    - b. De Gaulle. Algeria.
    - c. Ponderous organ.
    - d. U.S. example. Mass. Ret. A-laws. Service rival. No limited war ~~are~~. Fail. to develop small A weapons. No A weapons policy. Uncertain Trumpet.
  5. Forms of mil. threat.
    - a. Forays, incursion, infiltration. Greece.
    - b. Conv. war by proxy. Satell. vs neighbor.

(OVER)

(5 cont.)

- c. Satellite revolt. Hungary. Supplies.
  - d. Berlin.
    - Probe. Recon. in force. Mobil.
    - Gen. War. Sov fear of force.
  - e. Convent. war with Soviets.
    - (i) Sudden rush.
    - (ii) Gen. mobil.
  - f. Gen A war.
6. Forces needed.
- a. National ) a, b, c, d.
  - b. NATO convent. )
  - c. NATO forces with A weapons - e.
  - d. Strat. atomic weapons. - f.
7. Tact. A weapons.
- a. Possession -deters; prevents massing; limits scope of aggressn.
  - b. Use - offsets nos.; brings stalemate; forces choice of escalation on enemy. Destruction. Dangerous.
8. NATO Strat. deterr.
- a. Satisfies fears.
  - b. Offsets urge for nat. weapons.
  - c. Puts respon. for use on NATO.
    - but
    - a. Won't satisfy De Gaulle
    - b. May lead Soviets to scatter weapons
    - c. Loss of A-secrets
    - d. Loss of U.S. control

*SAC remains U.S.*

(NEXT CARD)

9, Implementation.

- a. Econ & polit. exten.
- b. Change law for A-weapons
- c. Adjust own strat. *Devil limited war*
- d. Help NATO to adjust. *weapons*  
*tech. progress*

Johnson "Vigorous & sustained effort to build up NATO non-nuclear defense & an effective NATO nuclear capability".

Force of example.

