

1 June 1962

General Taylor -

Secretary Gilpatric thought you might be interested in the attached 1959 Rand Study by T. C. Schelling (now of Harvard). In the study Schelling points out that not using nuclear weapons is a nice neat line of demarcation to limit a limited war, and once you use nuclears it is hard to draw a line.

This study is one of Schelling's early efforts in applying the theory of games to war. Thus he is more interested in limiting the war than accomplishing any objectives. If you take him at face value, presumably he would rather lose than use nuclears. But when one considers that he wrote this in 1959, when planning still called for an early use of nuclears, his paper has more appeal.

I have attached a brief acknowledging note to Secretary Gilpatric. I believe this approach is preferable to a longer memorandum challenging some of the points Schelling makes. My guess is Harry Rowen (ISA) or Alan Enthoven (Comptroller) prompted the Secretary to send this over.

Wys
W.Y.S.

Too metaphysical for me
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