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THE NEW VETERAN

IT IS NOT A HAPPY CIRCUMSTANCE FOR THE NATION TO HAVE MILITARY VETERANS AS A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE POPULATION SINCE VETERANS ARE BY DEFINITION THE PRODUCT OF WAR AND WE AS A PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT THE WAYS OF PEACE. BUT THE FACT OF HAVING VETERANS MAY BE PROPERLY A SOURCE OF PRIDE IF NOT OF REJOICING BECAUSE THEIR PRESENCE PROVIDES DRAMATIC EVIDENCE THAT OUR NATION HAS HAD VALUES FOR WHICH IT HAS BEEN WILLING TO FIGHT AND CITIZENS WHO HAVE RESPONDED TO THE CALL TO ARMS TO DEFEND THOSE VALUES.

TODAY WE HAVE JOINED IN PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE VETERANS OF ALL OUR FORMER WARS FOR THAT WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER THE CALL OF DUTY IN CRITICAL MOMENTS OF OUR HISTORY. AT THE RISK OF APPEARING TO PLAY FAVORITES, TONIGHT I AM GOING TO FOCUS MY REMARKS ON THE NEWEST RECRUITS TO JOIN THE RANKS OF OUR VETERANS -- THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE AND HAVE BEEN REPRESENTING OUR COUNTRY IN VIET NAM. HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM THAT LAND WHERE I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF SERVING WITH THESE VETERANS AND OF OBSERVING THEIR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, I

WOULD LIKE

WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO THE PEOPLE OF INDIANAPOLIS TONIGHT THE SAME FEELING OF ADMIRATION FOR THEM WHICH I HAVE DEVELOPED IN WORKING ALONG SIDE OF THEM.

IN MANY WAYS, ALL VETERANS OF ALL WARS ARE ALIKE. THEY HAVE ALL BEEN ANIMATED BY A SIMILAR SENSE OF DUTY IN FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR COUNTRY. THEY HAVE ALL LEFT HOME WITH SIMILAR FEELINGS OF REGRET AND WITH SIMILAR HOPES FOR A SPEEDY AND SAFE RETURN. I WOULD SAY THAT THE VETERAN IN SOUTH VIET NAM IS PARTICULARLY AKIN TO THE KOREAN VETERAN. BOTH HAVE SERVED FAR FROM HOME IN A REMOTE ASIAN LAND AGAINST THE SAME COMMUNIST ENEMY. BOTH HAVE ENCOUNTERED A SIMILAR DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING TO THOSE AT HOME THE MEANING OF THE DISTANT STRUGGLE. BUT HAVING BEEN THERE, THEY HAVE ACQUIRED A CLEAR AWARENESS OF THE STAKE AND THE NEED FOR SUCCESS.

HERE THE RESEMBLANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE VETERAN TO VETERANS OF OTHER RECENT WARS CEASES. ONE MUST GO BACK TO PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR, TO THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS AND THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION TO FIND ANALOGOUS CONDITIONS TO THOSE FACING OUR PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

I HAVE FOUND

I HAVE FOUND A REPORT SENT TO WASHINGTON BY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1863, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN LIFTED FROM A REPORT FILED YESTERDAY IN SAIGON. IT REPORTED THE CONDITIONS ON THE MISSOURI-KANSAS BORDER AT THE TIME. "THE EVIL WHICH EXISTS UPON THE BORDER OF KANSAS AND MISSOURI IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT IN KIND AND FAR GREATER IN DEGREE THAN IN OTHER PARTS OF MISSOURI. IT IS THE OLD BORDER HATRED INTENSIFIED BY THE REBELLION AND BY THE MURDERS, ROBBERIES AND ARSON WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE IRREGULAR WARFARE CARRIED ON DURING THE EARLY PERIODS OF THE REBELLION, NOT ONLY BY THE REBELS, BUT BY OUR OWN TROOPS AND PEOPLE. THE EFFECT OF THIS HAS BEEN TO RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY MAN WHO OPENLY AVOWED AND MAINTAINED HIS LOYALTY TO THE GOVERNMENT TO LIVE IN THE BORDER COUNTIES OF MISSOURI OUTSIDE OF MILITARY POSTS. A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE REMAINING THERE WERE OPEN REBELS, WHILE THE REMAINDER WERE COMPELLED TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY WORDS OR ACTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE REBELLION AT THE PERIL OF THEIR LIVES. ALL WERE PRACTICALLY ENEMIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FRIENDS OF THE REBEL GUERRILLAS. THE LATTER FOUND NO DIFFICULTY IN SUPPLYING THEIR COMMISSARIAT WHEREVER THEY WENT, AND, WHAT WAS OF

VASILY GREATER

VASTLY GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THEM, THEY OBTAINED PROMPT AND ACCURATE INFORMATION OF EVERY MOVEMENT OF OUR TROOPS, WHILE NO CITIZEN WAS SO BOLD AS TO GIVE US INFORMATION IN REGARD TO THE GUERRILLAS. IN A COUNTRY REMARKABLY WELL ADAPTED BY NATURE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE, IT HAS BEEN FOUND IMPOSSIBLE TO RID THE COUNTRY OF SUCH ENEMIES. AT NO TIME DURING THE WAR HAVE THESE COUNTIES BEEN FREE FROM THEM. NO REMEDY SHORT OF DESTROYING THE SOURCE OF THEIR GREAT ADVANTAGE OVER OUR TROOPS COULD CURE THE EVIL." SCHOFIELD'S SOLDIERS WOULD HAVE FOUND MUCH IN COMMON TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S MEN. THE LATTER HAVE SEEN THE EFFECT OF GUERRILLA TERROR ON THE COUNTRY PEOPLE OF VIET NAM AND KNOW THE DIFFICULTY OF TRACKING DOWN A GUERRILLA ENEMY OPERATING AMONG A POPULATION AFRAID TO TALK AND MOVING IN A TERRAIN DIFFICULT TO TRAVERSE.

THE PROBLEMS OF OUR INDIAN FIGHTERS WERE ALSO SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH FACE OUR MEN IN SOUTH VIET NAM. BOTH HAVE HAD A SKILLFUL, ELUSIVE, CRUEL ENEMY TO FIGHT. IN VIET NAM, THAT ENEMY OBSERVE NONE OF THE RULES OF CIVILIZED WARFARE AND ACKNOWLEDGES NO INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY. THEIR PRISONERS HAVE NONE OF THE PROTECTIONS

OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THEY ARE TREATED AS HOSTAGES AND OFTEN EXECUTED TO PROVIDE REPRISALS. THE FAVORITE TACTICS OF THE VIET NAM ENEMY, LIKE THE SIOUX WARRIORS, ARE THE SURPRISE NIGHT ATTACK AND THE CAREFULLY LAID AMBUSH. COMBAT IS SHORT, SHARP AND AT CLOSE RANGE. THE CASUALTIES ARE HIGH ON BOTH SIDES. SO ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF LEADERSHIP. IT IS A SMALL UNIT WAR OF SQUADS AND OF PLATOONS WHERE THE OUTCOME DEPENDS ON THE SKILL AND FORTITUDE OF JUNIOR COMMANDERS. WHEN SUCCESS COMES, IT IS NOT TO THE GENERALS BUT TO THE SERGEANTS, THE LIEUTENANTS AND THE CAPTAINS.

THERE ARE OTHER UNUSUAL FACTORS IN THIS VIETNAMESE SCENE. THE OUTCOME DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE UPON ABILITY OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES. THEY MUST LEARN THE WAYS OF THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS, UNDERSTAND THEIR MOTIVATION, ANTICIPATE THEIR REACTIONS, EXPLOIT THEIR STRENGTH AND COMPENSATE FOR THEIR WEAKNESSES. ALL THIS CALLS FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING OF ANOTHER PEOPLE VASTLY DIFFERENT IN HISTORY, LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND MODE OF LIFE. IN WORKING WITH THEM, WE MUST GAIN OUR ENDS BY PERSUASION AND BY EXAMPLE WITHOUT HAVING RECOURSE TO COMMAND OR IMPOSED AUTHORITY.

AT ALL TIMES

AT ALL TIMES, OUR PEOPLE IN VIET NAM MUST GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE CIVIL POPULATION WHICH HAS SUFFERED SO HEAVILY IN THE ELEVEN YEARS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. IN A SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE THE TARGET OF BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONFLICT. THE COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS MUST DOMINATE THEM TO EXPLOIT AND DRAW STRENGTH FROM THEM AS A PARASITIC PLANT FROM THE TROPICAL TREE WHICH IT EMBRACES AND EVENTUALLY STRANGLES. THE VIET CONG GUERRILLAS MUST HAVE THE RECRUITS WHICH THEY CAN ONLY GET BY IMPRESSMENT IN THE VILLAGES. THEY MUST HAVE THE FOODSTUFFS OF THE PEASANTS TO SUSTAIN THEIR UNITS. THEY MUST HAVE THE INFORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WHICH THEY CAN OBTAIN BY THREATS OR TERRORISM FROM THE CIVIL POPULATION. MOST OF ALL, THEY MUST SEPARATE THE PEOPLE FROM THEIR GOVERNMENT SO THAT SLOWLY THE STRENGTH AND THE MORALE OF THAT GOVERNMENT WILL BE ERODED TO THE POINT THAT IT WILL EVENTUALLY COLLAPSE AND BE REPLACED BY A COMMUNIST REGIME -- THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF THE INSURGENCY.

OUR PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIET NAM HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PEOPLE TO THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE HAZARDS OF COMBAT WAGED BY GUERRILLAS WHO HAVE

DELIBERATELY

DELIBERATELY INTERMINGLED WITH THE PEOPLE FOR PROTECTION. OUR AMERICANS HAVE ALSO THE RELATED TASK OF HELPING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO HELP THEIR OWN PEOPLE, TO TRAIN OFFICIALS TO BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND TO BRING IN THE FORCES OF GOOD GOVERNMENT ON THE HEELS OF MILITARY SUCCESS. ONLY BY SUCH A COMBINATION OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY EFFORT IS IT POSSIBLE TO BRING SECURITY TO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE HOPE OF AN IMPROVED LIFE TO THE PEOPLE.

DURING MY SERVICE IN SOUTH VIET NAM, I HAVE SEEN MANY EXAMPLES OF OUTSTANDING AMERICAN PERFORMANCE IN THESE NON-MILITARY FIELDS WHICH HAVE GENERALLY ESCAPED THE NOTICE OF THE PRESS. ONE FINDS TODAY IN EVERY PROVINCIAL CAPITAL AN AMERICAN TEAM OF MIXED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPOSITION, REPRESENTING THE ARMED FORCES, THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY. THESE INDIVIDUALS WORK AS A COHESIVE TEAM TO ASSIST THE PROVINCIAL CHIEF IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCE AND IN ITS PROTECTION FROM THE GUERRILLAS. ONE FINDS SMALLER AMERICAN TEAMS IN EVEN MORE

REMOTE AREAS

REMOTE AREAS. EACH PROVINCE IS MADE UP OF A NUMBER OF DISTRICTS AND IN DISTRICT TOWNS ONE FREQUENTLY FINDS A SMALL GROUP OF SOLDIERS -- AN OFFICER PERHAPS AND TWO OR THREE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO REPRESENT ALL THAT THOUSANDS OF VILLAGERS WILL EVER KNOW OF THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THESE LITTLE DETACHMENTS HAVE AS THEIR PRIMARY PURPOSE THE TRAINING OF THE VILLAGE GUARDS IN THE DEFENSE OF THE HAMLETS, THEY SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME ON NON-MILITARY TASKS. THEY ASSIST THE DISTRICT CHIEF IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF HIS VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. THEY EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND OFTEN OF FUNDS FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL TO THE POINT IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THEY ARE NEEDED. THEY CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH THE RICE CROP, THE FERTILIZERS, AND THE PIG FARMS. THE FIRST AID MAN WILL PROBABLY RUN A VILLAGE DISPENSARY AND ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE AT A LEVEL NEVER ANTICIPATED IN HIS BASIC TRAINING AS A MEDICAL CORPSMAN. I SUSPECT THAT THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THESE SMALL GROUPS OF AMERICANS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM MAY HAVE GREATER IMPORTANCE IN THE LONG RUN THAN OTHER MORE VISIBLE AND DRAMATIC FORMS OF UNITED STATES AID.

IN THEIR

IN THEIR TOTALITY, WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THESE VARIED AND COMPLEX TASKS WHICH OUR NEW VETERANS ARE DISCHARGING? IN A WORD, THEY ARE DEFENDING A FRIENDLY NATION AGAINST A COMMUNIST-DIRECTED "WAR OF LIBERATION", ONE WHICH THE COMMUNIST LEADERS IN HANOI OPENLY DECLARED IN 1959 AND WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING WITH TENACITY OF PURPOSE AT EVER INCREASING LEVELS OF EFFORT FROM THAT TIME TO THE PRESENT.

WHAT IS A "WAR OF LIBERATION"? WE FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THIS TERM ABOUT 1960 AS A RESULT OF THE DECLARATIONS MADE FROM HANOI. KHRUSHCHEV IN A SPEECH IN JANUARY, 1961, SPELLED OUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: "NOW A WORD ABOUT NATIONAL LIBERATION WARS. THE ARMED STRUGGLE BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SERVES AS ONE OF THE LATEST EXAMPLES OF SUCH WARS. THESE WARS BEGAN AS AN UPRISING BY THE COLONIAL PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR OPPRESSORS AND CHANGED INTO GUERRILLA WARFARE. LIBERATION WARS WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST AS LONG AS IMPERIALISM EXISTS". AND, OF COURSE, IN HIS EYES, THE UNITED STATES IS THE GREAT IMPERIALIST. KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUES: "CAN SUCH WARS FLARE UP IN THE FUTURE? THEY CAN. CAN THERE BE SUCH UPRISINGS? THERE CAN. THE COMMUNISTS FULLY SUPPORT SUCH JUST WARS AND MARCH IN THE FRONT RANK WITH THE PEOPLES WAGING LIBERATION STRUGGLES".

MORE RECENTLY, MARSHAL LIN PIAO, DEFENSE MINISTER OF RED CHINA, IN SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR MADE A VERY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT OF FUTURE CHINESE POLICY. HE DESCRIBED MAO TSE-TUNG AS THE LEADER OF A WORLD REVOLUTION WHICH IS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY NUMEROUS "PEOPLES WARS" -- THAT IS, "WARS OF LIBERATION" -- IN ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA. CITING MAO'S WELL PUBLICIZED STATEMENT THAT "POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARRELL OF A GUN", HE ADDS THAT "THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY ARMED FORCE, THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUES BY WAR IS THE CENTRAL TASK AND THE HIGHEST FORM OF REVOLUTION". THIS REVOLUTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE WAR OF LIBERATION TECHNIQUE ABOUT WHICH HE SAYS "THE MORE SUCCESSFUL THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES WAR IN A GIVEN REGION THE LARGER THE NUMBER OF U.S. IMPERIALIST FORCES THAT CAN BE PINNED DOWN AND DEPLETED THERE. EVERYTHING IS DIVISIBLE AND SO IS THE COLOSSUS OF U.S. IMPERIALISM. IT CAN BE SPLIT UP AND DEFEATED".

STRICTLY SPEAKING, THE "WAR OF LIBERATION" IS REALLY NOT NEW. WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF THE COMMUNIST USE OF THIS TECHNIQUE SINCE WORLD WAR II. THE CIVIL WAR IN GREECE, THE GUERRILLA WARFARE IN MALAYA, THE HUK INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES AND MANY FEATURES OF THE CHINESE

CIVIL WAR PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION. WHAT IS NEW IS THIS RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLETE RATIONALE FOR SUBVERSIVE AGGRESSION BASED ON THE USE OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION AS THE TACTIC OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION. NEW ALSO IS THE CHINESE PROCLAMATION OF THE INTENT TO USE THIS TECHNIQUE TO DESTROY THE UNITED STATES BY ATTRITION AND TO ABSORB EMERGING NATIONS OF ASIA, AFRICA AND SOUTH AMERICA INTO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ORBIT.

IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS NEW APPROACH APPEALS TO THE MILITANT COMMUNISTS OF PEKING AND HANOI. THE WAR OF LIBERATION IS CHEAP AS VIEWED FROM THE SIDE OF THE AGGRESSOR. THE HISTORY OF GUERRILLA INSURGENCY SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDING GOVERNMENT FORCES MUST HAVE A VERY HIGH SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS OVER THE GUERRILLAS IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THEM. A SUPERIORITY OF 10-20 to 1 HAS BEEN FOUND NECESSARY IN SOME OF THE SITUATIONS WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED. THUS THE STRAIN PLACED UPON A GOVERNMENT UNDER ATTACK IS VERY HIGH IN COMPARISON TO THE OUTLAY OF EFFORT REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE AGGRESSOR. NEXT, THIS TECHNIQUE ALLOWS AN EXTERNAL AGGRESSOR SUCH AS THE HANOI GOVERNMENT TO DENY COMPLICITY AND TO AVOID THE RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM FORMALLY PROCLAIMED HOSTILITIES. FINALLY, THE WAR OF LIBERATION

IS CONSIDERED

IS CONSIDERED RELATIVELY SAFE. KHRUSHCHEV MADE THIS POINT VERY CLEAR IN STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABLE RISKS OF WAGING NUCLEAR WAR AND THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL RISKS OF ESCALATION INTO NUCLEAR WAR ARISING FROM NON-NUCLEAR WAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, CLANDESTINE GUERRILLA WARFARE BEING DISAVOWABLE, IS RELATIVELY SAFE AND ALLOWS THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSOR TO ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS. LIN PIAO HAS MADE THE SAME POINT: "THERE HAVE BEEN WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION THROUGHOUT THE TWENTY YEARS SINCE WORLD WAR II" BUT HE ASKS RHETORICALLY, "HAS ANY SINGLE ONE OF THEM DEVELOPED INTO WORLD WAR"? HE TOO FINDS THIS AN EASY WAY TO ASSURE THAT THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION IS NOT MADE TO PAY.

WITH THESE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF WHAT OUR COUNTRY MAY FACE IN THE FUTURE, OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN IDLE. SINCE 1961, WE HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT IN SOUTH VIET NAM AND ITS WORLD-WIDE SIGNIFICANCE. ONE COGENT REASON WHY WE ARE DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW HANOI TO SUCCEED IN SOUTH VIET NAM IS THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WAR OF LIBERATION EVEN COUNTERED IN AN ADVANCE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT CAN BE DEFEATED BY THE FORCES AT OUR COMMAND -- THAT IT IS NOT INVINCIBLE AS THE CHINESE THEORETICIANS PROCLAIM. THAT TASK IS

PROVING DIFFICULT

PROVING DIFFICULT, BUT IT CAN BE DONE AND WILL BE DONE. I HAVE
CONFIDENCE IN OUR EVENTUAL SUCCESS BECAUSE OUR LEADERS HAVE SEEN
CLEARLY THE VITAL NATURE OF THE STAKE WHICH WE HAVE IN THIS STRUGGLE
AND HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL
END. OUR NEW VETERANS ON THE GROUND IN SOUTH VIET NAM HAVE A SIMILAR
SENSE OF PURPOSE -- AND I ALWAYS MEAN TO INCLUDE HEREIN NOT ONLY THE
VETERANS IN UNIFORM BUT ALSO THE HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN CIVILIANS WHO
PERFORM THE INDISPENSABLE NON-MILITARY TASKS. THESE VETERANS, MILITARY
AND CIVILIANS ALIKE, ARE LEARNING TO MELD TOGETHER ALL OUR RESOURCES,
MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, INTO EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS
CAPABLE OF DESTROYING THE VIET CONG GUERRILLA APPARATUS AND , WITH THE
RETURN OF SECURITY, OF REBUILDING A NATION ON THE HEELS OF THE RETREATING
FOE. ALTHOUGH THIS COORDINATION OF EFFORT CALLS FOR AN UNUSUAL DISPLAY
OF PROFESSIONAL SKILL AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, IN MY OBSERVATION OUR
VETERANS ARE RISING TO THIS COMPLEX CHALLENGE AND PERFORMING MAGNIFICANTLY.
IF THEY HAVE A CONCERN IN SOUTH VIET NAM, IT IS ABOUT THE HOME FRONT
HERE. OUR PEOPLE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE IRRESPONSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS
WHICH ARE MAKING THE HEADLINES IN OUR PAPERS AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

ON THE OTHER

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY CAN UNDERSTAND AND SHARE THE LANGUAGE OF
THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE EXPRESSED THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF OUR GOVERNMENT'S
COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIET NAM: "WE WILL NOT BE DEFEATED. WE WILL NOT
GROW TIRED. WE WILL NOT WITHDRAW EITHER OPENLY OR UNDER THE CLOAK OF
A MEANINGLESS AGREEMENT."
