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Allow me to elaborate for a moment on the need for those in national service who can bring into proper relationship the military and political affairs of the nation. This thought has a special relevance today at a time when we find our country deeply involved in a situation in Southeast Asia which calls for an intricate and an effective blending of many of our national assets both those which are military and those which are political in character. Although this present situation gives a particular urgency to our consideration of this need for proper proportion and balance in the use of our resources, the thought is not new that political and military affairs are usually intertwined and frequently difficult to separate. The German military philosopher Clausewitz recognized more than a century ago that war is merely a continuation of foreign intercourse by the interjection of another element, namely military force, to gain national objectives not attainable by less violent means. He believed that we should not apply military force to destroy an opponent but to compel him to do our will. Much earlier in history than Clausewitz, Polybius the Greek historian writing 125 years Before Christ recorded the same thought: "It is not the object of war to annihilate those who have given provocation for it but to cause them to mend their ways."

These quotations have a clear application to our strategy in South Viet-Nam which undertakes to convince the Communist leaders in Hanoi

[illegible]

that the continuation of their subversive aggression against South Viet-Nam is destructive to their own true interests and hence they must mend their ways. The strategy which we are following presently consists of four parts. The first is directed at the increase of our strength and the strength of the South Vietnamese government in those ground forces essential to gain and retain the military initiative against the Viet Cong guerrilla forces which are now heavily reinforced by units of the regular army of North Viet-Nam. The second component of our strategy is the use of air power, that of the United States and of South Viet-Nam, to restrict the further infiltration of men and equipment from North Viet-Nam and to remind Hanoi of the mounting price which they must pay for the continuation of their aggression. The third component consists of the non-military activities of the American civilians in South Viet-Nam who are engaged in strengthening and fostering the fragile political and economic structure of this young nation. The final component is the contribution of the diplomats directed at finding a just, peaceful solution to this eleven year struggle for the independence of South Viet-Nam.

I think that by the very enumeration of the components of this strategy one perceives the need for a broad spectrum of talents, military and civilian, in the American mission in South Viet-Nam and among those leaders of government in Washington who provide overall direction to these efforts. To a growing degree, I believe this need is being met. In every province in South Viet-Nam, there is an American team of soldiers and civilians who

work side by side endeavoring to strengthen the defense of the province against the guerrillas and at the same time to encourage and develop effective local government. In the district towns, one finds even smaller detachments of military personnel who are similarly engaged in trying to assist the Vietnamese district chiefs. These young American soldiers often spend far more of their time in supervising the distribution of fertilizer, in checking on the availability of materials for the village school or for the district dispensary, or in worrying about the sanitation of the pig farms than they spend on purely military matters. I feel sure that we are breeding in South Viet-Nam a new generation of American leaders, representing many segments of our government, who will learn to speak each other's language and understand reciprocal problems far better than our officials have done in the past. This is a requirement for the successful conduct of our foreign affairs. We are in an era of total competition to which we must be able to respond if need be with a total commitment of resources, human and material, if we are to discharge our responsibilities of world leadership.