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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

ADDRESS

BY

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GRADUATION EXERCISES

INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY

Washington, D. C.

December 17, 1965

Administrator Bell, Mr. Engle, Mr. McCann,
distinguished visitors, members of the graduating
class, ladies and gentlemen:

As Mr. Bell has suggested, it is with a warm
feeling of satisfaction that I come this morning to
address the graduating classes and wish them well in
their future police activities. I recall very well
the rather difficult beginnings of the predecessor
institution in Panama in developing into a very
effective Academy. Now we have here in Washington
not only the earlier Latin American branch but an
expanded international school symbolized by the
representation of 21 nations here today. I can
assure you it is an honor to my country that Washing-
ton has been chosen to be the site of this institu-
tion, which has such wide international implications.

I think we should look to President Kennedy as
the architect in large measure of the programs and
policies of my government and eventually of many
other governments directed at facing the challenge
of what was originally called subversive insurgency,
and which probably would better be described as

subversive aggression. The President first became aware of the problem during an early visit to South Viet-Nam, when the French were still in the throes of the guerrilla war against the Viet-Minh. When he became President, he soon found that among his principal international problems were the situations in Laos and in South Viet-Nam; and gradually developed a growing awareness of the extent of these problems. His subsequent personal interest in preparing the government to meet the future requirements inevitably had vast repercussions throughout all the executive branches.

As I look back over the records of counter-insurgency activities in 1961-63, I think they show the great effect of the Presidential interest in developing our understanding of the broad problem, in establishing a doctrine and programs of training, in inventorying resources and finally in establishing a mechanism to pull together effectively all the branches of the Federal Government having a part to play.

It was in 1960 that, in the course of our analysis of the problems in Southeast Asia, we began to under-

stand the meaning of that term of Communist jargon, the "war of liberation." Our understanding resulted from the fact that, after several years of fruitless effort on the part of that Hanoi leadership to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government by political subversion alone, Hanoi announced that a "war of liberation" would be initiated to "free" South Vietnam. This meant simply that guerrilla warfare, added to terrorism and sabotage, would henceforth supplement the insufficient forces of political subversion directed at the overthrow of the government in that country.

In 1961, I headed a mission sent by President Kennedy to Saigon to analyze the requirements there resulting from this new threat, the "war of liberation", and brought back a number of recommendations, one of which included the requirement to expand and improve the police performance in South Viet-Nam. This requirement was derived from a study of the police function in the situation there, in its relation to the many other programs, military, political and economic, which had to be amalgamated effectively in order to

respond to the "war of liberation."

While the mission recommendations were being implemented in the subsequent years from 1961 to 1963, considerable progress was made in the military, the police, the economic and the political fields. Then took place the overthrow of President Diem on November 1, 1963, which produced consequences which tended to interrupt many programs which had been progressing reasonably well up to that time. I will only mention the impact on the police organization and execution.

President Diem was a hard man; many have called him a stern dictator, and I think that description is reasonably accurate. As such, he necessarily appreciated the value of his police force and in particular of police-type intelligence so that by his police nets of informants he was able to control terror and sabotage in the principal cities. While terrorism was never entirely suppressed, Saigon was relatively a quiet city under his regime. Once he was eliminated, however, the forces of disorder moved

in and very quickly the experienced police chiefs were replaced, the information nets were broken up, the control of movement on the roads and into the cities disappeared and we were plunged into that very unhappy period of political and social disorder which existed for the next year and a half.

We were then to learn bitterly what it is to contend with a subversive insurgency without an effective police force. To add to the difficulties, the morale of the police became very low because the government would not support it adequately. In the political demonstrations and riots which occurred in 1964, the police were virtually useless because they had no assurance that their government would support them if indeed they took action against the demonstrators.

Now this is a very grim picture, I can assure you, as it was to those of us who were on the ground at the time. But we recognized at once the need for a complete overhaul of the police system and for a change in attitude of the local government if we were to restore the confidence of the police in their

subordinates and in their superiors.

As a result, a very extensive training program was initiated and, in the course of one year, a virtually new police force was created with a strength of about 42,000, a number that is still rapidly rising toward an ultimate strength of almost double. We found that the police were particularly essential in effecting what we call resources control. In South Viet-Nam, with the many Viet-Cong bases scattered through the provinces, it is most important to know who and what moves about the country in order to interrupt illicit traffic in various forms of contraband, particularly to seize weapons and medicines moving between Viet-Cong areas. This is a very difficult task for the police force of South Viet-Nam because of the extent of the road net of the country and the many waterways (some 3,000 miles of navigable waterways) which must be supervised and controlled. Only gradually, with the growth of the police, are we indeed able to assure a reasonably satisfactory execution of this very important function.

Now let me mention a few of the lessons which I

think we have learned in South Viet-Nam which bear on the overall police function. The outstanding lesson is that we should never let another VietNam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young, emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those symptoms which, if allowed to develop unrestrained, may eventually grow into a disastrous situation such as that in South Viet-Nam.

We have learned the need for a strong police force and strong police intelligence organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation. As has often been said, the police is the front line in this endeavor. We also recognize the importance of the police force in its relations to the armed forces of its own country. In South Viet-Nam the military effort never stands alone. It blends with the paramilitary and the police function and these in combination blend with the economic and social programs.

I have sensed on my visits in some countries that there is sometimes a certain rivalry or hostility between the local police and the armed forces; yet to be effective against subversion the two must learn to work together, with the armed forces serving as a back-up for an efficient police force. One of our lessons learned in Viet-Nam is the need for close cooperation, much joint common training, and joint exercises for the purpose of consolidating the police and the military forces.

I have also been impressed with the importance of the police as a symbol of government. In the situation such as South Viet-Nam, the people are the target of the Viet-Cong insurgents who are trying either to lure them to the side of Communism or to compel them to come to their side. It is for the representatives of the government, primarily the police force which is nearest to the people, to symbolize a benevolent government sincerely interested in the welfare of its people. This contribution of presenting a proper governmental image to the people is indeed a most important police

task.

From the Viet-Nam experience, we recognize the growing importance of the police profession in making a most important contribution to security. We recognize that a police career must be based on thorough scientific training and furthermore on an accurate understanding of the nature of the threat to which the country may be exposed. For many young countries, that threat is the growing danger of the "war of liberation" --the use of political subversion supplemented by terrorism and guerrilla warfare to overthrow non-Communist governments.

I hope that your attention has been called to the statement of Peking Defense Minister Lin Piao, a long statement made in September of this year. It is a most interesting blueprint of the foreign policy of Red China. In some instances, it is a fantastic and implausible document but it warrants the attention of all of us. He points out how Red China expects to use the "war of liberation" as a technique for expansion,

following the inevitable success in South Viet-Nam. He points out, also, as have other Communist spokesmen on the subject, that the war of liberation is a cheap way to export Communism and furthermore a disavowable and a relatively safe way because this kind of subversive aggression is not likely to grow into a conventional war or to threaten expansion into nuclear war. So it is quite clear that we have a new Communist technique which we must take into account as we look to the future. I can assure you that my government and my country take this challenge most seriously. President Kennedy has eloquently stated the challenge and our response.

He wrote, "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is in the southern half of the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. It is a battle for the conquest of the mind and soul as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot

fail to take sides."

Ladies and Gentlemen, we Americans have taken sides and we expect to continue to take sides with our friends who are under threat of subversive aggression. So I ask you, the graduates, as you return to your homes, to join with us in showing that the "war of liberation", rather than being cheap, disavowable and safe, is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure.

Gentlemen, I congratulate you on your successful completion of this course, and I wish for you all long careers of service in providing for the public safety of your countries.

Thank you.
