

COMMITTEE OF ONE HUNDRED

Miami Beach, Florida  
January 11, 1966

Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen of the Committee of One Hundred:

In looking over my past record, I have found that I appeared here in 1956 and, to my surprise, in the course of the dinner I found a few veterans of the Committee of One Hundred who recalled my visit. In reminiscing, I found that we had at least one thing in common in all cases, namely, that none of us could remember what I talked about. But I can be reasonably sure of one thing, I didn't talk about Viet-Nam because in 1956 the importance of the matters taking shape in that part of the world was not yet perceived at the time and, as a matter of fact, was not perceived over many years thereafter. I have been in and out of South Viet-Nam as Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and later as Ambassador to Saigon during the period of time since 1954. Up until my last return home last August, I would corner my best friend in his club, get hold of his lapel and say, "Look buddy, I want to talk to you about South Viet-Nam." The answer was a blank stare and silence until he turned the subject to his golf score or some similar important matter. Since I returned in August, 1965 from Saigon, I have been almost alarmed by the concentration of interest of the American public on this Asian problem. Exactly why the change in attitude over a comparatively short period of time I'm not sure, except that in the last year we have committed more men and more effort to that part of the world; more families have been

affected, more personal interests are touched. So I can assure you that when I came back in August I had no intention of getting on a chautauqua circuit to discuss Viet-Nam. Since that time, to my surprise, I have appeared on various platforms and before television so that this is my 49th appearance, and I can assure you while I no longer enjoy the sound of my voice I am tremendously encouraged by the fact of the eager interest, and the searching questions which are being directed at our programs and our policies in that part of the world. I detect two attitudes, I believe, among our people. The first I have already alluded to--the deep interest and sincere desire to know the facts and, secondly, a great confusion as to what is going on, as to what are the basic issues. I think this confusion is understandable in this sense, that in South Viet-Nam there are 44 different provinces with a total population of about 15 million. It is literally true that a fact can be stated accurately about Province A which is entirely untrue with regard to Province B or Province C. So that the quick and easy generalization of the headlines which occur in the papers are often misleading in the sense that they are true only as applied to a narrow segment of the country. Thus, this overly facile generalization, I think, has been at the basic cause of our confusion. I say this not critically in the slightest of our press representation in South Viet-Nam. Our reporters have had a very difficult problem not only because of the complexities to which I alluded but the difficulties of travel in a country where danger is on all sides. I had the same problem as

Ambassador--the danger of reporting back to Washington an impression which was only a partial or local truth. Now tonight if I can make any contribution in preparation for our discussion period, it would be to lay a background of exposition setting forth the principal problems before us and I would like to do so by posing three basic questions. First, what is going on in South Viet-Nam? Secondly, how is it going on? And third, how may it turn out?

In response to the first question, what is going on, I would say the easy answer is to say that there is a clash of basic interests between the Free World represented by South Viet-Nam, the United States and 13 nations taking part in South Viet-Nam and the Peking-Hanoi axis represented by North Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong guerrilla organization in South Viet-Nam (which is the military arm of the Hanoi Government) and, of course, in the background Red China. These two blocs have two simple objectives, each in direct conflict with the other. Their objective is to absorb South Viet-Nam into a single Communist state of Viet-Nam dominated by the government presently in Hanoi. This was their objective established in 1954. It has not varied one iota since.

We also have an equally simple objective dating also from 1954 which President Johnson has stated in the following language: "Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." Now in addition to these two basic objectives, both sides have collateral objectives as well.

On the part of the Hanoi-Peking alignment, it is to drive out the U.S. from Southeast Asia and to establish the invincibility of the so-called "War of Liberation" or "Peoples' War" about which I shall speak later.

On our side, we too have the collateral objectives of bringing stability and peace into all Southeast Asia and in so doing to establish the fact that the invincibility of this "War of Liberation" is a Communist myth.

Now one may ask fairly are our objectives sound? I would say they are both on moral and on practical grounds. We have laid our reputation on the line in defense of the principle of self-determination in South Viet-Nam—a principle of which we have been proponents at least since World War I. I think we have practical reasons also for feeling that this cause is one to which we should remain committed because of the serious implications of success or of failure. If indeed we succeed in our cause in South Viet-Nam, we shall have confirmed our right to leadership of the Free World. We shall have established ourselves in the eyes of all Asia as a winner and believe me in Asia only a winner counts. And finally, we shall have restrained the expansion of Red China into this part of the world which could serve as a springboard for advances elsewhere.

Now the consequences of failure are in general the opposite of the rewards of success. President Eisenhower in 1959 stated quite clearly the military dangers of failing to hold the line in this part of the world. The President said: "Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a

hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process which could if it progresses have grave consequences for the cause of freedom." Congress in August, 1961 recognized, in a Joint Resolution passed 502-2, the importance of holding our situation. This resolution contained the following language: "Congress approves and supports the determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression. The U.S. regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the <sup>maintenance</sup> ~~subordination~~ of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." Since that time, Congress has not seen fit to change its judgment.

Now I mentioned the "War of Liberation" or the "Peoples' War" as a factor which we must always keep in mind. We became aware of this jargon of Communism only in about 1960, when Hanoi declared a "War of Liberation" against South Viet-Nam. As we observed what that really meant--the introduction of guerrilla forces in addition to the political subversion to overthrow the government of South Viet-Nam--we realized that this was simply an old game under a new name. We had seen the same technique applied in Greece by the Communist guerrillas infiltrating out of Yugoslavia; we had seen it in Malaysia; we had seen it in the Philippines in the Huk insurrection; and we have been seeing it for a long time in Southeast Asia. We realized that if one wished to define the "War of Liberation" it would

be the use of guerrilla warfare and terrorism to support political subversion to overthrow a non-Communist state, usually with the guerrilla forces assisted from a sanctuary from without the country attacked.

In addition to what we learned from our own observation of what was taking place after 1960 in South Viet-Nam, the elect of the Communist world explained the "War of Liberation" and the fact that it was indeed a matter of great importance to them. Khrushchev in January, 1961, made a famous speech which included his comments on the importance of the "War of Liberation". "Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest examples of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank of the peoples waging liberation struggles." General Giap, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of North Viet-Nam, has made the following statement with regard to South Viet-Nam as a testing ground for the "War of Liberation". He says: "South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere else in the world." In other words, we believe that if we are not successful in resisting the "War of Liberation" in South Viet-Nam, it can succeed anywhere.

Those of you who are interested in the foreign policy of Red China have no doubt noted the long statement by the Minister of Defense Marshal Lin Piao in September last year. This statement included a number of policy observations and comments to include the view which the Red Chinese take of the "War of Liberation". There were two aspects which he mentioned. The first is contained in the following statement: "The more successful the development of a 'Peoples' War' in a given region, the larger the number of U.S. imperialist forces can be pinned down and depleted. Everything is divisible, and so is the colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split and defeated." In other words, by the use of this technique world-wide, they can gradually attrit the strength of the U.S. and eventually defeat us. Also he made a comment that the "War of Liberation" is a relatively safe operation because as he observes "There have been 'Wars of Liberation' for twenty years since World War II." But he asks, "Has any single one developed into a world war?" I read these citations to underline the importance attached to the situation in South Viet-Nam in the Communist world. They indeed regard this situation as a testing ground for the "War of Liberation" which to them seems an advantageous technique to apply in the future. Why is it advantageous? First, they would say it is cheap. It is cheap to train guerrillas. It is easy to slip them across frontiers. Secondly, it is disavowable. The outside sanctuary country, in this case North Viet-Nam, can pretend to have no part to play, just as Hanoi tried for years to deny any complicity in South Viet-Nam. Today, of course, that has changed, and the brassiest of apologists in Hanoi have given up any attempt to pretend they are not supporting the war. But nonetheless

the disavowable character appears an advantage in Communist eyes. And the final advantage is one which Lin Piao mentioned. It appears relatively safe to the Communist world which is deeply afraid of conventional war or nuclear war. They know that nuclear war is destructive to all parties and they are very much afraid that classical warfare might lead to nuclear war whereas low-level, ambiguous, undeclared clandestine warfare such as we are seeing in Viet-Nam appeals to them relatively devoid of danger.

Now we have been aware also on our side that something important is taking place in Southeast Asia, something that goes beyond the confines of that geographical peninsula. President Kennedy stated it in terms which we should all bear in mind. "The great battleground for the defense and the expansion of freedom today is in the southern half of the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East--the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations, and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is the battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

The answer to what is taking place in South Viet-Nam is that we have taken sides. We have taken sides to assure that freedom in this part of the world will not be destroyed.

The second question which I undertook to pose and to answer is, "how is it going on there?" In the time frame of this evening, I will

not try to include a historical review of the situation except to say that we are approaching the end of Phase III of the American commitment. Phase I I would define as the period from 1954, the time of the Geneva Accords and the partition of the country at the 17th parallel until 1960. You will recall the choice was given in 1954 that those who wanted to be Communist could either go North of the 17th parallel or stay North or if they wanted to be non-Communist, they could come South of the 17th parallel or stay South. The result was a very large movement of population. Almost a million North Vietnamese came South to avoid being in the Communist state and only about 80,000 went North. However, we are certain today that several thousand representing underground Communist cadres remained in South Viet-Nam to organize the subsequent insurrection. So from 1954 to 1960, I would call Phase I.

1960 was the time of the declaration of the "War of Liberation" by Hanoi--the decision to use guerrilla warfare to supplement political subversion in spite of which the Diem Government in South Viet-Nam had been strangely successful over these years. So from 1960, there was a new period lasting until November of 1963. This was the period in which we increased our assistance to South Viet-Nam as a result of President Kennedy's decision in 1961. We did it not in changing the quality of our assistance but in the form of advisory, economic and military assistance, but in the quantity thereof. As a result of the increase, by the end of the period we had around 17,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam, military and civilian.

Phase III--and I would say we are now approaching the end of Phase III--began on November 1, 1963, when President Diem after being dictator of the country for over eight years was assassinated and his government overthrown. What the historians will say in retrospect as to the right and wrong of Diem's assassination and overthrow, I can't say. There were many qualified observers of the scene who insisted then and insist today that we could never have won in South Viet-Nam under Diem's dictatorship. He was a hard man, a stern dictator who ruled the land with an iron determination. He was also an honest man of character but a man who never had the faculty of communicating with his own people. So the anti-Diemists say that he never would have succeeded organizing his people and bringing them forward as a unified coherent body capable of resisting the Communist attack. However, those of us who inherited the immediate consequences of Diem's overthrow felt it was little short of catastrophic. Diem had been sitting on internal forces, minority pressures, about which we knew almost nothing. And as soon as he was gone, they all came out of the political Pandora's box and caused us problems without end for the ensuing months and years. It was these minority forces which caused the political turbulence and instability which characterized the government in Saigon for almost two years.

I was one of the frustrated Americans who had to deal with this situation, but I do think I acquired in time a certain philosophy in understanding and sympathizing with the historical causes of the problem. This little country had never had a chance, never has had a chance to develop nationhood. It is an amalgam of many small groups separated by

considerations of religion, language, culture and of region, always dominated by foreign rulers, never allowed to develop a sense of unity within the indigenous leadership. To expect these untrained leaders suddenly to emerge into public life after years of domination by President Diem and behave themselves as you and I might think the leaders of a country should behave which is under external attack was just not realistic. Whether we liked it or not, we were faced with a situation which had historical roots which reached far into the past and which no stroke of genius on the part of the Americans could change quickly.

The Communists were very quick to realize the advantage they were offered by this change of government because Diem exemplified to them the hard-core resistance against the Viet Cong movement. And in the ensuing months, they proceeded to exploit in many ways the removal of his strong hand. Terrorism and acts of sabotage of all sorts increased, also, successful attempts to cut the communications of the country, to blow up bridges, destroy railroad lines and that kind of thing, to interrupt the distribution of commodities in the country. The result was the economic isolation of many parts of the country.

Perhaps most significantly of all, we experienced an increase in the Viet Cong military effort. Instead of depending primarily on local recruitment to raise new guerrillas to replace losses of the battlefield, Hanoi began to infiltrate their own armed forces into South Viet-Nam in increasing numbers. As the months went by, we discovered that not only ~~more~~ individual soldiers were coming down in large numbers but also that complete tactical units of the army of North Viet-Nam were appearing

on the battlefield. Today, we think that at least nine regiments are present in South Viet-Nam and there may well be more because the process of identification is always slow.

Last spring the Communists taking advantage of the monsoon season, the rainy season in South Viet-Nam, planned to mount the largest offensive of the war starting in May. We became aware of this plan in the early spring months in a variety of ways, prisoners, documents captured, communications intercepted and that kind of thing. We also detected the movement of Viet Cong forces moving from South Viet-Nam up into the area North of Saigon. We were quite prepared for a major offensive when the monsoon weather came. We were not disappointed and in late May and in early June there were a series of large engagements, the largest we had had since the start of the war. Both sides suffered heavily in this period and then the Communists fell back. The Viet Cong major units faded away and left us without contact. This was during the period when our U.S. ground forces were beginning to arrive in South Viet-Nam. It soon became pretty clear that the Communist side was reevaluating the situation and deciding how to adjust their plans.

Before discussing their reaction to the arrival of our forces, let me describe the strategy which we had adopted on our side. We had known that this drive was coming during the monsoon season. We had anticipated the likelihood that 1965 would be a critical year in the military situation. Not at a single moment, not by a single decision but by an evolutionary process, we had developed a four prong strategy by the time of the monsoon season. The first component was to develop at a faster rate the ground

forces of South Viet-Nam so we could be more effective on the ground against the guerrillas. In the previous year, we had extended ourselves to the utmost to train and arm more South Vietnamese forces and we had been reasonably successful. We had raised 120,000 additional soldiers and 20,000 additional police. But, unfortunately, that effort was not good enough, because in this same period of time, according to our best intelligence, some 60,000 additional Viet Cong guerrillas either had been recruited or infiltrated in from North Viet-Nam. In other words, you see we were gaining only at a rate of a little better than two to one. And in guerrilla war, history has indicated the government force, the defensive force, must have a very high ratio of superiority in order to hope to succeed. But it was clear that our rate of progress was not good enough and that fact brought the critical decision--a decision taken most reluctantly and after painful debate in Washington--to introduce our own ground forces in order to compensate for this imbalance. In summary, the first point of our four point strategy was to increase our strength on the ground using insofar as necessary American forces to compensate for indigenous shortage.

The second component of our strategy was to utilize our air power, our own and that of the Vietnamese Air Force, to strike at military targets in North Viet-Nam. This, again, was a very critical decision taken after over two years of discussion. When I went to Viet-Nam in late 1961 as President Kennedy's representative, I brought back a report which pointed out that the source of our trouble in South Viet-Nam was in North Viet-Nam.

We posed the question in our report whether we could continue to accept as a matter of common law the right of an external power to wage clandestine warfare across a frontier without paying a price. We didn't answer the question then. We made no recommendations to use our air force at that time but we were thoroughly aware of the fact that the day of decision might come.

It came in February, 1965, from a variety of reasons. The actual triggering factor was not the most important event of the war--the mortar attack on our American barracks in Pleiku. But it led us to embark on an air program which we understood clearly to have three purposes. I am going to mention them because we frequently become confused as to what our air program intended to accomplish. The first purpose was to give the Vietnamese people in the South the feeling for the first time of being able to strike back at the source of all their troubles. For eleven years, they had suffered under the Viet Cong attack. They knew where the source of leadership was but they had never had a chance to strike at it north of the 17th parallel. Reason No. 2: We wanted to use our superiority in the air to limit and restrict and make difficult the infiltration of men and equipment from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. We were thoroughly aware, I can assure you, that air power would never stop this. We had had too much experience in Korea to think that air power can make ground movement impossible. But we also knew that we could make it harder and that was our purpose. The third objective of the air program, I think in the long run, is perhaps the most important. It was to remind

the leaders in Hanoi who provide the direction for this war that little by little, progressively day by day, week by week, they would have to pay an increasing price for the continuation of their aggression. Now, today, when we ask ourselves is this program justified, I suggest that we should match our progress against those criteria.

The third component of our four-point strategy was the one which we hear least about, yet is of the utmost importance. It includes the non-military activities going on in South Viet-Nam to improve government, to offer a better standard of living, to give security, to create the feeling that the central government in Saigon is sincerely interested in the welfare of its people. This is the hardest area in which to operate. In a country that has no traditions of government, as I indicated at the outset, it has been very difficult to develop an administrative class of civil servants who are deeply and sincerely interested in the common people. Also, it has been particularly hard to pursue these non-military programs because security is a first requirement for their success. We must get the Indians away from the doorstep before we can start planting the corn. Nonetheless, we have over 1,200 devoted non-military Americans who are exposed to the hazards of Viet-Nam to the same extent as our military who are working day by day, night by night for better government.

The fourth and last component of our strategy is what I would call our international stance, the attitude of complete readiness to sit down for unconditional discussions any time the other side is willing to talk. I won't amplify on this point because I think the activities of recent weeks have filled the papers with this subject and I would think it is

reasonably clear that our government has indeed gone to all extremes to get some response from Hanoi.

Now having outlined our strategy, let me ask what about our progress? How have we done? Returning first to the ground situation, I would say that first we have blunted the monsoon offensive, it failed, and, second, we have taken the initiative in most parts of the country. At least we have taken the initiative away from the large Viet Cong units. It is extremely difficult, of course, to suppress all the banditry, the small acts of terrorism, the incidents as we say, which take place throughout the country. This task is primarily a police function and one which requires a police force of almost unlimited size. But insofar as the hard core, main line Viet Cong units are concerned, our forces are looking for them, and they are not looking for us.

Secondly, in the air campaign, I mentioned its three purposes. Certainly the morale objective was reached almost at the outset but I would add, however, that the morale factor can work almost against us if we never resume the bombing without a satisfactory settlement following very quickly thereafter. Insofar as the effectiveness of air in stopping infiltration is concerned, obviously it has not stopped infiltration. No one expected it to. But by the same token if one analyzes the effect of the breaks in the rail lines, the interruption in the highway systems, the inability to use many of the ports and airfields, I think a fairminded person must concede that the air campaign has made infiltration much more difficult. As to the effects on the minds of the leadership in Hanoi, I can't believe that they are happy or were happy as they saw the narrowing circle of devastation

close around the Haiphong-Hanoi area. What's in their minds tonight with this cessation going on I frankly can't say.

Insofar as the political-economic situation is concerned, we have a government which, by the standards of its predecessors, is relatively stable. It has been in business now for about six months. This stability, of course, in a situation like this, is only relative. Incidentally, the Ky Government is not a military government as most of us think. It is true there is a directory of ten generals who guarantee the government before the people. But the cabinet members, except for Ky the Prime Minister and Co, the Defense Minister, are all civilians. And they are a pretty good lot considering the fact that none of them has had any great political experience except perhaps the Foreign Minister. But in any case, they have shown stability, they have been able to reconcile the many minority elements, particularly those that involve the Buddhist and Catholic elements so that one has the feeling we are doing perhaps a little better in the political field than we had a right to expect six months ago.

We have always had economic problems in this country. Any country at war, of course, is under great economic stress. And a little agricultural economy such as that of South Viet-Nam, with a war now in its twelfth year, is obviously under extraordinary stresses. Fortunately, by a combination of the work of our own economists and those in the Vietnamese Government-- and they happen to have several very good ones--inflation has been controlled quite well up to now. Until last summer, the price structure had not varied more than about 25 percent on the average, although one could

find wide fluctuations in local areas. However, I must point out that the economic problem is going to get harder as American aid increases. The growth of our forces, with the many construction requirements, has added to the shortages in skilled labor, in construction materials, in transportation, etc. Thus, we see that the economic front is a very important front that we don't hear much about. But we have to watch it just as carefully as the military front.

On the international front, the question of negotiation I shall pass over and discuss it at the very end.

I believe I have done my best to answer the first two questions which I posed; namely, what's going on and how it is going on. Now the hard, final question is, how may it turn out? At this point, I have to report that I came here in a small aircraft and had to leave my crystal ball behind. So I am not prepared to go into any great detail of how the future may shape up. But it is not difficult, I think it is useful to ask what are the major problems of both sides and what are the alternatives.

First, let's take Hanoi. I think it is always well for us to put ourselves occasionally in the other fellow's chair because we can always feel so much more keenly our own problems and forget about his. Any general knows that if he only listens to the incoming shells of the enemy he can get scared to death and it is well for him to try to visualize how his artillery sounds on the other side. So let's look at the problems in Hanoi, and I speak of Hanoi as the central point of hostile leadership, while recognizing that the Viet Cong themselves have a rudimentary kind of political

structure and that Peking will have a very large voice in any ultimate settlement. The Hanoi problems are, generally speaking, three in number, three big ones. The first is the problem of the growing United States presence in South Viet-Nam. There was no question in my mind but that at the start of this year they fully expected that 1965 would be a year of military success for them, not in the sense that they would take Saigon and the government would capitulate, but that they would ~~mix~~ seize and hold important towns and provinces and surface the shadow governments which they maintained in rudimentary form in many parts of the country. This was their great hope and it was shattered largely by our timely decision to bring in American forces whose presence now obviously make a military victory impossible. One would think that as added American forces arrive that the lingering hope of a military decision on the part of the Viet Cong must disappear completely.

The second problem facing Hanoi is the air campaign. The progressive devastation of the targets in North Viet-Nam, the destruction of those physical structures which represent ten years of hard work on the part of the Ho Chi Minh Government, and the uncertainty as to just how far this air attack will go poses a formidable threat.

Now the third problem is one which probably looms largest among the dark clouds which hover over Hanoi--the behavior of Red China. We should never forget, ladies and gentlemen, as we reflect upon the problems of Southeast Asia that it is a fact of nature and of history that the Chinese, whether they come from the mainland or Taiwan, represent the traditional, hated,

suspected enemy of all Vietnamese whether they live in North Viet-Nam or South Viet-Nam. So the problem of how to resist the growing American presence and how to turn the threat of the air war without appealing to Red China and offering to turn over North Viet-Nam as a satellite to Peking--that presents a dilemma of major proportions.

Now the alternatives that Hanoi faces I think are fairly obvious to anyone. They can hang on and keep on doing about what they have been doing over the last year or so, always hoping the Americans may tire. They might, and I thought after the monsoon offensive when there was a long lull in operations, that they might indulge in the following alternative; namely, to "go back into the woodwork" as someone has expressed it. The guerrillas could fade back into the hills and into the jungles and there avoid contact with us over an indefinite period and thus present to our forces a very tough question of whether we should try to follow them to the utmost corners of this little country. How to catch them, how to determine their location, such would be some of the practical problems which would have faced our military commanders. It would have been an alternative which I think would have been difficult on our part to counter.

The third alternative is to escalate--to use that overworked verb-- by bringing in additional forces from North Viet-Nam. And finally, the fourth is to negotiate, trying to accommodate themselves to our objectives, in a way not too disadvantageous from their point of view.

I think it is fairly clear that, for the time being, they are taking course number three. They are escalating in the sense that we know they

have brought in several additional regiments in the last few months, and certainly none of the noises we are hearing from their leadership in Hanoi suggest that at the present time they are prepared to negotiate.

If those are the problems and alternatives of Hanoi, how does it look from our side? We know our own problems quite well. The first problem is, having gained the military initiative, at least to some degree, to retain and increase it during the coming months, so that we can eliminate any hope in the minds of the Communist leaders that they have any chance of a military victory in the South. Our second problem is on the most difficult front--the stability of government and of the economy in South Viet-Nam. That situation is precarious and will remain precarious. The third and final problem is the one we have heard so much about in recent weeks, how to convince Hanoi that there is a better way of behaving than at the present time; that we are not trying to destroy their government; we are not trying to prevent their being Communists in the North if they wish it; we would welcome them into a peaceful community of Southeast Asia to which we are prepared to give economic aid if they would only do one thing--cease the aggression against the South and withdraw their armed forces to whence they came.

Now if those are our problems, what are our alternatives? They parallel very closely the alternatives of the North. We can continue at about our present level and do nothing much more than we have been doing. That suggests we are willing to be patient and let time take care of the future. That may be a good way to do it, but we Americans just aren't patient. So I don't think that is an acceptable course of action. Secondly, we can

escalate on our side either by increasing our ground forces, by increasing our air pressures, or by doing both. Or third we, too, can negotiate. I think our preference to negotiate on acceptable terms has been made quite clear. But in the absence of any response from the North, I think we are inevitably faced with some form of increased commitment in the South, either on the ground or in the air, or both.

Now let me close by a discussion of some current events, specifically the peace offensive and its significance. As I understand the decision to extend the Christmas cease-fire, it was done for a number of reasons, any one of which I think reasonably valid. There were many doubters in our country and some of you ladies and gentlemen may be among them, that our government had not been sincere in seeking negotiations or discussions without conditions. There has been mishandling of the so-called feelers that took place allegedly in Cambodia and the Italian episode. As a result, there was a feeling reflected in various parts of the press that the government had not tried very hard. There were also critics of our previous pause which took place last May, who said it had been too short to give a ~~it~~ fair chance for response from the other side. Also, there were those who favored the extension of the Christmas pause because they felt that the pause had never had any real merit and hence we should give it such a good try this time that its futility would be exposed to all those who doubted and criticized in the past. And finally, there was a feeling that we should take time out long enough this time to make perfectly clear that we have no alternative other than to increase our commitment in South Viet-Nam or to withdraw.

Now there were also strong arguments against this suspension of bombing which I have heard in many quarters in Washington. I think that the strongest argument against this extended cease-fire is that it tends to work against our basic purpose of convincing the leadership in Hanoi that we really mean business; that there is no escaping from the implacability of our decision to see this thing through. To interrupt the bombing tends to offset to some degree the impression of determination which we wish to create. Also, my military friends were not happy about it because the interruption of the bombing allows the flow of supplies to move more rapidly with less interruption than in the past; it allows the repair of rail lines leading from China; it allows the increase in anti-aircraft preparations which will make it harder for aircraft when they go back. Then, of course, ~~in~~ the great political difficulty of resuming our bombing if it becomes necessary was anticipated. The pressures on the President and his advisers are going to be very great indeed, if and when he decides that a resumption is necessary.

These, then, were the pros and cons of the debate which ended with the decision in favor of an interruption of bombing while all peace feelers were increased by the despatch of all the envoys to all parts of the world. Now how this peace offensive will come out, I don't know. As every other American citizen, I would sincerely hope that we could get within the next few days some reaction favorable to sincere negotiations but I must say that I am skeptical. And, furthermore, I am worried about this aspect, that many of us have tended to equate negotiations with peace. Now I can assure you there is a vast difference between negotiation and peace. I commanded

the Eighth Army in Korea at the end of the war when the armistice negotiations were going on and had to resist the Chinese attacks day after day while they were talking peace at Panmunjom. I am afraid that if we go into negotiations there will be a great effort to have a so-called ceasefire and thus take all the pressure off the other side of the table and we will face again those long negotiations on the model of Panmunjom. Over two years, ladies and gentlemen, we sat at that table. And during those two years we suffered some 46,000 American casualties and our Korean allies lost over 150,000. I would like to read to you a paragraph from Admiral Joy's book, How Communists Negotiate, a paragraph written with the recollection of Panmunjom vividly in mind. "The armistice effort in Korea taught this. Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for armistice, increase it. In June, 1951, the Communist forces were falling back steadily suffering grievously, then Jacob Malik issued his truce feeler. As soon as the armistice negotiations began, United Nations Command Ground Forces slackened their offensive operations. Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to the maximum during armistice talks. Force is a decisive factor, the only logic the Communists truly understand. It has been argued that to endure the casualties which resulted from offensive operations while an armistice was potentially around the corner would have been an unacceptable policy. Yet I feel certain that the casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years of negotiation far exceed any that might have been expected from an offensive in the summer of 1951. The lesson is do not stop until hostilities have ended, not if you want an armistice with the Communists on acceptable terms within a reasonable period of time."

I would urge that, as we seek peace with all the earnestness which is ~~sitting~~ within our souls, we not forget that sitting down at a table with Communist negotiators is not peace in itself. As we sit down--as I hope we will some day when the time is ripe--we must bear in mind the statement of our President when in one of his recent speeches he said: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."