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*General Taylor's
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ADDRESS BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (RET.)
BEFORE THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN - TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1966

I am most grateful to the Research Institute of Japan and its sponsors/ for inviting me to return to Japan/ and giving me the pleasure of meeting again with old friends/ and reviving memories of the days in Tokyo before the war/ which form the basis of my claim to be an "Edokko." My only regret is that your invitation is/ to a large degree/ a result of the world-wide concern over the military and political situation in Southeast Asia/ the contemplation of which is certainly no cause for enjoyment in my country or in yours. But while I could wish for a more congenial reason for my visit/ it is a matter of encouragement to find in Japan a growing recognition of the importance of this struggle in Viet-Nam/ and the significance of the stakes involved for all of us. My purpose today is to present to you how the picture looks to ^{most of} us in America/ and how we hope the actions of our government will contribute to the restoration of peace and the establishment of stability. I should remind you that my views are personal/ and that I am in no sense an authorized spokesman for the American people or their officials. However, since I participated in the formulation of the current policy, it would be surprising if my present views departed significantly from it.

As we reflect upon the conflict in Viet-Nam, I think that most of us in America are moved by two somewhat contrary feelings. The first is fear of the expansion of war which any outbreak of hostilities on this shrunken planet causes/ and secondly a concern over the world-wide consequences of a possible Communist victory in Southeast Asia. The first consideration provides the motive for the evident caution which has marked the use of

military force by my government/and the constraints imposed on the strategy and tactics being employed. The second impresses us with the need to do whatever is necessary/to prevent the success of this Communist-inspired and directed aggression in Viet-Nam and its environs. Since the conduct of my government has reflected the influence of both of these considerations,/in-
evitably it has been exposed to the complaints of critics from both
extremities of the spectrum of views on Viet-Nam,/from the one which would trim our commitments to avoid further risks/and from the other which would apply force at a faster rate and at higher levels in the search of a rapid, predominantly military solution.

Because of these differing views in the United States,/throughout the past year there has been a running debate on Viet-Nam policy in the Congress, in the press, in the academic world and in private life. The debaters have found the substance for their arguments in the vast quantity of reports and commentaries of official and unofficial sources/which fill our papers and blanket our television screens. The very proliferation of information and pseudo-information has been a primary cause for the differences in the interpretation of events. The protagonists of any particular viewpoint toward Viet-Nam, often inclined at the outset to favor a ^{particular}/interpretation of events, have been able to find among the facts and purported facts reported in the press and elsewhere/the elements of a case in support of the position of their preference.

I am not saying, mind you, that the reporting of the Viet-Nam war by press, radio and television has necessarily been inaccurate. But it has

been so prolific as to make interpretation difficult and to encourage quick generalizations which are highly dangerous in reaching conclusions about Viet-Nam. I have often had occasion to say that there is not one situation in Viet-Nam but at least forty-three, one corresponding to each province in the country. A single fact flashed in a headline without qualification about an event in Province A, often suggests that it applies equally to the entire country, which is usually not the case. Thus in America and, I would presume, in Japan and elsewhere, many sincere and conscientious students of the situation in Viet-Nam ~~have~~, by a selective acceptance of reports compatible with early preconceptions, ^{have} succeeded in creating a distorted picture in their own minds of what is really taking place ~~in Viet-Nam~~, a picture of something which does not exist or at best exists only in part.

Let me add that there is certainly no complete protection against this kind of self-created illusion even for those who have worked for extended periods on the spot in Viet-Nam. The local situation immediately at hand always looms large in one's evaluation of the overall situation. Senior officials have much the same difficulties in reporting accurately and avoiding unjustified generalizations as do the representatives of the publicity media. But I was always impressed that, to my knowledge, no visitor to Viet-Nam ever came and left during my sojourn there without conceding on departure that the picture which he had brought with him to the country did not coincide with the one which he carried away. After all, there is nothing like an eyeball confrontation with people and facts to bring

reality to one's evaluation of a complex situation. Most of the critics of United States policy in Viet-Nam have not had the advantage of this revealing experience.

Having warned this audience of the difficulties of accurate reporting and evaluation, and having conceded the strong possibility of error on the part of any single report or reporter, I would now like to discuss the situation in Viet-Nam as I saw it as Ambassador and as I have continued to perceive it as a White House consultant. For convenience of exposition, I am going to pose four basic questions and then undertake to answer them in turn. They are the following: First, why is the United States in Viet-Nam? Second, what are its objectives? Third, how does it propose to attain these objectives? Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, what are the problems and the prospects for the future?

The easy and direct answer of why the United States is in Viet-Nam is that we were asked. The first request for our presence and assistance came from President Diem to President Eisenhower in 1954. Even before the Geneva Accords of that year, the leaders in South Viet-Nam had become deeply impressed with the dangers which lay ahead. They were aware of the well laid, long term plans of Ho Chi Minh and his associates to impose a Communist regime on South Viet-Nam. At the time of partition in 1954, you will recall that the opportunity was given to every Vietnamese to choose to live under the Communist regime of Ho Chi Minh in the north or in the non-Communist state of South Viet-Nam below the 17th parallel. At that time, nearly a million North Vietnamese fled south, bringing with them only the possessions

which they could carry in their hands/and more would have come had they not been prevented by the Communists. The movement of the Communist-inclined from the south was much smaller,/about 80,000 going north,/many of them young men of military age who went north to prepare themselves for subsequent reentry as guerrillas into South Viet-Nam. However, these were not all of the Communist partisans. We now know that the Communist leadership deliberately left behind in South Viet-Nam the infrastructure,/both political and military,/necessary to support the guerrilla invasion which was later to follow. In recognition of the difficulties ahead,/President Diem turned to the United States in 1954 and asked for help. His request was granted and that act marked the beginning of the direct American involvement which has continued in expanding form up to the present time.

Why did the United States Government make this affirmative response which called for the assumption of heavy responsibilities and liabilities in a small country thousands of miles from the American mainland? I would say that there were at least three basic reasons for our response. The first was our historic propensity to want to help free people threatened by aggression. We have always tended to believe that liberty is not secure anywhere unless free men defend it everywhere and have tended to act pretty much in consistence with that precept. In 1947, President Truman gave official expression to this point of view in responding to the British plea for help in Greece/when he addressed the following words to the American Congress: "It must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting the attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." These words introduced the aid program for Greece and Turkey which marked

point
an important turning [^] in our foreign policy following World War II. Similarly, we have always believed in the right of self-determination for all people to decide the government under which they are to live--President Wilson was the spokesman for this doctrine in World War I. With such traditional attitudes, it was only natural for us to come to the aid of South Viet-Nam/which, we perceived, was threatened with the imposition of a Communist regime and with the loss of freedom of determination of its own way of life. Thus, in effect, our motivation here was no different from that which led us to join in the defense of South Korea when that country was attacked in 1950. The source of the threat to both countries was essentially the same--militant Asian Communism; only the means of aggression was different--in Korea the overt attack of conventional forces; in Viet-Nam the sinister, ambiguous attack of the forces of subversion and terror.

There was a second, juridical reason why we felt obliged to assist South Viet-Nam. In September 1954, /by a vote of 87-1 in our Senate, /we had adhered to the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty which carried with it the responsibility to go to the aid of certain specified countries /if they were the victims of aggression by means of armed attack /and if they requested help. South Viet-Nam was on that list. South Viet-Nam requested help. Thus, in the minds of the responsible American leadership, there was and is no doubt about the binding character of the commitment which stemmed from our signature of the SEATO Pact. Our word was pledged in a way that a default here would put in question our reliability everywhere.

It is true /that, in the current debates, /some of my fellow citizens have come to regret this treaty undertaking. Some have even tried to disregard it

and to pretend that it does not exist. Fortunately, the responsible officials of the American Government know that it does exist and intend to maintain the American word. We are proud/~~that in past history~~/we have stood by our friends and our allies in the good years and the bad years and we do not intend to tarnish this record by a different behavior in Southeast Asia.

The third and final reason for our accepting the challenge/~~was an~~ appreciation of the consequences of a Communist victory beyond the confines of Viet-Nam/~~one~~ which I hope is shared here in Japan. We Americans have taken very seriously the statements of the Communist leaders/~~that the so-called "War of Liberation" on the Viet-Nam pattern will be the favored tactic for the expansion of militant Communism in the future.~~ We listened attentively to Khrushchev in 1961 when he said with respect to what he called national liberation wars:/"These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles." We have studied Marshal Lin Piao's policy statement of September 1965, where he explained how the "War of Liberation" would be used by the Communists/~~not only in Asia~~/but in Africa and Latin America. Personally, I have difficulty in believing that the Chinese under present circumstances can operate effectively very far from their own frontiers; but, nonetheless, I suspect that they are prepared to try if the opportunity presents itself.

As we Americans watched the development of the guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam beginning in 1959,~~we became aware~~/~~that in the "War of Liberation"~~/~~we were merely seeing~~ an old game played under a new name. We recognized

it as the same tactic employed in the Civil War in Greece, in the Huk insurrection in the Philippines, in the guerrilla warfare in Malaysia and during parts of the China Civil War. It could probably be said that Castro led a "War of Liberation" when he seized the political power in Cuba. By analyzing the elements which have entered into these Communist-inspired conflicts, it is relatively easy to reach a definition of the term "War of Liberation" or "Peoples War." Common to all is the use of subversive aggression for the overthrow of a non-Communist state, employing terrorism and guerrilla warfare supported clandestinely from an external Communist source.

Thus, it is not only the statements but also the behavior of the Communists which convince us that they take very seriously the "War of Liberation" concept and expect to use it widely if they succeed in Viet-Nam. It appeals to them for a variety of reasons. It is clear that they were very deeply impressed by the defeat of their overt aggression against South Korea where the armistice of 1953^{had} left the battle-front generally north of the 38th parallel which had been the line of departure for the invasion of the south. The cost of that war and the greater risks which a repetition of similar scope would entail in this nuclear age have contributed to the conviction that a better way must be found to continue the expansion of Communism. The best way in sight appears to Hanoi and Peking to be the so-called "War of Liberation." It is relatively cheap, since guerrilla forces can be trained, equipped and maintained at a relatively low level of cost in comparison to the great expenditures necessary to defend a government under attack. There is the political advantage that the clandestine Communist ally can disavow participation in the guerrilla warfare which it is supporting--as Hanoi tried

for years to deny complicity with the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. You will recall how these disavowals for a long time confused and misled the unwary international public with regard to the nature and extent of Hanoi's participation. The final advantage perceived in a "War of Liberation" is the relatively safety conferred by the ambiguity of guerrilla warfare and the difficulty of confronting it with conventional diplomatic and military means. In a sense, the tactics and technique of a "War of Liberation" are subterranean in nature, designed to tunnel under the conventional defenses of the Free World and thus to avoid confrontation by traditional forces.

For the foregoing reasons, we in the United States are deeply impressed with the need to defeat the "War of Liberation" in South Viet-Nam and to expose the myth of its invincibility. If we are not to be confronted with the same threat elsewhere, we need to demonstrate in South Viet-Nam that, far from being cheap, disavowable and safe, the "War of Liberation" can be made costly, dangerous and doomed to failure.

In summary then, the United States is in Viet-Nam because asked in by a succession of South Vietnamese governments speaking for their people. We accepted because of an instinctive desire to help a weak nation under aggressive attack; also because, in this particular case, we felt committed by a treaty engagement; and finally because we perceived the importance of the stakes involved in the "War of Liberation" and the threat of its extended use as a weapon of aggression in many other parts of the world. President Kennedy expressed our conclusion in eloquent terms when he stated: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East--the

lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations/and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence in a battle for the conquest of minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we can not fail to take sides." Thus, the simplest explanation of our conduct is that we Americans have taken sides in a cause the importance of which far transcends the geographic boundaries of South Viet-Nam. It is a cause in which Japan and all other freedom-loving peoples have a share in the stakes.

The next question which I undertook to answer was: What are the objectives of the United States in South Viet-Nam? What is it trying to accomplish? The easy and direct answer is that we are trying to attain a simple, clear objective, one which has been stated in only slightly varying terms by at least three Presidents--Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. Although the words have differed somewhat, the sense has always been essentially the same. President Johnson in his April, 1965 speech in Baltimore stated it this way: "Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

But it is not sufficient to state such a general objective without describing the ways and means, the tactics and strategy whereby we hope to attain it. In making this explanation, I shall describe our strategy as one consisting of four components, all interrelated, all essential to the accomplishment of the basic objective and all requiring successful execution. I would stress that/ just as the basic objective is limited in the sense that it does not set total

military victory or unconditional surrender as the ultimate goal, similarly the supporting strategy is limited in scope and application.

The first component of this strategy relates to the conduct of the ground operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas and against the units of the North Vietnamese Army which are now in South Viet-Nam. The latter we estimate to have a strength of almost 40,000 men organized into 19 regiments. These units of the Northern Army began infiltrating probably at the end of 1964 and have been coming in at an increasing rate ever since. We believe that since January 1st of this year the total infiltration of units and individuals amounts to about ~~26,000~~^{40,000}, whereas in the entire previous year, 1965, the infiltration estimate was some 25,000.

In the early years of our military assistance to South Viet-Nam, we Americans limited our military help to the provision of advisors and equipment. In 1961, following the open declaration of a "War of Liberation" by Hanoi, President Kennedy decided to increase the scale of our support, but always adhered to a basic principle in determining the nature and scope of that support. That principle was and is that the United States should not undertake to do anything in South Viet-Nam which the South Vietnamese can do for themselves in time. I feel that if the form and extent of American aid are scrutinized, it will be seen that we have always acted in general accordance with this principle. While it is true that our aid has increased very substantially both in quantity and in quality, that increase has been made necessary by the growth of the military threat represented by the Viet Cong and the infiltrated units from North Viet-Nam. The Government of Viet-Nam has not been able to increase its own forces fast enough to repel this growing threat in time and hence we have had to provide the deficiencies. Fortunately, in so doing in recent times,

we have received help from similarly-minded allies such as Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

From the outset, we had always hoped that the South Vietnamese could provide all the military manpower necessary for the ground battle and it was not until the spring of 1965 that we recognized the inevitable, namely, that there was not sufficient manpower and leadership in South Viet-Nam to repel unassisted the growing guerrilla threat from the north. It was this consideration that led President Johnson most reluctantly to agree to the introduction of American ground forces.

I am often asked what limit there is on the numbers of American forces which we will introduce. I do not believe that there can be any definitive answer to that question. Thus far, my government has acted on the principle that the validated requirements of the field commander, General Westmoreland, must be met and, thus far, they have been met. I would expect no change in this policy. Today, we have approximately 300,000 ground troops in action in South Viet-Nam and I suspect that we shall need more before the objective of the ground fighting is attained.

It is important to recognize what that ground objective really is. It is not the extermination or capitulation of all the enemy forces now under arms in South Viet-Nam. It does not contemplate a final police-type round up of the last dissidents in the jungles as was done, say, in Malaya. Rather, it is to break the back of the Main Force units of the Viet Cong and of the units of the North Vietnamese Army, inflicting such losses upon them as to destroy their capability for sustained field operations. If these units are destroyed or dispersed, then it will become possible to restore peace to the countryside and

bring in the elements of civil government/necessary for its physical, social and political rehabilitation. We have found from experience/that, without a certain level of security and stability,/it is impossible to make enduring progress in rebuilding the countryside and in restoring a normal way of life.

I feel that the military campaign has gone well during this calendar year. There have been an estimated 31,000 enemy killed,/over 4,000 prisoners taken/and over 7,500 defectors. If one adds some reasonable figure,/such as 60,000/to account for the seriously wounded,/we see that the total enemy manpower losses are in the vicinity of 100,000. Beyond this number, there are the losses from disease and desertion which are known to be high but which can not be expressed in precise figures. To replace such losses by the painfully slow methods of infiltration under air attack/must present a very serious problem to the enemy leaders. Surely the latter must be perceiving that there is no further possibility of a military victory in South Viet-Nam.

I would now like to pass to a discussion of the second component of the overall strategy, the use of airpower against military targets in North Viet-Nam. Like the decision to introduce United States ground forces into South Viet-Nam,/the decision to attack North Vietnamese military targets was undertaken only after a long debate within our government/which literally lasted for years. However, by February 1965,/it was perfectly apparent that we must use all appropriate weapons/if we were to beat back the increasing forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South Viet-Nam. In concert with the South Vietnamese Government,/we undertook this air campaign for three reasons which were announced at the time and which apply today. They were valid at the time of the decision and, in my judgment, are still valid now.

The first purpose of undertaking these attacks was to give to the South Vietnamese people the feeling that, for the first time, they were carrying the war to the enemy. For eleven long years, they had been under guerrilla attack fomented by the leaders in Hanoi. The people in South Viet-Nam had no illusions as to where their true enemy lay. Thus, when the word came that the Air Forces of South Viet-Nam and the United States were striking military targets north of the 17th parallel, there was a great wave of enthusiasm and clear indications of heightened national morale. By the same token, I might remind you that any significant diminution now in our use of this air weapon would have a seriously negative effect upon morale in the south and on the popular will to continue the war.

The second purpose of initiating the bombing campaign was to use air power to the extent that it could be effective to slow down and make costly the infiltration of men and supplies from the north. I would emphasize that no one ever thought that air power alone could stop this infiltration. However, we knew from our experience in World War II and in Korea that the proper use of air power could limit the numbers of enemy ground forces which could be supported in combat in the south and thus would place a certain ceiling on their total strength in the field. No one knew then, in fact no one knows exactly now, what that ceiling is. But we are quite confident that the air campaign has indeed made difficult and costly the continuation of the aggression from the north. The feverish efforts of the North Vietnamese during the 37-day bombing pause after Christmas to repair bomb damage and to move men and supplies in daylight over roads previously impassable attested to the effectiveness of the bombing campaign.

The third reason for undertaking this campaign was perhaps the most important. It was to utilize the air weapon to bring home to the leadership in Hanoi that, little by little, they would progressively pay an increasing cost for the continuation of the war in the south. Throughout all history, the rational use of military power has been primarily for the purpose of changing the will of an adversary. When persuasion and inducements fail, then coercion in some form must be applied if the desired end is to be gained-- this is the case for individuals and for states alike. While sometimes in past history military force has been applied to the point of physically destroying the adversary to remove his opposition, most wars have not been this kind of total war. Rather, they have had the objective of creating a situation so disadvantageous for the adversary as to make him prefer to change his conduct from self-interest and thus to comply with the wishes of the other side. The Graeco-Roman historian, Polybius, writing in the second century before Christ, stated the case for this form of rational military coercion in the following words: "The purpose of war is not to annihilate those who provoke it but to cause them to mend their ways."

That statement is a large part of the case for the bombing in North Viet-Nam. The air action is not for the purpose of destruction for destruction's sake but, like the counterpart ground action in the south, is to present to the Hanoi leaders so depressing a prospect of increasing loss as to cause them to change their ways. This decision to reform will be made easier, I hope, by the solemn affirmation of our leaders that the United States has no desire to keep military forces or military bases in

Southeast Asia and will be most happy to limit its subsequent involvement there to assisting the post-war restoration of peace and stability, ~~in that part of the world.~~

The third component of the overall strategy includes all of those non-military activities directed at rebuilding the war-ravaged provinces of South Viet-Nam and offering to the people the hope of a better life for the future. These activities unfortunately have received very little attention in press reports and public discussions in spite of the magnitude of the American effort in this sector. The fact is that since 1954 the United States has contributed \$3.5 billion to it, which is substantially more than the expenditures for the Military Assistance Program. From the outset, we have been thoroughly aware that there can be no strictly military solution to this situation in South Viet-Nam. The military program is important primarily to give security behind which the Government of Viet-Nam can carry out the educational, health, welfare, agricultural programs which we are encouraging and supporting with advice and funds. We recognize that the success of these non-military activities will, in the long run, be the yardstick for determining the lasting success of our effort in this country.

While, as I indicated, we are doing quite well on the military front, I can not say the same without qualification for this political, social and economic front. There are grave problems here stemming from three primary causes. The first is the lack of security which continues to exist in many of the provinces and limits the degree of possible progress. The second is the political inexperience and the weakness of governmental administration in this young country. Finally, there are the pressing dangers of inflation to the economy.

I have already commented on the effects of the lack of security. The political-social problem is epitomized by the chronic instability of government both in Saigon and in the provinces/which has plagued the country since the overthrow of President Diem. However,/after many discouragements and set-backs,/a government has at last appeared which has maintained itself in office over a year/and, through a combination of toughness and moderation, has frustrated the attempts of the political minorities to pull it down as they had its predecessors. Since his victory over these elements in late June,/Premier Ky has undertaken to expedite the establishment of constitutional government/following a compressed schedule which is bold to say the least-- and some critics would say, too bold. But, in any case,/even the critics are impressed with the apparent sincerity of his efforts and we are bound to wish them success. Preparations have been completed for the elections for the Constitutional Convention which take place just three days from now. There has been no evidence of governmental tampering with the selection of candidates/or of any intention to rig the elections in any way. We will all watch their conduct with intense interest/not only to appraise their fairness/but also to gauge the popular participation. Bear in mind that the Viet Cong and some of the non-Communist dissidents have vowed to sabotage or to boycott these elections. A substantial turn-out of voters, ~~which~~ ~~is~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~elections~~, will be a great encouragement to the anti-Communist forces which are sincerely trying to lay a legal constitutional base for popular government. However, even after a successful election on September 11,/the road to constitutional government is sure to be difficult and probably longer than the optimists anticipate. I often remind my compatriots that

it took the United States thirteen years, to traverse the road from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the inauguration of Washington, the first constitutional President, in 1789. Americans then, should be the last to criticize if our Vietnamese friends have difficulty moving from the Diem dictatorship to a constitutional republic in less than four years. *and constantly ed. war.*

Economic factors are causing growing concern in South Viet-Nam, many of which result from the massive influx of United States military forces and their inevitable demands on labor and commodities. The cost of living continues to rise and the warnings of growing inflation are unmistakable. To cope with the situation, the Government of Viet-Nam has invoked outside assistance. In May, the International Monetary Fund sent a team to Saigon to examine the money problems which are numerous and serious. As a result, on June 18 there was a devaluation of the currency for the purpose of controlling inflation. The early reactions to this courageous decision have been good; but it is too soon to be sure whether these measures will be enough to bring inflation under control.

In meeting these difficult problems, the evidence of understanding and sympathy by the more than thirty friendly nations which are giving various forms of non-military aid to South Viet-Nam is a source of great encouragement to this young nation, borne down by the weight of two decades of war. I am sure that the people there value highly the economic and humanitarian assistance which Japan has given over the years and hope for its continuance and increase until their ordeal is ended.

It is particularly difficult to evaluate progress in these non-military fields. Probably government control of population is the best yardstick if it can be applied with any guarantee of accuracy. Although it is certainly not scientifically accurate, this indicator shows that, at the present time, about 54 percent of the population of South Viet-Nam is securely under government control and something over 20 percent of the population clearly under Viet Cong control. The remainder of the population is in those grey zones where the security of the population ebbs and flows with the changes in the military situation. These figures represent relatively little progress over the past year, a fact which emphasizes the need for more security and, hence, for increased United States troop strength.

Going back to the discussion of the overall strategy, I now come to its fourth and final component, the diplomatic. This sector includes the many activities of my government and of other seekers after peace in attempting to find a negotiated settlement to this conflict. It is hard to identify and tabulate all of the probes and all of the demarches taken thus far to initiate discussions but there are more than a score by my count and I suspect that there are many which have never got on any official list.

As you know, thus far we have received absolutely no indication from the other side of a willingness to talk. However, we are not discouraged and expect to continue our efforts indefinitely. To some, this highly conciliatory attitude may seem a sign of weakness and suggest lack of will to carry on an unpleasant task. I hope that it is not so interpreted in Japan. Quite the contrary, we are doing this in a spirit of complete

determination not to yield our basic objective much as we want peace. That objective, I would remind you, is an independent South Viet-Nam free from attack. By its very simplicity, it does not lend itself to compromise. But its attainment does not preclude many advantages which could accrue to Hanoi as a member of a prosperous, peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. The creation of such a community would be high on the agenda of any peace conference.

Now let me pass to the final question which, at the start, I undertook to answer. What are the prospects and the problems of the future? I would say that, on the military side, the problem is to continue to improve our effectiveness in destroying the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in South Viet-Nam. We can not afford to accept a stalemate which would threaten us with the indefinite commitment of our troops to this part of the world. We are anxious to do our job and to go home. We are convinced that that job can not be done until we are so clearly successful in South Viet-Nam as to destroy the vestige of any hope that the Viet Cong somehow can find a military way out of their growing predicament.

As an indispensable part of this effort, I feel that we must continue our bombing program against the north. It constitutes an important incentive to the Hanoi leadership to come to the conference table which, if withdrawn, would greatly reduce the prospects of an early settlement. Their maneuvers to make its cessation a precondition to discussions is a clear indication of its effectiveness and, hence, from our point of view, of its indispensability.

Likewise, we must do better in the non-military fields which I have discussed. Governmental stability is indispensable, /not only for the effective conduct of military operations and for the successful rehabilitation of the devastated provinces /but also to present to Hanoi a disillusioning picture of South Vietnamese unity and political progress. The Viet Cong and their allies have cleverly exploited political instability in the past /and hope to find it a valuable ally in the future. They will do everything in their means to continue this exploitation of internal weaknesses, /hoping thereby for a new round of governmental crises, /destructive to the hopes of the Vietnamese people and to their confidence in themselves.

I would again emphasize the importance of the elections which will shortly take place. It has been a brave venture on the part of the South Vietnamese to undertake to create constitutional government literally under the bullets of the enemy. I know of no country in history which has ever undertaken such a feat. It may be imprudent, it may be foolhardy, but is certainly admirable and all free peoples should wish it well.

We are not out of danger in the economic field where inflationary pressures are still powerful. However, many forces are at work to remedy this condition and I believe /that, given time, /inflation can be brought under control and the cost of living can be leveled off. But it is going to take both time and courageous governmental decisions.

As for negotiations, while there are no signs now of peace talks, inevitably there will be. No war ever ends without some kind of negotiation even if there is no international conference or formal bargaining. But

negotiations are not an end in themselves and their start does not mean that lasting peace is just around the corner/as we discovered in our two-year negotiations for an armistice at Panmunjom in Korea. Both sides must come to the table/sincerely desirous of a reasonable settlement/and not viewing the conference table merely as a new field for conflict in another form. The negotiation of a cease-fire and a final settlement of a guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam/will at best be enormously complicated and difficult even if good will exists on both sides of the table.

I now arrive at the end of my discussion. I have tried to explain why the United States is in Viet-Nam, the simple objective which it is pursuing and the limited strategy which it employs. I believe that I have been moderately optimistic in describing the military progress/and conservatively pessimistic in outlining the non-military problems. I am convinced that to attain success in reaching our objective of a free and independent South Viet-Nam/we must show clear progress on all fronts,/the military, political, economic and diplomatic. This will take more time and the expenditure of more resources than those committed up to now. It will also require continued patience on the part of the brave South Vietnamese people now in their twelfth year of war, perseverance on the part of the American people who are prone to like quick results and enduring understanding on the part of the friends of freedom about the world. The hope of the enemy is no longer in a military victory but rather in a collapse of our morale or a break in our determination. They are trying to convince themselves that

international or domestic pressures will somehow force the United States and its friends to change their course of action. I am convinced that they are wrong and that they underestimate the character of the American people and their like-minded friends. President Johnson has given a slogan which I believe animates the vast majority of the American people when he said: "Until peace comes, our course is clear. We will keep our commitment, carry on our determination, and do what we must to help protect South Viet-Nam and maintain the stability of Asia."