



MOZ

April 4, 1966

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)
4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Apartment 1630
Washington, D.C. 20016

Dear Gen. Taylor:

Thank you for your note of April 1, and I appreciate your allowing us to feature your foreign policy speech at West Point.

As you know, most printers are prima donnas, and ours have asked us to schedule 30 days in advance. We'll send along galley proofs to you as soon as we have them.

I think your article will be very helpful in setting students right on this important issue.

Very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. O'Brien", is written over the typed name.

David O'Brien
718 Noyes Street
Evanston, Illinois

4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Apartment 1630,
Washington, D. C. 20016,
January 14, 1966.

Dear Bradford:

Many thanks for the copy of my recent address at West Point. I am sorry that my staff hurried you but I needed the edited version for reference in connection with certain other speeches I am preparing.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Major Z. B. Bradford,
Department of Social Sciences,
United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York 10996.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

Department of Social Sciences

MADN-J


10 January 1965

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)
4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Apartment 1630
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of your speech, and responses to questions, as they will be published. I regret the delay. I had assumed from your letter, which accompanied your edited version, that it would be satisfactory for me to send you a copy of the conference report when it became available. Therefore, your speech was being prepared for the printing process when Col. Root called. This explains the inclosed copies being done by Thermofax. I hope this is satisfactory.

Sincerely,



J. B. BRADFORD
Major, Inf
Executive Secretary, SCUSA XVII

Incls
as

4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Apartment 1630,
Washington, D. C.,
December 23, 1965.

Dear Major Bradford:

I am returning herewith the edited text of my address to the Student Conference and of the questions and answers which followed. I would appreciate a clean copy of both for my files when you have them available.

It was a pleasure for me to have taken part in SCUSA XVII.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 Enclosures:

Major Zeb. B. Bradford,
Department of Social Sciences,
United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York 10996.



MADN-J

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996
Department of Social Sciences

8 December 1965

Weekend

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Special Consultant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Taylor:

Let me add my thanks to Colonel Lincoln's for your superb address here to our Student Conference. As Executive Secretary of SCUSA XVII I was in close touch with the participating students and you can be assured that your remarks were indeed relevant to their questions concerning our policy.

Inclosed is the transcript of your address and also of the question period which followed. We have released it to no one. At your convenience I hope you will review it and indicate to me any errors so that I may have it published in our conference report.

You will also find the draft copies of the reports made by the three student groups concentrating on the China-Southeast Asia area.

Sincerely,

4 Incl
as

Zeb B. Bradford
ZEB. B. BRADFORD
Major, Infantry
Executive Secretary, SCUSA XVII



OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

MACS

13 December 1965

M.D.

General Maxwell D. Taylor
USA Retired
Special Advisor to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear General Taylor:

The success of our Seventeenth Student Conference was due in large part to your splendid Banquet Address. Your remarks were ideal in clarifying a number of issues which concerned the student delegates. To repeat the comment I made to you that evening, I have never heard a more lucid exposition of the background, status and aims of our mission in Vietnam. I have heard several other people comment to the same effect.

I am also gratified that you found time to speak to the Corps of Cadets at Washington Hall. You may be certain that your generosity was appreciated and will be long remembered.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jim Lampert".

J. B. LAMPERT
Major General, USA
Superintendent



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996
Department of Social Sciences

MADN-J

6 December 1965

max

Dear General:

You did a magnificent job for our student conference and for West Point on Friday. Thank you very much.

We should be particularly appreciative since you substituted the student conference for a dinner party that I know you wanted to go to. The reports from the student discussion groups on Saturday noon were very thoughtful and moderate. They would have done credit to a faculty level conference. Credit for their insight and moderation should go in considerable part to you.

Sincerely,

GAL
G. A. LINCOLN
Colonel, USA
Professor

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Room 300
Executive Offices of the White House
Washington, D. C.

P.S. I am asking the Executive Secretary of the Student Conference to send you the student reports from the Southeast Asia discussion groups. The reaction of our student groups is, of course, not likely to be typical since these individuals are all specially selected and most of them are majors in economics, political science and international affairs -- hence, have some education in the problems about which they are talking. GAL

12-14-65
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B-64

Speech Plus
Q & A Period

ADDRESS BY

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, USA (RET.)

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

TO THE SEVENTEENTH STUDENT CONFERENCE
ON UNITED STATES AFFAIRS

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

DECEMBER 3, 1965

Thank you. Thank you very much. General Lampert, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I appreciated the reference which General Lampert made to my "farsighted contribution" to this now respected institution of the Military Academy--SCUSA. I'm sure that General Lampert will join me in saying that most of the bright thoughts of Superintendents are the result of the suggestions of able subordinates. I must concede that whatever part I have played in the origin of SCUSA I owe to the very able Academic Board which supported me as Superintendent, and in particular to Colonel Lincoln, who has contributed so much to the United States Military Academy and to the achievements of its graduates in the field of Social Sciences.

I came here tonight with considerable trepidation, I must say, because I appreciate that an appropriate final address to this gathering would require an attendance at your seminars in order to anticipate those questions which remain unanswered. I cannot feel too sorry for you ladies and gentlemen who are writing reports tonight and will be up all night, because I can assure you this is nothing unusual to those of us who earn our pay in Washington. I hope that you will appreciate also as you wrestle with these reports that there is no easy way to resolve some of these international problems. I might suggest that you ask yourself, "What would it mean if my government were going to act on this report tomorrow and follow my recommendations?" It is thoughts like that which make hairs turn gray among the Presidential advisors and those who do have a responsibility for what the United States is doing world-wide. And if indeed one may question whether the fountain of all wisdom is found in government, one may be at least sure that responsibility is there. Hence I am startled sometimes as I read press commentaries upon our government's actions suggesting that the judgment of someone like the Secretary of State is offset by that of a private citizen with no responsibility, whereas the Secretary of State carries tremendous burdens of responsibility and puts his career and reputation on the line by his every action.

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I like the subject of your discussion--this question of the multiple forms of foreign policy. I have often reflected in recent years, particularly since returning to government in 1961, on the changed orientation of our international concerns. A few years ago, we enjoyed the dreadful simplicity of concentrating on the dangers of nuclear war and of attending primarily to the threat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Today the very fact that this threat has divided itself into many parts brings us multiple problems in many ways more frustrating than we had at the time of the terrible but simple problem of avoiding a nuclear war with the Soviet Bloc.

It seems to me that the multi-polar distribution of power is the factor which is now giving these "new dimensions" to our foreign policy which you ladies and gentlemen have been discussing. Today we have no single great adversary, but rather several of varying dimensions, consisting primarily of the USSR, Red China, North Viet-Nam, and Cuba. But one might even add to that list such countries as the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Cambodia, and perhaps France. Now, it is important to note that there is very little unity of purpose in this long list of competitors. Even our Communist adversaries are divided among themselves over many important subjects affecting the foreign policy of the United States. Hence, they must be dealt with, not as a bloc but according to the merits of their individual cases. Certainly they cannot be viewed as members of a homogeneous hostile coalition.

Now of these countries, only the USSR and Red China have objectives that can be considered world-wide in scope; the others are primarily interested in relatively local objectives. And they recognize, I would say, the limitations upon their ability to influence events outside of their immediate neighborhoods. Nevertheless all display competitive tendencies which affect the United States foreign policy in varying degrees. We encounter these competitive forces in many corners of the globe where our adversaries concentrate their efforts. For example, France in Western Europe, the DRV in South Viet-Nam, the USSR and Red China throughout Latin America and Africa. We cannot afford to neglect entirely any of these challenges. Yet at the same time we cannot disperse our resources headlessly without regard for the dangers of their attrition.

I hope that, in the course of this last three days, you have paid adequate attention to the very significant statement of the Defense Minister of Red China, Lin Piao, who in a statement of some 100,000 words laid out the blueprint of the political plans and intentions of his country. Among the many things he said, he reminds us, and I quote: "Everything is divisible, and so is the colossus of United States imperialism. It can be split and defeated."

After that warning, I think we should remind ourselves always of the danger of overextension. In choosing where to allocate our forces, necessarily we must keep a sharp eye on the Soviet Union and China because of their past record of aggression and the clear statement of their intention to use the "War of Liberation," or the "People's War" as a device for subversive aggression in the future. President Kennedy recognized and accepted the challenge in the areas primarily threatened when he wrote: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe: Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East--the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations. And they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination, as much as one of force and of violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and the souls, as much as for the conquest of lives and territories. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

From the conflict that results from our taking sides emerge the conditions of this so-called "disorderly planet" (to use President Johnson's phrase), to which we must adjust the dimensions of our foreign policy. At this moment, we are sampling the problems of adjustment to this situation in our frustrating experience in South Viet-Nam. Here we see the "War of Liberation" in action and are learning the cost of suppressing this expansive technique when encountered in an advanced state of development. We begin to understand why this technique recommends itself to the Communist leaders in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. It is cheap in relation to the heavy expenditures in men and equipment by the government under attack. It is disavowable at least for a long time, as Hanoi has demonstrated in attempting to deny complicity in South Viet-Nam until the mass of the accumulated evidence of direction and support in men, units, and equipment has forced silence upon even the brassiest of Communist apologists. It is a relatively safe technique as our friend, Lin Piao, has reminded us saying, "There have been wars of liberation for twenty years since World War II." But he asks rhetorically, "Has any single one developed into a World War III?" One might wonder parenthetically whether this doctrinal point of faith may not perhaps serve as a brake on Chinese willingness to risk escalation toward general war, because it would never do to have Communist dogma proved wrong in practice.

Now I would like to use for a moment the situation in South Viet-Nam to illustrate the growing complexities of our foreign policy and its implementation abroad. This "War of Liberation", so called, being waged in South Viet-Nam poses an interesting case study of the difficulties of focusing the combined resources of many departments of our government on a complex foreign problem requiring an integrated effort both in Washington and in the country under attack. It also illustrates the process of calculated limited escalation which is inherent in resistance to a war of liberation.

I would say that we are now in the Third Phase of our involvement in South Viet-Nam. Since the partition of that country in 1954 under the terms of the Geneva Accords, there has been a basic conflict of objectives between South Viet-Nam, our allies in the Western bloc and ourselves on one side, and North Viet-Nam, Peking, and the Viet Cong apparatus in the South on the other. It was very clear even in 1954 that the objective in Hanoi was to bring about a unified North and South Viet-Nam in a single Communist state under the direction of Hanoi. It was also clear that, in order to accomplish that, it would be necessary to remove the American presence and the American influence from South Viet-Nam. It was equally clear on our side that we should not permit this if only out of consideration of elementary international justice. Faithful to our tradition of supporting the right of self-determination for all nations, we felt obliged to align ourselves with South Viet-Nam and see that this emerging country had an opportunity to choose its own government and its own way of life and develop its own society and its own economy. President Johnson has stated our objective as it was in 1954 and as it is today. The President said in his speech in April 7th of this year, "Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." That was the issue in 1954. It remains the issue today. I would say that both sides have adhered to their objectives faithfully and that both sides have adjusted their tactics and their strategy in accordance with the changing conditions as the years have progressed.

The first phase of our American involvement extended from 1954 until about 1960. This was the period following the establishment of Diem as President. He had been chosen reluctantly and with some trepidation by his own people and had been viewed by Washington with great concern where it was frequently said that Diem would never last six months. President Diem fooled us all in those early years by leading his country

forward in a period of slow progress, both political and economic, and, in so doing, defeated the efforts of the Viet Cong political cadres to penetrate his young government and overthrow it by political subversion.

By 1959, it was quite clear that South Viet-Nam was on the move. Even a small boomlet was appearing in its economy and the leaders in Hanoi were quite convinced that they must change their tactics and strategy. This change took the form of the declaration of a so-called "War of Liberation" by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam. This action meant simply that, to the political subversion which had been taking place over the years, would be added the use of guerrilla warfare as a means for terrorism, for sabotage, and for the reinforcement of the political arm by military means to overthrow the government--all of this new panoply of subversion was about to unfold. In Washington, we became aware in late 1960 and early 1961 that the rules were being changed, that "escalation", to use that overworked noun, was taking place. When I reported for active duty to President Kennedy in the spring of 1961, I found that he was deeply concerned over the reports that were coming from South Viet-Nam, and I agreed to undertake a mission to that country in the late fall of that year to examine the new requirements arising from the "War of Liberation" which had then been going on for about a year and which was resulting in serious terrorist inroads into the countryside with increasing loss of life among the peasantry. The Viet Cong were occupying their villages, assassinating their head men and impressing their young men into service.

As a result of this visit to Viet-Nam, I filed a report which was concurred in by the representatives of the affected departments who had accompanied me. We were quite aware of the desire of President Kennedy to keep constantly in mind that the struggle was the resistance of South Viet-Nam against the external aggression of the North. President Kennedy in his directive to my group had used the following significant language. "In your assessment of the situation, you should bear in mind that the initial responsibility for the effective maintenance of the independence of South Viet-Nam rests upon the people and the government of that country. Our efforts must be evaluated and your recommendations formulated with this fact in mind. While the military part of the problem is of great importance to South Viet-Nam, its social, political and economic elements are equally significant." I think the report we filed was consistent with this directive from the President. We did not recommend any dramatic change of what we had been doing. In those early years our assistance to this country, while both military and economic, had been preponderantly for non-military purposes. We reviewed the effectiveness of our previous programs and agreed that, in general, the concept of advising and assisting this young country, both in the political, economic and military fields was entirely sound and necessary: we agreed we should not take over the fight from the Vietnamese, but should do everything to create a viable independent state that we could someday leave behind, able to sustain itself.

There were two possible recommendations that we debated very strenuously among ourselves. The first was with regard to the use of American ground forces to supplement the armed forces of South Viet-Nam, which, even then, were obviously inadequate to meet with the growing threat of Viet Cong infiltration. We decided against this recommendation, feeling that we should first make every effort to create all the strength possible in the Vietnamese military and police forces so that, hopefully, by their own resources, they would be able to defend themselves and turn back the guerrilla tide. The second point, about which we were equally uncertain, was the use of our air power against North Viet-Nam. It was perfectly clear in 1961, even then, that the source of the strength of the effort against the South was in Hanoi, and that the Viet Cong reinforcements came from North Viet-Nam. Nonetheless, we were reluctant to expand the war,

to raise the international difficulties and complications which would result from an air campaign against North Viet-Nam at that time. But we did write the following language in our report: "While we feel that the program recommended herein represents those measures which should be taken now, we would not suggest that it is the final word. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the regular war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our allies, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international frontier." We asked, rhetorically, "Can we admit the establishment of a common law, that the party attacked, and his friends, are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact of external aggression is clearly established?"

Our report was utilized as the basis for the expanded program which was followed with considerable success throughout Phase Two from early 1962 until the start of Phase Three which opened with the overthrow and assassination of President Diem on November 1, 1963 and continues today.

Up to the fall of Diem, our military programs had been progressing well; we still had economic problems, it isn't new, as well as the growing difficulty of getting the Diem government to communicate freely with its own people. The wisdom and justification for the overthrow of Diem will be a subject for historians of the future to decide. There was a strong school of experts who felt that we could never win with Diem, that he had removed himself so completely from contact with his own people that the government must be changed. On the other hand, those of us who inherited the consequences of Diem's overthrow felt that our tasks were enormously complicated by it. His removal after eight years as President opened the Pandora's box of evil political spirits about which we Americans had had no understanding, and resulted in the political turmoil which ensued.

So now we come to the Third Phase which may be approaching an end. As I said, the phase began on November 1, 1963 and was characterized by the exploitation by the Communists of the overthrow of Diem, and our reaction thereto. To Hanoi and to the Viet Cong, the death of Diem, their mortal enemy, was indeed good news. So they proceeded to exploit this event by increasing their political subversion and terrorism. Attacks on American forces began, but most important of all, the infiltration from the North increased. For the first time, elements of the armed forces of North Viet-Nam began to appear in the South. We became aware in the early months of this year of the presence not only of individual soldiers of North Viet-Nam, but also of tactical units -- first of battalions, and then of regiments. As of now, we think that approximately nine regiments are present in South Viet-Nam. In response to this escalation, again to use that word, on the part of North Viet-Nam, we were obliged to review our programs and adjust our own tactics and strategy to the changing situation. In so doing, in the course of 1965 we evolved the strategy which we are now following.

I would say that we have adopted a strategy consisting of four elements; the first, the effort to increase the effectiveness of our ground forces. In the course of the last year, by strenuous effort in the strengthening of Vietnamese military and police forces, we added 140,000 men to the armed forces of that country--I would say, a very considerable feat for a country with a population of about 15,000,000. We learned, however, from our intelligence, that in this same period the Viet Cong had either infiltrated or had recruited locally forces approximating 60,000, so that we were gaining only at the rate of a little better than 2 to 1. As we all know from experience in guerrilla warfare, such a ratio of superiority is not enough. It was considerations like that, considered in the light of the clear indications that the monsoon season would herald a serious offensive by the Viet Cong which led us to the momentous decision, taken very slowly

and reluctantly after months of debate, to introduce American ground forces into South Viet-Nam. It was not a pleasant decision, but we felt we were compelled to it by the inevitable logic of the situation facing us. So I repeat, the first element of our strategy was to increase our effectiveness on the ground, both by Vietnamese forces and by the introduction of American forces.

The second element was the use of our air power against the military target system in North Viet-Nam. As I have noted, in 1961 we anticipated the possible necessity of that decision but we did not want to take it until the clear necessity was before us. By February of this year, it became apparent that we must do something to reverse the trend that was going against us--a trend which was being reflected in the loss of morale in South Viet-Nam, and the loss of the initiative in the combat against the guerrilla forces in the south. Let us remind ourselves why this decision was taken. What was and is the purpose of the air campaign? There were three reasons for initiating it. They were clearly thought out. They were thoroughly understood at the time. They have not changed today. The first reason I have already alluded to, namely, to give the people of South Viet-Nam for the first time in 11 years, the chance to strike back at the source of all their troubles, and for the first time to return blows in compensation for the many which they had received. The second purpose was to use air power, insofar as air power is capable of being so used, to limit and restrict the further introduction of men and supplies into North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. It was perfectly clear to all of us that air power would never stop this infiltration. We were equally sure, however, that we could make it more difficult and more costly. The third purpose, I think, is perhaps in the long term the most important, namely, to use our air power and the blows against the military target system to remind those leaders in Hanoi who were responsible for this aggression that little by little, day by day, week by week, they would have to pay an increasing price for their aggression.

The third component of our strategy is the one we unfortunately hear very little about. It is the work of our non-military Americans in South Viet-Nam--the Americans who are there representing the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency--the people who are there to teach this emerging country how to strengthen its administration both in Saigon and in its forty-five provinces, how to shore up its economy, threatened as always by inflation in time of war, and how to exploit the military successes by bringing in good government behind the advancing forces on the ground. We hear very little about all this. As Ambassador, I tried to induce our press to go out into the provinces and see the exciting work done in these non-military fields. But, unfortunately, as always, the combat got the headlines and the fact that our government is doing far more in terms of dollar expenditures in non-military areas for nation-building has escaped most of our citizens.

Now the fourth and final point in our strategy is the action of the diplomats who have been making persistent efforts to induce the leaders on the Communist side to approach the conference table in a spirit of reconciliation and with a willingness to abandon aggression under the terms of a fair and just settlement.

Those then are the four forms of our response to the Communist exploitation of the overthrow of Diem which began in late November of 1963 and continues today. I will not evaluate our success at this time, although in a question period I shall be very glad to discuss our progress. I have described our strategy to illustrate the point which I made at the outset, the growing complexity of the instrumentation of our foreign policy overseas.

To conduct these four programs which I have mentioned requires the cooperation of our three armed forces and seven departments of our government. Their representatives are found both in Viet-Nam and at the seat of government in Washington. The effective conduct of interdepartmental affairs arising from the situation has required a very careful review of our methods of operation, both in the field in Viet-Nam and at home. If you are interested in the organizational mechanics, in Saigon we have a United States Mission chaired by the Ambassador which meets every Monday. It consists of his principal subordinates who represent all the agencies of the Mission. General Westmoreland is there representing the Department of Defense. Also there are the heads of the AID mission, of the Political Section of the Embassy, of CIA, of the United States Information Agency. This group sits around the table at the Embassy in Saigon, reviews the accomplishments of the last week and considers the problems of the coming week. Then on Friday afternoon they meet with the Vietnamese National Security Council which includes the Prime Minister and the appropriate ministers in order to coordinate mutual efforts and to get an effective meshing of American and Vietnamese machinery in order to produce the best joint results.

In the provinces, all forty-five of them, there are similar small American groups of both military and civilian representation, working with the provincial chiefs in parallel with the efforts of the U.S. Mission in Saigon. Then out in the districts, which are subdivisions of the provinces, one finds in many of them a very small military detachment--a Captain perhaps, a Lieutenant, and two or three Sergeants, who fly the flag at the most advanced outposts. There, these young men in uniform do things that they never dreamed of in their military training. While they have military tasks in training and improving the hamlet militia, they are in all sorts of activities which are far from military--how the pigs are faring, how are crops doing, how is the dispensary working, is the maternity hospital adequate--they deal with these and many other questions that are part of the complexities of community-building.

That then is the picture that I want to paint of the variety in the foreign activities required to cope with the many aspects of resistance to what we call the "War of Liberation." In Washington, there has been a similarly complex problem of using our federal governmental system most effectively in meeting these problems. The basic difficulty is this: we have in Washington the great agencies of government--State, Defense, the other cabinet departments and many agencies--all reporting to no one short of the President. These channels of power and responsibility come together at the President himself. It is true that the National Security Council was set up after World War II to try to give a committee-type focal point short of the President. But, in point of fact, this arrangement has not functioned effectively and has left unanswered how to provide the guidance necessary to a number of Federal agencies without expecting the President himself to sit at the head of the Council table and make the decisions in person. I think that, by cut and trial methods, the results in Washington have been reasonably satisfactory insofar as they relate to Viet-Nam. But I would say they have been "satisfactory" only because we have had only a single great problem at one time. I have often wondered what we would do if we had two South Viet-Nams at a single moment. We have solved the Viet-Nam organizational requirement generally by concentrating responsibility in the State Department at the level of the regional Assistant Secretary for the Far East, who in turn has set up the so-called Viet-Nam Coordination Assistance Committee, chaired by a very able diplomat, Ambassador Unger, who was formerly Ambassador to Laos. This Committee meets at least once a week, often many times more frequently, with representatives from the other departments of government involved in the operations in South Viet-Nam. So by this ad hoc, cut and try method, we have succeeded in focusing on Viet-Nam the necessary attention but only because we

have this single problem so that busy men like the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of CIA, can indeed respond quickly to the calls for help of the Unger Committee.

Now I have the feeling, as most of us in Washington do, that we are going to have to do better for the future. We are at the present time making a review of all those procedures bearing on our capability to cope with "wars of liberation," not only in South Viet-Nam but also any place they may occur in the world. We feel there is a deep significance in the struggle in South Viet-Nam which goes beyond the intrinsic importance of that piece of Asia. It represents a long-term challenge, proclaimed boldly and confidently by the Communist leaders. Khrushchev in his speech of January 1961 announced that the "War of Liberation" was henceforth going to be the favored tactic for the expansion of Communism. General Giap, the Commander-in-Chief of North Viet-Nam, has made this statement: "South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world."

Now similarly our own people have recognized the significance of this struggle in South Viet-Nam. President Eisenhower in 1959 emphasized the military importance of the struggle there. He said, "Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring them several hundred miles into a previously free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced with a great flanking movement. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process which could as it progresses have grave consequences on the fortunes of the nation."

I frequently hear it asked as I go about the country, "Why isn't Congress consulted about what's taking place in South Viet-Nam?" Our Congress in August of last year examined what was going on in South Viet-Nam, endorsed the program of the President, and ended by making the following statement: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." This joint resolution was approved by 507 votes to 2. ←

Clearly, the success or failure of the "War of Liberation" in South Viet-Nam is indeed an important matter both for us and the Communist world. Hence, we should try to profit from the lessons derived from our experiences there. In the time available, I could not possibly discuss all the many lessons we have learned but I shall mention briefly three or four which stand out.

The first lesson is the need for a firm identification of those places in the world where this technique of subversive aggression might be applied. This calls for a new organization of intelligence activities world-wide, paying the same concentrated attention to this new kind of threat which we have paid to the threat of nuclear war in the past. As many of you know, we have a so-called "Watch Committee" in Washington that sits around the clock, watching for any indication of hostile actions on the part of our enemies in the field of either conventional or nuclear war. We must learn to develop the same kind of techniques to anticipate situations conducive to subversive aggression. That anticipation will require the identification of the sensitive areas. Then we must have ways and means to eliminate the causes, to assist the developing countries by far-sighted programs, aimed at eliminating the conditions which favor the invitation of subversive insurgency.

The second lesson I think I have mentioned already. We need to tighten up government procedures in Washington. We still have not done well enough in spite of the

ad hoc methods which have succeeded reasonably well thus far. If indeed the State Department is to coordinate all of our foreign affairs and to be accountable for the success of all overseas programs, then the State Department coordination machinery needs to be strengthened both at the level of the Secretary and at the level of the regional Assistant Secretaries.

Next we have to develop an attitude of calmness toward the problems of the world, the cool nerve necessary to cope with these situations which arise in so many different quarters. We must recognize the fact that there is no such a thing as complete safety in the international world any more than there is complete safety in our private lives. We must try to be reasonably secure, but never expect to be wholly safe. We must recognize the inevitable risks, run none that can be avoided, and then take the maximum hedges against possible failure. Also, we must understand better the role of military force in this multi-polar world--particularly in such a situation as we have in Southeast Asia. We must realize that military force can hardly be expected to bring about the unconditional surrender of the Viet Cong. An Appomattox kind of settlement is not a plausible objective for our military efforts in such a struggle. Nor is the destruction of North Viet-Nam a likely or even desirable one. I have found in the writings of a Greek historian Polybius, who lived over 100 years before Christ, the following sentence which seems to me to apply aptly to the role of military force in Viet-Nam. Polybius wrote: "It is not the object of war to annihilate those who have given provocation for it, but to cause them to mend their ways." I think today that that describes very well what we are attempting in Southeast Asia. We do not wish to destroy North Viet-Nam. We simply wish to accomplish our basic objective of giving South Viet-Nam the right to determine its own future. To do so, we are prepared to use force--military, political, economic, moral, whatever is necessary--to cause the leaders in Hanoi to mend their ways.

I have tried to illustrate in our situation in South Viet-Nam the many problems which are confronting us now and which I think are typical of those which may confront us in the future. Such lessons as these derived from South Viet-Nam are, I believe, applicable in some degree to the broad spectrum of new problems which foreign policy will encounter in expanding to the new dimensions required by the opposition we can expect in marshaling the forces of order on a politically disorderly planet.

Thank you all; I look forward to answering your questions.

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QUESTION PERIOD:

Delegate: What significance would General Taylor attach to the recent military build-up in North Viet-Nam?

General Taylor: One should always try to place himself in the chair of the opponent and decide what his alternatives are and what he is likely to do. The decision earlier this last year on the part of the Hanoi leadership was to make every possible effort to increase the pressure on the ground in South Viet-Nam, to drive through in the region of Binh Dinh Province which is intermediate between Hue in the North and Saigon in the South, thereby splitting the country and gaining not only a military victory but a great political one as well. This was defeated by the increase of the Vietnamese forces and the introduction of our own forces. The monsoon offensive went off on schedule in May. There were about six heavy engagements of regimental size; both sides lost heavily. Then the Viet Cong fell away. This was more or less contemporary with the

arrival of our initial forces and their readiness for combat. We didn't know exactly what the Viet Cong were up to. They were certainly reflecting and reorganizing. I thought they would come back again in August and September in another round of engagements. But, strangely, they did not. I think we know now, by this time, what was taking place. They were reevaluating the situation and deciding that they must choose between about three courses of action: either to rock along at their present level of commitment or to fall away from the issue as some people have described it, "go into the woodwork", go back into the hills, go back into the jungle, and wait for our forces to follow them and perhaps to confuse us by their actual intentions. Whether they were giving up or whether they were only lying low would be the question. Or third, they could escalate. That means throwing more forces into the scale and seeing what effect that would have on our purpose. I think the latter course has been adopted. Just when they started to bring in the additional regiments from the north we cannot be entirely sure, probably farther in the past than we would think, because it is time consuming. It is difficult to move these forces. Their logistic systems are clever; they are painstaking and I must admire their patience. But it is very difficult to expand the logistics system and to give the necessary supply support to the new units so that I would suspect it has been at least six months in bringing in the forces we now encounter. But it seems reasonably clear they have indeed decided to throw in these additional forces rather than to retreat and see if we will come after them, or even perhaps assume that they are no longer aggressive, and leading us to feel we should not build up any further. So their purpose, I would say, is to try once more to come back and hit hard, striking at objectives close to the Cambodian-Laotian border, where their supply lines are short from their bases across the frontier and see if they cannot get our forces into engagements--where we will lose heavily--either suffer the psychological and political effects of a defeat or suffer heavy casualties that will increase the clamor at home in the United States against this course of action. Bear in mind that as the leaders sit in Hanoi and see this increasing growth of American strength in the south, they can have no real hope of a military decision in the south. It is perfectly impossible, and I think they are clearheaded enough to accept that. But their great hope is that by some device we can be diverted from our course of action. That either by international pressures or by domestic pressures, we can be led into changing our course of action and thereby taking the pressure off them. So, I think they feel they must continue the conflict even though it is an expensive one, and play for the breaks, as we would say.

Canadian Delegate: General Taylor, do you think that the International Commission set up by the 1954 Geneva Accords has served any useful purpose in Viet-Nam, and do you think that it can serve any useful purpose in the immediate future?

General Taylor: The ICC?

Delegate: Yes

General Taylor: Yes, I think it's very useful and I hope all Canadians will stay there. At least we have some honest witnesses and some impartial observers to what is going on. So, I would say the ICC--frustrating though the life is for all members of that group--has indeed been most useful. It is contributing in the present situation and it would be very unfortunate if it were withdrawn at this time.

Delegate: (Question inaudible)

General Taylor: The question, I think, in general terms is: "To what extent does the United States, or rather can the United States influence a Saigon Government to behave more in our image." I do not think that should be our objective, frankly. I think that

all attempts fail whenever we are misguided enough to think that the Saigon government should look and think like the Washington government. First, it is impossible, and secondly, it is probably not a desirable end in itself. But your point is a very serious question. I am not suggesting that it is not there, because many times I have wrung my hands, I can assure you, over the pronouncement of some of our Saigon statesmen who were at the moment responsible for the government. You have to be patient, very patient, when you are in this business which I have engaged in. And this applies to ambassadors in all the other 80 emerging countries. One cannot judge performance in local countries by the standards we think they should observe. As a matter of fact, sometimes we may be wrong as to those standards ourselves. But we have to recognize that in a country like South Viet-Nam we have a portion of the earth's surface that has not ever had the opportunity to develop nationhood, never has had a chance to develop political experience. The people of South Viet-Nam are an amalgam of minorities, minorities based on religion, on culture, on language, and on region. And they are all highly suspicious, the one of the other. There has never been a nation of either South Viet-Nam or of a combined North and South Viet-Nam. And the result is that you have many able and many very honest people in political life but still no sense of team play. I have tried, and completely failed, to find a translation either in French or in Vietnamese of Franklin's old saw, "We must hang together, or hang separately." I think there may be something significant in the absence of the language which will convey the thought. So all of us have to recognize that Viet-Nam and Saigon are not going to perform in the way we would like. I am convinced that given time, certainly given a reasonable amount of security, this little country can grow, can become a self-respecting and respected member of the community of states in Southeast Asia, but do not think it is going to happen tomorrow, next week, or next year.

Delegate: (Question rephrased) General Westmoreland has stated that the war in Viet-Nam will last ten to fifteen years. Also you say we do not wish to annihilate North Viet-Nam. But what would be left of it if the actions urged by General LeMay and others are taken?

General Taylor: First, as regards to General Westmoreland, I am quite sure that he never said this was going to last ten years. I have never heard any responsible leader of our government willing to make a forecast as to how long it would last. I have been tempted and urged and I refuse to do so. I point out that like the watched pot that never boils, the watched peace never jells. I would suggest that it is a wrong point of view to watch the time clock. Workers never do well who watch the time clock. Governments never do well who watch the calendar. Our President has made in substance this statement: "We will do what is necessary, as long as necessary, until we achieve our very simple objective of self-determination for South Viet-Nam." So that would cover the question about General Westmoreland. I am sure that he would agree with what I have said that we cannot possibly put a date on it. Next with regard to General LeMay, I am not sure exactly what the General has said, but I am sure that he thinks that our bombing program is too slow. I have had many many debates with my civilian and military friends as to the air program. I suspect that that is the most controversial factor in the four point program which I just described. There are two extreme views as to the use of our air power. One group is on one side, saying that even though it may not have been a mistake to initiate the program, it is going too fast; let's hold it back till we get more progress in the south--particularly since, if we go too fast, we run the danger of driving the Chinese and USSR representatives together, and we could even drive North Viet-Nam into the arms of Red China. The latter point refers to a fact that I am sure all of you in your discussions have noted: that to all Vietnamese, both North and South, Chinese of all descriptions whether they live on Taiwan or on the mainland, are the traditional, suspected enemy. So that one of Hanoi's great problems is

how to escape the vice in which we are placing them without turning over the country to Peking. The other school of thought, and I expect General LeMay is among them, is that we are going much too slow. I do not think I have ever heard even the extremists urge that we destroy Hanoi tomorrow night and forget all considerations for the civilian population, but they would go more deeply into the sensitive target areas which have still been untouched in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. Well, all I will say is that our responsible people are conservative people. They are quite aware of the fact that we must keep pressure on Hanoi, and mounting pressure, but generally feel that we must not go too fast. We must give ample time for the enemy to mend his ways--to use Polybius' expression. Only by experience and common sense will we arrive at the proper rate. Thus far, we have gone somewhat faster than the ultra-conservatives on the side of slow movement would like, and have fallen considerably short of the wishes of those who say we should go faster. Frankly, as a matter of balance, I think we are at about the right speed now.

Delegate: What is the effect upon the Soviet Union of the action in Viet-Nam?

General Taylor: Well, any response I give you is purely personal because I have no access, I can assure you, to behind the scene information. It is perfectly apparent however that the Soviet Union is getting no joy out of this situation in Southeast Asia. They have no interest there, no national interest, and they know that they do not want to get into a confrontation with the U.S. They are also convinced that they must not let Red China get in the forefront and carry the red banner a little farther and a little faster than they do. It is the old battle for leadership in the Communist world so they are torn in two directions. Our general feeling on that is that they would be less unhappy if we could get Hanoi to negotiate a settlement in the South, but nonetheless they are certainly not going out in the forefront and take the lead to urging negotiation. I think that is what Mr. Stewart is going to try to report to his government after his recent visit to Moscow.