

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1966

Bill:

I am attaching the first draft of my prepared statement before the Fulbright Committee. I expect to work on it further during my absence in New York and Toronto. I shall be back here in mid-afternoon Wednesday.

Because of the shortness of time, it would be most helpful if the President would glance at this draft and see if it is generally satisfactory. I am not staffing it about town as I want to be able to assert the personal nature of my views if the question arises.

If the President has any significant reaction, please inform Colonel Root in my office who can reach me by phone.

Max
Maxwell D. Taylor

Attachment

3263/NSL
7:30

- 4 plans
- Heavy Bomber plan - costs being serious consequences
- Pull out - treaty
- Enclave
- Contains our present policy of continuous presence at living present

February 15
12 noon

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR:

MPB

Max:

You will see comments suggested by the President and myself in pencil on your draft.

The President suggested you may want to bring up fact that four alternatives appear to be:

1. "The heavy bomber plan", which could lead to consequences beyond tolerance.
2. "Pull out"
3. "Holding strategy" or "enclave."
4. Continue our present policy of continuous pressure at all time until other side changes mind.

Bill Moyers

Bill Moyers

P.S.

It's a fine statement.

Bill

NEWS from ...



ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR FURTHER INQUIRY CALL: 232-3200

1529 EIGHTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036.

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George Catlett Marshall Banquet Address

October 30, 1968

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)

NOT FOR RELEASE UNTIL DELIVERY

9:30 P.M. 30 October 1968

"I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think that one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world."

These are the words with which Secretary of State George Marshall opened his address at Harvard on June 5, 1947, in which he announced the broad outlines of the Marshall Plan for Europe. They have striking currency as we reflect upon their pertinence to many aspects of our present foreign policy, particularly to many of the problems arising from our involvement in Southeast Asia. In seeking understanding support for the actions of our government in that part of the world, we have encountered all of the difficulties which General Marshall mentions, compounded by the remoteness and the alien quality of the scene of action and the apparent absence of direct bearing of the issue upon our national interests as most of our citizens understand those interests. For these reasons, the places, people and issues have been far more difficult to describe, explain and report than the corresponding tasks which confronted General Marshall and his advisors.

As in General Marshall's case, some of the difficulty in explaining Viet-Nam lies in the proliferation of information presented by press, television and radio which, as a consequence of technological progress in mass communications, have grown far more proficient than in Marshall's day. Television, in particular, has brought the battlefield to our living rooms with a vividness most disturbing to those who have never known war, somehow conveying the impression that it is we Americans who almost alone have been responsible for the cruelties and brutalities of the war as pictured on the screen.

The influence of the media on public opinion, enhanced by the advances extending the quantity and nature of their coverage, has been augmented by the crusading zeal

displayed by some reporters and commentators on the war. In an editorial at the time of the disorders at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, a leading Washington newspaper commented as follows:

"It is, on occasion, difficult to distinguish the passion to inform from the passion to perform. Some reporters have avoided the historic choice between being actors on the public stage and observers of the show by deciding to do both. . . (In Chicago) they became so engaged in the pursuit of news that they moved into the role of newsmakers."

In a similar way, in Viet-Nam, some reporters and commentators have felt that their task is not to describe the events but to shape them, not to report on foreign policy but to make it.

I do not for a moment suggest that the media have anything like a sole or even a primary responsibility for the confusion which characterizes the popular state of mind toward the issues in Viet-Nam. There have been many other factors contributing to this confusion. The very nature of the conflict extending over the 44 different provinces of South Viet-Nam has made it difficult to describe for the most conscientious of reporters. The conditions of the conflict vary from province to province so that a perfectly accurate statement about the situation in Province A may be completely misleading if applied to neighboring Provinces B or C. Hence, we often encounter apparently conflicting reports on the ebb and flow of the war which by their seeming contradiction arouse the suspicions and stimulate new charges of a credibility gap. Yet all may well be true, each in its own geographical context.

Another factor contributing to the difficulty of explaining Viet-Nam has been our manner of waging this war, the way we have used our military resources, particularly our air power in attacking military targets in the North. This is the so-called strategic gradualism which has aroused the criticism of many military people and others of a hawkish bent. Yet there have been reasons for that strategy whether one finds them entirely convincing or not.

Since the end of World War II, all responsible governments throughout the world

have been deeply impressed with the danger of nuclear World War III which would be destructive of all participants and of most bystanders. In the view of sober political leaders, this grim prospect argues for great caution in utilizing military force in any form in pursuing foreign policy objectives. Military operations anywhere in the world are to some extent a threat to world peace. Thus, when any great power contemplates a resort to arms, there is likely to be apprehension, at least to some extent justified, that an escalating situation may get out of hand and lead to the world war which all parties wish to avoid. It is this concern which has been the primary cause for the slow, cautious use of our air arm which has characterized our air operations in North Viet-Nam. But whatever justification this prudence has had, it has been branded by the critics as timidity and has contributed greatly to the unpopularity of the war and to the difficulty of explaining it to the satisfaction of many of our citizens. Despite the heroic efforts of the President and his principal advisors to present the case for American policy to our people, they have had only limited success in overcoming the adverse effect of such factors as I have mentioned.

This experience raises a fundamental question as to whether a democracy like the United States under similar conditions can successfully wage a prolonged limited war far from home, using limited means for limited objectives. President James Perkins of Cornell has pointed out the great difficulty of rallying this country behind a foreign issue involving the use of armed force without a clearly identified enemy posing a threat either to our homeland or to the vital interests of our close friends. As many of our citizens view the situation, Viet-Nam does not meet these criteria, hence their dissatisfaction with our involvement. For the future, President Perkins concludes that, "We now have to give more attention to the public understanding, to the importance of international support and cooperation, and to the need for increased development assistance as a more effective way of forestalling the circumstances that invite aggression. In the end, we may feel as restrained in the invocation of limited

deterrence as we earlier did in the application of massive retaliation."

This is a very important point because, if indeed we can not expect to use our military forces in support of distant causes, it is time to recognize that fact and adjust our foreign and military policy to these realities.

But then what happens to the Truman Doctrine and the world-wide systems of alliances which commit us contingently to over 40 nations to provide them with military assistance under certain conditions? We have no reason to believe that the potential troublemakers of the world are about to abandon the use of aggressive force for the purposes of changing the world order to their advantage. There are too many discontented have-nots in the world for the haves to be left in peace. The Communist leaders have stated very clearly that they have their own solution to the problem of expansion by force in a world fearful of World War III. They see the same dangers as we and have concluded that both nuclear war and limited war are to be avoided because of their unpredictable consequences. On the other hand, they find in the technique of the "War of Liberation" a form of force which is relatively cheap, not too dangerous, and which has the advantage of being disavowable by the clandestine participants. We of the Free World are left with the question of how to resist this kind of aggression if, indeed, democracies are not capable of using force in distant places because their people can not understand the need.

One way to meet the problem is to develop ways and means of preventing the "War of Liberation" by anticipatory action, identifying in advance of attack the countries which are probable targets of subversive aggression and attempting to strengthen them from within in order to eliminate the weaknesses which expose them to attack.

This preventive approach has much to commend it but, unfortunately, in the present temper of our country, it runs counter the aversion for foreign aid in most of its forms. Even though the help extended to threatened nations is non-military in character, its proponents are vulnerable to the charge of hankering after the role of world policeman

which our Viet-Nam experience has brought into general disrepute and of preparing the way for new overseas adventures.

If these obstacles to effective preventive measures are insuperable, then we might next try to find somebody else to assume the task of strengthening the new and vulnerable nations. Can we not associate ourselves with other advanced nations in some kind of international consortium to help the needy have-nots on some selective basis? Unfortunately, no such effective international body exists today willing or able to do the job and, indeed, we are in a period of general disillusionment with regard to the effectiveness of international bodies. We reproach the United Nations for not having helped us in Viet-Nam and are critical of the impotence of its agencies in keeping the peace or allaying distress. The fact seems to be that, if the United States is to be neither the world policeman who maintains the peace nor the prime benefactor of the have-nots, these tasks are likely to go undone with consequences difficult to foresee but in the long run certainly adverse to our national interests.

So we are faced with a question of great importance to ourselves and to the world. Sobered and embittered by our Viet-Nam experience, how are we to choose between two very unattractive alternatives? Shall we turn our backs on the problems of the emerging nations, raise the draw-bridges of Fortress America and look for security principally in our nuclear deterrent strength? Or shall we continue to venture into the outside world in the name of regional security, self-determination, resistance to aggression, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and similar principles and programs which in the past decade have characterized our foreign policy? If we follow this latter course, will we of necessity encounter the same frustrations and suffer the same internal divisions as in the Viet-Nam war?

Personally, I find it impossible to believe that the decision will be to retire into Fortress America. Even if it were attempted, the seclusion could not be long-lived in a world which is pressing in upon us more and more each year. Nor do I believe that an outward-looking posture toward world problems necessarily implies the danger of

a repetition of the experience of Viet-Nam. With the benefit of the lessons of this episode, it should be possible to display greater wisdom and foresight in identifying our true interests abroad and greater selectivity as to time, place, and cause for the commitment of our resources. To recognize our true interests will not be simple. We can not leave their determination to instinct, impulse, emotion or habit; we need to derive them from the logic of relevant experience and from sound estimates of the requirements of future policy. Then we need to make them comprehensible to our own people, bearing in mind the following words:

"An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome."

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the words with which General Marshall closed his address at Harvard on June 5, 1947. It would be well for us to take counsel of them today. Thank you.

Linnell
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CBS NEWS
2020 M Street
Washington, D. C. 20036

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FACE THE NATION
as broadcast over the
CBS Television Network
and the
CBS Radio Network

Sunday, February 13, 1966 -- 12:30 - 1:00 PM EST

GUEST: GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Special Consultant to the President

NEWS CORRESPONDENTS: Martin Agronsky
CBS News

Chalmers Roberts
Washington Post

Robert Pierpoint
CBS News

PRODUCERS: Ellen Wadley
Prentiss Childs

DIRECTOR: Robert Vitarelli

MR. AGRONSKY: General Taylor, former Lieutenant General Gavin and former Ambassador Kennan both told the Foreign Relations Committee this week they feared if we continue our present policy in Vietnam we will find ourselves on a collision course with Communist China that could lead to a U. S. - Chinese war.

Do you share that concern, sir?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I think one has to share a concern whenever military operations break out any place in the world. I certainly do not feel nervous about the possibilities of escalation to general war with China. There are so many good reason why that should not occur. However, obviously, a prudent government would not rule out constant consideration of that possibility.

ANNOUNCER: Live, from CBS Washington, FACE THE NATION, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Consultant to the President.

General Taylor will be questioned by CBS News White House Correspondent Robert Pierpoint, Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post. CBS News Correspondent Martin Agronsky will lead the questioning.

We shall resume the interview with General Taylor in just a moment.

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MR. AGRONSKY: General Taylor, clearly many U. S.

experts on Far Eastern policy, both in and out of government, are considerably more concerned about the prospect of our being on a collision course with Communist China than you are. For example, a former U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Roger Hilsman said yesterday, "Unless fundamental changes are made in U. S. conduct of the Vietnam War, the question of the U. S. war with China is not whether but when."

Do you feel that it is as inevitable as that, sir?
And if you don't, why don't you?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No, definitely not. I do not subscribe to inevitability of anything in future history. It depends upon the judgment, the leadership, the intelligence, the courage of leaders in our country, and also in other countries of the world.

I can recall a few years ago the statement of the inevitability of general nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Well, that is still not completely scratched off our list of concern, but it's certainly much lower on the list than it was, say, ten years ago.

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MR. ROBERTS: General Taylor, is what you say, does what you say mean that the Government here is operating on the premise that unless the nature of our participation changes greatly there is no real danger of getting into war with China?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, first, Mr. Roberts, I cannot speak as an authoritative representative of the Government. I am not in the Government. I am a private citizen. But I would say that as long as I was concerned with the making of policy and implementing policy there was a clear understanding that we had a limited objective and we were going to proceed toward that objective progressively without running unnecessary risks.

Now, our limited objective, the one that has been announced and proclaimed by three presidents -- President Johnson has stated it many times -- that it is simply to allow South Vietnam the opportunity to choose its own government. And that means, of course, that Hanoi will cease its aggression against the South. That is a limited objective and we are using limited means to get there.

MR. PIERPOINT: General Taylor, we had a limited objective in the war in Korea also, but the Chinese Communists did not seem to understand that limited objective. We are now bombing North Vietnam as a part

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of this limited objective in the South. At what point do you think that the Chinese Communists might come into war as they actually did in Korea?

GENERAL TAYLOR: If I may go back to Korea, I think our mistake, it was a mistake, was to change our objective in midstream. Our original objective was simply to repulse a North Korean invasion of South Korea. It was when we then decided to liberate all of Korea that we changed our objective and created the situation which we discussed.

We are not changing our objective in South Vietnam. We have adhered to it since 1954 and I hope we will continue to adhere to it to the end. North Vietnam knows exactly what we are doing. Why we are bombing. We have announced over and over again the three reasons why we started this program.

MR. ROBERTS: General, cannot we look at this in a little larger perspective? You do not really mean to tell us that the war in Vietnam is something only in the country called Vietnam. Is not this war and have not a number of administration officials said so, really part of a major American long-term policy to contain the power of China in Asia just as we have contained the military power of the Soviet Union in Europe?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I quite agree that there is more

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involved than the local situation, although the local situation justified our, the contribution of our aid, our participation, and justifies our continuation. We are committed to reaching this goal of a free South Vietnam, but in so doing, in so doing must also defeat the intent of Hanoi-Peking to push the American influence out of Asia, to demonstrate that the so-called war of liberation is the surefire, safe way to expand militant Communism in the future. So there is a great deal at stake in addition to the local situation.

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MR. AGRONSKY: General Taylor, our present Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. William Bundy, said yesterday that there can't be, as he put it, an effective deterrent military force unless a balance of power around China's frontiers without a major and direct military contribution by the United States.

Is he not saying when he says this that U. S. policy is now committed to containing Communist China by force within her present frontiers in Asia?

GENERAL TAYLOR: You would have to ask Mr. Bundy to interpret that. I, frankly, would not be prepared to do so today.

MR. AGRONSKY: Would you say that that was our policy?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No. I would say that we are a leader of the western world, only one, but a leader of the western world, determined to prevent the imposition of a Communism which is not wanted on the countries that are willing to help themselves. That's what we are doing in South Vietnam. It is really as simple as that.

MR. PIERPOINT: General Taylor, this limited objective in the South seems to have some confusing aspects to it. General Ky, in the Declaration of Honolulu, -- and you were at the Honolulu Conference -- said very flatly and firmly that what he was after was victory over the Viet Cong, and he refused any idea of negotiating with them, yet President

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Johnson has indicated that we would negotiate a settlement in the South.

Do we have to have complete victory over the Viet Cong, or will we negotiate a settlement?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, Mr. Pierpoint, I am glad you raised the word "victory," because it is very curious, as I read the comments on the situation in South Vietnam, that in some quarters the word "victory" has acquired an evil connotation. It is something that one shouldn't strive for. Well, I hope we are striving for victory alongside of our allies, but victory is just accomplishing what we set out to do, to allow South Vietnam to choose its own government and have Hanoi cease the aggression. That's victory. It has nothing to do with a surrender of all the Viet Cong, the destruction of all Viet Cong. And victory over the Viet Cong does not imply an Appomattox or Yorktown.

MR. PIERPOINT: How long, in your opinion, would that take, and how many U. S. troops would it cost us?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have been asked that question so many times, I at least know one thing, don't try to answer it. It can't be answered. The time that we will have to expend is the time required to reach our objective, and it is not going to be short. But one cannot put a finite limit in evaluating it.

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MR. AGRONSKY: Would you say that our objective has in any way changed in the past year?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would not.

MR. AGRONSKY: You wouldn't?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would not. It has not changed

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since 1954.

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MR. AGRONSKY: General Taylor, when President Johnson was campaigning for election in August, 1964, he said that he had had advice to load our planes with bombs, drop them on certain areas that he thought would escalate the war and would result, as he put it, in "our committing a good many American boys to fighting the war that I think" -- I quote the President now -- "that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land."

Now, clearly there has been a change in the President's policy from the time when he said that in August, '64, until today. We certainly could not have increased, sir, the numbers of American boys that we have now committed to fight in Vietnam unless the President had changed his mind?

GENERAL TAYLOR: No, sir. I do not see any inconsistency in there. I was sent to Saigon by President Kennedy in 1961, in October, and in his directive to me it was very clear that do not forget that this is a Vietnamese war and we are only to do those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time. I think we are still loyal to that formula. The reason we have more men in Vietnam today than we had last year is that the threat has increased, the requirement has increased. And in spite of the great

growth of the forces in South Vietnam they have not grown fast enough. Today there is almost 700,000 men under arms in South Vietnam. South Vietnam is the strongest military ally we have in the world in terms of forces in being today. The losses which they take are six to seven times the losses we take. So there is no question that this is still a Vietnamese war. The trouble is in our reporting back in the United States we only hear the American side of it.

MR. ROBERTS: General, I would like to go back to this larger view of this war and the argument about containment that is going on before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the past few days.

Do you accept the idea that China can be contained in the same sense that we have had a policy of containing the Soviet Union?

GENERAL TAYLOR: The word "containment" I think means different things to different people. If it means frustrating China's aggressions directed at the free world, I would say that we are certainly interested in so frustrating their foreign policy.

MR. ROBERTS: And do you view the war in Korea as having been an exercise in that policy?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Going back to Korea, I would certainly say yes. But here again South Korea was

attacked by North Korea and the Chinese. And we intervened and repulsed them.

MR. ROBERTS: And do you view the present war in Vietnam as basically having that objective?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, the basic objective I have already stated. It is the people of South Vietnam who are -- their liberty, their freedom is our primary objective. And in maintaining that objective we do --

MR. ROBERTS: That same thing was true in Korea with the people of South Korea but in a larger historical sense it was the other purpose which dominated.

GENERAL TAYLOR: It was applying the principle to which we have been loyal in many parts of the world.

MR. AGRONSKY: You cannot, obviously, as Mr. Roberts is indicating very clearly, regard the war that is being fought in South Vietnam as being fought in a vacuum. All the other --

GENERAL TAYLOR: I quite agree and I do not think I have taken that position. I quite agree there are many overtones, very important overtones.

MR. AGRONSKY: Which are the overtones that Mr. Roberts raises and that many people in the country are concerned about, the possibility of committing ourselves by following these policies in Vietnam to a collision

course which could result in the conflict with Communist China. That is the concern and that is the overall thing that worries everybody in this country, sir.

GENERAL TAYLOR: I can understand their concern, but I wonder if those who worry would suggest, then, that we should avoid any confrontation with any aggressive hostile power and allow the free, the uncommitted world to fall to their domination.

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tion.

MR. PIERPOINT: But, General Taylor, isn't the aggressive hostile power that we are fighting actually made up mainly of South Vietnamese?

GENERAL TAYLOR: In one sense of the word, yes. In another sense of the word, not at all, because while on a head count you will find most of the Viet Cong, or particularly the guerrillas, the local types are South Vietnamese, the ones who really count, the hard core, even if they are South Vietnamese, they have been taken north and trained in the North and came back as foreign invaders.

MR. PIERPOINT: And as we escalate, aren't more and more of them coming in from the North?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes, but they are pure ethnic North Vietnamese confirming the foreign character, the support of the war.

MR. PIERPOINT: But then it seems to me we are going down a path in which the more we send in the more the North Vietnamese send in, and when it comes to a certain point it may mean Communist China will also have to come in.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Bear this in mind, gentlemen: there is a ceiling on the supportable forces that the Communists can put into South Vietnam and maintain in action.

MR. PIERPOINT: What is that ceiling?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I don't know what the ceiling is, but

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there is one, just as there was one in Korea. Our air power has been belittled in its performance in Korea because it did not stop the war. Well, it didn't stop the war, but it put a ceiling on the war. There were at least a million more armed Chinese north of the Yalu who never came into action because they could not be supported on that front under the pressure of our air power. By the same token, there is some ceiling on the strength that can be supported in the South, and it is fairly low, I would suggest. I think even today the fact that a Viet Cong or a North Vietnamese battalion only fights about one or two days a month is indicative of the fact that they can't support combat on an enlarged scale.

MR. ROBERTS: Are you saying that North Vietnam could not then commit its entire army in the South?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Not on the present basis, not on the present basis as a clandestine organization with a clandestine line of supply, with a distribution by porter, as it is today.

MR. ROBERTS: You mean they could if they crossed the border in an overt formalized conventional war --

GENERAL TAYLOR: If they came down the coast in a formal attack across the demarcation line, I would think so.

MR. ROBERTS: We would like to have them try it, wouldn't we?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am not a hawk, in that sense,

Mr. Roberts. I don't want to see an enlargement of this war in any form. What we are trying to do is to convince Hanoi that they are on a losing gambit. They better change it. And I think that we can do that.

MR. AGRONSKY: General, you have said that the South Vietnamese now have 700,000 men committed, that is South Vietnamese troops. You have said that you could see a ceiling as far as the enemy is concerned. Is there a ceiling as far as we are concerned? At what point do we stop putting troops in?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, fortunately, in spite of what is said about South Vietnam as being the wrong place to have a war -- and in a certain sense I would agree that no place is the right place to have a war -- I would say the logistic problems are comparatively simple, from our point of view, because we have access by air and sea to the entire country, of all Southeast Asia. It is the most supportable, from a logistic point of view. And with our great resources I would say we can lay a logistic base there in time for almost any force we wanted. I am not suggesting that we are going to any of these astronomical figures that have been mentioned, but certainly we have the capability.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you say the fact that we have 200,000 men on the ground in South Vietnam today and no more is strictly a logistical, due to the logistical

limitations?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would say that we couldn't, for example, today absorb many more than we have. As more troops are brought in, the logistic base will have to be expanded before their arrival.

MR. PIERPOINT: General Taylor, what do you think about the suggestion, for instance, that was made today by Senator Ribicoff that has been made by several others that we take the whole issue of Vietnam to the Geneva Conference and include at the Geneva Conference representatives of the Viet Cong who, after all, do control a fair amount of people in the South?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I only saw the headlines of the Senator's statements so I have not had a chance to discuss it. Our President has said he is ready to talk peace in South Vietnam in any form where honorable men come to the table with a sincere effort to find a solution. Whether this is practical or not as a political measure, I just do not know.

MR. PIERPOINT: Do you think that he would be willing now to sit down at the table with the Viet Cong?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I am not prepared to interpret for the State Department or for the White House, but we have said over and over again that we see no reason why the legitimate interests of the Viet Cong could not be represented in some way.

MR. ROBERTS: General, I would like to go back to that logistical question a moment. You said that our present situation limited our ability to put troops in to about what we put in, but we are putting in a tremendous additional logistical capability which is

being interpreted in Congress and downtown as allowing us to get as many as 400,000 troops there by the end of this year, is that correct?

GENERAL TAYLOR: That figure has been used in the press, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And is it not likely we are going to end up with 400,000 maybe by the end of the year?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would not say 400,000. I would say more than 200,000. I am not sure where the ceiling will be.

MR. ROBERTS: A lot more.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, some more, but going back to your basic question, and I can assure you this is one of General Westmoreland's tasks which he discharges. As a professional

he will see that the logistic base is ample for the troops as they arrive. He must be doing that.

MR. ROBERTS: So that it is really as the Mansfield report said an open end war as of today?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I like that term "open end war". How is your life, Mr. Roberts? I would say you have an open ended life. My business is open ended in the sense that it is an evolving thing. The only time you have a really closed end so far as I know is when you are very dead.

MR. AGRONSKY: What does that mean, General? I do not understand.

GENERAL TAYLOR: That the suggestion that any enterprise of importance is a closed end affair that you know it will come out in a certain way at a certain point of time, it just doesn't turn out that way in life as I see it. And only when we are dead and cease to evolve, then we are closed ended, closed in.

MR. AGRONSKY: But, General, if you provide an end, that is a ceiling to the possible participation of the enemy in this war, why then is there not a ceiling on the participation of ourselves in this war?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, the ceiling I referred to is one we impose on the enemy and puts him at a serious disadvantage. That's the ceiling of the supportability of his logistic system and the effect of our bombing on his lines of communication, which makes it impossible for him to go beyond a certain point. What we are trying to do is simply break the back of his resistance in the South so that the people in Hanoi see clearly they have no chance of a military victory. That is our objective. Whenever that comes, everything comes to a happy ending. The ceiling in a sense is the will of the enemy in Hanoi.

MR. AGRONSKY: And how can one determine the will of the enemy when along the frontier of North Vietnam sits an enormous power that may not accept our ceiling and it may wish to bolster the enemy?

GENERAL TAYLOR: You are raising the question of the possible intervention of China, I see.

MR. AGRONSKY: Yes, sir.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, it is certainly not impossible that the Chinese would come into this, but there are so many good reasons why they should not want to come into it. One is that Hanoi itself, the Government in Hanoi certainly does not want armed Chinese in North Vietnam. It is a fact of history that the Chinese have been the hated, distrusted enemy of all Vietnamese throughout the centuries. And the idea of Ho Chi Minh inviting in large numbers of combat forces is not impossible, but it certainly would be a decision he would take very reluctantly. And why the Chinese, who must be enjoying this war by proxy and fighting to the last North Vietnamese, why they want to come in, I frankly cannot see.

MR. AGRONSKY: General, there are many more things we would like to ask you and we will resume the questioning in a moment, sir.

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MR. AGRONSKY: General, do you think that we have any indication from our interpretation of what they think in Hanoi that the enemy accepts this as a limited war, as we do?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I wouldn't know quite how to answer that question, Mr. Agronsky. First, we certainly don't know much about the leadership in Hanoi. We don't know what goes on inside of those Asian heads. I wish we did. I am quite sure, however, that all, they are governed, as all men are governed, by their interpretation of their national interests. And I have always had the feeling that when we present a situation which clearly indicates that a continuation of their policy and aggression in South Vietnam certainly is failing, that they will change their behavior.

MR. ROBERTS: General, I would like to ask you in relation to the answer about the war of national liberation which all the Communist countries is the term they use for this war.

Now, there is a difference in argument about these wars among the, especially among the Russians and the Chinese. How important do you think it is, from the American interest in worldwide sense, to demonstrate that this war of national liberation, as they call it, won't work?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I think that it is very important if only because of the obvious importance which they attach

o2

to it. Their leadership, both Russian and Chinese, and Vietnamese, have asserted the outcome in South Vietnam will prove the efficacy of the war of liberation. Having been proved there, then it will be applied in the developing countries of Latin America, of Africa, and of Asia.

General Gyap the Commander and Chief of the forces in Hanoi, said if the American effort, the American imperialist effort in South Vietnam can be defeated there, it can be defeated anywhere. So it is perfectly clear to me that they think it is important, and hence we must take it very seriously.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, doesn't that mean then that this is really the stake in this kind of a war for the United States, and that the unhappy fact is that the people in South Vietnam just happen to be the locale of this test of wills between major powers?

GENERAL TAYLOR: If you are trying to make them into the role of a puppet, being the toy in a game between the great powers, I don't agree, for the moment. We went in there with a sincere, humanitarian interest in fifteen million people. We still have that deep, sincere humanitarian interest. It is quite true there are very important issues now blended with that, but I would never give up the point that the basic reason we are there is our concern for these fifteen million people.

o3

MR. PIERPOINT: General Taylor, we have just a few moments. I would like to ask you a question that appeared in today's news, that is, that you were being considered by the President to head the Central Intelligence Agency, to replace Admiral Raborn.

Is that true?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I have absolutely no knowledge of any such proposition.

MR. AGRONSKY: Gentlemen, I am sorry, our time is up.

Thank you very much, General Taylor, for being here on FACE THE NATION.

Now, I would like to remind our listeners that later this afternoon, at four-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard Time, CBS News will present a special program: Vietnam Perspective - Congress After Honolulu; and with members of the U. S. Senate participating.

CBS News National Correspondent Eric Severeid is the moderator.

And a word about next week's guest on FACE THE NATION in a moment.

- - -

Today, on FACE THE NATION, General Maxwell Taylor, Special Consultant to the President, was interviewed by CBS News White House Correspondent Robert Pierpoint, Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post. CBS News

o4

Correspondent Martin Agronsky led the questioning.

Next week, Senator George Aiken, Republican of Vermont,
will FACE THE NATION.

-- --

October 11, 1965

Dear President Semans:

I am most appreciative of your kind letter of October 4 commenting upon the events attending my visit to Foothill College. I can assure you that I understand perfectly the situation which arose and the complete absence of involvement of representatives of Foothill College. I felt that the audience which I addressed was most friendly and provided me with a sympathetic forum for the discussion of our policies in Southeast Asia.

I am sure that the action of the intruders was far more embarrassing to you than to me. Every community has problems such as this one which we Americans all understand. The only ground for real regret is the effect of these demonstrations abroad where they are not understood and are often misinterpreted.

Let me take advantage of this opportunity to thank you for the courtesies and attention afforded me by representatives of Foothill College. Apart from the episodes we have mentioned, my recollection of my visit to Foothill College will be most pleasant. I only regretted that I did not have the opportunity to see the entire campus by daylight.

In appreciation of your writing,

Sincerely,

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Maxwell D. Taylor

Dr. H. H. Semans,
Acting President,
Foothill College,
12345 El Monte Road,
Los Altos Hills, California.

FOOTHILL COLLEGE

12345 EL MONTE ROAD • LOS ALTOS HILLS, CALIFORNIA



TELEPHONE 948-8590

October 4, 1965

Weekend

General Maxwell Taylor
c/o State Department
Room 7428
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

My sincere apologies for the unfortunate incidents which surrounded the question and answer period after your very fine objective and analytical lecture on Viet Nam. Your fielding of the legitimate questions in the question period was superb.

In retrospect, I am sure you will agree that the audience, including at least 1,000 Foothill students, was in full support of you and your point of view. May I say that, as far as we have been able to determine, no Foothill students were involved in either the picketing or the demonstration at the end of the lecture.

The pickets in front were a group from Stanford which the Dean of Students had warned us would come, and they represented the "Stanford Anti-Viet Nam Committee." This is apparently a non-violent group. The student who tried to speak represents a splinter off of this group and they believe in more aggressive tactics. Their placards were concealed when they entered the gymnasium.

A third group called "Individuals for Non-Violent Revolution" came from San Jose. We also understand there was a group whom we have not identified by name that came from Berkeley.

Foothill College has never had such a disturbance on the part of the audience, even though we have previously presented controversial issues.

Dr. Roth, who is a Lieutenant Colonel in Army Intelligence Reserve (Retired) was given a copy of the splinter group's two plans of action just before you and he walked on the platform. He chose what he thought was a course of action which would prevent disturbance and any personal embarrassment to you. The College made a mistake in departing from its format of allowing no statements and only questions during the question and answer period. You will recall that as soon as Dr. Roth saw the nature of the student's statement he immediately cut him off.

General Taylor

October 4, 1965

Although we have not as yet pin-pointed the identity of the person who threw the poster paint, we are certain it was intended for the demonstrators, rather than for you and Dr. Roth. This paint is water soluble and if you will indicate to us the amount of the damages, we shall be glad to reimburse you.

We thought we had covered all contingencies, and would welcome your personal suggestions on how to protect the speaker and the College from the type of undisciplined protest from outside groups which you unfortunately experienced.

May I add my personal admiration for you and your willingness to present a much-needed report so that confusion in the minds of a large number of citizens can be dispelled and so that a few unintellectual and immature dissidents are not allowed to represent the views of an informed general public.

Sincerely,



H. H. Semans
Acting President

lea

COLONEL ALLISON MILLER, RETIRED

12140 TIPTOE LANE

LOS ALTOS, CALIFORNIA 94022

October 2, 1965

Dr. Calvin C. Flint, President
Foothill College
12345 El Monte Road
Los Altos Hills, Calif.

mm

Dear Doctor Flint:

Recently it was my pleasure to hear Dr. Seaman when he talked to a group at the Cabana Hotel. He assured us that Foothill maintained proper discipline and was not a small edition of Berkeley. The excellent opinion of Foothill College resulting was completely destroyed last evening at the Lecture given by General Maxwell D. Taylor. The treatment given General Taylor was disgraceful.

Professor Irvin M. Roth, the Moderator, was directly responsible for the insults to the distinguished speaker and proved himself totally incompetent to represent the College before the public. The talk was billed as a Lecture with a question period. In spite of this, Professor Roth turned the rostrum over to a member of a picketing group who proceeded to insult General Taylor in a libelous tirade which was only terminated by the noisy objection of the audience.

The handling of the lecture was improper and objectionable in other ways. Pickets were allowed to parade so close to the entrances of the building as to block the entrances and inconvenience the people attending. Tickets, it was said, were required by fire regulations to prevent over-crowding the building; however, pickets without tickets with their placards were permitted to enter and to obstruct the aisles and doorways. Representatives of the fire department were present and permitted these violations of regulations. The Moderator took no action to prevent this disruption of the proceedings. In fact, he appeared to encourage them.

Viewing the pickets, permitted to disrupt the Lecture, leads me to believe that even the Sanitary Code was violated by their admission. As a taxpayer being charged to support Foothill College, I am revolted by the entire proceeding.

Dr. Calvin C. Flint, President

-2-

October 2, 1965

Each person attending was given a program stating "a long-standing Foothill College Policy of making facilities available to groups wishing to present dissenting opinions" and listing a leftist program for October 23rd. In spite of this, Professor Roth deliberately arranged to violate the policy of the College, allowed the insulting of a distinguished gentleman, and proved his massive incompetence to publicly represent Foothill College. I suggest you take him to the woodshed. If this is not consonant with academic freedom, then at least prevent him from future opportunities to disgrace Foothill College before the public.

It is my understanding that members of Dr. Seaman's department visit classrooms to check on instruction. I would, therefore, suggest permanent assignment of a monitor for Dr. Roth's classes. The smell of leftist ideology is too strong to ignore.

Yours truly,

Oliver Miller

USMA Nov 18

AM:RH

cc Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor

4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Apartment 1630
Washington, D.C. 20016
January 5, 1966

Dear Mr. Harlacher:

Under separate cover I am returning the tape of General Maxwell Taylor's address at Foothill College. Unfortunately, we have not been able to transcribe the tape because of our limited secretarial staff and the press of recent events.

It would be appreciated if you would provide a copy of the transcript so that General Taylor may edit his remarks.

Sincerely,

James T. Root
Lt Col, USA
Executive Officer

Mr. Ervin L. Harlacher
Director, Community Services
Foothill College
12345 El Monte Road
Los Altos Hills, California

Executive Office Building,
Room 300,
Washington, D. C.,
December 28, 1965.

Dear Mr. Harlacher:

I have just come upon your letter of December 9 to Miss Marilyn Army concerning the tape of General Taylor's speech at Foothill College.

Please accept our apology for the delay in returning the tape. Miss Army was hospitalized for emergency surgery and, in the resulting confusion, this matter was overlooked. We are transcribing the tape and will return them to you as soon as this is complete.

Sincerely,

James T. Root
Lt. Col., USA
Executive Officer

Mr. Ervin L. Harlacher,
Director, Community Services,
Foothill College,
12345 El Monte Road,
Los Altos Hills, California.

FOOTHILL COLLEGE

12345 EL MONTE ROAD • LOS ALTOS HILLS, CALIFORNIA

TELEPHONE 948-8590

December 9, 1965

Miss Marilyn Army
Secretary to General Maxwell Taylor
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Miss Army:

In mid-October we mailed you a tape of General Maxwell Taylor's speech at Foothill College on October 1, as per the General's request. It was our understanding that the General wanted an opportunity to listen to the tape before it was used in our instructional program and as part of the programming of our educational FM radio station, KFJC.

As you can well imagine we have received numerous requests from the community as well as the campus to hear the tape of the General's lecture; however, to date it has not been returned to us. We would appreciate whatever assistance you can provide in expediting the return of the tape to the college.

I shall look forward to hearing from you.

Cordially,


Ervin L. Harlacher, Director
Community Services

ELH/sc



HARRY WALKER Inc.

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October 4, 1965

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Executive Office Building of the White House
Suite #300
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

I received the enclosed wire from Foothill College in answer to my wire and I thought you might like to read it. If there is anything else that I can do, please let me know.

In reference to my letter on Friday, I spoke to Mr. F. Reed Dickerson of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, who phoned me today confirming the fact that he definitely would like to have you on Friday, February 25, 1966 at \$2500. I told him that I would take this matter up with you and that I would let him know shortly.

I questioned him carefully about the make-up of his audience, etc., and he assured me that during the last year, they had two controversial speakers: United States Senator William Fulbright and William Buckley. He said that both programs went very smoothly and that he has never experienced an unruly audience at his university.

I naturally hope that you will find it possible to accept this date.

Cordially yours,

Harry Walker

peb
enclosure

OF SERVICE
This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1201 (4-60)

SYMBOLS
DL=Day Letter
NL=Night Letter
LT=International Letter Telegram

(54)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME

BA090 OC146

O PKA239 PD4 EXTRA=TDPK LOS ALTOS HILLS CALIF ¹⁹⁶⁵ OCT 12 4 11 PM PDT 67

HARRY WALKER

100 BOYLSTON ST BSN=

:INDEED WE DID ASSURE YOU OF NO REPEAT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO DEMONSTRATIONS THERE WAS NONE PICKETING (WHICH WE COULD NOT LEGALLY BAN) ALL PRECUATIONS WERE TAKEN TO ENSURE THE GENERALS SECURITY THE SMALL DEMONSTRATION WHICH DID OCCUR INSIDE THE GYM WAS UNEXPECTED AND WAS HANDLED IN THE BEST POSSIBLE MANNER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE EVENTS BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1201 (4-60)

1965 OCT 7 PM

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

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The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

WE ACTED IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES INCLUDING YOU AND THE GENERAL IF YOU WISH FURTHER INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT CARRIED IN THE PRESS PLEASE CALL ME=

= DR E L HARLACHER DIRECTOR OF CUMMUNITY SERVICES
FOOTHILL COLLEGE =

=617-426-2334=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE.

FOOTHILL COLLEGE

12345 EL MONTE ROAD • LOS ALTOS HILLS, CALIFORNIA



TELEPHONE 948-8590

October 21, 1965

General Maxwell Taylor
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

We thought you would like the picture on the last
page of our Foothill Sentinel Special. We like it!

Sincerely yours,

GIBB R. MADSEN
Dean of Students

GRM:jd

Enclosure

LIFE-TIME HONORARY MEMBER

VETERANS CLUB



FOOTHILL COLLEGE

No 497

THIS CERTIFIES THAT

General Maxwell D. Taylor

IS A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING

Oct. 1, 1965

Frank A. Maravice

DATE

PRESIDENT

NOT VALID WITHOUT THE SIGNATURE OF MEMBER

The White House
Washington

1965 OCT 11 PM 9 20

WA085 PD

TDL SANTA MARIA CALIF OCT 2 448A PDT

GEN MAXWELL TAYLOR

THE WHITE HOUSE

AM SHOCKED TO READ TREATMENT GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR AT
FAIRMONT HOTEL AND FOOTHILL COLLEGE STOP PLEASE CONVEY MY
APOLOGIES AND BEST REGARDS TO A GREAT MAN

R G FOSTER.

FORM NO. 1 (REV. 1-1-64) OFF. USE ONLY
U.S. AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

The White House
Washington

1965 OCT 11 PM 9 20

WA085 PD

TDL SANTA MARIA CALIF OCT 2 448A PDT

GEN MAXWELL TAYLOR

THE WHITE HOUSE

AM SHOCKED TO READ TREATMENT GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR AT
FAIRMONT HOTEL AND FOOTHILL COLLEGE STOP PLEASE CONVEY MY
APOLOGIES AND BEST REGARDS TO A GREAT MAN

R G FOSTER.

October 11, 1965

Dear Mr. Mansfield:

I am very grateful to you for your letter of October 4 commenting upon the incidents surrounding my visit to Foothill College on October 1. I understand the causes of these demonstrations which I am sure were more painful to the local citizens than to the visiting speaker. We all have similar problems such as these in many of our American communities.

Thanking you for your thoughtfulness in writing me,

Sincerely,

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. John P. Mansfield,
776 University Avenue,
Palo Alto, California.

JOHN P. MANSFIELD
PALO ALTO
CALIFORNIA

October 4, 1965

Dear General Maxwell Taylor:

Friday night, October 1st, 1965, I was at Foothill College when you gave a very clear picture of our Vietnam situation.


Please let me apologize for the actions of a few members (too many) of "our Great Unwashed Society" Junior Grade.

I am also ashamed to learn that college kids have such gutless, jelly-livered and wishy-washy leadership from their faculty members as displayed by the moderator, Irving M. Roth, Social Sciences Division, Foothill College. I know there are students desirous of the opportunity of a college education, who would be willing, and glad, to abide by present rules as well as regulations.

It is downright distressing to also learn that, as a citizen and taxpayer, I have provided some of the tax dollars that make it possible for these junior and senior "Kooks" to romp around in Country Club surroundings. Meanwhile, loyal dedicated people, such as yourself, give their entire lives to make a better country in which to live and to preserve the type of Freedom that protects a citizen -- even if he elects to act like a jackass.

I am one of the many millions of Americans who are proud of you, General Taylor, as a diplomat, as a soldier, and as a gentleman!

Sincerely,


John P. Mansfield
776 University Avenue
Palo Alto, California

October 12, 1965

Dear Mr. Kreber:

I appreciated very much getting your letter of October 3 commenting upon the incidents surrounding my visit to Foothill College in California. Your kind words are most encouraging to me and I am very grateful to you for them.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. Francis G. Kreber,
1509 Lenox Avenue,
Utica, New York.

Oct 3, 1965

Dear General Taylor

I regret in regard to what happened to you, Friday at Fort Hill College Massacrum. I hope the College will pay the cleaning bill you who gave so much and all most got killed by the Viet.

and terrorists, and then coming to Calif and have some Bed Communists to do this to you they must be fello or cowards that they might hope to go and fight for their Country.

If it were not for Gen Washington or Nathan Hale or John Paul Jones where would this country be today, and you & our beloved Gen MacArthur

October 5, 1965

Dear Helens:

Many thanks for your cordial note. I was glad to receive the reaction of an impartial bystander to the doings of my "pink" admirers.

I appreciated very much your kind words of encouragement.

With warm regards to you and your family,

Sincerely,

(Sgd) MAX

Maxwell D. Taylor

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY *MT*
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

----- 11 October ----- 19 65

SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF
PROTOCOL BUREAU

MEMORANDUM:

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Sir, this card was found in the Military sedan assigned to you during your recent visit to San Francisco.

Barbara McNaul
BARBARA McNAUL
Major, GS
Protocol Bureau

Dear General Taylor,

Last evening Mrs. Ralph Tudor and I attended your very excellent and informative address at Foothill College and I wish my George could have been there also.

I am appalled at the discourteous treatment you received at the hands of the radical idiot fringe. These, of course, were a small part of the enthusiastic and appreciative audience.

I, as well as so many
others, are deeply grateful
for all you have done for
our country. You are our
outstanding classmate;
your war record, all
that you have done since,
and are doing now is of
the highest patriotic del-
icacy and we are so
proud of you.

Please know that you
are a real inspiration
to many many fine young
Americans.

With deep respect and
gratitude and all good
wishes to you and your
dear wife.

Sincerely,

Helena O. Taylor

October second.

October 6, 1965

Dear Mayor Thurber:

You are most considerate to send your letter of apology with regard to the incident last Friday night at Foothill College. I quite understand that the disturbers of the evening were not representative citizens of Los Altos and that the majority of the latter are undoubtedly opposed to such behavior. The reception which I received from the faculty members and bona fide students of Foothill College was irreproachable and I have carried away a most pleasant recollection of the evening in spite of the unfortunate disorders.

Thanking you again for your thoughtfulness in writing,

Sincerely,

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Maxwell D. Taylor

Mayor James P. Thurber, Jr.,
1 North San Antonio Road,
Los Altos, California.

CITY OF LOS ALTOS

1 NORTH SAN ANTONIO ROAD - LOS ALTOS, CALIFORNIA
TELEPHONE 948-1491



October 4, 1965

CITY COUNCIL

JAMES P. THURBER, JR., MAYOR
AARON CORENMAN, VICE-MAYOR
S. M. CIMINO
AUDREY H. FISHER
HARRY C. KALLSHIAN

General Maxwell Taylor
c/o State Department
Room 7428
Executive Office Building
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:


I would like to take this opportunity to express my apologies for the behavior of some of our citizens during your speech Friday night at Foothill College.

We have always prided ourselves on a policy of hearing both sides of a question and of showing due respect to the speaker whether or not we agree with his views. What happened Friday was inexcusable, and I can only hope that some of these responsible for the uproar will have second thoughts and see the errors of their ways.

I know that the antagonists do not represent the views of the vast majority of Los Altos citizens, and I personally would like to extend to you an invitation to visit our city again under what I hope will be quieter circumstances.

With all best wishes.

Most sincerely,


James P. Thurber, Jr.
Mayor

October 6, 1965

Dear Mr. Broome:

I have just received your greatly appreciated letter of October 3 commenting upon the incident at Foothill College last Friday night. I am encouraged to receive the reactions of "Responsible Citizens Aroused" which I am sure are similar to those of most of your local citizens.

You were very kind to call me and to follow up with this letter of reassurance.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. John C. Broome,
5350 College Avenue,
Oakland, California.

5350 College Avenue
Oakland, California
October 3, 1965

General Maxwell D. Taylor
4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Taylor:

Confirming our telephone conversation of last evening I would like to express again the sincere apologies of the Bay Area community for the unfortunate incident which occurred at Foothill College last Friday night. I am sure you realize that such conduct is not indicative of the feelings of the responsible community at large.

It is with these sentiments that a group of young businessmen formed "Responsible Citizens Aroused".


Responsible Citizens Aroused is a bipartisan, ad hoc committee whose aim it is to counter the propaganda offensive of the Viet Nam Day Committee and the tactics which it employs.

We enjoy the endorsement of local Democrat and Republican legislators such as Assemblymen Nicholas Petris, Donald Mulford, Jerome Waldie and Supervisor Kent Pursell, for whom I can also speak.... We apologize to you, sir, and want to take this occasion to thank you for your years of service to our country and, particularly, the most recent year in Viet Nam.

For your information I have enclosed a statement of principles published by Responsible Citizens Aroused on September 15.

Thank you, General, for accepting my telephone call and I will pass on your greetings to my father, who holds you in such high regard.

Sincerely yours,



John C. Broome, Chairman
Responsible Citizens Aroused

JCB:hh
Enc.

Statement of R.C.A. --- Responsible Citizens Aroused

Today, September 14, is Constitution Day. It is on this occasion that we remember the principles our country was founded upon and the men who have made it great.

But today we also mark with some degree of chagrin that there exists an element in our immediate community which openly challenges the basic framework of not only the community, but the nation as a whole. This element, currently known as the Viet Nam Day Committee, will, in 30 days, stage an organized riot for the purpose of amplifying their position. We would wonder how some of the defenders of our Constitution, such as Sergeant York, Nathan Hale, General MacArthur and John F. Kennedy, would feel when reflecting upon the Viet Nam Day Committee this Constitution Day of 1965.

Responsible Citizens Aroused believes in the principles of Constitutional Democracy upon which our government is based.

R.C.A. supports the President's role in the conduct of foreign affairs.

R.C.A. believes in, trusts and has faith in the discretion, dignity and virtue of all American people.

R.C.A. is a group of young Bay Area people who intend to unite vocal support for our country and its principles and display to the community, the United States as a whole, and the world, that the Bay Area is populated by responsible Americans. R.C.A. asks for other like-minded citizens to join this effort.

Let us make our position clear:

We are not objecting to picketing and peaceful demonstrations. As a matter of fact, picketing is an old tradition in America. We abhor war and desire a just peace. It is the United States leaders who are requesting negotiations. You hear no requests for negotiations from Peking. We do not, however, subscribe to a policy of peace at the price of the freedom of the South Vietnamese.

The Viet Nam Day Committee does not represent the feelings of Americans. Its actions have insulted the integrity of the American people. Its members have called the President of our country a "Facist" and a "Dictator". They have called the former United States Ambassador to Viet Nam a "murderer" and demanded he "stand trial" for his actions before five of their members. They have given the name of Bay Area cities and institutions a black eye all over the world.

We believe that the Bay Area community has been insulted long enough. It is now time for patriotic, responsible citizens to stand up in active support of their country and in opposition to the Viet Nam Day Committee.

- (1) We call for pledges to attend a patriotic program on October 16 at a location to be announced, while the Viet Nam Day Committee is "attacking" the Oakland Army Terminal. Major speakers are now being invited to address this program.
- (2) R.C.A. calls for the public, Republicans and Democrats alike, to write their representatives and senators expressing support of our government and the President.
- (3) R.C.A. calls for contributions to provide advertising for the program and transportation for the speakers.

Contact: Responsible Citizens Aroused,
5350 College Avenue
Oakland, California
655-8601

RE: LOS ALTOS TRIP 10/1/65

Gen. Richardson had never received your original letter -- he will be most happy to have you stay at Presidio, they have a room for you at Pershing Hall. Gen. Richardson wanted to host a small dinner for you but I said that your schedule was too tight to allow it.

You will be picked up at the Airport by the Foothill people, brought to Presidio, they will wait for you and drive you to the College. You will be met at the gate of Presidio - and the Major that called me was sure that it would be Gen. Richardson himself.

There will either be 1,000 or 2,500 attendance, depending on the number of tickets given out and where held. She said that at the rate it was going now it would have to be transferred because of the amount of people.

The press will be present and there will be a press conference after your talk.

There will be a tape recording which they use for educational purposes, which they will send you for editing, and use only with your permission.

There definitely will be questions after your talk.

Driving time to Presidio fm the Airport will take about 1/2 hour, and then another hour fm Presidio to Foothill.

September 27, 1965

Lt. Gen. James L. Richardson, Jr.
Commanding General, 6th Army,
Presidio
San Francisco, California

Referring to my letter of September 21st, will overnight accommodations
be available for October 1-2 *query*

Sincerely,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

*O.K.
by phone*

September 21, 1965

Dear Jim:

I am writing to ask if you could put me up overnight at your guest house on the evening of October 1-2. I have a speaking engagement at Foothill College and would prefer to spend the night at the Presidio rather than to go to a hotel.

As you may recall, my greeting from some of your California undergraduates was overly enthusiastic on the occasion of my last visit.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General James L. Richardson, Jr.,
Commanding General, 6th Army,
Presidio,
San Francisco, California.

