



ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

1529 EIGHTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

16 September 1965

Weekend

General Maxwell D. Taylor
Executive Office Building - Suite 300
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

Enclosed herewith are copies of the recent addresses to the George Catlett Marshall Dinner which were requested by your office. I am also enclosing a burned copy of the message which we have received from the President to be delivered at our 1965 Annual Meeting. I hope that these will prove useful.

All of us are looking forward to having you with us with a great deal of pleasure.

Cordially yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert F. Cocklin". The signature is fluid and cursive.

ROBERT F. COCKLIN
Brigadier General, USAR
Director of Public Relations

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1965


TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Since the last Annual Meeting of your Association, the United States Army in partnership with its sister services has been called upon for greatly increased efforts in support of our national policy to bring peace with honor to this troubled world. As Commander-in-Chief, I share your pride in the magnificent manner with which these challenges are being met in widely separated parts of the globe.

Your Association is to be commended for your constant vigilance and your untiring efforts to insure the maintenance of a strong, modern, mobile Army. I have actively implemented your endeavors to improve the attractiveness of the military career and as I have indicated to you before, I want our uniformed citizens and their families to be first-class in every respect.

The responsibilities which face our Army today are numerous and heavy - the entire nation is grateful for its strength and effectiveness. The courage and determination of our military men in Vietnam particularly, is in the great American tradition and a source of inspiration to us all. I know that your Association will continue to encourage high caliber young men and women to choose a career in the Army and add their talents, imagination and versatility to strengthen our national aims.

As your Commander-in-Chief, I am pleased to send you greetings and to reiterate my earnest support of your endeavors.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 8, 1961

NO. 621

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

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PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK
SECRETARY OF STATE

AT THE GEORGE MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER GIVEN BY THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN HONOR OF
MR. JOHN J. McCLOY, SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 8, 1961

General Baker, Mr. McCloy, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

There are many reasons why your invitation confers such high privilege as to be a command. This host Association, the towering figure of General Marshall we remember this evening, and the award you have just bestowed upon my friend and colleague, John J. McCloy, are among them.

I have been a member of this Association for a number of years -- in sentiment and interest longer than you might think. As a boy of twelve, I began my Army training in high school ROTC in Atlanta, Georgia, and have greatly valued my lifelong ties with the Army. Indeed, Secretary Marshall, some fourteen years ago, summoned me to the Department of State just three days before I was to take the oath of office as an officer of the regular Army.

It is not easy for me to speak in measured tones about George Catlett Marshall -- a rigorous and accomplished soldier who was, at the same time, one of the greatest civilians of his day. Few men have had such profound influence upon all who served with him; he brought to living reality, for all around him, such simple notions as duty, justice, integrity, and love of country. He left his associates a rich legacy of practical wisdom -- not in polished essays but in countless fleeting comments in the course of daily business. "Don't ask me a question," he would say, "without bringing me your proposed answer." "Don't wait for me to tell you what you ought to be doing -- you tell me what I ought to be doing." Or -- "Gentlemen, let's not talk about this matter too much in military terms; to do so might make it a military problem."

You could have found no more suitable recipient for the George C. Marshall Award than John J. McCloy. He has served his country well, in distinguished posts, but none calling for more imagination, clarity of thought, and persistence than the one he now holds as the President's Adviser on Disarmament. A man with less courage would abandon the task, a man with less humor would find it intolerable, a man with less hope for the future of man would give up in despair. The necessity for his effort is simply explained -- we shall not find our way through the troubled world of today unless we keep working toward the world which must come into being if man is to survive.

Others have shown interest in the fact that General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during the greatest war in our history, also earned the Nobel Peace Prize. So, too, that a former Assistant Secretary of War now heads our work on Disarmament. We in America do not find this odd. For in their own lives these men remind us of both the olive branch and the arrows in our Great Seal, the symbols of a people who love peace but who take their liberties seriously in a dangerous world.

I wish

I wish to speak briefly this evening about danger and some of the simple truths which moments of crisis clarify. If what I say is not new, it is because our commitment to freedom is as old as our Republic. We ourselves must try to be clear if others are to understand - at a time when the world cannot afford misunderstanding. We must find ways to make it clear that our desire to live in peace is not weakness - and to make it clear that our readiness to fight for freedom is not belligerence.

The forces of aggression in the world are trying to sow confusion, as have other aggressors in other decades. "All we want is a peace treaty", they say, but a peace treaty which threatens the peace. "All we want is a free city of Berlin" - but the freedom they have in mind can be seen across the walls and through the barbed wire which divide that city. "Settle Berlin and the way will be open for a period of peace and relaxation", they say. "Just once more" is a familiar phrase we have heard before - the nerve gas to prepare the way for endless appetite and ambition.

Their hope must be that we and the rest of the world will have short memories about this postwar world. Though we have all lived through it, we ourselves sometimes forget.

The United States emerged from the second world war at a pinnacle of power never before achieved by any nation. Our productive facilities were incomparable and, alone among the larger industrialized nations, were unscathed by bomb or shell. We had a great army and the mightiest sea and air forces the world had ever seen. These were deployed around the globe on every sea and continent. We had developed a fantastic weapon, and we alone had it.

One thinks of Lord Acton's thought that "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It has been refuted by the course pursued by the United States in the last sixteen years.

It is not a small thing in the history of the world that a nation with supreme, well-nigh unchallengeable, power turned away from the exploitation of that power, from the corrupting policies which power could entail. We committed ourselves wholeheartedly to building a peaceful world order based on the principles which were written into the United Nations Charter.

We took a leading role in creating the United Nations. I know of no better statement of the enduring purposes of the foreign policy of the American people than Articles 1 and 2 of that Charter.

Every nation which joined the United Nations joined in solemn commitments to renounce and suppress aggression and to settle disputes by peaceful means. Machinery was established to facilitate peaceful settlements -- the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court. The members pledged themselves to use not only these bodies but the traditional processes of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.

When one thinks of that great document, one remembers the hopes that went into its drafting. In the vernacular of the GI, it looked as if "man almost had it made".

We not only

We not only abided by the principles of the United Nations and dedicated ourselves to constructing the sort of world envisioned by the Charter. We also moved to dismantle our own military power. In fact, we disarmed unilaterally and precipitously. By the end of 1946 we had no single Army division and no Air Force group ready for combat.

We still had an atomic monopoly. But we proposed to divest ourselves of atomic weapons, too. I was on the General Staff when Hiroshima occurred. I remember a remark of a colleague: "War has turned upon and devoured itself, for no human purpose can be achieved by war under these conditions". We as a nation believed that. We presented a plan for the international control of atomic energy, to assure that it would be used only for the peaceful benefit of all the peoples of the world and to avoid the kind of nuclear arms race which is subjecting the world to terror today. We most earnestly endeavored to get the United Nations to put that plan into effect. Our efforts were frustrated by one member: the Soviet Union.

We also sought to activate Article 47 of the Charter, providing for establishment of a United Nations force to be available to the Security Council itself, assisted by a Military Staff Committee -- a force to be used in keeping the peace.

And, not least, we repeatedly have tried to give effect to the provisions of Article 26 and 47 for establishing a system for the regulation of armaments.

Why have these hopes, which we are convinced are the hopes of most of mankind, been frustrated? Why have all our efforts borne so little fruit? The central reason is that one government refused to join with the rest in building the kind of world the United Nations Charter envisioned and, instead, embarked upon a course of aggression.

The Soviet Union contemptuously reneged on its wartime pledges to permit self-determination in Eastern Europe. It supported an aggression against Greece, thinly disguised as a "civil war." It tried to intimidate Turkey into yielding concessions which would have jeopardized the independence of Turkey and exposed other nations in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond to aggression.

Counting on economic chaos as its ally, the Soviet Union sought to extend its dominion into Western Europe. In 1948, in violation of its agreements with the Western Allies, it blockaded Berlin, denounced the quadripartite control machinery for Germany, and set about making the part of Germany which it occupied a political and social segment of the Soviet Union itself. Then came the aggression in Korea. A little later came the ruthless suppression of Hungary.

One incident after another has made it quite clear that the Soviet Union will not tolerate self-determination by any people over whom it can extend its sway. One incident after another has demonstrated that it is not prepared to work toward a world of law. As one Soviet representative put it: "The law is like the tongue of a wagon: it goes in the direction in which it is pointed." Or, as other representatives have put it: "The Soviet Union will not submit its interests to decision by anyone else." Such a policy -- and its corollary, the Troika, which would paralyze the Executive functions of the United Nations -- torpedoes the possibility of law, of adjudication, of mediation, of peaceful settlement, peaceful adjustment of conflicting interests.

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That declared policy of non-cooperation, plus modern weapons -- plus the Soviets' terroristic threats to employ those weapons -- gives dramatic content to the words used by Thomas Hobbes in describing the law of the jungle: "nasty, brutish, and short."

Against this background, the meaning of the cold war becomes clearer. We did not declare it; we ourselves cannot end it. The cold war is the direct expression of the announced determination of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to extend their "historically inevitable" world revolution by every available means. It is a program of action, which they sometimes try to disguise as a scientific principle. They speak of the irresistible spread of ideas -- but have ~~no~~ to show a single ~~instance~~ of a people who have voluntarily embraced communism through free elections. The cold war will end when those who declared it decide to abandon it. Otherwise, it cannot end so long as peoples throughout the world are determined to be free, to decide their own institutions, to control their own destinies.

The Soviet leaders do have in their hands a revolutionary potential more dramatic than anything we have yet seen. That lies in their capacity to transform the world in which we live by a simple decision to live at peace with it. One can experience no more startling a reflection than to imagine what could be within the grasp of mankind if the principles of the United Nations Charter were deeply established as the rule of conduct of all nations, including the Soviet Union. We are familiar with the capacity of law to enlarge the areas of individual freedom by simple arrangements for protecting each against the undue intrusion of the others. We have made great progress in applying a rule of law across national frontiers in arranging the countless daily transaction of the world's work. Already, throughout most of the world, there is in progress every day, throughout the year, acts of cooperation which support what Raymond Fosdick has called "the infinity of threats which bind peace together." But a large, important and powerful part of the world has not joined this effort and, indeed, seeks to disrupt it. This is the great challenge to Soviet leadership; this is the direction in which they can move to write brilliant chapters in the history of man. If they are another world, it is their own choice; in the world we know, there is room for all who are prepared to join in carrying forward the promise which lies within the grasp of man.

In the field of disarmament, Soviet leaders hold in their hands another crucial key. It is not difficult to disarm the United States; we are a people who would prefer to turn our resources to other purposes. The most effective way to disarm is to begin by keeping the peace -- to demonstrate over time that they will leave their neighbors alone. If the United States is spending for arms today almost four times what we spent in the immediate postwar years, it is not because we prefer it that way, or because economic prosperity depends upon it. We do so reluctantly, as a harsh necessity. Without the clear necessity, the American people could not be compelled to sustain so heavy a burden for arms.

Obviously, what I have suggested would take time -- time which we may not have. The arms race produces its own tension. If we could find a way to limit that race before broad political issues are resolved we should make the effort. Here, again, the key is not in our hands. Important steps could be taken promptly if those involved would abandon the fetish of secrecy. Disarmament cannot occur if those who are prepared to act in good faith and with full public knowledge are to become what Aristide Briand called "dupes or victims." We must continue our own effort to achieve reasonable and practical proposals; present tensions

make the

make the effort more and not less essential. This is why we hope very much that the Congress will complete action at this session on President Kennedy's proposals for a Disarmament Agency.

The months ahead will be critical months and much will turn on the issue of Berlin. President Kennedy has called it "the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments, stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation." He has called upon our own people and upon our Allies to undertake fresh sacrifices to give the free world the additional strength we shall need to keep the peace or to meet the dangers which might arise. Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze discussed these matters with you yesterday.

At the very time he called for greater strength, President Kennedy said, "We shall always be prepared to discuss international problems with any and all nations that are willing to talk -- and listen -- with reason ... If they seek genuine understanding -- not concessions of our rights, we shall meet with them ... We cannot negotiate with those who say 'what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.'"

We expect negotiations on Berlin as soon as it is apparent that negotiations of a serious and constructive character can occur. We cannot believe that any power could press so dangerous an issue without full exploration with all whose interests and pledges are involved. There are channels of communication available between Moscow and the West; they are not being neglected. The problem is whether channels can lead to a meeting of minds, whether peace is a common purpose, whether there are arrangements, in the President's words, "consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom, and with the legitimate security interests of all nations."

If peaceful processes are to succeed, they must be given their chance. This means that unilateral action taken against the vital interests of the free world in West Berlin could only court disaster. There have been threats and implied threats of such action in recent weeks, with particular regard to allied air traffic into Berlin. These threats have been rejected promptly and in the most solemn terms by the Western powers. I spoke earlier of clarity. It is possible for those who do not understand democracy to make a mistake about these matters - by listening only to the voices they wish to hear, by confusing debate with disunity, by reading a desire for peace as a willingness to yield. These are mistakes which Moscow cannot afford and which mankind cannot afford.

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REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
GEORGE MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OCTOBER 23, 1963

FOR RELEASE IN AM'S OF THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1963

On this occasion, honoring the great man we do, the temptation is very strong to eulogize and memorialize. For all of us who knew him, whether as soldier or statesman or friend, our memories carry the strongest sense of respect and awe for one of the most exceptional Americans of our history -- George Catlett Marshall.

In the context of eulogy, we could review his remarkable career, dwell upon the high trusts which he held, and pay just tribute to the success of the enterprises he led and the programs he initiated in support of the cause of freedom.

But to speak of George Marshall in the past tense would be an injustice to this occasion -- and to these times. Out of the historic years of the middle Twentieth Century, other men may have written their names on the record of history with a more flamboyant hand. But as that record comes into truer perspective, the name and record of George Marshall stands forth in bolder relief as a continuing influence upon our times.

As soldier, he guided the forces of freedom to victory in the first global war. As statesman, he set in motion new forces of freedom to make that first global war also the last such conflict.

Today the harvest is ripening in the fields which were sown by this unselfish and dedicated man, and there are lessons for us to apply -- lessons from both the work he pursued and the spirit of character he exemplified.

In pursuit of the victory in World War II, George Marshall offered his countrymen a living lesson of the necessity for confidence, for perseverance, for courage. He helped to teach us an indelible lesson about the necessity for allies and the equally imperative necessity for unity within a free alliance. Likewise, in his direction of our strategies, he taught much that is invaluable about keeping first things first, fixing upon our objectives and pursuing them steadfastly without distraction, division or diversion.

As statesman, George Marshall again imbued our national policies and purposes with these same concepts. While he will never be forgotten as a soldier, history will surely honor him more highly for helping his countrymen to understand that the victories of peace are to be won by those nations which pursue their objectives in a straight line of dedicated purpose -- without distractions, divisions or diversion.

Two decades ago, on the very eve of our greatest national danger, George Marshall took command of an army equipped with broomsticks. No General could have had much confidence in that army's readiness. But George Marshall did have confidence in the American people -- and in their political systems. On the foundation of that confidence, he persevered without despair, without deriding

(more)

the system or its leaders, without doubting the people. Through the dark days of "Too Little, Too Late" -- days many of us still remember so vividly from the Southwest Pacific -- his unwavering confidence inspired in his countrymen the confidence indispensable for a great and successful national effort.

Only a few years later, sixteen years ago now, civilian George Marshall as Secretary of State saw the nations which had been liberated at such sacrifice from one aggression lying prostrate before a new aggressor.

Europe's harvest had failed. France was free -- but without food. England was safe -- but without coal for heat. Italy was liberated -- but a Communist coalition was within ten per cent of occupying control of the government. Greece saw guerrillas advancing across the countryside to within twenty miles of Athens. Turkey was resisting Communist claims to vital provinces.

Only three years after the end of the war, that great victory seemed destined to be made hollow -- the sacrifices to have been in vain.

George Marshall knew how desperately men everywhere wanted peace. At that decisive moment, he instilled into our policy the simple but powerful proposition that those who want peace must be strong enough to keep peace. On that proposition, America has stood ever since -- and stands tonight.

In Greece and Turkey, in western Europe and southeastern Asia, we as a nation have held steadfastly to a straight line purpose of building strength -- military, economic and political. Because we have built it, because other free men have joined with us in maintaining it, because together we have demonstrated our willingness to use it, we are today realizing exactly the results George Marshall foresaw.

We have negotiated and ratified the test ban treaty because we are strong, not because we are weak. We are encountering and exploring other opportunities for other negotiations and other agreements because our adversaries learned beyond all doubt one year ago in Cuba that we not only have the strength to meet aggression but we have the will to use that strength against any who would breach the peace in our hemisphere -- or in the world.

George Marshall is gone. The great armies he commanded have been disbanded. The great plan which bore his name has long since ended. But his influence continues to shake the world in which we live tonight.

As his works live on, so the spirit of his character should also live on in our lives today. Few men of our times have made so great or so indelible an imprint of character as did George Marshall. Had he been a selfish or self-centered man, had he been a partisan, had he been less respectful of the institutions of our system or less confident of the capacity of our people, the history we recount tonight might be very different than it is.

Once, when he was asked about his politics, George Marshall replied, "My father was a Democrat, my mother was a Republican -- I am an Episcopalian."

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Such an answer seems inconsistent in this era when partisanship is so exalted by many as the first duty of citizenship. But a more partisan, more self-seeking man could not have accomplished for freedom and for America what George Marshall accomplished.

The lesson of this example applies to us all. Over the past quarter century, our system and our people have been challenged as never before. We have been challenged to meet new opportunities and new responsibilities by new means and methods, new policies and purposes. We have succeeded in our response because our system, our institutions and our traditions have been free of dogma and have permitted us to exercise the genius of innovation and inventions under a free and flexible system.

Today we have reached a point of new responsibility and new opportunity. We cannot know fully the forces responsible for the evidences of change within the system of communism. We realize the objective of that system for world domination has not changed -- and will not change. We do not realistically expect the character of communism to be negotiated away by the representatives of communism who come to the conference table.

But we must and we shall hold steadfastly to the character and objectives of our own society. We shall not reject realistic opportunities that arise to relax tensions and promote honorable peace. We can know and believe that in a world which wants peace, the most telling pressure we can exert upon the communist system will be a continuing pressure for peace. Peace and freedom are the points of our offensive. The free world has the offensive for peace today -- and we shall keep it.

We shall keep it by maintaining both the strength of our arms and the initiative of our diplomacy -- meeting new challenges as new opportunities. As citizens, let us fill our roles by exemplifying in our citizenship those qualities of George Marshall -- confidence, perseverance, courage, and unselfishness.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE STEPHEN AILES
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
AT THE ANNUAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER
AUSA ANNUAL MEETING
SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
18 NOVEMBER 1964

General Gavin, General Bradley, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I, of course, am greatly honored to be here in this capacity this evening.

I share with all of you great respect for General Marshall and deep admiration and affection for General Bradley. The careers of both men emphasize that the qualities which lead to a distinguished career in the Army are highly prized in civilian life. Both of these men distinguished themselves in post-Army careers — General Marshall in the highest levels of government and General Bradley in business and in a whole range of activities for the public good.

Each is a legend in the Army. I feel that I know a great deal of both from the references to both which still pervade the conversations of the senior people in the Army.

The Army is a remarkable organization — remarkable in ability and energy and in resourcefulness; but, most of all, in attitude. I am confident that I will never again be associated with so selfless or so patriotic a group of men, or with men who are so determined to advance the national welfare. I know that General Marshall and General Bradley espoused and indeed embodied this point of view, and that they contributed

substantially to the traditions which make this attitude and approach so much a part of the Army today. I personally take great pride in being associated with the Army and in partaking of the inspiration that has come down through the years from the Marshalls and the Bradleys who have gone before.

The annual meeting of AUSA is an ideal time for the Secretary of the Army to make something in the nature of a report. This Association is his constituency in a sense in that it is made up of Army people and their civilian partners who support the Army. Furthermore, it effectively sees to it that the public generally knows something about the Army, about its inestimable value to the country, its accomplishments, and its progress. This particular occasion, the George Catlett Marshall dinner — in my judgment by far the finest affair of its kind — presents an ideal forum for a discussion, not only of great men and great deeds of the past, but of our hopes for the Army of the future.

A wide range of topics come promptly to mind when one contemplates what such a report should include. In the interests of time, I will limit myself to three or four items of current interest which I consider to be of long range importance to the Army.

The first item I would mention is a management development which I consider extremely significant, a new system to which General Abrams alluded in his remarks on Monday. We call it the "C" System because the

ratings which we assign to the units of the Army under this system include the letter C. Under this system, we measure readiness of a unit in terms of three things - one, manpower - what percentage of the TO&E strength (that is, the standard strength for such a unit) is present for duty and what percentage of the required skills, the MOS's, are covered; two, equipment - what percentage of the standard table of equipment is on hand and how much of it is in commission and ready for use; and three, training - what level of training has been achieved by the unit. Every unit is assigned a readiness objective, measured in days required to get fully combat ready, represented by the symbol C1, C2, or C3, and based on that unit's mission under the war plans. The objective itself is translatable into required levels of manpower, equipment and training which the unit must meet. And the important point is that readiness objectives of all of the units in the Army, the manpower and equipment levels, can be met at the same time if the resources available to the Army are properly managed by the Army.

Regular reports come in showing unit readiness so determined, and the appropriate sections of the Army staff go promptly into action to remedy whatever deficiencies are revealed by these reports. These reports, when the kinks in this system are finally ironed out, will constitute not only an accurate and objective statement of the condition of our fighting Army, unit by unit, but will provide a constant up-to-date measure of how well we are managing the Army's resources. They will permit us

to manage by exception in the sense that the source of every deficiency which appears can be identified, isolated, and promptly corrected.

Let me give an example. Recently C System reports from some units flagged the fact that too many of their wheeled vehicles were down for repair. The reason was not a shortage of repair parts or trained mechanics, but rather the fact that too many old vehicles were in the inventories of the units. This and some related studies on maintenance problems completed about the same time formed the basis for a substantial reprogramming of 1964 funds into the procurement of trucks and jeeps. The C System turned the light on a problem and we were able to take prompt steps required to remedy it.

In a sense, the top management of the Army has put on a hair shirt by the adoption of this system because, under this system, the red lights flash every time we fail to get to the units in the field the men they need with the MOS's they need, or the equipment they need or the means to maintain that equipment. The important thing to note is that the hair shirt is on the top management of the Army and not on the company commanders.

I have heard the comment made that this system tends to depreciate or dampen the traditional can-do attitude of the commander at each level because on occasion it requires him to report that his unit is not as ready as it is supposed to be. I cannot agree. We are dealing here with resource readiness, not attitudinal readiness and, in that sense, are measuring our

performance, not his. I firmly believe that the Army's most valuable attribute is that can-do attitude, an attitude which has nearly two hundred years of tradition behind it, but I am determined that that can-do attitude is going to be backed up by all the men and all the equipment which the TO&E calls for. Let me point out that that is an unbeatable combination. Under the strong hand of our Vice Chief, General Abrams, and with all the support General Johnson and I can give it, this system will achieve that result.

The second item I would mention deals with the new recruit. We have made some major strides in improving our basic combat training, the eight weeks period of training which is every enlisted man's introduction to the Army. I have long been convinced that no program is more important to the Army than its recruit training program. This is the formative stage of a man's Army career in so far as his basic attitude and motivation are concerned. In the past, we have not done as good a job in this area as we should have. Two years ago, our Human Affairs Research Organization, HUMRRO, actually made a finding that the men of higher potential who came into the Army thought less of the Army at the end of basic training than they did when they came in.

Faced with this challenge, we have taken action. Within the past year or two, we have centralized recruit training responsibility at CONARC, have developed a new curriculum (through the combined efforts of our training center commanders under CONARC's guidance), have toughened up what one might call the soldier side of this program (the

physical training, marches and bivouacs, hand-to-hand combat, etc.), and have raised the priority of the training centers so that they will get the trainers and the company commanders they need. We have taken a long series of steps to emphasize the importance of recruit training and to give to the trainer's job the prestige to which it is entitled. We have established the job of drill sergeant, called the time-honored campaign hat out of retirement to be the drill sergeant's badge of office, and have required even veteran noncoms to complete successfully a difficult five weeks course at the training center before they can qualify for this title and this assignment. The results of these changes are heartening. I hope you talked to the drill sergeants at the exhibit downstairs. A preliminary analysis by HUMRRO indicates a strong possibility that the earlier finding will be reversed when all the evidence is in. The men in the new program, working with the drill sergeants, have a great deal of respect for the program, feel that they have gotten a lot out of it, and have ended up with a far more favorable attitude toward the Army and the NCO's and officers with whom they have trained than was the case before. Few developments could be of greater importance to the Army than this one.

One other aspect of the procurement of enlisted men should be mentioned. The Army has a program called Special Training and Enlistment Program or STEP for short. Under that program, we propose to provide a way for a volunteer to serve in the Army even though he cannot now meet our standards for enlistment, if his educational or physical

deficiencies are readily remediable. In FY 1964, 181,000 men were examined for enlistment in the Army. Of these, 111,000 were acceptable. Of those turned away, 57,000 could not pass the mental test, but 41,000 of them had scores within the range that our experts consider to be correctable. This is no idle estimate since, as I am sure you know, the Army has had a great deal of experience under its General Educational Development program with correcting educational deficiencies of draftees who have come into the Army with test scores in this range. Of the 13,000 turned away for medical reasons, about 900 had correctable deficiencies. We propose to take in about 15,000 of these volunteers a year as on-trial enlistees, give them basic training over a stretched out period (14 weeks as against 8) at Fort Leonard Wood, and give the recruits with educational deficiencies a course of academic instruction each afternoon. We will take them into the Army if, and only if, after an appropriate period of instruction, they can meet our standards. If not, they will be honorably discharged. This program requires congressional approval and will be presented to the Congress at an appropriate time when the new Congress convenes. Personally, I am thoroughly in favor of it as is the Army staff. Without lowering our standards in any way, by dint of a little extra effort on our part, we will make Army service available to well motivated men who would not otherwise be able to serve. And remember this, every time a man qualifies for regular duty in the Army under this program, one less man has to come in under the draft.

As far as officers are concerned, a most important step for the Army is the expansion at West Point which is now under way. Legislation enacted by Congress in the last fiscal year authorizes an increase in the enrollment at West Point from 2500 to 4400 men. This means that by 1972, West Point will be adding not 500 but approximately 900 second lieutenants to the United States Army each year, and I must say that I view the annual addition of 400 highly motivated and highly trained products of that admirable institution as one of the finest things which could possibly happen to the Army. Some \$20 million is included in the fiscal year 1965 budget as the first increment in construction costs for this expansion.

I called on General MacArthur out at Walter Reed Hospital the day after the President had signed the West Point Expansion Act into law last spring, and told General MacArthur about it. He was tremendously pleased. He said, "When I was Superintendent in 1920, the authorized enrollment was 1300. As Chief of Staff, I had it increased to 1960. The figure I really had in mind was 4400."

A second development of importance on the officer front is the new ROTC Program which was enacted by Congress in the close of this last session. Under this program, the Army will be able to offer to the ROTC colleges some flexibility which in turn will permit them to accommodate the ROTC Program on their campuses to their needs.

If a college wishes to continue the present four-year program of instruction with one summer camp between the junior and senior year,

it may do so. If it wishes to change to a two-year program of instruction with two summer camps, it may do so. If the college wishes to maintain both programs, it may do so since the junior and senior years of instruction, MS-3 and MS-4, will be the same under both programs. The addition of the two-year program makes ROTC available to the ever increasing number of college men who receive their first two years of instruction in junior colleges. In addition, it does not make ROTC participation depend finally on a choice made in the first week of a man's college career when he hardly is in a position to make the best choice on such an issue. Further, this program may be better suited to the needs of the students on some college campuses or in some departments where the academic pressure is unusually severe.

One good aspect of this legislation is the fact that it provides the Army with funds for higher retainer pay to MS-3 and MS-4 students and for a sizable number of scholarships. We have not yet made final decisions on how the scholarship program will be implemented, but I can assure you that our principal aim will be to make these scholarships available to men who wish to make the Army their career.

I personally feel that the new ROTC legislation, for which Congressman Hebert of Louisiana worked so valiantly, will bolster the ROTC program and enable us to produce through it more and more officers of the kind we need. As I am sure you know, this program is our principal source of officers. Some 1,000 officers receive commissions in the Regular Army

directly out of the ROTC program each year and, in addition, over 10,000 second lieutenants come on active duty for a two-year term each year.

Up to one-third of these elect to make the Army their career.

From what I have said, you can see that we are taking steps to provide our units with the men and equipment which they need and the Army is visibly stronger every day as a result. But, while all this has been going on, we have not forgotten the taxpayer. The Army has played its part in Secretary McNamara's cost reduction program and has played it willingly and well. That program has three tenets, buying only what we need, buying at the lowest sound price, and operating what we have as efficiently as possible. This program has enabled the Army to do its job and to procure its equipment at less cost than would have been required had we not had the program. The higher costs which have been avoided amount to over \$1 billion in fiscal 64, and we anticipate a similar accomplishment this year.

We keep faith with the taxpayer in another and, in a sense, more painful way, and that is by closing installations which are no longer needed. Secretary McNamara announced this morning that a new list of installations to be closed will be issued tomorrow. Some Army installations will appear on that list. I would like to go firmly on record here that the Chief of Staff and I endorse and approve the inclusion of each of the Army items on the list, and are convinced that the actions to be taken

will save substantial sums of money without in any way interfering with the Army's ability to perform its mission.

The purpose of all our efforts is to produce an Army which can function in the field. I am always impressed by the soldier in his primary role of soldier, and in his natural habitat, the field, and never return from a visit to the troops without being tremendously impressed with the men who make up the Army. Two weeks ago, I visited the Air Assault Division test now under way in the Carolinas and spent two days with the units of the 11th Air Assault Division and with the opposition, the 82d Airborne Division. I would like to say that the professional performance there by all ranks is plainly outstanding and tremendously impressive even to a lay observer such as myself. The resourcefulness and effectiveness of the 11th Air Assault Division and of the 10th Air Transport Brigade which supports it would exhilarate our friends and terrify our foes. I might say that these organizations have tremendously impressed the officers and men of the 82d Airborne Division by whom they have been opposed in these exercises. I talked with General York and several of his subordinate commanders and senior noncoms. Their attitude toward the Air Assault Division and indeed their pride in their own performance in the tests are both revealed in this paraphrase of what they told me, "Anybody but the 82d would have been badly cut up in this exercise."

Unit pride is an essential part of the strength of any Army, and we have our full share.

But in another area, in a far off corner of the globe, in a lonely war, some of our finest young men are writing one more heroic chapter in the epic of the United States Army. They are proving that we have in the Army today men whose valor, patriotism and idealism make them worthy heirs of the Marshalls and the Bradleys of earlier days.

I refer, of course, to Vietnam. Let me give you one particularly articulate expression of a viewpoint which I would say exemplifies the attitude of every man who has returned from Vietnam with whom I have talked.

Captain James Spruill was killed by a land mine in April of this year. His letters to his wife would have never been made public had it not been for the fact that she became dismayed at some material which appeared in the press last spring indicating that our servicemen in Vietnam were disillusioned. As she told me, in order to keep faith with the men there, she sent some excerpts of her husband's recent letters to the New York Herald Tribune. We were so impressed with Captain Spruill's eloquence that we published excerpts in booklet form for distribution in the Army. I would like to close by reading two excerpts from these letters.

" . . . It was brought to my attention last night that we were once inadequately equipped and poorly trained and that professional soldiers came from afar to aid the fledgling American Army in its fight for freedom and internal order. Two of these 'advisors' are well known — Von Steuben and Lafayette. It is heartwarming to think that we now continue the tradition of sacrifice fostered by those two men when they aided a nation in need. . .

" . . . I feel that there is too much talk of despair. I warned you of that before I left. You may remember. Above all, this is a war of mind and spirit. And it is a war which can be won no matter what present circumstances are. For us to despair would be a great victory for the enemy. We must stand strong and unafraid and give heart to an embattled and confused people. This cannot be done if America loses heart. . . . Please don't let them back where you are sell me down the river with talk of despair and defeat. Talk instead of steadfastness, loyalty and of victory -- for we must and we can win here. There is no backing out of Vietnam, for it will follow us everywhere we go. We have drawn the line here and the America we all know and love best is not one to back away. "

Ladies and gentlemen, the United States Army will live up to your highest expectations. It merits your support, and I know that it will continue to receive it.

BRADFORD SPEED PACKAGING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

WILLIAM H. BAUMER
PRESIDENT

23 November 1965

General Maxwell D. Taylor
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Taylor:

Your speech at the General George Marshall Dinner of the AUSA on 27 October 1965 was the clearest public statement I have heard on the Vietnam War.

As a member of the Board of the American Peace Society, I speak for the members in saying that they would be highly honored if you would permit publication in the quarterly magazine, "World Affairs."

I am enclosing a copy of the recent issue of the magazine which lists on the back cover the members of the Board of Directors.

Sincerely yours,



William H. Baumer
Brigadier General, USAR (Ret.)

Enc.

October 22, 1965

Mac:

On Tuesday evening, I have to deliver the George Catlett Marshall address before the Association of the United States Army. This is the first occasion when I have had to prepare the formal manuscript for my public comments on Viet-Nam.

I am attaching hereto the draft which I propose to use. So far as I know, it is strict orthodoxy. However, I would appreciate your glancing over it to see if there is anything which might be less than useful.

So far as I know, the only statement which is new (from me) is on page 7 with regard to the definition of "success".

MDT

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

I passed today's draft of your speech on to my brother Bill, and he makes the following small suggestions:

On page 3, he suggests that you remove the sentence about nuclear bombs in the bottom paragraph of page 3 -- simply to avoid the foolish conclusion, to which he leaped himself -- that you might be suggesting that more than two would do the trick.

Slightly more serious are his suggestions on page 11. He suggests that we change the word "devastation" to "costs" in line 8 of the first full paragraph on that page, and change the very last line on the page to read "accept the inevitability of permitting South Vietnam to determine its own future." He thinks this just a little bit better in that it includes the possibility of reunification by agreement, and accurately states the announced objective of both the United States and the GVN.

Both Bill and I think this is a good speech and will be in the continuing struggle for public enlightenment.

McG. B.

McG. B.

August 30, 1965


Dear Elvis:

I am honored by your invitation to address
the George Catlett Marshall Memorial Dinner on the
evening of October 27th, and accept with pleasure.

Regards,

Maxwell D. Taylor

Elvis J. Stahr, President,
Association of the United States Army,
1527 Eighteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.



ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

1529 EIGHTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

232-3200

25 August 1965

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA-Ret.
4000 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. Apt. 1630
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Max:

The Association of the United States Army will hold its Annual Meeting on October 25, 26 and 27 at the Sheraton-Park Hotel here in Washington, D. C. Some 3,000 members of the Association and their guests will be in attendance.

The highlight of our meeting is the George Catlett Marshall Memorial Dinner which this year will be held on the evening of October 27th. We cordially invite you to be the speaker at this dinner. Previous speakers at the dinner have included Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk and President Johnson.

Some 2,000 will be in attendance at the dinner including officials from the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the military services, Members of Congress, officers and men of the United States Army and officials from industry.

We will, of course, extend to you and Mrs. Taylor an invitation to be our guests for the entire meeting and hope that you would attend as much of it as your schedule will permit. So many of your old friends and Army associates will be present for the dinner that your appearance as our speaker would be most fitting.

We would be highly honored if you will accept our invitation. It would not only be wonderful to have you speak to us but will add immeasurably to the professional value of the meeting.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,


ELVIS J. STAHR
President

Jim

Get me a copy of

Gen Marshall's speech
at Harvard when he
announced the Marshall Plan.

MB

Attached
for

European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery

Weekend

REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE¹

I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufac-

¹ Made on the occasion of commencement exercises at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, and released to the press on the same date.

June 15, 1947

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THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

turer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise

will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

Economic Aid to Italy

NEWS RELEASE
PLEASE NOTE DATE



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:30 P.M. (EDT)
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962

NO. 1654-62
OXford 53201-53176

REMARKS OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
AT THE ANNUAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962 -- 8:00 P.M. (EDT)

It is a double privilege to be here with you this evening. By this occasion we honor two great soldiers. They served together in a war to defend human freedom against the greatest threat it had ever faced. When that war was won, they worked together to build the defenses of the Free World against an even greater threat. In a sense they are both here in this hall, one quite vividly in spirit, and the other in person.

I never knew General Marshall. But no one who served under him, even in a very junior capacity, as I did, could help but absorb some appreciation of his extraordinary qualities. His contributions to the Army, to our country, and to the human race suggest the breadth of his concern -- and the foolishness of trying to pigeonhole something called "the military mind."

Through the first peacetime Selective Service Act, he gave the Army the manpower it needed in a time of crisis. As a military adviser to the President, he was the principal architect of the strategy that gave us victory. As the author of the Plan that bears his name, he gave the Free World an idea that helped to bring Europe back from the ashes, and that is now being applied in our own hemisphere through the "Alianza para Progreso." One of General Marshall's wisest choices, demonstrating again his remarkable powers of judgment, was his selection of Dwight D. Eisenhower for early high command, leading to the career for which we are honoring General Eisenhower this evening.

General Marshall himself received many well-deserved tributes during his career. The highest tribute that I know of was paid to him by Henry Stimson, when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of War. Those of you who attended this dinner ^{two} ~~last year~~ ^{years ago} heard these words from Robert Lovett. I think they are worth repeating. Speaking on VE Day to a small gathering of War Department leaders Mr. Stimson turned to General Marshall and said:

MORE

"I want to acknowledge my great personal debt to you, sir, in common with the whole country. No one who is thinking of himself can rise to true heights. You have never thought of yourself. Seldom can a man put aside such a thing as being the commanding general of the greatest field army in our history. This decision was made by you for wholly unselfish reasons. But you have made your position as Chief of Staff a greater one. I have never seen a task of such magnitude performed by man.

"It is rare late in life to make new friends; at my age it is a slow process, but there is no one for whom I have such deep respect and, I think, greater affection.

"I have seen a great many soldiers in my lifetime, but you, sir, are the finest soldier I have ever known."

What I want to talk with you about this evening are the responsibilities and the challenges that confront today's soldiers, and today's Army.

My thesis is a paradox -- actually, a paradox within a paradox.

The first paradox, which I will only mention, is this: As the United States strives to maintain the great and increasing military might required to protect our vital interests and the vital interests of the Free World, we must at the same time strive for disarmament arrangements that will reduce the danger of war. General Eisenhower personifies that paradox. He is distinguished not only for leading the greatest military expeditionary force in history, but also for breaking new ground in the field of disarmament. There is, of course, no inconsistency in pursuing world-wide disarmament while pursuing Free World strength: We seek disarmament, but not unilateral disarmament. The disarmament we seek, like the strength we have, is intended to preserve our real security.

The second paradox--the one I want to discuss more fully this evening--relates to the role of the Army: As weapons of mass destruction grow more powerful, numerous and widely proliferated among the nations of the world, the role of the Army, and even the role of the individual combat soldier, becomes not less but more important.

The continuing growth of the Soviet nuclear force is the fundamental fact influencing all our military planning. Our first responsibility to ourselves, to our Allies, and to the Free World is to preserve the vital interests of the Free World while avoiding nuclear war. We deter the Soviets from using their growing nuclear force by maintaining a nuclear force strong enough and survivable enough to ride out any conceivable nuclear attack, and to survive with sufficient power to cause unacceptable damage to the attacker.

We have such a force today, and we have increased the budget to assure that we shall have such a force in the future.

The POLARIS submarines deployed around the world, our bombers on 15-minute ground alert, our intercontinental missiles, increasingly hardened and dispersed in a great arc across the western plains provide the required deterrence. We have no reason to fear the Soviet rocket rattlers. Mr. Khrushchev himself has recognized the dangers of nuclear war in his much-quoted speech of January 6, 1961, when he said, "the problem of preventing a global thermonuclear war is the most burning and vital problem for mankind."

But Mr. Khrushchev remains an enthusiastic advocate of other kinds of wars, which he calls "wars of national liberation," and which we identify as subversion or covert aggression. He favors these wars because he believes they are below the threshold of nuclear deterrence; and recent history tends to support his judgment. The United States' nuclear superiority did not deter the Communist invasion of Korea nor the Communist drive for domination in Southeast Asia. Today the threshold of nuclear deterrence is still quite low. But as the Communist nuclear strength increases over the years, that threshold is bound to rise, whatever our margin of nuclear superiority. Therefore, we require increasing capability to deter forms of political and military aggression against which the application of nuclear weapons may not be a credible response.

It is essential in order to protect our own national security, as well as to meet our responsibilities as the leader of the Free World, that we develop and maintain the forces to deter Communist aggression across the entire spectrum of military and para-military aggression -- and, if deterrence should be unsuccessful, to stop that aggression dead in its tracks.

Mr. Khrushchev also likes to talk about "peaceful coexistence." To the extent that his peaceful coexistence means competition in advancing the well-being of peoples in the developing nations, or in the peaceful arts and sciences, or in the race to the moon, we welcome the Communist challenge. As President Kennedy has said, ". . . if Freedom and Communism were to compete for man's allegiance in a world of peace, I would look to the future with ever-increasing confidence."

But the Soviets are not limiting themselves to such competition. So-called "peaceful coexistence" encompasses many levels of conflict from agitation to assassination, from trade fights to shooting fights. That is why countering Communist aggression requires the organized efforts not only of all of the four military Services but of all the agencies of government. This effort is making new demands on each of the military departments. The Army in particular must expand and diversify and modernize itself to deal with a wide range of counter-insurgency and limited-war situations.

I must emphasize that these new requirements do not imply any shift in our stated policy on the use of nuclear weapons. The President has declared that "the defense of Europe and the defense of North America are indivisible," and he has expressed "the hope that no aggressor will mistake our determination to respond instantly with whatever force is appropriate." The appropriate response, whether it be nuclear or non-nuclear, whichever best supports our objective, will be made promptly and forcefully.

The U. S. Army has risen to many challenges in its 187-year history. The 145 battle streamers on the Army Flag represent past threats to America extending from the Revolution to the Korean conflict. Rapid change is no new experience for a Service that in World War II expanded from a small peacetime force of some 270,000 to a modern Army of over 8 million -- that in 1950 changed from garrison duty in Japan one day to combat in Korea the next -- a Service that knows that today it may be in training one hour and in combat the next in any part of the globe.

It has been an impressive and inspiring experience for me to observe the Army responding to the challenges of the '60s. You all know that the number of combat-ready Army divisions has increased by 45% in the past 14 months.

All of you may not be aware that both the 1962 and the 1963 budgets included over \$2½ billion for Army procurement of weapons and equipment -- 65% more than appropriated for fiscal year 1961.

Equally important for the Army is the fact that 1963 procurement funds for airlift aircraft are double the amount for 1961 and that twice as many tactical fighters are being procured for the Air Force in fiscal year 1963 as in fiscal year 1961.

Together with these substantial increases in Army combat effectiveness, a greatly intensified effort is being made to assist our friends and Allies in meeting the threat of Communist-supported insurgent movements. The Army's Special Forces have now been built up to almost four times their strength at the beginning of 1961. In addition these forces are contributing to a development to which I attach extreme importance. Augmented by special units, they are demonstrating the ability of our armed forces to play a vigorously constructive role in support of the economic and social development of less developed areas within our defense perimeter. We know how importantly economic and political reforms contribute to defense against subversion. We recognize the fact that it is this kind of progress, building on whatever can be achieved through military or paramilitary means, that provides the long-term solution to defense against subversion. The Army has a particularly challenging role to play here, and it is making encouraging progress in meeting that challenge.

Incidentally, the cost to the taxpayer of all these developments would be considerably higher but for our overall program to increase the efficiency and reduce the cost of our logistics operations. We have initiated actions since 1961 that will cut the costs of such operations by more than one billion dollars in fiscal year 1963 and by at least three billion dollars per year within three years. The Army's share in this cost-reduction program for 1963 is \$377 million.

At the same time that the Army has been absorbing these large increases of men and equipment and innovations in doctrine, it has been going through a major reorganization involving combat arms and technical services that date back almost two centuries to the time of our first Commander-in-Chief. This reorganization, which has been planned by the Army staff to bring the Army structure into line with its new obligations and new operations, has been the most comprehensive since Secretary Root created the General Staff system in 1903. It has required thousands of man-hours of studies and thousands of pages of planning documents.

But all of these plans and programs would have come to nothing without the dedicated efforts of men and women whose job it is to carry out the plans at every level of responsibility -- from the division commander to the last private -- from a special forces team in Vietnam to the infantry squad in Berlin -- from the Immediate Office of the Secretary to the records rooms in the sub-basement in the Pentagon.

There is no more important concern in the management of the Department of Defense than the welfare and morale of these men and women. I should like to list for you some of the major steps that are being taken to improve their welfare and maintain their morale:

1. The first increase in quarters allowance for military personnel since 1952, will go into effect 90 days from now -- an average increase of 18%.
2. The Congress has just approved a 50 percent increase in the military housing program for the current fiscal year over the previous year.
3. The per diem allowance for both military and civilian personnel has been increased to meet higher costs of living.
4. At our request, the President has appointed a Special Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Services to consider particularly ways to alleviate the problems of off-base discrimination in housing, in education, in transportation, and in recreation, that makes life more difficult for soldiers and their dependents not only in some overseas areas, but also in some parts of our own country.
5. A comprehensive study of military compensation is being completed, looking toward legislation in the next Congress that should bring a long-overdue increase in military pay scales and incidentally reduce the drain of skilled manpower trained at government expense away from the Services to private industry.

These improvements in the circumstances of military service are the least that we owe to our service people. But these are surely not the attractions that draw men and women to the Services, or that sustain them through the rigors of military life. They march to the music of a more distant drum.

In Germany two weeks ago, and earlier in Vietnam, I had an opportunity to observe and talk with some of the officers and men who are occupying our most forward positions under extremely difficult circumstances. I can only report that their readiness, their determination, and their sense of humor, measure up to the highest standards of the U. S. Army.

I had a rare insight into the motivations for military leadership the other day when President Kennedy shared with me a letter that he received from Major General William F. Train in response to the President's letter of condolence about General Train's son, Lt. William F. Train, III, who was killed in Vietnam.

General Train wrote:

"After graduation from West Point in 1959 and completion of the Infantry School, followed by airborne and ranger training, our son chose Korea as a demanding first assignment. He was completely dedicated to 'Duty, Honor and Country' and the life of a soldier. While there, in addition to his military duties, he actively sought to make friends with the Koreans, learn their language, and acquaint himself with this life and culture. He thus exemplified the qualities of leadership, diplomacy, and civic-mindedness so urgently advocated

by you in your speech to the graduating cadets at West Point on 6 June. Upon his return to the United States, he served at Fort Myer, Virginia, for almost a year, and then volunteered for the new challenge of Vietnam. He believed that his success with the Koreans, together with his facility in French, would be of especial value to his country there.

"His dedication and achievement in his work are fortunately memorialized in the words of a man who served under his command; a sergeant, who wrote: 'His fierce devotion to duty and his tremendous talent for taking care of small details, as well as large ones, endeared him to his men. We knew him as one officer who 'always had time.' Even when he didn't have time, he took time. We always got the impression that we were second only in importance to the mission to be accomplished. This is what enlisted men look for in officers and this is also what causes men to follow such a leader with an unquestioning attitude.'"

General Train continued:

"We send you this letter to thank you for your condolences and to tell you about our son. We are anxious that our nation remember him not just as another casualty of the cold war, nor even only as our son, but rather as a loss to the Army and to the Nation, of one of its promising, courageous young officers. We buried him at West Point on 9 July in the hallowed ground of the Military Academy whose motto of 'Duty, Honor and Country' he lived during his brief life."

It would be presumptuous of me to follow General Train's words with any words of my own. Instead, let me conclude by reading to you a few sentences spoken by General Marshall at Trinity College in June 1941, on one of the few occasions when he unburdened himself of his inmost feelings.

"The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul, are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end . . . It is morale that wins the victory

"It is more than a word - more than any one word, or several words, can measure.

"Morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is elan, esprit de corps and determination.

"It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end - the will to win.

"With it all things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught.

"We are building that morale - not on supreme confidence in our ability to conquer and subdue other peoples; not in reliance on things of steel and the super-excellence of guns and planes and bomb sights.

"We are building it on things infinitely more potent. We are building it on belief for it is what men believe that makes them invincible. We have sought for something more than enthusiasm, something not merely of the intellect or the emotions but rather something in the spirit of the man, something encompassed only by the soul."

E N D

November 26, 1965

Dear General Baumer:

I am very happy to authorize the publication of my George Catlett Marshall address in "World Affairs". As I do not know whether you have a copy of the text, I am enclosing one herewith.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor

Brig. Gen. William H. Baumer, Ret.,
Bradford Speed Packaging and Development Corp.
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

(1)
Final Version

GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEMORIAL ADDRESS
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, USA (RET.)
27 OCTOBER 1965

I PRESUME THAT ALL OR MOST OF MY PREDECESSORS ON THIS PLATFORM HAVE SHARED MY PRESENT FEELING OF TREPIDATION AT UNDERTAKING TO MAKE THE ANNUAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEMORIAL ADDRESS. IT REQUIRES MORE THAN A USUAL RHETORICAL EFFORT TO DO JUSTICE TO THE OCCASION AND TO THE MAN TO WHOSE MEMORY THE EVENING IS DEDICATED. MY PREDICAMENT IS INCREASED BY THE CONCURRENT CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE RECIPIENT OF THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEMORIAL AWARD TONIGHT IS AN OLD FRIEND FOR WHOM I HAVE ALWAYS HAD THE GREATEST ADMIRATION, GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS. I FIRST KNEW HIM WHEN HE FILLED A MORE AWESOME ROLE THAN THAT OF AN ARMY GROUP COMMANDER. DURING MOST OF MY CADET DAYS, HE WAS A CAPTAIN OF FIELD ARTILLERY AND A MEMBER OF THE REDOUBTABLE TACTICAL DEPARTMENT AND AS SUCH UNDERTOOK TO MAKE SOMETHING FROM THE UNPROMISING MATERIEL OF THE CORPS OF THAT DAY. IN THE COURSE OF INTRODUCING US TO THE MYSTERIES OF GUNNERY, HE ACCOMPLISHED FAR MORE IN IMPRESSING UPON MY GENERATION OF CADETS HIS STALWART CHARACTER AND HIS OUTSTANDING QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP. THROUGHOUT THE INTERVENING YEARS, HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE CAN LEAD AN ARMY GROUP TO VICTORY IN BATTLE AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, CAN ALSO DEFEAT AND CIRCUMVENT THE RAVAGES OF TIME. HE REMAINS AN EXAMPLE TO ALL OF US WHO ASPIRE ALWAYS TO LEAD AN EFFECTIVE AND STRENUOUS LIFE.

WITH REGARD TO GENERAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL, I NEVER HAD THE OCCASION TO SERVE NEAR HIM IN MY EARLY DAYS SINCE THEY WERE SPENT WITH THE ENGINEERS AND FIELD ARTILLERY AND THUS NEVER BROUGHT ME TO THE

INFANTRY/

INFANTRY SCHOOL WHERE COLONEL MARSHALL LONG HELD SWAY. IT WAS MY GREAT GOOD FORTUNE, HOWEVER, TO BE ASSIGNED TO HIS OFFICE A FEW MONTHS BEFORE PEARL HARBOR AS ONE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF. FOR OVER A YEAR, I WAS IN CLOSE DAILY CONTACT WITH THE CHIEF AND LIKE ALL OF MY ASSOCIATES DEVELOPED AN AFFECTION AND RESPECT FOR HIM WHICH I WILL CARRY TO THE GRAVE. THE VALUE OF THE LESSONS WHICH HE TAUGHT THE OFFICERS AROUND HIM WAS INCALCULABLE. HE DID SO MANY LITTLE THINGS WHICH ARE ALWAYS COMING TO MIND, EVEN AFTER THE PASSAGE OF MANY YEARS. I VIVIDLY REMEMBER CARRYING MY FIRST STAFF PAPER TO HIM TO RECEIVE HIS DECISION AS CHIEF OF STAFF. IT WAS THE EARTH-SHAKING QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ALASKAN NATIONAL GUARD SHOULD BE INCREASED BY TWO COMPANIES, A SUBJECT ABOUT WHICH G-1 AND G-3 HAD DIFFERING VIEWS. I CAREFULLY PRESENTED THE PROS AND CONS OF THE ISSUE TO GENERAL MARSHALL, THEN LEANED BACK IN MY CHAIR TO RECEIVE HIS DECISION. LOOKING ME COLDLY IN THE EYE, HE SAID, "TAYLOR, WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT IT?" I GASPED AND NEARLY DROPPED MY PAPERS. IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ME THAT A MERE MAJOR HAD A RIGHT TO SECOND-GUESS THE AUGUST POWERS OF G-1 AND G-3. BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I LEARNED MY LESSON AT THAT MOMENT. NEVER AGAIN DID I APPEAR BEFORE GENERAL MARSHALL WITH A PAPER ON ANY SUBJECT-- HOW TO INVADE THE FORTRESS EUROPE, HOW TO ORGANIZE THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN THEATER, ANY SUBJECT--WITHOUT A PERSONAL OPINION AS TO THE RIGHT SOLUTION. THIS MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED BRASHNESS BUT IT CERTAINLY WAS TRAINING IN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A POSITION AND TO MAKE A FIRM RECOMMENDATION.

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THE MOMENT OF GREATEST HISTORIC INTEREST WHICH I SHARED WITH GENERAL MARSHALL WAS IN JULY, 1945, IN GERMANY FOLLOWING THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE. MY DIVISION WAS THEN AT BERCHTESGADEN WHERE I RECEIVED WORD FROM POTSDAM THAT GENERAL MARSHALL WISHED TO PAY A VISIT TO REST AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LUNCHEON WITH GENERAL PATTON WHOSE HEADQUARTERS WAS NEAR BY. THE LUNCHEON TOOK PLACE AT THE BERCHTESGADENER HOF ON JULY 28 AFTER WHICH WE WENT OUT TO WATCH A TRACK MEET BETWEEN SOLDIERS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND OF THE II CORPS. IN THE COURSE OF THE AFTERNOON, AS THE CONVERSATION LAGGED, GENERAL MARSHALL ABRUPTLY CHANGED THE SUBJECT WHICH WE WERE DISCUSSING AND TOLD US ABOUT THE ATOMIC BOMB TEST AT ALAMAGORDO 12 DAYS BEFORE. AFTER DESCRIBING THE EFFECT OF THIS EXPLOSION WHICH HE EXPLAINED WAS REALLY AN "IMPLOSION", HE THEN DESCRIBED THE OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR ITS USE. HE TOLD HOW WE WERE GOING TO DROP ONE OF THESE BOMBS ON JAPAN THE FIRST MOONLIGHT NIGHT IN AUGUST AND ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT TWO WOULD BE ENOUGH. AS WE ALL KNOW, HIS ESTIMATE WAS CORRECT AND THE USE OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ADDED TO THE EFFECT OF THE PRECEDING LAND, SEA AND AIR CAMPAIGNS, BROUGHT ABOUT THE VICTORY WHICH WAS SEALED ON THE DECK OF THE USS MISSOURI IN TOKYO HARBOR.

AS WE LOOK AT OUR WORLD-WIDE MILITARY PROBLEMS TODAY, PARTICULARLY THE ONE CONFRONTING US IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, I OFTEN WONDER HOW GENERAL MARSHALL WOULD REACT TO CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. ~~THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE~~
~~THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE~~ WITH
the REGARD TO *in SVN* THIS COMPLEX SITUATION, I SUSPECT HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REPEAT ONE OF THE OPENING SENTENCES OF HIS HISTORIC ADDRESS AT HARVARD

IN 1947/

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IN 1947 ANNOUNCING THE MARSHALL PLAN. REFERRING TO THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AT THAT TIME, HE SAID, "I THINK ONE DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF SUCH ENORMOUS COMPLEXITY THAT THE VERY MASS OF FACTS PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC BY PRESS AND RADIO MAKE IT EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE MAN IN THE STREET TO GET A CLEAR APPRAISEMENT OF THE SITUATION". THESE WORDS HAVE AN UNUSUALLY PAT APPLICABILITY TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SCENE. THERE WE ARE FACED AND HAVE BEEN FACED FOR A LONG TIME WITH A PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION--COMMUNICATION OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES TO OUR OWN PEOPLE, TO OUR ALLIES AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE VERY MASS OF FACTS AND REPORTS COMING FROM VIET-NAM OVER THE YEARS HAS TENDED TO CONFUSE AND TO CONCEAL THE SIMPLICITY OF THE BASIC OBJECTIVES, ALTHOUGH THESE ARE SO FORTHRIGHT AND SO EASILY STATED THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES SUSPECTED OF DEVIOUS MOTIVES BEHIND THE SIMPLICITY OF THEIR ELABORATION.

THE FACT IS THAT SINCE 1954, THROUGHOUT THREE ADMINISTRATIONS, WITH IMPERTURBABLE CONSTANCY, OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND ^{of} THE RIGHT OF THAT PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, TO LIVE THEIR LIVES IN THEIR PREFERRED WAY, AND TO ADVANCE TOWARD ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT. BUT TO REACH SUCH AN OBJECTIVE, IT IS FIRST NECESSARY TO BRING AN END TO THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, DIRECTED BY HANOI AND SUPPORTED BY PEKING, AND THE PURSUIT OF THEIR OBJECTIVE OF UNIFYING NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM IN A SINGLE COMMUNIST STATE.

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TO SUPPLEMENT THIS STATEMENT OF WHAT WE DO WANT TO DO, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MENTION SOME OF THE THINGS WE DO NOT WANT TO DO. WE ARE NOT SEEKING A PERMANENT FOOTHOLD ON THE CONTINENT OF ASIA; WE WANT NO BASES, NO ALLIANCES, NO SPHERE OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES. FROM THE BEGINNING, WE HAVE INTENDED TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM VIET-NAM AS SOON AS THEY ARE NO LONGER NEEDED. WE DO NOT SEEK TO WIDEN THE WAR BUT MERELY TO BRING THE AGGRESSION TO AN END.

IF WE NEEDED OTHER REASONS BEYOND THOSE WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED FOR THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WE ARE PURSUING IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, SEVERAL COULD BE CITED. THEY COULD BE FOUND IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A COMMUNIST VICTORY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN OUR STRUGGLE IN THIS DISTANT PART OF THE WORLD, WE ARE OPPOSING A "WAR OF LIBERATION", THE FORM OF AGGRESSION WHICH THE COMMUNISTS IN HANOI, PEKING AND MOSCOW HAVE ALL PROCLAIMED AS THE FAVORED TECHNIQUE OF THE FUTURE FOR THE EXPANSION OF MILITANT COMMUNISM. NOW A "WAR OF LIBERATION" IS MERELY COMMUNIST JARGON FOR THE USE OF TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE TO SUBVERT A NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT WHILE DISGUIISING THE AGGRESSION AS A CIVIL REVOLT. THIS TECHNIQUE IS ON TRIAL IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TEST IS THOROUGHLY RECOGNIZED BY THE COMMUNIST LEADERS AS WELL AS BY OUR OWN. GENERAL GIAP, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH VIET-NAM, HAS SAID "SOUTH VIET-NAM IS THE MODEL OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF OUR TIME. IF THE SPECIAL WARFARE WHICH THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS ARE TESTING IN SOUTH/

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SOUTH VIET-NAM IS OVERCOME, THEN IT CAN BE DEFEATED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD". ON OUR SIDE, WE RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE TO THE SAFETY OF ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ABOUT THE WORLD. WE, TOO, KNOW THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STAKE FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM AND FOR MANY OTHERS *emerging countries* WHO LIVE IN THE SHADOW OF THE THREAT OF THE "WAR OF LIBERATION". PRESIDENT EISENHOWER IN 1959 STATED "STRATEGICALLY, SOUTH VIET-NAM'S CAPTURE BY THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BRING THEIR POWER SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES INTO THE HITHERTO FREE REGION. THE REMAINING COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD BE MENANCED BY A GREAT FLANKING MOVEMENT. THE LOSS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WOULD SET IN MOTION A CRUMBLING PROCESS WHICH COULD AS IT PROGRESSES HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR US AND FOR FREEDOM". MORE RECENTLY THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS PASSED BY A VOTE OF 502 TO 2 IN AUGUST, 1964, STATED "THE UNITED STATES REGARDS AS VITAL TO ITS NATIONAL INTEREST AND TO WORLD PEACE THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA". THUS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR NATIONAL OBJECTIVE--THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND ITS EXISTENCE AS A VIABLE STATE--IS REQUIRED NOT ONLY AS A MATTER OF JUSTICE TO A SMALL COUNTRY STRUGGLING TO BE FREE BUT ALSO AS A PROTECTION TO OTHER AREAS CERTAIN TO BE ATTACKED IF HANOI SUCCEEDS IN VIET-NAM. THUS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE TRANSCENDS THE NUMBERS OF THE FORCES PRESENTLY ENGAGED, THE SIZE OF THE TERRITORY INVOLVED AND THE RESOURCES IMMEDIATELY COMMITTED. SOMETHING TRULY BIG GOES ON HERE. CLEARLY, OUR VITAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE.

IF/

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IF THAT BE SO, IT IS A FAIR QUESTION TO ASK, "WHAT ARE OUR CHANCES OF SUCCESS?" FIRST, LET ME MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR WHAT I WOULD MEAN BY SUCCESS. I WOULD SAY THAT IT IS THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVE OF AN INDEPENDENT SOUTH VIET-NAM WHICH, IN TURN, REQUIRES A CESSATION OF THE CONTINUOUS INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIEL FROM NORTH VIET-NAM INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM AND THE CONTINUED DIRECTION OF THE WAR FROM HANOI. IT WILL ALSO REQUIRE AN EVENTUAL DISOLUTION OF THE EXTENSIVE GUERRILLA APPARATUS WHICH HAS BEEN CLANDESTINELY INSTALLED AND PROGRESSIVELY EXPANDED THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIET-NAM. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN SUCH A DEFINITION OF SUCCESS WHICH IN ITSELF REQUIRES AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF OUR OPPONENTS, AN INGLORIOUS CAPITULATION LIKE THE ONE ON THE DECK OF THE MISSOURI OR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE COMMUNIST STATE OF NORTH VIET-NAM. THE CLASSIC PATTERN OF YORKTOWN, APPOMATTOX, OR TOKYO BAY IS HARDLY RELEVANT TO THE TERMINAL PHASE OF A GUERRILLA SITUATION SUCH AS WE HAVE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IF WE ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, THE CEREMONIAL TRAPPINGS OF SUCCESS WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPORTANCE.

WITH REGARD TO THE FEASIBILITY OF ATTAINING OUR OBJECTIVE, I WOULD SAY THAT WE ARE MAKING ENCOURAGING PROGRESS AS WE PURSUE A STRATEGY FORMED OF FOUR PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS.

FIRST, WE ARE VIGOROUSLY ENGAGED IN INCREASING THE GROUND STRENGTH OF OUR FORCES, THOSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND OUR OWN, IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE FORCES COMMITTED TO THE VIET CONG GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE BEGUN IN MAY OF THIS YEAR. THIS OPERATION, YOU WILL RECALL, WAS THE WIDELY HERALDED

"MONSOON/"

"MONSOON OFFENSIVE" WHICH THE COMMUNISTS HOPED WOULD RESULT IN SPLITTING SOUTH VIET-NAM BY A DRIVE TO THE SEA BETWEEN HUE AND SAIGON. THAT OFFENSIVE IS PRESENTLY STOPPED AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT IT WILL BE RESUMED. THE PRESENCE OF OUR UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES HAS CONTRIBUTED MIGHTILY TO THIS CHANGE OF EVENTS. IT WAS TIMELY ACCEPTANCE OF THE INESCAPABLE NEED FOR THESE AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS WHICH OVERCAME OUR LONG-TIME RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE OUR FORCES IN THE GROUND BATTLE.

THE SECOND COMPONENT OF OUR CURRENT STRATEGY CONSISTS OF THE USE OF AIR POWER, OUR OWN AND THAT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, AGAINST THE MILITARY TARGET SYSTEM IN NORTH VIET-NAM. THIS AIR CAMPAIGN WAS BEGUN IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR FOR THREE PURPOSES. THE FIRST WAS TO GIVE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ELEVEN YEARS THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE BACK AGAINST THE SOURCE OF ALL THEIR TROUBLES IN THE NORTH.. THE SECOND PURPOSE WAS TO UTILIZE AIR POWER TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH VIET-NAM INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE FINAL AND IN THE LONG RUN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT PURPOSE WAS TO REMIND THE COMMUNIST LEADERS IN HANOI THAT THEY MUST PAY A PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER PRICE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTH.

THE THIRD COMPONENT OF OUR STRATEGY IS THAT DIRECTED AT STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. WE HAVE ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THOROUGHLY THAT THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IS NOT BASICALLY A MILITARY ONE, THAT SECURITY

ATTAINED/

ATTAINED BY MILITARY FORCE IS IMPORTANT LARGELY AS A MEANS TO PERMIT THE AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT TO BRING LONG-NEEDED SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE PEOPLE. THUS WE WILL SPEND IN THIS FISCAL YEAR WELL OVER \$300 MILLION TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM BEHIND THE SCREEN OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. THIS MONEY WILL GO TO CONTROL INFLATION, ALWAYS A MENACE IN TIME OF WAR, AND TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURE, PUBLIC HEALTH, EDUCATION AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION THROUGHOUT THE SECURE AREAS. A RELATED PURPOSE IS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PEOPLE THE EARNEST DESIRE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BRING THEM A BETTER AND A MORE SECURE LIFE AND THUS TO CONFIRM THEM IN THEIR RESISTANCE TO THE COMMUNIST ENEMY.

THE FOURTH COMPONENT IN OUR STRATEGY IS REPRESENTED BY THE CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR READINESS TO DISCUSS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM WITH ANY GOVERNMENT SINCERELY INTERESTED IN PURSUING PEACE. OUR LEADERS HAVE STATED THIS READINESS OVER AND OVER AGAIN AND PATIENTLY AWAIT A RESPONSE FROM THE COMMUNIST SIDE. CERTAINLY OUR SINCERITY MUST BE APPARENT TO BOTH OUR FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES ALIKE--THAT WE WANT A PEACE BUT ONE CONSISTENT WITH OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT SOUTH VIET-NAM LIVING UNDER A GOVERNMENT OF CHOICE OF ITS OWN PEOPLE.

HOW WOULD WE SAY THAT THIS FOUR-POINT STRATEGY IS SUCCEEDING? WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE HAVE RECAPTURED THE INITIATIVE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WOULD SEEM THAT WITH THE INCREASING AMERICAN COMBAT STRENGTH THIS INITIATIVE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN WITH US.

IN THE AIR, WE HAVE PROGRESSIVELY DESTROYED A LARGE PART OF THE MILITARY TARGET SYSTEM OF NORTH VIET-NAM. DAYLIGHT MOVEMENT ON THE ROADS, RAILROADS, AND WATERWAYS OF THAT COUNTRY HAS BECOME BOTH DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS. ONE CANNOT CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THESE AIR ATTACKS WITHOUT BECOMING CONVINCED THAT, IN LARGE PART, THE OBJECTIVE OF IMPEDING THE INFILTRATION OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF MEN, MATERIEL INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM IS BEING ATTAINED. WITH REGARD TO THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, ONE CANNOT BE SURE BUT OUR COURSE SEEMS A SOUND ONE BOTH FROM A MILITARY AND POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. OVER A CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST THE GREEK HISTORIAN ^{Polybius} SAID "IT IS NOT THE OBJECT OF WAR TO ANNIHILATE THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN PROVOCATION FOR IT BUT TO CAUSE THEM TO MEND THEIR WAYS".

SOONER OR LATER A COMBINATION OF ^{the} AIR OFFENSIVE AND ^{the} GROUND INITIATIVE SHOULD CONVINCe THE HANOI LEADERSHIP THAT THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MEND THEIR WAYS.

ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRONTS, WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS ALTHOUGH THESE REMAIN THE WEAK SECTORS OF OUR EFFORTS. WE MUST DISPLAY CONTINUED PATIENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON AND IN THE PROVINCES, RECOGNIZING THE INEVITABLE LACK OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE IN A COUNTRY WHICH, BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HISTORY, HAS NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO DEVELOP LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, WE HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN RESTRAINING INFLATION IN A WEAK ECONOMY EXPOSED TO STRESSES OF A LONG WAR. THUS FAR, WE HAVE BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL AND I HAVE LITTLE

DOUBT/

DOUBT THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO HOLD INFLATION WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS ;
EVEN THOUGH THE PROBLEM IS LIKELY TO BECOME GREATER WITH THE INCREASED
NUMBER OF AMERICAN FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

WITH REGARD TO REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED
THAT THUS FAR WE HAVE HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE COMMUNIST SIDE. WE ARE
QUITE CONVINCED, HOWEVER, OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE PRESENTING THE
LEADERSHIP IN HANOI AND IN PEKING WITH VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. HANOI,
IN PARTICULAR, MUST VIEW THE FUTURE WITH FOREBODING. THE DILEMMA OF
THE LEADERSHIP THERE IS THE CHOICE EITHER TO CHANGE THEIR BEHAVIOR
AND TO FOREGO THE ATTEMPT TO CONQUER SOUTH VIET-NAM OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
TO ACCEPT INCREASING ^{costs} ~~damages~~ OF THEIR COUNTRY THROUGH AIR ATTACKS
AND TO FACE THE DEEPLY DISTURBING PROBABILITY OF EVENTUALLY FALLING A
SATELLITE TO THE RED CHINESE. IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN THE
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THIS PART OF THE WORLD THAT ALL VIETNAMESE,
NORTH AND SOUTH, DISLIKE AND DISTRUST THE CHINESE WHOM THEY REGARD AS
THE TRADITIONAL, SUSPECTED ENEMY.

ON OUR SIDE, WE HAVE DIFFICULTIES ALSO. WE MUST RETAIN THE MILITARY
INITIATIVE. WE MUST WORK CONSTANTLY FOR THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE ECONOMY. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING TO CONVINCHE HANOI AND THE
COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP THAT THEY HAVE NO CHANCE OF A MILITARY OR POLITICAL
SUCCESS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM OR OF A BREACH OF OUR HOME FRONT HERE. ONLY
THUS CAN WE BRING THEM TO THE MOMENT OF TRUTH WHEN THEY CHANGE COURSE AND
ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF ~~THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVE OF A FREE,~~
permitting SVN to determine its own future

~~INDEPENDENT~~

~~FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIET NAM.~~ TO BRING THEM TO THIS CONVICTION, WE AS
THE PEOPLE MUST DISPLAY A SOLIDARITY OF FRONT AND AN UNUSUAL
RESOLUTION. IN THE WORDS WHICH GENERAL MARSHALL SPOKE AT TRINITY
COLLEGE IN JUNE, 1949, "WHAT WE NEED TODAY IS STAYING POWER, THE
SPIRIT WHICH ENDURES TO THE END--THE WILL TO WIN".