By
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 13, 2003.
My talk is about the war
on terrorism. I’d like to start with a personal story.
September 11 in
On
We asked the US European
Command for the means to get back to
Strategizing at
30,000 Feet
In the KC-135, we
conferred and wrote papers about how to comprehend the September
11 attack as a matter of national security policy.
President Bush’s
statements even then showed that he thought of the attack, in essence, as an
act of war, rather than a law enforcement matter. That point may now seem
unremarkable, but think back to the 1993
We in the KC-135 chewed
over such questions as what it means to be at war not with a conventional enemy
but with a network of terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. How
should we formulate our war aims – how define victory? What should be our
strategy?
As we mulled all this,
the airplane’s crew invited us to the cockpit to look down on the southern tip
of
When we landed in
That work has held up
well since September 2001.
The President and his
advisors considered the nature of the threat. If terrorists exploited the open
nature of our society to attack us repeatedly, the American people might feel
compelled to change that nature – to close it – to defend ourselves. Many
defensive measures come at a high price – that is, interference with our
freedom of movement, intrusions on our privacy, inspections and an undesirable,
however necessary, rebalancing of civil liberties against the interests of
public safety. In other words, at stake in the war on terrorism are not just
the lives and limbs of potential victims, but our country’s freedom.
It isn’t possible to
prevent all terrorist attacks; there are simply too many targets in the
Because the
The Three-Part
Strategy
Accordingly, the
President’s strategy in the war on terrorism has three parts. One is disrupting
and destroying terrorists and their infrastructure. This involves direct
military action, but also intelligence, law enforcement and financial
regulatory activity.
The list of senior
members of al Qaida and affiliated groups who have
been killed or captured since 9/11 is impressive and includes such key figures
as:
·
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad;
·
Abu
Zubaydah;
·
Hambali; and,
·
Mohammad
Atef.
These and other
successes against the terrorists demonstrate that international cooperation is
alive, well and effective. We’ve worked jointly with the
From our interrogations
of detainees we know that the absence of large-scale attacks on the
The second part of our
strategy targets the recruitment and indoctrination of terrorists. The
objective is to create a global intellectual and moral environment hostile to
terrorism. We refer to this part as "the battle of ideas." As the
President’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism puts it: We want
terrorism "viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy or genocide:
behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must
oppose." This requires a sustained effort to de-legitimate terrorism, and
to promote the success of those forces, especially within the Moslem world,
that are working to build and preserve modern, moderate and democratic political
and educational institutions.
And the third part of
the strategy, of course, is securing the homeland. The Bush Administration has
created the Department of Homeland Security, while the Defense Department has
organized a new Northern Command in which, for the first time, a combatant
commander has the entire continental
Coalitions
Our strategy envisions
international cooperation. The war is global. We have forged formidable,
adaptable partnerships -- a rolling set, because some coalition partners are
comfortable helping in some areas, but not in others.
After 9/11, nearly a
hundred nations joined us in one or more aspect of the war on terrorism – in
military operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban
in Afghanistan; in maritime interdiction operations; in financial crackdowns
against terrorists funding; in law enforcement actions; in intelligence-sharing;
and in diplomatic efforts.
In Operation Enduring
Freedom-Afghanistan, there are 71 members of the coalition; including
contributors to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 37 countries
have contributed military assets. In
The Terrorist/State
Sponsor/WMD Nexus
As President Bush noted
early on, the war’s greatest strategic danger remains the possibility that
terrorists will obtain chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The list of states
that sponsor terrorism correlates obviously and ominously with the list of
those that have programs to produce such weapons of mass destruction.
The nexus of terrorist
groups, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD is the security nightmare of the
21st century. It remains our focus. We are treating this threat as a
compelling danger in the near term. We are not waiting for it to become
"imminent," for we cannot expect to receive unambiguous warning of,
for example, a terrorist group’s acquisition of biological weapons agents.
We know the list of
terrorist-sponsoring states with WMD programs -- Iran, Syria, Libya and North
Korea. Iraq used to be in that category, but no longer is.
Iraq – The Case for
Action
Iraq under Saddam
Hussein was a sadistic tyranny that developed and used weapons of mass
destruction, launched aggressive attacks and wars against Iran, Kuwait, Israel
and Saudi Arabia and supported terrorists by providing them with safe harbor,
funds, training and other help. It had defied a long list of legally binding UN
Security Council resolutions. It undid the UN inspection regime of the 1990s.
It eviscerated the economic sanctions regime. And it shot virtually daily at
the US and British aircraft patrolling Iraq’s northern and southern no-fly zones.
In sum, containment of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a hollow hope.
The best information
available from intelligence sources said that (1) Saddam Hussein had chemical
and biological weapons and was pursuing nuclear weapons, and (2) if Saddam
Hussein obtained fissile material from outside Iraq, as opposed to having to
produce it indigenously, he could have had a nuclear weapon within a year.
Those assessments, and
most of the underlying information, were not recent products of the
intelligence community. They were consistent with the intelligence that
pre-dated the Administration of George W. Bush. And they were consistent with
the intelligence from cooperative foreign services and with United Nations
estimates of weapons unaccounted-for.
It was reasonable, indeed
necessary, for the US government to rely on the best information it had
available. And while we haven’t yet found (and may not find) stockpiles of
chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, David Kay reports that the Iraq Survey
Group has obtained corroborative evidence of Saddam’s nuclear, chemical and
biological programs, covert laboratories, advanced missile programs and Iraq’s
program (active right up to the start of the war) to conceal WMD-related
developments from the UN inspectors.
The Iraqi dictator posed
a serious threat. Given the nature of that threat, seen in light of our
experience with the surprise attack of 9/11 and the crumbling, one after
another, of the pillars of containment, it would have been risky in the extreme
to have allowed him to remain in power for the indefinite future. Intelligence
is never perfect. But that is not grounds for inaction in the face of the kind
of information the President had about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Saddam’s demise has
freed Iraqis of a tyrant, deprived terrorists of a financier and supporter,
eliminated a threat to regional stability, taken Iraq off the list of rogue
states with WMD programs and created a new opportunity for free political
institutions to arise in the Arab world. All of this serves our cause in the
Global War on Terrorism.
Experiments in
democratization
In Iraq and Afghanistan,
democratization has begun. Success will strengthen the forces of moderation in
the Muslim world. It could create a new era in the Middle East. Already, since
Iraq’s liberation, talk of reform and democracy is more common and more intense
in the Arab world. It would be desirable if the Middle East reached a political
turning point similar to the points in history when Asian democracy and Latin
American democracy blossomed and spread rapidly.
As the President said
last week at the National Endowment for Democracy: "It should be
clear to all that Islam – the faith of one-fifth of humanity – is consistent
with democratic rule. Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim
countries … More than half of all Muslims in the world live in freedom under
democratically constituted governments."
Opposition to democratic
rule motivates extremists in both Afghanistan and Iraq to try to tear down the
newly formed institutions. They see the potential for modernization,
democratization and liberalization of the economy and they oppose and fear what
they see.
Extremism of the type
that fuels terrorism is a political phenomenon. It’s driven by ideology and
ideologies, we know, can be defeated. Like Soviet Communism and Nazism, radical
Islamism can be discredited by failure.
When the Soviet system
collapsed, it helped demonstrate that our nation’s positive message --
individual liberty, the rule of law, tolerance and peace – has global appeal.
Soviet communism was discredited practically and morally by its ultimately
undeniable failures to deliver goodness or happiness. Radical Islamism – an
ideological stew of historical resentments, political hatreds, religious
intolerance and violence – can be expected to have a similar end. Like
communism, it promises a utopia that it can’t deliver.
As the President
noted: "Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military
dictatorships and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. …
The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible
leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and
subjects – they deserve to be active citizens."
In Afghanistan and Iraq
– as well as elsewhere in the region – this process has begun.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan has a way to
go before it achieves a stable, permanent government. Taliban forces are
working to regroup and attack, often from bases in the rough terrain of the
tribal areas just across the Pakistan border. Afghanistan’s central government
needs more skilled administrators. It needs better control over the country’s
customs revenues. And important open questions remain as to the right
relationship between the central government and the local governors and
military commanders.
But Afghanistan has come
far since its liberation from the Taliban only two years ago. President Karzai is increasingly extending the government’s authority
across the country:
·
President
Karzai has replaced about one-third of the provincial
governors.
·
Reform
of the Defense Ministry is underway and producing greater ethnic balance.
·
The
government and the Constitutional Commission have just produced a draft
constitution that the loya jirga may approve next month.
·
National
elections in Afghanistan are scheduled for next year.
·
International
assistance to Afghanistan is increasing.
·
A
modern ring road – a boon to commerce, security and national unity – is being
built around the country. The Kabul-to-Kandahar
portion is to be usable by December of this year.
·
And
NATO has taken over the UN-mandated ISAF in Kabul, and is expanding its
peacekeeping role outside the capital.
Afghanistan’s courage
and unity will continue to be tested. But it appears that Afghanistan is passing
these tests. It’s a country on the rise. And it’s a country that’s no longer
affording terrorists the quiet enjoyment of bases of operation.
Iraq
Iraq, too, is a story of
difficulties, but also progress and promise. Iraqis, like Afghans, know that they
have been liberated from tyranny. They recognize their stake in the Coalition’s
success, even though a thick residue of fear inhibits many from contributing to
that success.
Our strategic goal in
Iraq is to give Iraq back to the Iraqi people—well-launched on the road to
freedom, security and prosperity. We can’t build the new Iraq for them – but we
can make sure that, when we leave, they are in a position to build it
themselves. Our foremost objective is to improve the security situation to make
political and economic development possible. We recognize that security,
freedom and prosperity are tightly interrelated. There is no solution to the
security problem without progress on the economic and political fronts.
The enemies of our
strategic goal are:
1. Former regime loyalists – Saddam’s
"dead enders;"
2. Foreign fighters – "jihadists;"
3. Terrorist groups—al Qaeda
and its allies; and
4. The scores of thousands of criminals
that Saddam released from his prisons in the months before the war.
We don’t underestimate
the task we face – we recognize that the enemy has a number of strengths. For
example, the country is awash in munitions, our enemies have access to a lot of
money and Saddam remains at large. It doesn’t take an enormous effort to attack
small numbers of soldiers every week. And the international jihad network has
opted to support the fight against the Coalition in Iraq – making Iraq the
central battlefield now in the Global War on Terrorism.
But we also know that
our enemies have vulnerabilities. For example, the former regime is not popular
in the country, and it had and has a very narrow base of public support.
Moreover, Iraqis resent the presence of foreign jihadis
who have chosen Iraq as the battlefield on which to confront the US. Few Iraqis
support the jihadis’ ideology.
Another enemy
vulnerability is his relatively small geographic base: The vast majority of the
attacks against Coalition forces in recent month have occurred in Baghdad and
in Saddam’s former stronghold north and west of the capital. In large parts of
the country in the north and south the population is well-disposed to the
Coalition and those areas are relatively free of such attacks, though there
have been horrific bombings in Mosul, Hajaf and, yesterday, in Nasariyah.
We believe the enemy
strategy is to:
1. Break Coalition will, through daily
attacks on Coalition forces;
2. Target embodiments of success, through
attacks on infrastructure and police;
3. Divide and intimidate Iraqis, through
assassinations of civilians, including attacks on the Governing Council;
4. Portray the Coalition (especially the
US) as imperialist and exploitative;
5. Drive out international organizations
and NGOs; and,
6. Slow down progress towards self-rule in
the hope that the Coalition will run out of patience and leave.
Coalition forces are
taking the initiative to search out the enemy, defeat his efforts and cut off
his bases of support. We are doing this through direct action based on specific
intelligence, such as the raid conducted against Uday
and Qusay and the recent raid by the 82nd
Airborne which netted two former Iraqi generals in Fallujah,
who are suspected of being key financiers and organizers of anti-coalition
activities in the city.
Our forces are
innovating at the tactical level. They are using battlefield surveillance
radars to locate mortar positions. They’re developing and deploying technical
means to deal with roadside bombs. And they’re continually developing special
convoy security measures. Coalition forces have stepped up efforts to guard the
borders to prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters and terrorists.
Although the Coalition
is doing a lot, the strategic solution to the security problem in Iraq is to
enable Iraqis to provide for their own security. And so, the Coalition is
organizing and equipping Iraqis and putting them in positions of responsibility
for their own security. Having more Iraqis active in their security forces will
yield several benefits in helping to reach our strategic objectives. Iraqis
have more familiarity with the people and terrain of Iraq. Iraqis can provide
better intelligence on the locations of terrorists. A leading role for Iraqi
security forces will also show that Iraq is on a rapid course to self-rule and
reduce friction between Coalition troops and the population.
More than 100,000 Iraqis
are already active in the five security forces: Police; Border Police; Site
Protection Service; Civil Defense Corps; and the New Iraqi Army. This number
has been growing rapidly – in early September it stood at 62,000. The Iraqi security
forces have proven effective in a number of actions. They are taking on an
increasing share of the security burden and are suffering casualties.
As I have said, we
understand how tightly interrelated the governance, economic and security
problems are. Therefore, a key element of our security strategy is improving
the lives of the Iraqi people and building Iraqi political institutions.
Regarding essential services: Oil production now exceeds 2 million barrels a
day and provides revenues for Iraqi salaries and other government expenses.
Electricity production has attained pre-war levels. Iraq’s educational system
has been reestablished. There are a record 97,000 university-level school
applications. Levels of healthcare comparable to the pre-war level have been
achieved.
As you know, the
Congress has recently appropriated a large sum of money (approximately $20
billion) for Iraqi reconstruction, including the building up of the security
forces. But the US isn’t bearing the whole burden: at the recent donors’
conference in Madrid, other countries and international institutions pledged
about $13 billion. The major donor countries, aside from the US, were: Japan,
Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Canada, UAE and South
Korea.
As for the building of
Iraqi political institutions, the Governing Council has been operating since
July and has appointed interim ministers to run Iraqi ministries. The Governing
Council has won international recognition in UN Security Council resolution
1511 and from the UN General Assembly and the Arab League. In addition to the
national-level council, there are more than 250 councils at the provincial and
municipal levels; these represent important steps toward Iraqi self-rule. An
Iraqi runs the Central Bank and an Iraqi council of judges has been established
to supervise the prosecutorial and judicial systems.
As you are aware from
recent press reports, we are continuing our efforts to build up the Iraqis’
capability to run their own affairs. And we are working with the Governing
Council to help them develop a timeline for drafting a new Constitution and
holding elections under it, as called for in UN Security Council resolution
1511. Our guiding principle is that as much authority as possible should be
transferred to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.
We understand how
important it is to communicate effectively with the Iraqi people. Our basic
message is two-fold: first, we intend to stay the course -- to fulfill our
responsibilities and ensure that Iraq is well launched on the path to freedom,
security and prosperity. Second, we do not want to rule Iraq, nor will we stay
any longer than is necessary. We understand that there is some tension between
these two messages – but we are conveying both of them. Neither is subordinated
to the other.
Although the major
combat operations that toppled the Saddam regime were over by May 1, the war to
determine the future of Iraq continues. The stakes are large: if Iraq can be
launched on the path toward freedom, stability and prosperity, the terrorists
will have suffered a major defeat and the people of the Middle East will have
an alternative model to follow. Our enemies understand this, and we must expect
them to throw all their resources into the fight. This struggle will take time
– time to root out enemy fighters and supporters within Iraq, time to gain
control of the borders, and, most of all, time to help the Iraqis rebuild their
political and security institutions to the point that they will be able to take
over the main burden of the fight.
Visitors returning from
Iraq commonly comment that what they saw there jibed not at all with the
picture of the country that outsiders get from television and newspapers. This
is hardly surprising: If all one knew about life in the US was what one saw on
local TV news broadcasts, one would imagine that life in America is nothing but
murders, power outages, fires and the like. Because we live here, we know that
a lot else is going on -- business and industrial work, cultural and educational
life, politics, government and social activities. There’s a lot going on in
Iraq too that doesn’t make the evening news.
Stay the Course
From its inception in
the days following 9/11, the President and his team have implemented their
strategy for the war on terrorism with steadiness, prudence and good results.
The plans for our combat and post-combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq get
challenged from time to time, as is inevitable and good in a democracy. Though
these plans have, by and large, worked well, we review and revise them
continually, as Jerry Bremer’s current visit to Washington highlights.
Those plans were and are
the product of much cooperation across the US government and with key allies.
They helped us avert many ills – for example, Iraq has not found itself
with masses of internally displaced persons and international refugees,
starvation, a collapse of the currency, destruction of the oil fields, the
firing of SCUD missiles against Israel or Saudi Arabia or widespread inter-communal
violence. There is value in pausing and reflecting on the anticipated
catastrophes that we were spared through a combination of foresight, military
skill and the kind of luck that tends to favor forces that plan and work hard
and wisely.
The United States and
its coalition partners are on sound courses in Afghanistan and Iraq, though
much remains to be done in both places. As long as we’re making progress in
rebuilding the infrastructure, in allowing normal life to return and, most
importantly, in helping the Afghans and the Iraqis develop political
institutions for the future, we are on the path to success – despite the
attacks of the terrorists and former regime supporters.
Staying
the course won’t be easy or cheap. We are reminded of this every time we hear
of another attack on US or Coalition forces. The President asked Congress to
make available the necessary resources and Congress has done so. To crown our
military victories with strategic victories, we’ll have to succeed in both the
civil and the military aspects of our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the
Global War on Terrorism, we are achieving our goal: We are defeating terrorism
as a threat to our way of life. Our coalitions are on the offensive, the
terrorists are on the run and the United States has preserved our freedom. The
world is safer and better for what we have accomplished. Americans have much to
be proud of.