Despite the CIA's improved analytical tradecraft and increased resources, George argues, the future of its analytic mission remains in doubt. Post-9/ 11 improvements have been coupled with a continued focus on current intelligence priorities that minimize attention to the development of strategic research and deeper knowledge. Simply increasing the number of analysts has not produced deeper expertise. The CIA's traditional recruitment and training methods, as well as its rewards and promotion system, encourage analysts to avoid concentrating on any single area, region or functional expertise, and a continued reliance on risk-avoidance security practices restricts analysts' contact with non-government and foreign experts.

To rectify these inadequacies, George contends, the CIA's analytic directorate must develop incentives for analysts who wish to develop more strategic analysis and remove the security harriers to closer collaboration with experts outside the US government. Developing cross-agency analytic collaboration would also maximize expertise and would benefit from intelligence-community-wide training programs similar to what the U.S. military does at its senior service colleges.

Dealing with North Korean Futures