

# Joint Doctrine Update

## Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

**J**oint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, states, “Joint warfare is team warfare.” The lubrication between the various parts of the joint team is common understanding, which is built on the broad shoulders of joint doctrinal thought expressed in standardized terms that are widely known and used.

Crisp and clear definitions of ideas, capabilities, and authorities are at the heart of joint doctrine. Descriptive language—different from defining language—amplifies understanding by providing context and color. The former tells us what a thing *is*; the latter only tells us about *aspects* of the thing. The mantra “precise terms used precisely” is therefore a doctrinal catechism and should be a core competency of all members of the U.S. profession of arms.

In service of common understanding is the Joint Terminology program administered by the Joint Staff J7. JP 1–02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, sets forth standard U.S. military terminology that is approved for general use by all components of the agency.

JP 1–02 serves as the primary repository of approved terms and definitions and should be consulted when preparing correspondence, to include policy, strategy, doctrine, and planning documents. JP 1–02 does not replace a standard English language dictionary, but rather serves as a supplement containing terms that have distinct military meanings not adequately covered in a common dictionary.

It is important to note up front that JP 1–02 is not the source of terms. It is the box where the approved terms are held for easy reference. Terms in JP 1–02 come only from four sources: joint doctrine, specific notation in Office of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy issuances, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–agreed terminology, or by direct order of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense or the CJCS.

But not all military terms are appropriate for JP 1–02. Service-specific, functional-

ity specific, or highly technical terms are considered specialist terminology and should reside in glossaries written for a specific audience. Frequently, definitions are provided for a limited use (that is, for a single document); future concepts under development may also generate new terms and definitions (or new definitions for extant terms). None of these are considered JP 1–02 definitions by default.

Of the four approved sources, joint doctrine is the most preferred method for establishing terminology as its narrative format provides room for amplifying descriptive text. Next in preference are policy issuances, specifically DOD directives, DOD instructions, CJCS instructions, and DOD directive-type memorandums; these statements lack the space to provide full contextual meaning. Next, NATO-agreed terminology may be entered in JP 1–02 to delineate its usage in an Alliance context, particularly when a NATO definition may be different from a U.S. definition. Finally, and least preferred, directed terms are incorporated in JP 1–02 when the meaning of a term requires an authoritative decision for resolution between competing perspectives. (Recent examples of the latter are the current definitions of *cyberspace* and *cyberspace operations*.)

The J7 administered process for including terms in JP 1–02 involves DOD-wide<sup>1</sup> staffing. During the staffing process, any component may comment on a proposal recommending approval, disapproval, or modification. The CJCS, through the J7, is responsible for resolving any contentious issues that arise during coordination.

Terminology standardization, while a structured and orderly process, is a field that is responsive to the needs of the joint force. Most notably, there is an ongoing effort to annotate each entry in JP 1–02 with a source publication. Source documents are helpful because they identify the authoritative context for each term. Additionally, source documents enable terms to be reviewed and updated regularly as part of the normal revision cycles of their source publications.

The initial effort for identifying source documents started in 2008 when the J7 identi-

fied 1,354 of approximately 6,000 terms in JP 1–02 that were not used in joint doctrine publications and could not be attributed to a source document. The staffing of these terms to the Services, combatant commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense yielded 900 obsolete entries that the Director of the Joint Staff approved for deletion in March 2010. This sourcing effort is ongoing and seeks to ensure that JP 1–02 remains the relevant, up-to-date source for DOD terminology and a foundation for common understanding and cooperation within the joint force.

Questions about the Joint Terminology program can be directed to [JEDDSupport@js.pentagon.mil](mailto:JEDDSupport@js.pentagon.mil).

### NOTE

<sup>1</sup> DOD components that review terminology proposals are the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the CJCS and the Joint Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of the DOD, the combatant commands, the DOD agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in the DOD.

### Proper Citation

When citing a term found in JP 1–02, one should refer to the source document and not JP 1–02; it is *not* proper to state, “In accordance with JP 1–02, the definition of *Irregular Warfare* is . . .” Proper citation is “Per JP 1–02, the definition of *Irregular Warfare* is . . .”

### JPs Revised or Under Review

- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- JP 1–0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 1–04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*
- JP 2–01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*
- JP 2–01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 2–03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 3–0, *Joint Operations*
- JP 3–01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*

JP 3-02.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Landing Force Operations*

JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*

JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*

JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*

JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*

JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*

JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*

JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*

JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*

JP 3-13, *Information Operations*

JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*

JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*

JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*

JP 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*

JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*

JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*

JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*

JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*

JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*

JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*

JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*

JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*

JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*

JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*

JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*

JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*

JP 4-01.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Transportation Terminal Operations*

JP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shores (JLOTS)*

JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*

JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*

JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*

JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*

JP 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*

JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C<sup>3</sup> Systems Support in Joint Operations*

JP 6-01, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)*

## Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24

By GIAN P. GENTILE

The principles of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) have become transcendent in the U.S. Army and other parts of the greater Defense Establishment. Concepts such as population security, nationbuilding, and living among the people to win their hearts and minds were first injected into the Army with the publication of the vaunted Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in December 2006. Unfortunately, the Army was so busy fighting two wars that the new doctrine was written and implemented and came to dominate how the Army thinks about war without a serious professional and public debate over its efficacy, practicality, and utility.

The fundamental assumption behind population-centric counterinsurgency and the Army's "new way of war" is that it has worked in history, was proven to work in Iraq during the surge, and will work in the future in places such as Afghanistan as long as its rules are followed, the experts are listened to, and better generals are put in charge.

Combat commanders currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are judged as successes or failures by COIN precepts. A recent article in the *Army Times* by veteran reporter Sean Naylor accused a battalion and brigade commander of a Stryker Brigade in Afghanistan in 2009 of not following FM 3-24's rules and implied that, because of this, it failed at its mission and had many Soldiers killed as a result. An Army report on the Wanat engagement, where nine American Soldiers were killed in Afghanistan in July 2008, also put the battalion and company commanders in the docket and judged them to be failures at population-centric counterinsurgency. That unofficial report (leaked to the press) helped lead to a more formal Army investigation.

In a recent book review in *Army Magazine*, retired Army officer and

counterinsurgency expert John Nagl "indicted" the Army for not following proper COIN rules in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. Should they be *indicted*, as Nagl charged, for failing at population-centric counterinsurgency? This has gone too far. In fact, it is all reminiscent of the preposterous claims made by Vietnam-era Army officer David Hackworth that the commanding general in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, William C. Westmoreland, should be held "criminally" liable for U.S. failure there. Westmoreland was not the single point of failure for the United States in Vietnam—in fact, far from it. That most tragic war was lost because the Army failed at strategy and, more importantly, the other side wanted victory more.

Of course, leaders in war must be held accountable for their actions and what results from them. But to use as a measuring stick the

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*our Army has been steamrollered by a counterinsurgency doctrine that was developed to deal with insurgencies and national wars of independence from Algeria in the 1950s to Indochina in the 1960s*

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COIN principles put forth in FM 3-24 with all of their underlying and unproven theories and assumptions about insurgencies and how to counter them is wrong, and the Army needs to think hard about where its collective "head is at" in this regard.

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