By Derek S. Reveron
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Dr. Derek S. Reveron is a Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Georgetown University Press, 2010).
Given the large number of U.S. forces deployed around the world and the casualties sus- tained in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easy to miss that the Services do much more than engage in combat. On any given day, military engineers dig wells in East Africa, medical personnel provide vaccinations in Latin America, and special operations forces (SOF) mentor militaries in Southeast Asia. Through these activities, the United States seeks to improve its international image, strengthen the state sovereignty system by training and equipping security forces, preempt localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect national security by addressing underlying conditions that inspire and sustain violent extremism.
Far from preparation for major war, these activities rely on a unique blend of charitable American political culture, latent civil-military capacity within the Department of Defense (DOD), and ambitious military officers who see the strategic landscape characterized by weak states and nonstate actors. In short, the new strategic assumption sees U.S. security as inextricably bound to the security of every country in the world. To be effective in this environment, a new cooperative strategic approach is replacing traditional notions of national defense, which is based on security assistance. The implications of this are profound; what was once the province of SOF is now a core capability for conventional forces.
While this article does not directly address operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, important lessons are emerging from those conflicts that are reshaping the military outside of counterinsurgency operations. First is the impact of intervention itself; forced democratization tends to produce semidemocratic governments with political instability and internal conflict.1 Second, to bring stability to postconflict zones requires new ways of using military forces. For example, General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), noted that success in Afghanistan would be achieved when there are Afghan police units in every district, a greatly expanded Afghan National Army, and significant agricultural reform.2 Finally, combat operations have taught the military that lethality cannot solve security problems. Instead, training and equipping at a time when populations are less vulnerable to nuclear annihilation or traditional war, transnational forces have instilled a pervasive sense of insecurity indigenous forces to protect and control their territory are essential for long-term stability. These lessons have gained traction and have been extended to weak states in more permissive environments. Paul Collier argues that the role for advanced militaries of the world is “to supply the global public good of peace in territories that otherwise have the potential for nightmare.”3 Implicit in Collier’s assertion is the importance of weak states to international security.
Priority of Weak States
At least since the early 1990s, state failure has been identified as a risk to international peace and security. In spite of objections to nationbuilding by the military, this view continued throughout the 2000s, when policymakers saw a direct connection between weak states and international terrorism. For Secretary of Defense Robert Gates:
The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland, for example, that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack, are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.4
This assessment moved formerly subnational or regional crises to the international level, where it was assumed that failed states or states at risk pose an acute danger to national security. It produced external intervention into weak states in the name of human security (for example, the United States and Philippines, United Kingdom and Sierra Leone, France and Ivory Coast, or Australia and East Timor). And it expanded the number of recipients of security assistance.
Prioritizing weak or failing states represents a profound shift in strategic thinking. Historically, countering the Soviet Union or promoting economic interests drove U.S. foreign policy decisions and military deployments. Yet since the 1990s, weak states have captured the attention of the world, which struggles with bringing stability to countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and Somalia. At a time when populations are less vulnerable to nuclear annihilation or traditional war, transnational forces have instilled a pervasive sense of insecurity. Consequently, it is important for the United States to understand what threatens friends, adversaries, and those countries in between. With few exceptions, the United States willingly forms security assistance agreements with almost every country in the world and supports those governments through security cooperation.
As DOD civil-military capabilities (for instance, the Navy’s 16,000 Seabees) are used around the world, conventional forces are assisting partners through security cooperation. Formally, security cooperation is:
the ability for DOD to interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.5
Security cooperation falls under the purview of the overall geographic combatant commander, but his strategy and activities are executed at the country level through his security assistance officer, who is a member of the Country Team working for the U.S. Ambassador.
Too easily forgotten, the Department of State is the lead foreign policy organization in the United States and plays a critical role in security assistance through the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is a direct link to DOD. With a broad mandate in international security affairs, active cooperation with DOD is required. If done well, security assistance activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives the military’s theater campaign plans and Embassies’ mission strategic plans. Since programs always take place in particular countries, Ambassadors are at the forefront of security assistance. Under National Security Decision Directive 38, the U.S. Ambassador has absolute authority over all U.S. personnel and operations within a country, which means that all military programs are subject to ambassadorial approval and are critical to promoting U.S. objectives in a particular country.6
The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (for example, selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense (providing equipment and funding to Israel), supporting multinational operations (training and equipping the Georgian military, which was the third largest troop contributor in Iraq in 2008), and preventing crisis and conflict (facilitating Colombia’s success against a decades-old insurgency). As noted in doctrine, there are six categories of security cooperation activity:
Underlying all of these activities is the clear intent to achieve U.S. national security objectives. It is important to remember that states must manage both the risks of abandonment and entrapment by their friends and allies.8 The United States does this by building a partner country’s military and developing professional relationships across militaries.
These activities are increasingly enshrined in doctrine and are defined as “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition.”9 For example, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE) has been developing a capability for maritime domain awareness throughout Europe and Africa. CNE has been working with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and African partners to develop a regional capability to protect trade, natural resources, and economic development. This includes establishing maritime domain awareness through the automated identification system, an array of coastal radar systems, and improved command and control of a naval reaction force. Inherent in these activities is developing enduring relationships. In the Near East, for example, long-term relationships have produced trust and access for the United States to have forward operating bases in Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Additionally, weapons are prepositioned in other countries, to include Oman. While partners benefit from these programs, such initiatives also support broader U.S. foreign policy objectives of global influence.
Security cooperation also includes security sector reform, which is an area of increasing importance. It focuses on improving civil-military relations, promoting collaboration among regional partners, and fostering cooperation within partners’ governments. The United States has learned that contemporary security challenges often require whole-of-government solutions and regional cooperation. Consequently, it seeks to foster this same approach around the world. Programs support legislative reform (for example, seizing assets from drug traffickers in Colombia), enhancing cooperation between police and defense forces (building bridges among bureaucratic rivals in Jamaica), and managing the legacy of past human rights abuses by militaries (integrating human rights training in programs in Latin America and Africa). Furthermore, it considers the internal health and welfare of partners’ military forces by combating HIV/AIDS in militaries, promoting noncommissioned officer development, and providing educational opportunities for officers.
The legislative authorities for these programs primarily reside in the Department of State, but DOD has the capacity and expertise to implement military assistance programs. Financed under Title 22 (Account 150), the international assistance budget was $27.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2009 (see table 110). Fifteen different programs are included in Account 150, but only six can be considered security related: foreign military financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), international narcotics control and law enforcement, peacekeeping operations, Andean Counterdrug Program, and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs. While security assistance programs are substantial, nonsecurity assistance programs exceed them by at least two to one. There are considerable differences across regions as well. In Africa, for example, nonsecurity programs are the dominant approach to international assistance. In the Near East, however, the opposite is true.
Though the United States has security assistance programs with over 150 countries, it does privilege several (see table 2). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance, and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and its control of the Suez Canal. Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that Washington seeks to strengthen and not undermine it. One reason the United States focuses assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international SOF exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. Over the past five decades, security assistance has evolved from a program designed to buy influence and access to one that is now intended to build capacity meant to obviate U.S. military presence. Recipients are expected to “graduate” from assistance and become capable of filling national and regional security deficits.
In total, security assistance comprises about 27 percent of normal international assistance, which is implemented by a variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors. (Excluded from “normal assistance” are those activities funded by supplemental budgets that largely benefit Iraq and Afghanistan.) From the DOD perspective, combatant commanders have a broad array of security assistance tools at their disposal. For its part of the 150 Account, security assistance often takes the form of IMET and FMF. Additionally, DOD directly funds security assistance through Section 1206/7 and other command funds, but this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Thus, State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels.
Created by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Congress intended for IMET to accomplish three principal goals: to foster increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in order to enhance international peace and security, to help participating countries to become more self-reliant by improving their ability to utilize defense resources obtained through FMF, and to increase the awareness of internationally recognized human rights issues.11 Thirty years later, the objectives of the program remain fundamentally unchanged. Through the IMET programs, combatant commands train about 8,000 international military officers from 125 countries a year. By comparison, the Fulbright program awards grants to about 4,000 international participants per year.12 When other programs are included, DOD reaches an international audience of at least 55,000 annually.13 Programs include English-language training at the Defense Language Institute, training activities such as the basic infantry officer’s course, and attendance at U.S. professional military education institutions such as the Naval War College. Regarding the last, attendance by officers from other countries is increasing, with foreign officers currently composing about 15 percent of the graduating class, and it is a priority to increase international participation in U.S. schools.
While the training and education are often well received, that is difficult to measure. One major impact of IMET programs is building personal and professional relationships with people likely to rise to senior levels within their countries. In Botswana, for example, 11 of 14 serving general officers are graduates of IMET programs. Moreover, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first-hand knowledge of the United States contributes to the professionalization of armed forces, winning access and influence for diplomatic and military representatives. As a testament to the quality of selections for the Naval War College’s Naval Staff College, for example, 236 participants have attained flag rank, 102 later served as chiefs of service, 5 became cabinet ministers, and 1 became his nation’s president.14 Thus, in theory, the United States is training and educating its partners to facilitate future collaboration.
In FY00, IMET programs were budgeted at $49.8 million, which nearly doubled to $90.5 million by the end of the Bush years in FY09. As table 3 shows, countries in Europe and Eurasia received the most funding, while Pacific and East Asian countries received the least. Underlying the preference for training and educating military personnel from Europe and Eurasia is NATO integration. Since NATO expanded from 16 countries in 1999 to 28 countries in 2009, it was essential for the United States to train its new allies to facilitate the integration process. This also ensures that European officers network with other NATO officers. Much as U.S. officers interact with officers from Estonia, IMET affords opportunities for Estonian officers to interact with Spaniards.
Taken by region, IMET has global impact. In Africa, every country but Somalia and Zimbabwe received some type of IMET assistance in 2009. Although it is a relatively modest program in terms of cost, both the President and Congress attach considerable importance to the IMET program. Recipient countries are likewise heavily reliant on these grants. In many cases, the program serves as the only method by which partner militaries receive advanced training from their U.S. counterparts. Without opportunities from countries such as the United States, there is little indigenous capacity to professionalize militaries through military colleges and training programs. To foster independence and sustainability of these programs, the United States also helps many countries develop their own professional military education networks and educational programs through exchanging faculty, sharing curriculum ideas, and providing books and professional journals.
Augmenting military education and training is foreign military financing, which supplies grants and loans to finance purchases of American weapons and military equipment. The State Department oversees the program, but DOD manages it on a day-to-day basis. In FY09, the FMF budget was the largest program in the State Department’s international assistance account, consuming over $4.8 billion (see table 4).15 Countries in the Near East are the top recipients, while countries in Africa receive the least amount of U.S. weaponry and equipment. Because of the high cost of U.S. weapons and different needs by region, FMF is unevenly distributed.
By country, nearly 80 percent of FMF goes to Israel ($2.55 billion) and Egypt ($1.3 billion). Of the remaining 20 percent, just a few countries receive substantial assistance: Pakistan ($300 million), Jordan ($235 million), and Colombia ($66 million). Seventy countries share the remaining $300 million. Of note, only 9 countries in Africa received FMF in 2009 compared to 45 African countries that received IMET. This suggests a deliberate policy to focus on professionalizing militaries instead of arming them, which is a contrast from the past. (Through its 1206 funding, however, DOD is providing weapons for countries in Africa.) In contrast to Africa, nearly every country in Europe and Eurasia receives FMF. The top recipients are Poland ($27 million), Romania ($15 million), Turkey ($12 million), Georgia ($11 million), and Bulgaria ($9 million). In fact, Poland receives more than twice the amount of all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa combined. NATO integration and U.S. missile defense programs largely explain this.
A program such as FMF advances U.S. interests in many ways. When countries buy U.S. military equipment through FMF (and direct commercial sales), the basis for a relationship is formed. There are typically secure long-term commitments for training on how to maintain and operate the equipment. As table 5 illustrates, the top recipients are long-time U.S. allies and partners to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. The relationships are sustained through military sales using FMF and direct commercial sales. Additionally, providing spare and replacement parts ensures competitor countries do not interfere with the relationship. Finally, combined exercises build personal bonds between U.S. and partner countries’ personnel.
Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
Outside of IMET and FMF, the Department of State operates integrated security assistance programs such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). The precursor programs to GPOI were created to respond to the demand for peacekeepers in Africa, which increased during the 1990s. With a shortage of peacekeepers, the United Nations (UN) Security Council found it difficult to separate former warring parties or deploy as a buffer to prevent the outbreak of war. The demand for trained peace-keepers rose from 10,000 in the 1980s to nearly 100,000 by early 2007 and is expected to grow by at least 50,000 in the coming years.
Though the United States does not provide troops for peacekeeping missions, it is responsible for about 25 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget and has many bilateral programs to train, equip, and deploy peacekeepers. In FY09, these efforts were valued at $395 million. In 2010, the peacekeeping program focuses on supporting African Union operations in Somalia, trans- forming the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army into a conventional military force, and supporting militaries in Liberia, the Trans-Sahara, and East Africa. While substantial, General William Ward, commander of U.S. Africa Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the equipment needs of troop contributing countries for peace support operations in Darfur and other anticipated operations dwarfs GPOI’s ability to provide the magnitude of equipment required to satisfy United Nations Contingent Owned Equipment requirements.”16 GPOI now includes 51 partner countries and organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa (see table 6).17 With increased capacity gained through GPOI, Africa’s military contribution to UN peacekeeping doubled from 2000 to 2004.18
While the number of available African peacekeepers has increased, current efforts fall short of the goal of Africans providing for African security. Of the seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in 2009, only the hybrid UN–African Union mission in Darfur is composed of an African majority. Non-Africans primarily compose the other six UN operations. In addition to the shortfall on UN missions, there are open billets on African Union peacekeeping missions as well. In sum, there is a shortage of at least 45,000 African peacekeepers for meeting the African Union objective of Africans providing for their own security. Given standard deployment cycles, the number can be multiplied by three to account for forces that are training to deploy, are deployed, and are recovering from deployment.
Initially, the GPOI training was conducted by the U.S. military, but demand for military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan largely shifted responsibility to government contractors. Yet a major goal is to reduce dependency on external actors such as the United States, so GPOI supports peace operations training centers in dozens of countries, including Albania, Bangladesh, Belize, Bosnia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, and Uruguay. When the program concludes, it will be critical to see how well partners sustain momentum and participate in peacekeeping operations.
Game Changer? 1206 Funding
Created during the Cold War, IMET and FMF are long-term programs and are slow to respond to changes in the security environment. Thus, when the United States wanted to help Kosovo formalize its military structures or Afghanistan build an army, it could not proceed under traditional foreign assistance programs. On average, it takes 3 to 4 years from concept to execution. In an effort to overcome lengthy program delays, Congress granted DOD “global train and equip” authority under Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.19 This was a depar- ture from vesting security assistance authorities in the Department of State and led to charges of a militarized foreign policy.
The law provides funds to build the capacity of partners’ military forces. This is used primarily for counterterrorism, but also gives the military unprecedented levels of discretion and streamlines project development. For example, many countries received assistance to upgrade their maritime surveillance capabilities, obtain new patrol craft, and improve communications systems. In terms of fiscal scope, the train and equip program is limited to $350 million annually, but it has taken 4 years for it to develop at this level, partly due to an expansive definition of counterterrorism. Out of the approximately $1 billion expended over that period, the greatest beneficiaries of 1206 funding are Pakistan ($210 million), Lebanon ($107 million), Yemen ($98 million), Indonesia ($57.5 million), and Bahrain ($50.4 million).
In addition to 1206 funding, DOD gained authority to support stability operations in U.S.-led coalitions under Section 1207. Congress limited this assistance to a country’s military forces (excluding police forces) and stipulated that no nation should receive assistance if otherwise prohibited from receiving foreign military assistance through other sources.20 This caveat was included to ensure that DOD did not undermine State. As DOD has gained legislative authority to execute security assistance programs, oversight has been a key concern. To ensure that foreign policy was not being militarized, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act delegated approval authority for Section 1206 spending from the President to the Secretary of Defense, but stipulated the Secretary of State must concur for the approval of all programs.21
To be sure, 1206/1207 are expedient authorities for military commanders to fund programs, but they are not without oversight. The law requires that any services, defense articles, or funds provided or transferred to the Secretary of State comply with the authorities and limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, or any law making appropriations to carry out such acts. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense must notify congressional committees when the authority is exercised, and the notification must be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State.22 At the time the change in law occurred, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, “In 1206, we have provided a dual key approach of delivering resources for emergent short-term military assistance needs and counterterrorism activities.”23 Finally, all military personnel entering a country to conduct security assistance programs must be granted country clearance by the U.S. Embassy there. With few exceptions, U.S. Ambassadors approve and are well aware of security assistance programs occurring in their countries.
With that said, there are limits to oversight. For example, Chad received $6 million to establish a light infantry rapid reaction force in FY07.24 But in the same year, the Department of State criticized Chad’s security forces for “engaging in extrajudicial killing, torture, beatings, rapes and human rights abuses.”25 When investigated, it appeared that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) did not brief Embassy personnel until after the proposal received 1206 funding, at which time the Embassy expressed concern.26 Additional research is needed to understand the limits of oversight, but at least in the FY06 request, USEUCOM coordinated with only 4 of 14 Embassy staffs prior to submitting its global train and equip requests.27 The Government Accountability Office did note that coordination improved in FY07, and a program with Thailand was canceled after a coup occurred there in 2006.28 Such instances as these give rise to fears about the militarization of foreign policy.
Fundamentally, the fear stems from the question of who is in charge. On the one hand, the State Department oversees the security assistance programs that DOD implements. Yet new models such as 1206/1207 and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program create coordination challenges. In principle, coordination should occur through the Country Team, which has the best situational awareness of the country where programs occur. However, with multiple staffs involved across the region and in Washington, DC, there are bound to be missteps. Congress noted, “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism.”29 Yet Congress acknowledged that the problem can be solved in the field: “It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”30 While combatant commands trumpet regional approaches and Washington-based bureaucracies herald inter-agency approaches, all programs, regardless of funding source, take place in defined geographic territories where U.S. Ambassadors serve as the whole-of-government representatives. As the Obama administration attempts to improve interagency coordination, it will be well served to study U.S. Embassies as a model instead of focusing on battles across the Potomac.
While preparation for war is the military’s traditional mission, security assistance has emerged as a key task. As Title 10 makes clear, “The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”31 Because the United States is relatively secure from interstate rivalry, it is now focused on intrastate security deficits. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirmed this: “preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential elements of America’s national security approach.”32 Consequently, preparations for war are giving way to military operations that focus on humanitarian assistance, stability operations, and security assistance. This is not new. At least since World War II, it has been the interest of the United States to guarantee American security by reducing threats from abroad and encouraging a system of global trade to promote American prosperity and create global interdependence. Security assistance has been a key plank of this U.S. foreign policy throughout. What is different today, however, is that partners’ security challenges now impact U.S. national security. As made clear in the failed airline attack on Christmas Day in 2009, poor counterterrorism in Yemen or the lack of intelligence-sharing in Nigeria can threaten the United States.
With weak governments unable to control territory or channel social frustration in nonviolent ways, once-local conflicts are now international. This places security assistance programs at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy to help allies, friends, and partners. With few exceptions, partners’ security forces are too small, poorly equipped, and ill trained to effectively monitor and secure their borders and prevent transnational actors from exploiting security deficits. Consequently, the United States has stepped up its security assistance efforts and finds its military forces in more countries than ever. The forces seldom engage in direct combat operations but are training, equipping, and mentoring partner countries’ militaries. Through State Department and Defense Department programs, these efforts total more than $7 billion annually. Overall, these programs are a part of U.S. grand strategy, which emphasizes military-to-military relations to strengthen weak states and confront nonstate actors.
Given the size of security assistance and fears of a militarized foreign policy, the Obama administration is attempting to rebalance U.S. foreign policy. Made clear in the 2010 QDR, security assistance is an invaluable tool. Almost every country in the world demands it, and it has the long-term potential to alleviate the stress on the U.S. national security bureaucracy by creating viable partners. This goal is shared by the Department of State and Department of Defense, which seek to combat irregular threats and prevent future conflicts. With this in mind, security assistance should not fall victim to reorganization or fiscal limits. Instead, the U.S. Government should strengthen the Chief of Mission authority of the Ambassadors in countries where these programs take place to ensure that its goals are met, partners develop capacity, and countries graduate from assistance programs. PRISM
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Lene S. Christiansen, and Havard Hegre, Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention
and Democracy, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4242 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).
2 Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit NATO SHAPE Headquarters and Afghanistan 21–26 July 2008,” July 30, 2008.
3 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 125.
4 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009), 31.
5 “Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon, Post 24 August 2006 JROC,” available at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare.
6 John D. Finney and Alphonse F. LaPorta, “Integrating National Security Strategy at the Operational Level: The Role of State Department Political Advisors,” in Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
7 Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operations Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2006), I–3.
8 G.H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
9 “Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon.”
10 All data for tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 are derived from Department of State, FY2009 International Assistance Summary Tables. Data do not include supplemental funds or programs funded outside the Department of State. Regional designations are based on Department of State regional boundaries that vary slightly from Department of Defense boundaries.
11 Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2003), chapter 5.
12 In fiscal year 2007, the Fulbright program was $198.8 million. Of the 7,000 participants a year, slightly more than half are not American. This includes 1,650 foreign graduate students, 850 foreign scholars, 175 Humphrey fellows, and several hundred others. For more information, see http://fulbright.state.gov.
13 Department of Defense (DOD), Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary Justification (Washington, DC: DOD, 2009), 5–37, available at
14 Bill Daly, “Building Global Partnerships,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April 2007), 44–47.
15 Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Tables,” available at www.state.gov. It is important to note that military assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan is not included in this account data.
16 William E. Ward, “Advance Questions,” Anticipated Confirmation Hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007, available at www.africom.mil/Transcripts/WardAdvanceQandA09-27-07.pdf.
17 Nina M. Serafino, Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2009).
19 Nina M. Serafino, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, RS22855 (Washington, DC: CRS, updated June 3, 2008), 1. Authorities provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot generally be used for training or equipment programs, whereas Title 22 funds, controlled by the State Department, but which include some DOD-implemented programs such as FMF and IMET, cannot be used to fund military operations.
20 National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–163. 119 Stat. 3456–3458.
21 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109–364. 120 Stat. 2083, 2418.
22 Nina M. Serafino, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, RS22871 (Washington, DC: CRS, May 7, 2008).
23 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 15, 2008, available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/04/103589.htm.
24 Serafino, Section 1206, 4.
25 Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Chad,” March 6, 2007, available at
26 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Section 1206 Security Assistance (Washington, DC: GAO, 2006), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07416r.pdf.
27 Ibid.; Serafino, Section 1206.
29 Richard G. Lugar et al., “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: GPO, December 15, 2006), 2.
31 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, Section 168.
32 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 75.