National Defense University College of Information and Cyberspace	CIC 6047: Influence Warfare
	Credits: 2 Section(s): 1
	Academic Year: 2020 – 2021 (fall – Tuesday afternoon)
School of Joint Strategic Studies	**Location:** Blackboard Collaborate Ultra (details will be emailed)

1. Faculty Information

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Additional information	Howard Gambrill Clark, Ph.D. has specialized in influence strategies and psychological warfare for over 22 years. He is a former Marine (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Philippines); Yale graduate; White House counterterrorism analyst; DHS and SOCOM Senior Counter-Radicalization Intelligence Analyst; the Senior Intelligence Officer for DHS Operations; and senior countering-violent-extremism consultant and faculty member who has taught, operated, or commanded influence and counterterrorism missions on five continents for multiple organizations (Special Forces, Special Operations, USAID, etc.) and allies. Dr. Clark has also served as CEO for Stability Institute (international think tank with members on six continents), President of Narrative Strategies (international think tank), and Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and authored eight books.

Teaching Team

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2. Course Description

Upon successful completion, the student will be able to plan and implement influence strategies in a way that is practical, actionable, and intrepid. This will help with every warfighting function in all the instruments of state power. It will also allow the student to do more with less—to optimize effects with what the student's future units or agencies already have at their disposal.

During the course, each student will produce a strategic plan that has the potential to indirectly and enduringly affect the behavior of a foreign audience.

The course will use a build approach in which disciplines (from the fine arts such as storytelling traditions, humanities such as history and literature, social sciences such as psychology and anthropology to include paleoanthropology, and natural sciences such as neurobiology) will build towards a holistic look at influence.

We will first investigate narrative, which is the base for any strategy or influence plan. Then we will study how narratives may be weaponized and how they may help strategic flexibility (important against diffuse threats). We will then discuss several approaches to influence warfare from the honest and open means of building long-term trust to clandestine approaches to subversion. We will then investigate the many instruments of the operational art to implement influence campaigns. Finally, we will look to influence warfare in specific domains such as great power competition, tribal society, violent extremist campaigns, and guerrilla and total warfare.

Although readings include scholarship, this is not an influence appreciation course. Instead it is to help support the development of leaders to achieve effects in any field of security, economic development, and diplomacy. Ultimately this is a strategy/policy course with a foundation in groundbreaking scholarship (especially the past two decades of findings in neurobiology, paleoanthropology, and anthropology).

So that the student understands the subject—an often misunderstood subject—a description of the discipline writ large follows.

Influence is widely misunderstood and often confused with persuasion, diplomacy, threats, and attempted coercion and compliance.

Influence, for the strategist and statesperson is purposefully producing a desired outcome without apparent materialization of hard power by indirect or seemingly intangible methods. This may incorporate subtle approaches and even clandestine campaigns to hide the means and intent.

At the end of the course the student-professional will be able to effect greater change with fewer resources.

Academically, influence plays a major role in debates on strategy and helps us to understand how to plan and implement effective strategy. Specifically (and each lesson discusses one or more of the following themes to differing degrees):

- Foundational narratives
  - Cognitive / social constructs, national mythologies, imagined communities
  - Shared understanding of cosmology, metaphysics, traditions, values
  - Shared neural architecture: "…complexity allows the human brain to generate all the attributes that define the human condition: the entirety of our culture, history making, and civilization…" —Neurobiologist Miguel Nicolelis
  - Fragility and need to defend
  - Defines much of power and warfare (powers convincing people to follow them and abandon others)
  - Understand what's behind others' strategies
- Direct versus indirect approaches to strategy
  - Indirect often driven by subtly, subterfuge, and/or deception
  - Direct includes will to fight (transcendence, unity, shame, etc.), surprise, and terror/fear
- Finite versus 'limitless' resources and means
  - "…methods which will be neither diplomatic nor military." —William Stephenson
  - Open branding → building deep seated earned trust over time
- Strategic flexibility
  - Influential commander's intent and strategic vision / narrative

- – Inspire bravura operational art
- • Influential intelligence
  - – Persuade and influence policy to improve strategy (sometimes dramatically)
  - – Demand/use meaningful population data (beyond passing opinions & inappropriate methodology)

Influence warfare predates militaries and states. Leaders competed to adopt masterful narratives and protect the self-evident nature of said stories to try to win over willing populations—to unify masses and deploy them martially. 'Winning' civilization creation myths, whether based in history or not, along with shared narratives of threats, would allow leaders to unite large communities to function and go to war. The leaders that could deliver a more compelling 'why,' could perhaps win people to their ideas of governance and legitimacy.

Today winning over or disillusioning populations through information strategies is still an overshadowing vanguard of international politics and warfare. By the armistice of the First World War observers noted "…information warfare was a powerful weapon—it could raise armies, incite violent mobs, and destabilize whole nations." And more recently the Russian Chief of the General Staff wrote in 2013, "The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals…in many case have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness…"

This is not new. Influence warfare and its centrality to strategy is not a new concept. It was never enough for someone to be physically strong or savvier at throwing a spear to mobilize a citizenry.

Tools of statecraft for strategic influence may well include any or all overlapping elements of political warfare and international politics to include security, economic, diplomatic, information, intelligence, religious, ideological, cultural, psychological, education, religious, agricultural, and development means.

However, scholars and strategists often focus on strategic communications, information campaigns, and clandestine strategies along with careful deception of intent and means—an underlining feature of strategic influence being indirect and without the apparent exertion of force.

It assumes that 'anything goes' within the bounds of the laws of physics and within acceptable lines with regards to the morals and ethics of the protagonist state. This course does not endorse and warns strongly against any immoral, amoral, unethical, or illegal practices. But it provides an overview of sometimes unethical behavior so as to better defend oneself against nefarious influence campaigns.

3. Learning Outcomes

Upon completion of this course, students will be able to:

- **Course Learning Outcome**. Evaluate the international security environment with an emphasis on the impact of strategic influence of adversaries, competitors, and allies.
  Joint Learning Outcomes: JLO 1.3, 1.5, JLO 1.6, JLO 2.5, JLO 3.3, JLO 3.4, JLO 4.5
  Special Areas of Emphasis: SAE 1, SAE 2, SAE 3
  Desired Leader Attributes: DLA 1, DLA 2, DLA 6

- **Course Learning Outcome**. Apply trans-regional, multi-domain, multinational, policy, and strategy approaches to operations to influence populations and governments.
  Joint Learning Outcomes: JLO 3.3, JLO 3.4
  Special Areas of Emphasis: SAE 1, SAE 2, SAE 3
  Desired Leader Attributes: DLA 1, DLA 2, DLA 3, DLA 4, DLA 5, DLA 6

- **Course Learning Outcome**. Analyze the critical aspects of the human terrain and the information environment to influence strategies.
  Joint Learning Outcomes: JLO 3.3,
  Special Areas of Emphasis: SAE 1, SAE 2, SAE 3
  Desired Leader Attributes: DLA 1, DLA 3

- **Course Learning Outcome**. Create an influence strategic plan applying principles of strategic leadership, including creative and critical thinking, decision-making, and ethical conduct.
  - Joint Learning Outcomes: JLO 1.1, JLO 1.3, JLO 1.4, JLO 1.5, JLO 1.7, JLO 4.2, JLO 4.5
  - Special Areas of Emphasis: SAE 1, SAE 2, SAE 3
  - Desired Leader Attributes: DLA 1, DLA 2, DLA 3, DLA 5, DLA 6

This is an unclassified course.

4. Course Evaluation

Final Grade Breakdown

The final course grade will be calculated using the following categories:

Course Component	Percentage of Total
Seminar Contribution	40%
Strategy Memorandum	30%
Presentation	30%

Assessment Component 1 (Seminar Contribution)

Students should:

Prepare for seminar participation by reading all of the required readings and conducting independent research into relevant topics (especially on terms or ideas that are new to the student). Students should reference the learning objectives and issues for consideration in each lesson to guide their preparation for class and reflection upon their readings and research.

Furthermore, the lesson descriptions are enormous for this course. These descriptions often cover the key points of the readings and will prepare the student well for seminar.

Routinely contribute relevant, thoughtful, logical, evidenced, and reasoned comments, observations, perspectives, questions, experiences, examples etc. to class discussions and debates. When applicable, students should strive to cite the source of their evidence-based comments. Two-to-three thoughts or questions that show critical analysis and creative thinking—along with thoughtful active listening to peers—are expected per lesson for a good score. Students will be given feedback and recommendations periodically.

Actively participate in class exercises and debates. Listen attentively to others' comments and respect differing points of view for a positive learning environment.

Assessment Component 2 (Strategy Memorandum)

The strategy memorandum should be about 1000 words in length (includes footnotes and endnotes). The style of the paper will that of a memorandum to the head of state. Examples of format will be available, but the style is simple and incorporates bullet points and concise, precise language for a statesperson who has little time. Extreme prioritization and short clear sentences will be necessary.

Memos will be due the beginning of the final class. The memo will comprise three parts:

1) Diagnosis of Issue (on global or regional influence challenge, opportunity, or threat)
   - Defines and explains nature of issue (15%)
   - Simplifies overwhelming complexity (15%)
   - Identifies certain aspects as critical (15%)
2) Guiding Vision
   - Overall approach to cope with and overcome obstacles identified in diagnosis (25%)
3) Set of Coherent Actions
   - Two or three courses of action that accomplish / carry out guiding vision (15%)
   - Risks, costs, timeline, and measures of effect (15%)

Assessment Component 3 (Presentation)

The final presentation may be the same topic as that of the paper or a different topic. If the same topic, students must focus on one or two main themes of the paper and prepare for questions (from the professor as well as class).

Presentations will be no longer than five minutes (cut-off point is five minutes and zero seconds) followed by ten minutes of questions and answers by the professor and class—as the professor directs.

Depending on the topic and approach chosen, along with the professor's feedback throughout the length of the course, a student may elect to focus more on the diagnosis of the issue, guiding vision, or one or two courses of action.

The grading rubrics below are for individual classroom contribution:

CIC Classroom Contribution Rubric		
Exceeds Standards (A)	**Meets Standards (B)**	**Fails to Meet Standards (C)**
Demonstrates by discussion and contributions that critical thought has been given to the readings for each session. Regularly and consistently contributes comments, observations, and evaluations that demonstrate a high degree of reflection on the subject, applies relevant experiences to the subject that adds richer context and relevance to the discussions.	Demonstrates knowledge of readings for each session in contributions to class discussions. Contributes comments, observations, and evaluations that often demonstrate reflection on the subject.	Shows that readings have not been read; rarely makes contributions in class discussions.

The grading rubric below is for the oral presentation:

Oral Communication Skills Rubric			
Performance Area	**Exceeds Standards (A)**	**Meets Standards (B)**	**Fails to Meet Standards (C)**
Organization	Presenter follows logical sequence and provides explanations/elaboration.	Presenter follows logical sequence, but fails to elaborate.	Presenter does not follow logical sequence (jumps around in presentation).
Eye Contact	Presenter seldom returns to notes, maintaining eye contact with audience	Presenter maintains eye contact with audience most of the time, but frequently returns to notes.	Presenter reads most or all of report, making little to no eye contact with audience.

	throughout the presentation.		
Delivery	Presenter speaks clearly and loud enough for all in audience to hear, makes no grammatical errors, and pronounces all terms correctly and precisely.	Presenter's voice is relatively clear, but too low to be heard by those in the back of the room. Presenter makes several major grammatical errors, and mispronounces some terms.	Presenter mumbles, mispronounces terms, and makes serious and persistent grammatical errors throughout presentation. Presenter speaks too quietly to be heard by many in audience.
Conclusion:	Effectively summarizes the presentation and provides a sense of closure.	Provides an adequate summary &/or recommendation that is reasonable given the information/analysis presented.	Weak or no conclusion provided (it is too vague to be of any practical value) or the recommendation is weakly related to the analysis.
Responsiveness: a) Q&A	Addresses all questions in a manner that demonstrates a thorough command of the topic(s) of the presentation.	Presenter demonstrates an ability to address most questions in a thoughtful and effective manner.	Presenter cannot address basic questions about the topic or addresses them in a superficial manner.
b) time	Speaker uses the allotted time effectively. Finishes on time.	Speaker finishes on time but has to rush through last points to finish on time.	Speaker does not finish on time or finishes well before allotted time.
Multimedia Support and Visual Aids: Charts, animation, graphs, handouts, posters, videos, slides, sound	Presentation includes a balanced use of appropriate multimedia that enhances the overall presentation (easy to read, attractive, informative, and error free).	Presentation includes limited multi-media that enhance the overall presentation. Easy to read and informative, but not outstanding.	Presentation includes little or no multimedia or uses it in distracting or ineffective manner (difficult to read, has errors &/or typos, etc.).

The grading rubric below is for written assignment:

	Exceptional (A)	Acceptable (B)	Unsatisfactory (C)	Fail (F)
<u>**Focus**</u> Clear Topic/Main Idea Context, Audience and Purpose Meets Assignment	Paper topic or main idea is clearly stated and establishes a clear, insightful, possibly original point of view that provides focus for all elements of the work. The paper demonstrates thorough understanding of the context, audience and purpose of the assignment. The paper exceeds the goals and criteria of the assignment.	Paper topic or main idea is clearly stated and is relevant and consistently linked throughout the paper. The paper demonstrates awareness of the context, audience and purpose of the assignment. The paper completes the task specified by the assignment and includes all of the assignment's required components.	Paper topic or main idea is present but may be unclear, too narrow or too broad. Aspects of the paper stray from the central topic, or add length without relevance. Minimal attention is given to context, audience and purpose of the assignment. Parts of the assignment are underdeveloped, missing, or not linked to the assignment.	The paper has no clear topic or main idea. Fails to consider context, audience and purpose of the assignment. Substantive portions of the assignment are underdeveloped, missing, or not linked to the assignment.

Evidence/Analysis/ Synthesis Sources and Reasoning Analysis Alternative Perspectives Conclusion	Paper is supported by high quality and relevant sources and comprehensive research. Reasoning is clear, insightful and compelling with substantiating evidence. Exceptional analysis, interpretation, and presentation of evidence that distinguishes between the writer's own ideas and source materials. Free of errors of fact or unsupported generalizations. Alternative perspectives are comprehensively addressed Conclusions synthesize comprehensively the main ideas of the paper.	Paper is supported by relevant and appropriate sources and effective research. Reasoning is valid and well-conceived. Sound analysis and/or presentation of evidence that adequately integrates sources with writer ideas. Minimal/minor errors of fact or unsupported generalizations. Alternative perspectives are partially represented. Conclusions effectively synthesize the main ideas of the paper.	Paper topic is only partially supported by relevant sources. Quality and quantity of research/reference are superficial. Reasoning lacks sufficient rigor. Inconsistent analysis and/or presentation of evidence. Ineffective integration of source materials with writer ideas. Contains significant overgeneralizations, inaccuracies, or misrepresentation of source materials. Alternative perspectives are not acknowledged. Conclusions do not show synthesis or cohesion of paper topic.	Paper is not adequately supported; and research is inadequate; minimal use or inclusion of valid sources; evidence and reasoning are weak, inaccurate and/or irrelevant. Minimal analysis reflected in the paper. Contains egregious overgeneralizations, inaccuracies, misrepresentation of source materials, or errors of fact. Alternative perspectives are not acknowledged. No real conclusion or, if present, it fails to relate to the paper's main idea.
Organization Logical Flow of Ideas Transitions Paragraph Structure Digressions and Irrelevancies	Paper is inherently logical in structure; reader can easily follow the reasoning from introduction to conclusion. Skillful transitions effortlessly link ideas within and between paragraphs. Consistently strong paragraph construction referencing topic sentences. Paper is free of digressions and irrelevancies.	Paper flow is mostly continuous; individual sections are coherent. Adequate transitions guide the reader within and between paragraphs. For the most part, paragraph structure is solid throughout. Digressions and irrelevancies occasionally distract from the reasoning and flow of the paper.	Paper flow is mostly disjointed; individual sections are hard for the reader to follow with gaps in the flow. Paper is sometimes difficult to follow because of confusing arrangement of supporting ideas and/or ineffective transitions. Paragraph structure occasionally weak— multiple ideas covered in lengthy passages or frequent one or two-sentence paragraphs. Digressions or irrelevancies frequently distract reader from the reasoning and flow of the paper.	Logical flow of ideas is interrupted, broken, or non-existent. Writer's thoughts are difficult to follow throughout; transitions are not used, abrupt, confusing, or unclear. Paragraph structure is nonexistent. Digressions and irrelevancies consistently distract the reader from the reasoning and flow of the paper.

Mechanics Command of English Writing Quality Need for Revision	Displays excellent command of standard written English. Well-crafted sentences throughout. Virtually error free in syntax, grammar, mechanics, word choice, and spelling. Presentable to high-level officials/officers without revisions or edits.	Demonstrates sound command of standard written English. Contains few errors in syntax, grammar, mechanics, word choice, or spelling that might distract the reader. Presentable to high-level officials/officers with minor revisions and edits.	Demonstrates a rudimentary command of standard written English. Contains many errors in spelling, punctuation, capitalization, sentence structure, and/or word choice that interfere with communication. Presentable to high-level officials/officers only after significant revisions and edits.	Demonstrates minimal command of standard written English. Contains extensive errors in spelling, punctuation, word choice, capitalization and/or sentence structure that hinder and/or severely degrade communication. Not presentable to any audience as written.
APA	Demonstrates exceptional commitment to proper recognition of sources. APA style elements are presented correctly with overall high quality.	Demonstrates strong commitment to proper recognition of sources. Most APA style elements are presented correctly with minimal distraction to the reader.	Demonstrates inconsistent commitment to proper recognition of sources. Many APA style elements are presented incorrectly with obvious distraction to the reader.	Demonstrates poor or lack of concern for proper recognition of sources. Most APA style elements are presented incorrectly with great distraction to the reader.

Grading Scale (NDU GRADING SCALE)

Students will assigned the following letter grade, based on the calculation in the course evaluation section.

Grade	Score	GPA	Description
A	93 -100	4.00	Exceptional Quality
A-	90 - 92	3.70	Superior Quality
B+	87 - 89	3.30	High Quality
B	83 - 86	3.00	Expected//Acceptable Quality
B-	80 - 82	2.7	Below Expected Quality
C	70 - 79	2.00	Unsatisfactory Quality
F	0 - 69	0.00	Fail/Unacceptable Quality

5. Course Schedule

Course schedule, topics, guest speakers and assignment dates may be changed at the instructor's discretion. Students are encouraged to check Blackboard regularly for up-to-date course information.

Date	Time	Lesson Number	Lesson Title	Assignments Due	Faculty Lead
Tuesday Afternoon		1	Introduction to Influence Warfare		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		2	Foundational Narratives		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		3	Narrative Strategy		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		4	Influence Strategy		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		5	Influence Tradecraft and Elections		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		6	Influence Tools and Great Power Competition		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		7	Tribalism—Offline and Online		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		8	Violent Extremist and Drug Trafficking Organizations		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		9	Guerrilla and Total War		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		10	Social Media and Human Terrain		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		11	Influence and Strategic Flexibility		Dr. Clark
Tuesday Afternoon		12	Influence Strategy Presentations	-Strategy Memorandum -Presentations	Dr. Clark

6. Lesson Guide

Lesson #1: Introduction to Influence Warfare

Scope

This class serves as an introduction to the course and surveys each of its constituent areas.

Influence is a central instrument of national power.

Although the character of war may very well be different than past eras with new information platforms, many scholars maintain that the nature of war remains unchanged. And at the heart of wartime and peacetime strategy is influence. As Sun Tzu stated, "War is deception. Best of all is to vanquish a foreign army without a fight." As Kautilya imagined, "The arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill a single man; but skillful intrigue devised by wise men can kill even those who are in the womb." As scholars of Genghis Khan analyze, "Winning by clever deception or cruel trickery was still winning and carried no stain on the bravery of the warriors…Increasingly, paper was the most potent weapon in Genghis Khan's arsenal." And as contemporary scholar Lawrence Freedman states, "…the realm of strategy is one of bargaining and persuasion as well as threats and pressure, psychological as well as physical effects, and words as well as deeds…[Odysseus, Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, Jomini] would seek victory at a reasonable cost by means of deceits, ruses, feints, maneuvers, speed, and a quicker wit."

Influence can be executed as an almost standalone strategy, continuous supporting action for other strategies, or a central effort for other strategies. Some scholars and strategists maintain that power may include the 1) potential effects of mobilized hard power and 2) ability to master influence.

RAND provides a definition for influence that encompassed statecraft and strategy writ large:

> *…the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences that further [state] interests and objectives.*[1]

By encompassing everything, the definition is not terribly useful. Affecting attitudes and behaviors, in general, is the goal of direct military actions, economic policies, and diplomacy. RAND's definition defines statecraft and strategy generally.

The dictionary definition—legal and formal—of influence (in both American and British English) is helpful for three reasons.

First, using the legal and formal definition ensures good communication over a clear meaning. It allows students of strategy, commanders, and staff to be understood clearly without having to use dozens of disparate definitions taught at different defense colleges.

Second, the formal definition provides a clear delineation between influence and a multitude of other ways to affect outcomes from diplomatic persuasion to direct economic pressure to coercion to forced cooption. Also in the formal definition itself, we have an actionable and practical outline on how 'to do' influence. Specifically it points up the importance of subtlety and deception as the other side of the influence coin as Angelo Codevilla often describes.

Third, the definition appears to be the one that current regional and world powers use. Russia, China, and Iran, for example seem to understand that indirect approaches and subversive means are preferable to overt shows of force and persuasion so as not to reap the wrath of international outcries. Especially when influence is easily deniable, it is a safer option against potential stigma and sanctions.

Influence, as a noun in both formal and legal usage is:

> *The act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command; the act or power of causing an effect or change without use of direct force or authority.*[2]

> *The power or capacity of causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways.*[3]

> *The exertion of action of which the operation is unseen or insensible (or perceptible only in its effects), by one person or thing upon another.*[4]

> *The capacity or faculty of producing effects by insensible or invisible means, without the employment of material force, or the exercise of formal authority…not formally or overtly expressed.*[5]

> *A thing (or person) that exercises action or power of a non-material or unexpressed kind.*[6]

As a verb, influence, in high English and legalese, means "To affect or alter by indirect or intangible means."[7]

In statecraft, the emphasis is on the indirect and intangible-seeming means—that which is invisible and insensible without force or even the exercise of formal power or position.

When done well, people do not know who the influencer is.

When done well, people will not realize that they have been influenced.

When done very well, people may become the unwitting amplifiers or agents of an influence campaign.

And best of all may be when even future historians are unable to recognize that there was a cogent, concerted, and purposeful influence campaign.

Learning Outcomes

Students will be able to:

1. Understand definitions of influence.
2. Evaluate the strategic nature of influence warfare.
3. Apply lessons learned towards developing the early skeleton of a recommended strategic influence plan.

Issues for Consideration

1. What is influence?
2. How can warfare be defined?
3. Why are some influence campaigns more successful than others?
4. What is the role of influence in warfare and national security?

Required Readings

Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. xi – xiii, 42 – 53.

Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 91 – 94, 113 – 115.

Post-NDU Resources (recommended for your professional development after the course—see professor to borrow readings)

Clark Ph.D., Howard Gambrill, *Information Warfare: The Lost Tradecraft*, Narrative Strategies, LLC, Washington, DC, 2017, p. 9 – 18.

Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 326 – 329.

Chanakya, Kautilya, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, translated by R. Shamasastry, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016, p. 540.

Machiavelli, Niccolo, *The Prince*, translated by Luigi Ricci, Oxford University Press, 1935.

Orwell, George, "Review of Mein Kampf," March 1940.

Maan, Ajit, "Narratives are about 'meaning,' not 'truth,'" Foreign Policy, 3 December 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/03/narratives-are-about-meaning-not-truth/.

Maan, Ajit, "Calls to Terrorism and Other Weak Narratives," Narrative and Conflict: Explorations of Theory and Practice, George Mason University, Volume 2, Issue 1, http://www.ajitkaurmaan.com/uploads/2/6/7/9/26794704/calls_to_terrorism_and_other_weak_narratives.pdf.

Lesson #2: Foundational Narratives

Scope

Shared abstract realities enable today's states, international systems and bodies as well as trade, law, diplomacy, and security. These principles exist only in the imagination. Nature, by itself, provides no physical precedent for statecraft.[8] Instead, statecraft is one of our "mental abstractions…which are used to define and describe material reality."[9] Neurobiologist Miguel Nicolelis goes on to claim that:

> *Thanks to the neurobiological properties of our brains, we are capable of creating a coherent description of material reality—all that is out there around us. The only description we can have of "what is out there" is the one continuously sculpted by the complex circuits that connect the close to eighty-six billion neurons that form a typical human brain.[10]*

Nicolelis, echoing other neuroscientists of his generation, goes on to conclude on imagined realities:

> *All this complexity allows the human brain to generate all the attributes that define the human condition: the entirety of our culture, history making, and civilization…or even to create a huge variety of artificial media that allows us to establish enduring social groups over vast spans of time and space…[11]*

Some neurobiologists suggest our subconscious comprises, "95 percent goes on beyond our awareness and exerts a huge influence on our lives—beginning with making our lives possible."[12] And this complex, yet to be well understood, process allows us to survive in the world. Without an active subconscious doing most of the work making sense of the world, the overwhelming sensory bombardment we face each second would simply freeze us in neutral for life, unable to decide or take action.[13]

Even equality, liberty, freedom, and human rights are invented or realized by abstract narrative. To boot, many government narratives even brand themselves on the idea that an order exists not of this world—communities claimed a Holy Roman Empire in Europe through the Middle Ages, and current U.S. coins call upon a higher power of trust.[14] Sometimes these imagined orders looking to a world beyond this world will be further rooted in an ancient written language that is able to unite swaths of territory throughout the world:

> *…Christendom, the Islamic Ummah, and even the Middle Kingdom—which, though we think of it today as Chinese, imagined itself not as Chinese, but as central—were imaginable largely through the medium of a sacred language and written script.[15]*

> *All the great classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power. Accordingly, the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic, or Chinese was, in theory, unlimited. (In fact, the deader the written language—the farther it was from speech— the better: in principle everyone has access to a pure world of signs.)[16]*

> *…written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out of signs, not sounds.[17]*

Even in totalitarian states, when leaders have zero issue with murdering millions of their own citizens, governments still place a premium on narrative. These governments require a critical mass of supporters even if they repress, through force, the majority of citizens. Hitler and Stalin would unlikely have survived politically if they lost support of a critical mass that buoyed them through upheavals, rebellions, resistance, and intra and inter-party conflicts. According to historian Hannah Arendt, "Nor can their popularity be attributed to the victory of masterful and lying propaganda over ignorance and stupidity."[18] Totalitarians must engender acceptable shared fictive constructs of some supporters as a prerequisite to achieving and maintaining power.[19]

Even for Hitler, extreme violence, genocide, the holocaust, and invasions began, first, with an accepted fictive narrative that laid the foundation for a shared societal construct on which the armies of violence stood. As Austrian-born economist Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises observed:

> *Hitler and his clique conquered Germany by brutal violence. By murder and crime. But the doctrines of Nazism had got hold of the German mind long before then. Persuasion, not violence, had converted the immense majority of the nation to the tenets of militant nationalism.*

Hitler was not alone. Authoritarian regimes have most often placed a premium on foundational narratives—going great distances to justify their states' identity. Robert Kagan, neoconservative historian and foreign-policy commentator, posited in reply to the notion that autocrats typically fail to appreciate or leverage foundational narrative, "Traditional society was ruled by powerful and pervasive beliefs about the cosmos, about God and gods, about natural hierarchies and divine authorities, about life and afterlife, that determined every aspect of people's existence."[20]

Narrative-driven social constructs can be so powerful that people will impose their own ideas on others under the assumption that a certain ideal is 'self-evident' and thus universal. And at times each side uses the same ideal (or at least the same title of an ideal) from differing perspectives. And at times, civilizations have held deep-rooted narratives that their ideology must conquer the world and all 'ignorant' people living in 'darkness.'

While biological order in nature may indeed be relatively stable, "…an imagined order is always in danger of collapse, because it depends upon myths, and myths vanish once people stop believing in them. In order to safeguard an imagined order, continuous, diligent, and conscious efforts are imperative."[21]

Those that lead are always vulnerable to ruptures in societal cohesion if citizens stop believing in the shared imagined order. A rupture may result from underlying values of norms and laws weakening over time, or a revolution or invasion may offer a different notion of legitimacy. In such cases the very idea of legitimacy is under attack by a rival social construct. Examples may include: the Westphalian system of states non-European countries were forced to or elected to adopt; the spread of Islam in its first centuries collapsed previously held societal narratives; and some communist revolutionaries in China, Vietnam, and Cuba were able to not only martially defeat enemies but also, at least in part perhaps, countered (and attempted to collapse) the popular foundational ideas previously held in those countries. Today many violent extremists pose an existential threat, in the minds of some governments, to the concepts that underline governance and law—these groups wish to end the Westphalian system and disregard human rights and individualism. Even as these radicals fail, they still try to eat away at liberal principles. As Henry Kissinger asserts, "Those under assault are challenged to defend…the basic assumptions of their way of life, their moral right to exist and to act in a manner that, until the challenge, had been treated as beyond question."

Strategic leaders in all fields then must take meticulous care to build and protect narratives that are the basis for all tools of statecraft. From the youngest of ages, unnatural cultural instincts are learned. And education systems, rituals, rites, celebrations, holidays, symbols, laws, norms, community pressure, and security forces protect invented realities and the assumption of their immutable and manifestly unassailable nature.

Learning Outcomes

Students will be able to:

1. Understand the centrality of foundations narratives to state and sub-state systems.
2. Evaluate effective and ineffective foundational narratives as the basis for civilizations and warfare.
3. Apply lessons learned towards developing recommended approaches to strengthening and weakening foundational narratives.

Issues for Consideration

1. Why are foundational narratives still important to understand the strategic process?
2. Why are foundational narratives vital to understand warfare and international politics today?
3. What are the roles of foundational narratives in information, influence, and psychological warfare?

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Lesson #3: Narrative Strategy

Scope

Whether to inform, influence, or deceive, the core of most information strategies is a strategic narrative. It is often the central and starting point for strategic communications, information operations, public diplomacy, strategic deception, strategic influence, intelligence, and other disciplines.

Strategic narrative—as well as master narrative and counter narrative—has multiple differing definitions. Very often analysts and strategists consider one or more of the following themes:

1.   A story or set of stories
2.   An expression of identity—theories linking narrative and identity have been made by psychiatrists, neuroscientists, literary scholars, historians, philosophers, and social scientists
3.   Storytelling that holds or provides meaning for a people especially in a time of crisis—explaining or perhaps normalizing life for some group of people
4.   Storytelling that has a purpose normally to influence

Narratives may be written or verbal or refer to communicable actions and/or events. They may be gathered during interviews or surveys or may be naturally occurring (observed).

The idea of narrative may differ from community to community. Thus some scholars consider narratives unique to any given location.

A narrative may reflect a community. If communities are unique, then so are their narratives' substance, style, and means of transmission. Each narrative is grounded in history, expressing a group's identity, accomplishments, challenges, ambitions, and desires. And through such narratives, communities can recognize their identity amidst outsiders and neighboring communities. During developing events—such as regional warfare, foreign incursion, and environmental disasters for example—narratives allow a community to gauge meaning and understanding. Narratives emerge without necessarily conscious design as communities continue to develop and preserve identity, sometimes inoculating societies from outside ideas and ideologies.

Master narratives may reflect and/or communicate locally deep-seated ideologies, belief systems, history, and language as no outsider can. Only locals are fluent in the visceral and logical, rational and irrational, personalized and ubiquitous messages. And only at the local level, amongst trusted colleagues, friends, relatives, and neighbors will person-to-person transmission of narratives take on intensity, emotion, and color. Through trust, recognized monuments and temples, visual motifs, and repetition will master narratives naturally travel and strengthen. Locals are the experts at local messaging.

Scholars and strategists disagree on what might make a strategic narrative effective in international policy and warfare. There is unlikely a formula. However, some elements that may very well describe or be considered for an effective strategic narrative may include:
- Reflection of Audience
- Seeming Unassailability
- Urgency
- Change
- Brevity & Clarity
- Simplicity
- Concreteness
- Unexpectedness
- Materialization
- Pace & Lead
- Story vs. Statistics
- Deeds
- Coherence
- Fidelity
- Counter vs. Master
- Wasta (an Arabic word for influence, presence, and effect)
- Credibility
- Charisma
- Supreme Confidence
- Transcendence
- Platform Mastery

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Understand strategic narrative and its centrality to governance.
2. Evaluate effective and ineffective grand strategic narratives.
3. Apply lessons learned towards developing a recommended resilient and impactful national master narrative.

Issues for Consideration

1. Why are some messaging campaigns successful while others lack the ability to influence?
2. What considerations of narrative development are important to influence a population?
3. What are characteristics of historical successful strategic narrative campaigns?

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Lesson #4: Influence Strategy

Scope

Strategic influence commonly refers to producing a desired political outcome without apparent materialization of hard power by indirect or seemingly intangible methods.

Tools of statecraft for strategic influence may well include any or all overlapping elements of political warfare and international politics to include security, economic, diplomatic, information, intelligence, religious, ideological, cultural, psychological, education, religious, agricultural, and development means.

However, scholars and strategists often focus on strategic communications, information campaigns, and clandestine strategies (clandestine plans require deception, which in turn relies on information warfare) along with careful deception of intent and means—underlining feature of strategic influence being indirect and without the apparent exertion of force.

It assumes that 'anything goes' within the bounds of the laws of physics and within acceptable lines with regards to the morals and ethics of the protagonist state. Some maintain a willingness to cross ethical lines if the end state is a moral one. This lesson does not endorse any immoral, amoral, unethical, or illegal practices. But it provides an overview of sometimes unethical behavior so as to better defend oneself against nefarious influence campaigns.

This mindset of 'anything goes' to reach an end state—especially if it does not involve the costly deaths of soldiers—is epitomized in Genghis Khan's approach to warfare. As historian Jack Weatherford describes:

> *The Mongols did not find honor in fighting; they found honor in winning. They had a single goal in every campaign—total victory. Toward this end, it did not matter what tactics were used against the enemy or how the battles were fought or avoided being fought. Winning by clever deception or cruel trickery was still winning and carried no stain on the bravery of the warriors…*[22]

> *For the Mongol warrior, there was no such thing as individual honor in battle if the battle was lost. As Genghis Khan reportedly said, there is no good in anything until it is finished.*[23]

Strategic influence is unconcerned with valor on the battlefield. It is only concerned with 'winning'—meeting its intended outcome. Some conscious quixotic sacrificial defeats such as the Irish 1916 Easter Rising and 480 BC Battle of Thermopylae of 300 Spartans temporarily staving off Persian conquest of Greek city states may have influenced and inspired others to fight after these seeming sacrificial events. However, these events perhaps, that became perhaps historical lore, appear to be the exceptions. In general, strategic influence often resides in the universe that the ends, not the means, have precedence.

Strategic influence means different things to different strategists and scholars. And this lesson will consider several perspectives. But this lesson will primarily focus on one or more of the following in the context of security and strategy:

- The actions are outside what might normally be assumed within the overt military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic realms. However, strategic influence likely plays a role or central force of these other realms.

- A protagonist intends to influence actors or events through a concerted plan. Thus this lesson will not analyze how French fashion, Japanese animated literature, or American fast food may unwittingly affect foreign populations—even though they may, and they may even affect the soldiers that fight wars and diplomats that keep peace.

- A government; head of state; commanding officer; chief political, security, or social strategist of some campaign (military, political, or social); or corporation is the protagonist.

- Deception and the clandestine and/or covert nature of the means, intent, intended outcome, and/or players are paramount. Best of all, in some cases, may be when contemporaries and even historians in the future are unable to detect a concerted strategic influence campaign.

- Plans are heavily intelligence driven especially with regards to human intelligence and understanding the human terrain. Intelligence should drive all strategy, but the realm of strategic influence normally emphasizes a surgical and precise understanding of people's intentions, mindsets, leanings, and goals.

- Execution assumes an emphasis on information warfare or information security.

- The effects or means are psychological in nature, in part or as a whole. For example, strategic influence may turn a tactical military victory into strategic success via propaganda. In this context it is a force multiplier for an overt security operation. Or an influence campaign, on its own, may sway opinions and actions.

- It assumes the general target is people and people's minds:

> *In effect, the human being should be considered the priority objective in a political war. And conceived as the military target of guerrilla warfare, the human being has his most critical point in mind. Once his mind has been reached, the 'political animal' has been defeated, without necessarily receiving bullets.*[24]

- Strategic influence may attempt to enable, amplify, or leverage part of a population or a nation's populace writ large against a government or non-state actor. It seeks to sow "dissention in the enemy camp"[25] to "upset the existing balance of power"[26] so that perhaps the state attempting strategic influence does not have to move to overt warfare.[27]

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Analyze influence strategies in the context of military and political fields.
2. Synthesize and evaluate threats and challenges to the United States and her allies in the realm of influence.

Issues for Consideration

1. What defines strategic influence, and how does it differ from traditional military campaigns?
2. How can the United States and her allies defend against unwanted foreign influence?
3. What are the tools of statecraft in strategic influence?

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Lesson #5: Influence Tradecraft and Elections

Scope

In the last lesson, we focused on a number of approaches to influence warfare. Many of them assume a 'small footprint' with a view to operating as silently, invisibly, and distantly as possible and appropriate. Others assume clandestine action. And others require layered deception.

The following ideas comprise one type of tradecraft that has been used in influence warfare:

Consonance theory:

Literally consonance is a harmony among entities. Practically consonance involves finding native networks and narratives that share an influencer's goals.

Consonance, in the context of strategic influence, is an exercise in extreme pragmatism as a guide for helping policymakers and scholars towards viewing the world as spheres of overlapping control and influence even inside and across political boundaries.

Consonance theory in action is more than understanding the efficacy of a certain power system's ability to fight or influence without fighting. It calls for an understanding of will, motivation, patience, and other unquantifiable qualities.

Consonance theory's unit of measurement is not necessarily states but instead systems that control or have the capability to control people and/or land or at least influence the greater population or event. It necessitates analyzing these units or "systems" without prejudice towards formal titles or Westphalian borders.

In some countries the state almost monopolizes violence within Westphalian boundaries, and the population may be mostly polarized in one direction. In these cases the state may very well be the unit of measurement. In other cases the state may not currently control all areas but may have the potential to.

A multinational cooperative such as NATO, Association of Southeast Asian Nation, or the African Union, may also, in certain places and at certain times, be a system that does or has the easy capability to control or influence certain people. At certain times and locations, such a multi-state governing board may very well be a unit of measurement for control or influence.

In some regions, informal governance systems—sometimes across borders—prevail. These systems control or are able to control a certain area. Examples include rural Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, Sunni Arab tribes in western Iraq and eastern Syria, Kurdish political groups in northern Iraq, drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and Guatemala, blood-tie groupings in Appalachia, and gangs in some inner cities of megacities.

Sometimes they exist and operate despite or because of state laws. Some constitutions give explicit authorities and responsibilities to informal subnational groups. Other constitutions do not mention subnational influencers assuming the state has relative monopoly of violence within political boundaries. Yet other legal documents of states outwardly declare monopoly of violence over any would-be sub-state organization or other informal would-be influencing entity.

Some state apparatus work with civil-society influencers openly and willingly, some with apathy given to necessary realities of controlling populaces, and some covertly and with disdain wishing to eventually stem their influence.

Ungoverned space is rare. And governance systems that fill a vacuum are not always destabilizing or criminal in nature.

The theory absorbs normative ideas of realism when it applies—states that do almost monopolize violence within its borders— as well as liberalism (that international organizations may be able to influence certain people and places at a given moment to help towards staving off conflict) and constructivism (that ideas may change our very assumptions that drive any international theory or framework). Consonance theory is agnostic on the legal status of units of measurement or underlying current efforts to improve international security. It strips bare power nodes that do or can easily control or influence without the crutch of a world political map. It recognizes power centers that are capable of materializing their desired effect on an area or people, no matter if the power is a state or not.

Resonance theory:

Literally resonance is the reinforcement by the synchronous vibration of another entity. Practically resonance comprises the actions an influencer may take to leverage, empower, enable, or allow a consonant system's actions.

Resonance, in the context of strategic influence defines the 'how' with regards to leveraging said systems that become the witting or unwitting agents of influence.

Resonance suggests a minimalist, perhaps distant, silent, and/or invisible process. A state attempts to amplify or enable a movement's success and said movement's success then furthers the state's goals. It is not the creation of something new. It is only the reinforcement or prolongation of means and ends between two consonant bodies already in action. It is a non-competitive non-zero sum game in which both parties benefit from an influencer's amplification or enabling. It does not necessarily even assume action. Sometimes the best course of action is to do nothing. Observe, report, allow, and ensure not to hinder.

Will:

As Dale Carnegie wrote in his lesson *How to Win Friends and Influence People,* "There is only one way under high heaven to get anybody to do anything and that is by making the other person want to do it. There is no other way."[28]

Value, then, according to executive coach Di McLanachan, "is thus the essential ingredient if we are thinking about influencing others."[29] In other words, people have to want to be influenced to be influenced—they will find value for themselves from the action of the influencer.

Resonance assumes that will cannot be forced and to try to change the minds of non-consonant civil-society systems is at best a massively ill-advised investment—to include perhaps physical oppressive force—with little or no effect. Any state action should be conducted as silently and as invisibly as possible. What this looks like on the ground is local actors using local sustainable solutions with local materials and local knowledge through a local optic to solve local problems on a local timeline.

Consonant systems and leaders are not puppets or paid spies but instead are seeking their own agendas that happen to be in consonance with those of the state conducting strategic influence. "In most cases it is futile to try steering them against those agendas…Their work can be far more valuable, subtle, and dangerous than that of a mere spy…Good ones cannot be bought."[30]

There is precedent for identifying and employing agents and systems that already have a deep-seated will towards a consonant goal.

Niccolo Machiavelli observed, "[I]f one holds his state on the basis of mercenary arms, he will never be firm or secure; because they are disunited, ambitious." In other words, money is not a substitute for will. Will cannot be forced.

As U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman concluded about paid soldiers: "We tried almost every system known to modern nations…that the men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute."[31]

And as reporter John Reed noted about the early twentieth century insurrection in Mexico, "…that men fighting individually and of their own free will are braver than long volleying rows in the trenches, lashed to it by officers with the flat of their swords."[32]

During the Cold War, Soviets, according to their own accounts, in their final analysis, preferred so-called 'fellow travelers'—foreign people whose goals were already in consonance with those of the Soviets and who required little or no direction—to 'controlled' paid spies.[33]

Potency:

Oftentimes "The most valuable agents are potent in their own right."[34]

Influence strategies often do not call for shoring up another's power but instead recognizing those already with power. And then subtly allow, enable, or empower these networks or individuals that are already influential.

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Analyze the subtle means of influence.
2. Synthesize and evaluate the roles of secrecy and deception in strategic influence.

Issues for Consideration

1. Why are deception, secrecy, and subtlety important to influence?
2. Why do influence campaigns without subtlety and layered deception fail?
3. How can one study influence campaigns if they are by definition difficult to detect?

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Lesson #6: Influence Tools and Great Power Competition

Scope

The instruments of influence power include most materials and personnel that you have in your command. Think deeply about what you can do—whether advising or conducting mission abroad—to use that which you already have to conduct influence. In other words accept that "we go to war with only what we already have."

The instruments can be considered those agents of subversion. And influence activities are not easily separated from the actual activities conducted. For example, if you are going to conduct a grey psychological warfare activities, you may need the use of cyber professionals and requisite systems to create websites or disrupt current online communities (the literal instrument then would include all the hardware needed).

Activities of influence include:

Strategic Deception: "It is almost impossible to maintain [secrecy] but often can be better achieved through the use of misleading rumors than through tight security. To provide the enemy with several stories..." (H. Van

). Layered deception of interests, identities, strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, goals, and intentions may be vital to some aspects of national security.

Kompromat: Compromise adversarial leaders by ensuring seeming private meetings with publicly maligned foreigners (even one low-level former government contractor may be enough to later publish exaggerations of untoward relationships and influence).

Dietrologia: Exploit, exacerbate, and evidence deeply held conspiracies and wide rumors.

Glasnost: Surgical anti-malign-influence and anti-disinformation campaign built off of trust with civil societies—may include healthy robust competition between a government and private entities to include news services, educational institutes, and think tanks for checks and balances.

Black/grey/white propaganda: Includes strategies comprising many tactics such as fake news, disinformation, and flooding the information environment. White psychological warfare products/actions are attributable to the real source, such as an official statement. Grey psychological warfare includes purposefully abstruse attribution—may seem to derive from any benign source or have unknown attribution. Black psychological warfare products/actions purposefully appear to disseminate from a fictional or actual source concealing the identity of the true source.

This may include subtly amplifying narratives of influencers or building narratives that start with a deep understanding of the targets' foundational narratives, subconscious biases, outlooks, and predictions. And should abide by as many narrative strategy best practices as possible.

Trust building / partnership programs: Trust is earned through action over time. Trust cannot be surged. Education exchanges, cultural exchanges, security-force-assistance, development, stabilization, and inter-military training missions can emphasize, overtly and substantially, developing professional and personal relationships between participants. Through long-term relationships and trust—both sides affecting the outlook of the other (subconscious and conscious)—alliances can be built and strengthened.

Visa programs: Quietly work with allies to allow 'fellow-traveler' influencers to gain followers or influence others across borders without that person or others knowing of government actions.

Szalámitaktika: Salami tactics—influence to exacerbate factions within enemy camps or instigate enemies to fight one another.

Institutional sabotage: Indirectly encourage or cause slow foreign bureaucracies. Can also encourage apathy/malaise. Find dissenting or questioning factions within the adversary government or industrial complex. Ensure they have access to tradecraft literature, especially under the guise of "management and business best practices" (ironically), so that they can subtly slow or degrade government and industry apparatus over time.

Agents of subversion include:

Fifth columns: Civil society or government networks in an adversarial state that will work against that state.

Fellow Travelers: Individuals abroad who happen to already be working towards your government's goals. May wish to avoid overt relationship (especially if fellow traveler's influence derives from her independence) and instead subtly, silently, invisibly, and distantly support/amplify.

Third options: Unaffiliated third parties (contractors or mercenaries not paid or hired directly by a government and not formally affiliated with a government) of a state that will act directly on the state's behalf abroad.

Agent provocateurs: Agents infiltrate into or pretend to be with the opposition to discredit that opposition ☐ conduct or spur actions that would lead to arrest or public outrage.

Private investors: Private investment/donation to secondary parties that will eventually support fellow-traveler influencers. Investors should only have informal and perhaps unknown relationships with the protagonist government. And funds should be funneled or "cleaned" through as many intermediaries as possible before landing in the lap of unwitting agents of influence (grants, fellowships, donations, etc.).

When considering instruments, assets, and activities it is vital that we return to the 'spirit of include' and recall the nature of influence which include subtlety, indirectness, and a focus on trend that already exist. The following is a reminder of the mindset behind influence warfare and how it differs from other activities.

Strategic influence requires similar cognitive commitment to that of military warfare. It is not for the 'dabblers.' And the outcomes of strategic influence may very well be as decisive and vast as that of total warfare. That it is usually cheaper than all-out war should not distract strategists from the necessary dedication and planning and potentially world-shifting results as Angelo Codevilla explains:

> *Any and all means that produce such changes—coercive diplomacy, economic coercion, propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, coups de main, and support for insurgents—are acts of war in the same sense that armies crashing across borders or airplanes dropping bombs are acts of war because their results can be as intrusive or conclusive as the results of armies and bombs.*[35]

Strategic influence is not as spectacular as declared warfare between states. But it may be as or even more effective.

Benefits of influence instruments of power:

Strategic influence is often assumed to be cheaper than conventional warfare. If one can attain the same end state as with war, then influence is perhaps an attractive investment of resources.

Influence campaigns sometimes call for low-to-no overt physical presence. This may be beneficial in counterterrorism and stabilization missions when the very presence of foreign forces may fan the flames of instability, extremist mobilization, and radicalization. People may not despise what is not there—when influence and any indirect support for an entity is seemingly silent and invisible.

Lack of a large foreign physical presence may also be beneficial in the context of international security. It may placate competing and adversarial states so they elect not to increase defense spending as per a security dilemma-type ratcheting up of security expenditure—each side attempting to outdo its potential adversaries.

Strategic influence allows world powers, regional powers, aspiring powers, 'non-zero-sum' states, and non-state actors to 'punch above their weight class.' It allows one to do more with less.

While many analysts link asymmetric strategies on the cheap with weak states and non-state actors—as weak states are often unable to match stronger powers' military and economic might—regional and global powers still employ strategic influence. It may be a wise investment for strong powers to learn from non-state actors and weaker governments, who employ asymmetric approaches out of necessity to survive. A physically strong student of jiu-jitsu may be wise to learn from a small-framed instructor knowing that this weak-looking teacher must rely on perfect technique and unlikely 'cheats' proper style with brute strength.

To understand influence instrument, it is important to recall the definition of influence—as this will help you decide which instrument might be best for any given mission.

Influence, as a noun in both formal and legal usage is:

> The act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command; the act or power of causing an effect or change without use of direct force or authority.[36]

> The power or capacity of causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways: sway.[37]

As a verb, influence, in high English and legalese, means "To affect or alter by indirect or intangible means,"[38] and "to have an effect on the condition or development of."[39] In statecraft, the emphasis is on the indirect and intangible-seeming means.

It is important for the strategist and security professional to understand what influence is not when considering which instruments to use:

In contrast to influence, to persuade refers to an action that is more overt, known, and direct. In formal usage, persuade means, "To move by argument, entreaty, or expostulation to a belief, position, or course of action,"[40] "to win over to a belief or way of acting: convince,"[41] and/or "to plead with: urge.[42]

By contrast, manipulation often has malevolent connotations—trying to bend people's actions against their will by unwanted subterfuge or lying, for example—and may denote more direct action with an audience than influence. To manipulate is "to control or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means especially to one's own advantage."[43]

Persuasion and/or manipulation may play a role in some information warfare campaigns. However persuasion and manipulation are distinctly different phenomena from influence. Influence assumes an unknown, unseen, or otherwise intangible force. Thus subtlety, deception, and security (of the protagonist's identity, intentions, and/or actions) will often play key roles in strategic influence. Best of all may be influence when the target audience is unaware it has ever been influenced today and well into the future. Even better may influence that goes unnoticed even in the eyes of future historians.

The term coerce is all together quite different. To coerce assumes direct force or threat of force: "To restrain or dominate by force,"[44] "to compel to an act or choice,"[45] and/or "to achieve by force or threat."[46]

Similarly, the word control assumes authority or force to perhaps, in some cases, preclude the necessity of indirect influence: "To exercise restraining or directing influence over: regulate,[47]" and/or "to have power over: rule."[48]

Some scholars and practitioners focus on attempts to change beliefs and behavior no matter the target audience. This approach includes, among others, the following processes:

Compliance forces audiences to change behaviors, perhaps through military interdiction, but not beliefs—these changed behaviors perhaps being short lived and perhaps requiring great expenditure and security force presence.

Conversion attempts to change beliefs. Altering an audience's opinions and attitudes may be impossible and if possible likely requires control of an environment and total societal reeducation and restructuring—overseen enduringly.

Some scholars and strategic leaders dismiss attempts at compliance and conversion as ineffective and an unnecessary use of resources towards an unsure end state. Some strategists elect, instead, a minimalist approach to identify and then enable or empower civil-society systems whose goals are already in consonance with those of the influencer.

This minimalist, subtle tradecraft assumes that direct communications to influence hostile, inconvincible, or apathetic audiences either requires so much effort as to perhaps not be worth the cost or is outright folly.

It assumes the already willing may be the most effective agents to meet strategic influence goals. And actions to allow, enable, leverage, amplify, or empower such actors would be minimal and discrete in line with spirit of strategic influence that relies on indirect or seemingly intangible means.

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Analyze influence tactics, techniques, procedures, and options in the context of military and political fields.
2. Synthesize and evaluate threats and challenges to the United States and her allies in the realm of influence recognizing the potential effects of the execution of cogent influence plans.

Issues for Consideration

1. Why might some scholars claim limitless means versus finite means with regards to strategy?
2. Why do states limit themselves to 'normal' military, economic, and diplomatic functions?
3. What are the legal and ethical parameters for operating in influence warfare?

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Lesson #7: Tribalism—Offline and Online

Scope

Influence warfare does not only focus on states and civilians that firstly consider themselves citizen of states. It must also account for those that may not easily fall into the Westphalian mindset.

Some perspectives of realist, liberal, and constructionist theories of the international state system—that may help some define and even perhaps to some degree help predict international politics—fail to account for important identities within and sometimes transcending borders.

Scholars and strategists have at times ignored these nuanced identities—such as tribes, geographic clans, cartels, syndicates, and various other groupings—only to uncover their centrality in warfare, failing and weak states, and violent-extremist safe havens, sometimes crossing countries with legitimate strong governments. Even one leg of Carl von Clausewitz's central themes was civil society—perhaps understudied and often misunderstood in the modern world.

With international policies ranging from stability missions in Southwest Asia; humanitarian missions in the Sahel; and counterterrorism, support, intelligence, and full-spectrum strategies throughout North Africa and the Middle East, it may be wise to view true powerbrokers of regions in addition to the formal state systems that may retake areas in the future.

At the very least, understanding these systems that are sometimes more resilient than and outlast residing governments may inform military, economic, information, and diplomatic missions abroad.

What are the differences and similarities between a clan society and contract society ("rule of law" and "protection of the individual")? Clans, here, refer to subnational groups in the broadest sense: bloodline, geographic, and/or fictitious cohesion and may perhaps cover many various identities with ebbs and flows of strength.

'Clan-ism' defined much of mankind outside ancient empires—most of the world until modern history.

'Clan-ism' also may help describe underlying motivations and identities of individuals and communities throughout the world today below the level of and sometimes across formal states.

•   Clans and informal groups may be important to the constituencies of political leaders from the Philippine islands to rural Afghanistan to western Iraq to mountainous and inner-city areas of the United States to the jungles of South America to the megacities of Western Africa.

•   It is also important to recognize hybrid states where there exists both clan society and emphasis on legal protection of the individual—sometimes both written directly into law.

•   Clan identities become important in understanding weak central government institutions such as with Mexico and Guatemala's many drug trafficking organizations ("cartels") strongly governing swaths of territory and southern Somalia's many warring bloodline clans, extremists, and criminal organizations.

•   When states fail, the clan may become the most important governance, security, and development structure. Even in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan as the strength of clan-ism rises and falls throughout history, people tend to go back to their tribal composition during times of failed central government and crises.

•   As both the British and Russians observed in their wars in Afghanistan, the complexity of clan systems—both the changing allegiances of tribal confederations and the starkly different fighting styles from village to village—defeated powerful militaries. The tactical level directly affected strategic outcomes.

•   During regional and international negotiations it is important to understand human impulses (even those that are heads of states and multinational corporations) that may drive some people more towards a clan-society mentality such as holding honor as more important than some standard lawful diplomatic norm. "Grasping this impulse and appreciating the range of forms it takes are vital to solving a surprisingly long list of foreign-policy challenges," as acclaimed professor of law Mark S. Weiner notes.

•   Clans may make up the composition of revolutions and anti-colonial resistance.

•   Sometimes clan-society-type values at the national level will supersede the greater good just as financial institutions in the European Union have feuded, arguably, to the detriment of their own countrymen.

•   Culturally, clans can be important within a state. Thus public diplomacy, information operations, and cultural exchanges may be informed by traditional/cultural clan systems.

• Allied governments often fail with "state-building" because they fail to incorporate clan systems or simply do not allow the clan systems to naturally accept a legitimate government. States often cannot be imposed. Will can never be imposed.

• Sometimes, even in the modern world, a central government can only rule, at this given time, with some patronage or at least an understanding of rural clans and inner-city informal groups. The current failure (arguable) of Kabul's government to rule or even understand the vast majority of its country is possibly one example.

Learning Outcomes

Students will be able to:
1. Evaluate the implications to the global security environment of the influence of those at the subnational governance level.
2. Analyze the efficacy, power, and influence of regional and subnational governance systems today and potentially in the near and long-term future.

Issues for Consideration

1. What is the role of civil society in global security?
2. What determines the effectiveness of a social contract?
3. How does the rule of the clan, its influence, and its narratives affect global geopolitics?

Required Readings

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Lesson #8: Violent Extremist and Drug Trafficking Organizations

Scope

Influence warfare not only targets governments and their civil societies. It also targets non-government entities that may have security and governance apparatus themselves.

A strategist may analytically divide up a population where violent extremists reside and elect to use difference information warfare techniques on each clique:

Government counter-violent-extremist initiatives may include the following:

Enable / Support / Amplify: Support movements and individuals already against violent extremism. Such individuals and movements use rhetoric, education, defensive vigilance (populations reporting violent extremist activities to authorities, for example), defensive violence, and offensive violence, for example.

Specific cases of those against violent extremism include some persuasive anti-extremist religious and community leaders, youth group organizers, education facilitators, and Pasthun *arabakai* (defensive temporary militias) and *lashkars* (offensive militias that may be larger than *arbakai*).

Inoculate: Inoculate apathetic communities from violent extremist influences. This prevention approach may include education, community outreach, and narrative campaigns exposing violent extremism's ideological weaknesses and inhumanity as well as practical shortcomings.

- Activate: Motivate otherwise apathetic communities to counter or undermine violent extremists with words, programs, or weapons.

Apathetic communities may include majorities of some populations too focused on accessing potable water, food, and shelter for their families—obviating the luxury to join some transnational ideological revolt. Others may include those not focusing on violent extremist threats and intentions on seeking power until it is too late perhaps; those who do not feel violent extremists pose a threat; those who fear extremists; those who feel impotent against

violent extremist strength and influence; those that wish to take advantage of extremists' rise to power by, for example, selling goods to them; and those that feel vicariously vindicated in their otherwise repressed discontent with the status quo.[49]

- Dissuade: Identify and then stop those especially susceptible to violent extremism from joining a radical group.

It must be noted that there is no behavioral, psychological, familial, societal, economic, education, ideological, ethnic, cultural, criminal, religious, or political profile of someone susceptible to violent extremism. At least one common profile or set of profiles has not been uncovered yet.[50] However, some studies suggest violent extremists of some groups are overall better educated and wealthier than the majority in the communities from which they come.[51]

- Undermine: Force violent extremist leaders and ideologues on the rhetorical defensive. Approaches include employing revered critiques against violent extremist incompetence and ideological weaknesses to instigate an adversary's reaction that makes the enemy seem weak—perhaps forcing them to repeat weak justifications for violence.

- Demobilize: De-radicalize or disarm violent radicals to lessen or erase their threat to society.

- Kill / Capture: Directly dismantle malign groups and their networks until they can no longer function and/or people fear joining or supporting them. Governments often call this counterterrorism.

A strategist may instead simply wish to leverage anti-extremist movements to affect all the other audiences. This type of influence of a population writ large would thus be indirect.

Whether you choose one group to affect others or wish to affect all, strategic influence demands we must not be intellectually shackled by Westphalian borders and must not smear entire nations with a single brush. Even in the most seemingly unified populations we can find divisions and disparate motivations.

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:
1. Understand the strengths and weaknesses of attempted influence by contemporary violent extremist organizations.
2. Understand the different methods to study violent extremist groups in the realm of influence warfare: cognitive, behavioral, and holistic.
3. Assess the threat posed by violent extremist organizations' influence to global and regional security.

Issues for Consideration

1. What determines the effectiveness of violent extremist organizations' influence?
2. What are the main sources of potency of violent extremist organizations' influence campaigns?
3. How serious is the threat of violent extremist organizations' influence? Is the threat exaggerated or underappreciated?

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Lesson #9: Guerrilla and Total War

Scope

Guerrilla Warfare is often a central discipline for unconventional warfare executed through foreign internal defense. It considers "[m]ilitary and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces."[52] And it may be a means to counter other non-state actors and/or one or more states.

Some historians have argued that guerrilla warfare is as old as mankind. What is popularly considered 'conventional warfare' of army pitted against army is a relatively new concept. But even after armies of the first societies of Egypt and Mesopotamia stood up, militaries throughout history have had to contend with irregular warriors. And guerrillas have continued to fight one another to this day.

Even in 'conventional warfare,' guerrilla warfare may still play a vital role.

Even in absolute warfare, there may very well be a platform for guerrillas:

> *If two enemies fight each other to the last—and this is always the case where an ideology is involved (religion is part of it) guerrilla warfare and civilian resistance will inevitably break out in the final phase.*[53]

> *The military expert who undervalues or even disregards guerrilla warfare makes a mistake since he does not take into consideration the strength of the heart.*[54]

> *The last, and admittedly, most cruel battle will be fought by civilians.*[55]

Learning Outcomes

Students will be able to:
1. Understand methods to leverage guerilla 'immune systems' that may be able to combat adversaries.
2. Understand the tenets, suggestions, and stages of influence in guerilla warfare.
3. Apply lessons learned to recommend influence strategies in both guerrilla warfare and the final stages of what some call total warfare.

Issues for Consideration

1. What is will to fight and how is it important in guerrilla warfare?
2. What is will to fight and why is it important in total warfare?
3. Why do some strategists and scholars have difficulty in analyzing, defining, and measuring the effects of will to fight?

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Lesson #10: Social Media and Human Terrain

Scope

One potential influence myth is that atmospherics and public opinions, on their own, should inform influence, are altered by influence, and are the key to measuring influence impact.

According to this widely accepted thinking haunting all levels of the military, development, and diplomatic ranks, people's professed opinions (from polls and social media analyses, for example) are the playing field on which we conduct influence.

The information environment writ large may also be considered part of the international, regional, and domestic context on par even with physical terrain and geography perhaps:

> *Information is so prevalent, potent and unavoidable that it forms as much a part of the strategic environment as the terrain or weather.*[56]

> *Two things must be kept in mind about soft power, just as they must be about the weather: By itself, it determines nothing. And it presents challenges and opportunities to all sides in the conflict.*[57]

> *Just as sailors must take into account the strength and direction of the prevailing wind, warriors must deal with the disposition of the peoples involved in the conflict.*[58]

However, people's reported opinions may tell us little about the information environment.

Many studies and articles use surveys, polls, and social-media meta-data analyses to suggest conclusions. Studies often misuse or overemphasize the importance of surveys, polls, and data culling. It is thus important to understand the nuances and limitations of surveys, polls, and online data culling.

Even in safe and secure areas surveys and polls—supposedly societies free of intimidation—may be deeply flawed. It is folly to plan strategies or predict the future based solely off what populations claim to believe.

When considering answers to surveys or even looking to self-initiated opinions one might hear on the radio or read on social media, we must be cautious. What people self-report does not necessarily reflect their true beliefs. People exaggerate, lie to others, lie to themselves, ape common sentiments, and sound impassioned about things that have little bearing on their core values and actions:

> *People are not cultural or linguistic catalogues, and most of what we see as their cultural and social behaviour is performed without reflecting on it and without an active awareness that this is actually something they do. Consequently, it is not a thing they have an opinion about, nor an issue that can be comfortably put in words when you ask about it. Ethnographic fieldwork is aimed at finding out things that are often not seen as important but belong to the implicit structures of people's life. Asking is indeed very often the worst possible way of trying to find out.*[59]

Importantly, it is also a fallacy to assume people have opinions on most things. The billion-dollar industries of surveys, polls, and data culling may compel some consumers to rely too much on claimed beliefs:

…people have no opinion about most of things that happen around them. And this is normal: there are very, very few issues in the world that are everybody's concern. Some forms of opinion research, and our media these days, have created an opposite image: that everyone has an opinion about everything, that we all should have opinions about everything, that we all have good and valid opinions about everything.[60]

It seems like it could or should be an easy way to understand someone's beliefs…

The simplest way to try to understand people's motives is just to ask them. Short of hiring a psychic, breaking out the tarot cards, or tracing the lines across someone's palm, the easiest way to know what's going on inside people's brains is to listen to what comes out of their mouths.[61]

It also seems to satisfy those in social sciences providing unique quantified data of a phenomenon that is unquantifiable…

This is how social scientists often get their information: by administering surveys and conducting interviews, then tallying the results. They love this approach, because it gives them new, exclusive, and empirical data, seemingly untainted by their own opinions. When these scholars see strong patterns among the data—when essentially "everyone" is telling them the same thing—they usually assume that their subjects' statements can be trusted. So they run with them.[62]

There have been surveys that show strong trends towards a particular seeming shared viewpoint. But time and again, more careful ethnographic study have unearthed that publicly shared opinions may be misleading and even outright lies.

But you can't believe everything you hear. Respondents may give consistently unreliable answers for many things. They may be influenced by social and cultural biases. They may be lying, with ulterior motives. They may be in psychological denial because admitting the truth, even to themselves, would be far too painful. Or they may simply lack the knowledge or information to provide accurate answers.[63]

Sometimes the truth does not simply jump from the tips of respondents' tongues…[64]

Those gathering data on social media for atmospherics and opinions should also beware. Social media posts may be especially misleading as users often "present an ideal face to the world that might mask their true, and perhaps less ideal emotions."[65] Also any major data culling "can't always detect irony, sarcasm, and other subtle traits."[66]

In addition to ethnographic methodologies and warning of people's claims, we can also learn from challenges historians face. Historians, when diving into archival research must be skeptical of official journals, after-action reports, and logs: "Few official narratives in any language explicitly acknowledge disaster, panic or failure, or admit that people run away."[67] Similarly, historians when they interview folks that were in combat years or decades ago find that memories fade or events are crystalized through prisms of fiction over the years.

At a deeper level, hundreds of reproducible studies in neurobiology over the past 18 years suggest that our conscious mind may provide conclusions and opinions that belie our true beliefs. Such studies suggest that, "…when it comes to understanding our feelings, we humans have an odd mix of low ability and high confidence."[68] After all, as author Leonard Mladinow, summarizing decades of research on the subconscious, claims:

…we are not like computers that crunch data in a relatively straightforward manner and calculate results. Instead, our brains are made up of a collection of many modules that work in parallel, with complex interactions, most of which operate outside of our consciousness. As a consequence, the real reasons behind our judgments, feelings, and behavior can surprise us.[69]

Even if survey questions generated honest introspective answers and even if people only accurately posted honest opinions in clear language to social media (and everyone were to use social media), these 'atmospherics' of opinions may be unhelpful. People's spoken and written opinions may have very little to do with intensity and consistency of belief. More importantly opinions may never translate into action. Surveys in the fields of security should be tested elsewhere to see if they are generating false leads.

Words can be deceptive. Polls and surveys may be deceptive. There are no quantitative or technical panaceas to understand spheres of influence. There is no easy way. We must use surveys, polls, and data culling with great care and critical analysis of methodologies. We must also use an array of disciplines from neurobiology to regional studies to anthropology to sociology to history to the fine arts to cosmology. But in the end, we can sense spheres of influence through actions—means and end states. And in the end, we can observe the fruits of strategic influence through changed or

maintained behavior over time with a cogent cocktail of qualitative and quantitative analyses. And we must use a scientific approach that generates reasonable hypotheses for the reasons of a change or reasons of actions and then goes on to find and deeply analyze those hypotheses with the least inconsistent evidence.

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Analyze resilient and stabilizing networks, systems, and leaders abroad in the context of influence warfare.
2. Understand biases and fallacies that lead to misinterpretations of human domain intelligence and spheres of influence analyses.

Issues for Consideration

1. How is intelligence on populations useful?
2. What are questions to ask intelligence professionals for accurate and precise analyses of populations and spheres of influence in civil society?

Required Readings

Blommaert, Jan and Dong Jie, *Ethnographic Fieldwork: A Beginner's Guide*, Multilinguual Matters, Bristol, UK, 2011, chapter 1.

Lankford, Adam, *The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers*, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2013, p. 21 – 30.

Post-NDU Resources (recommended for your professional development after the course—see professor to borrow readings)

McDowell, Don, *Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Mangers, and Users*, The Scarecrow Press Inc, Toronto, 2009, p. 3-19.

Morgan D. Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1998), Chapter 11: Hypothesis Testing, p. 178–216.

Anthony Weston, *Rules for Arguments*, 4th ed. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2009), Chapters 1, 7, and 8 (pages 1–7, 49–65).

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http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%202-1%20Intelligence%20Operations.pdf, sections 1-1 to 1-7.

Lesson #11: Influence and Strategic Flexibility

Scope

If flexibility in strategy is vital, then communication of a well-defined, well-articulated, well-transmitted, and easily understandable national interest (or commander's intent within the security world or brand within the private sector) is fundamental. As U.S. Army War College Professor Richard A. Gabriel writes, taking lessons from one of Genghis Khan's famed generals, "Devise and utilize a strategic vision, for it is strategic vision that shapes goals, ways, and ends."[i] Only when an intelligence officer, senior policy analyst, logistics expert, and trigger puller understand and internalize a central deeply influential narrative may all work in concert with the ever-shifting tactical, operational, and strategic landscape. In warfare, when central command communications go silent and officers slain a communicable strategic vision allows frontline troops to proceed with confidence, impunity, and prejudice ensuring each action meets the national goal. Clear, simple, repeatable end states allow all elements of power at all levels to act with extreme flexibility to achieve a singular goal.

Also, when viewing strategy as a process, intelligence and information flow is especially vital. Planners must continuously receive intelligence and information in dynamic environments because an enemy, competitor, or ally's decisions will change because of or despite your initial strategic plan. As a process—versus a simple fixed strategic plan—we must ensure to continuously change in reaction to changing interests of partners and adversaries along with other internal and

external friction. It thus behooves one to update her analysis on allies, enemies, and state apparatus and civil society. It would be important to ensure capable communications and appropriate flow and control of information in all domains to inform the strategic planning processes.

Learning Outcomes

Students will be able to:

1. Understand the importance of an influential commander's intent, strategic vision, and brand to strategic flexibility and operational art.
2. Evaluate historical strategic flexibility with a focus on how strategy execution can influence new policy.
3. Apply lessons learned towards developing recommended approaches to ensure strategic flexibility.

Issues for Consideration

1. What communications and influence methods from strategic leaders allow operational leaders to succeed in warfare?
2. How does a state and military ensure that new or refocused intelligence drives, persuades, and/or influences updated strategic plans and policies?
3. Why have some states failed to change approaches to new or changing threats and challenges?

Required Readings

Roberts Ph.D., Wess, *Leadership Secrets of Attilla the Hun*, Warner Lessons, New York, 1985, p. 7 – 8, 90 – 94.

Rumelt, Richard P*., Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why it Matters*, Crown Business, New York, 2011, p. 77 – 87.

Post-NDU Resources (recommended for your professional development after the course—see professor to borrow readings)

Tuchman, Barbara W., *The Guns of August,* The Random House Publishing Group, New York, 1962, p. 73.

Sinek, Simon, "The Infinite Game: How to Lead in the 21st Century," How To: Academy, 13 May 2019, https://youtu.be/3vX2iVIJMFQ. (especially, but not only, 26:04 – 34:17)

Augustus, Flavius Mauricius Tiberius*, Maurice's Strategikon: Handlesson of Byzantine Military Strategy*, translated by George T. Dennis, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1984, p. 83 – 92.

Gabriel, Richard A., *Genghis Khan's Greatest General: Subotai the Valiant*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2004, p. 137 – 139.

Lesson #12: Influence Strategy Presentations

Scope

Students will prepare and then deliver a recommended national strategic plan for influence

The presentation may comprise three parts, but students should focus on one main point and be ready to answer questions:

- Diagnosis of Issue
    - Defines & explains nature of issue
    - Simplifies overwhelming complexity
    - Identifies certain aspects as critical
- Guiding Vision
    - Overall approach to cope with and overcome obstacles identified in diagnosis
- Set of Coherent Actions
    - Two or three courses of action that accomplish / carry out guiding vision
    - Risks, costs, timeline, and measures of effect

The final presentation may be the same topic as that of the strategy memorandum or a different topic. If the same topic, students must focus on one main theme of the paper and prepare for questions (from the professor as well as class).

Presentations will be no longer than five minutes (cut-off point is five minutes and zero seconds) followed by ten minutes of questions and answers by the professor and class—as the professor directs.

Depending on the topic and approach chosen, along with the professor's feedback throughout the length of the course, a student may elect to focus more on the diagnosis of the issue, guiding vision, or one or two courses of action.

The format will be that of a briefing to the president and cabinet. The student will not be judged on style, may read from notes or a script, and may bring as many notes / aids as the students wishes.

Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to:

1. Synthesize influence best practices on multiple lines of effort for a notional national strategic narrative.
2. Create and then evaluate the execution plan for a notional national influence plans at the strategic level.
3. Critique and analyze—concisely and clearly—fully realized influence plan recommendations.

Issues for Consideration

1. How does one synthesize disparate influence concepts in a unified information strategic plan?
2. What execution plans can best support a holistic national influence strategy?
3. How can disparate elements of information and influence strategy—such as narrative, will to fight, and tribal influence—be synthesized to create a holistic approach that supports national interests?

7. Course Policies

All CIC students are expected to read and abide by the policies in the official SJSS Student Handlesson, including the non-attribution, academic integrity, and attendance policies.

Technology & Learning Materials

NDU uses Blackboard as its Learning Management System. You will receive your Blackboard username and password from the registrar's office before your course begins.

Please visit http://www.ndu.edu/Students/Incoming-Students/ITD/NDU-IT-Guide/ for details about campus technology requirements.

For technical help throughout the course, you may contact the NDU Information Technology Directorate at (202) 685-3824.

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Krueger, Alan B, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*, Princeton University Press, 2008.

Robert A. Pape, *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Random House, 2005.

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