

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE WASHINGTON, DC




ELECTIVE SYLLABUS NWC 6011

Intelligence Challenges, Structures, and Strategies

Academic Year 2020-2021
SPRING 2020

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NWC 6011: Intelligence Challenges, Structures, and Strategies
Fall 2020 (Academic Year 2020-2021)

	Topic	Tuesday Class Dates	Title
BLOCK 1	1	15 September 2020 0830-1030	The Nature and Role of Intelligence in National Security
	2	22 September 2020 0830-1030	Intelligence Community Evolution and Reform
	3	29 September 2020 0830-1030	Collection Capabilities and Challenges: the “-INTs”
	4	6 October 2020 0830-1030	Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination
	5	13 October 2020 0830-1030	Covert Action and Other Sensitive Operations
BLOCK 2	6	20 October 2020 0830-1030	IC Integration and Collaboration
	7	27 October 2020 0830-1030	Intelligence and Policy
	8	3 November 2020 0830-1030	IC Support to the Military
	9	10 November 2020 0830-1030	The Broader Intelligence World
BLOCK 3	10	17 November 2020 0830-1030	Domestic Influences on Intelligence: Budgets, Opinions, and Oversight Memo Due
	11	1 December 2020 0830-1030	Intelligence Success and Failure
	12	8 December 2020 0830-1030	Strategic Views on Intelligence: The Coming Decade and Beyond Student Briefings Due

INTRODUCTION

SECURITY CLEARANCE NOTE

This elective course is open only to US students and requires a TOP SECRET security clearance with an active SCI read-in. Although the syllabus and assigned take-home readings are unclassified, on-campus class meetings will take place in a secure classroom (SCIF) and regularly cover classified subjects. *Remote class sessions via Blackboard or other online platforms will be strictly unclassified.* The course director will aim to maximize classified class meetings on-campus while adhering to health safety protocols. Conditions permitting, the class will conduct a site visit to IC agency for classified briefings and tour at some point during the semester.

Students are responsible for confirming their clearance information is on file with NDU Security (and for arranging an SCI read-in, if needed) prior to the start of classes.

Students are also responsible for having their home organization's security office pass any necessary clearance information to NDU Security via fax (send on department/agency letterhead to 202-685-3765) or via JPAS (use SMO code W37WAA2 for SCI level; SMO code W37WAA6 for non-SCI collateral-level).

COURSE OVERVIEW

This course provides rising senior strategists and policymakers with a foundation for interacting with and leveraging the capabilities of the US intelligence community in the pursuit of US national security. It introduces the basic concepts of strategic intelligence collection and analysis. ***It is NOT designed to create intelligence officers.*** Rather, it offers practical insight into how to be an effective consumer of national intelligence and informed contributor to intelligence-related dialogue. Instruction will consist of in-class or online discussion, guest speakers, and, if conditions permit, a site visit for briefings and tour at an IC agency.

The course explores the organizational and functional aspects of intelligence and surveys IC elements, capabilities, and services that support warfighters and civilian policymakers in all branches of government. It is meant to help students achieve a holistic understanding of how the IC's different parts work with each other and the challenges the IC faces in supporting strategic decision makers. It is also designed to help students think critically and strategically about the missions and roles that the IC and its elements play in the US national security process.

No prior experience with intelligence is required for this course. Given the course's introductory level, students with extensive familiarity with the intelligence community and strategic intelligence are discouraged from enrolling. Please note that this course focuses primarily on intelligence at the strategic level and covers the intelligence community's support for the tactical and operation needs of warfighters only in passing. Prior experience with tactical intelligence may be helpful but not often relevant to classroom discussions. This course is appropriate if you have had some interactions with intelligence professionals but would like to understand the "bigger picture" and strategic role of intelligence.

APPROACH

The course consists of 12 sessions that will include guest speakers, student presentations, team exercises, and, if conditions permit, a site-visit to an IC agency. When available, other National War College IC chairs will join seminar discussions to maximize the diversity of experience, expertise, and perspective in the classroom. The goal is to create an unconstrained environment that will foster insightful discussion and analysis from multiple perspectives.

The course is organized around three main blocks:

- Topics 1-5 focus on the foundational elements and undercurrents below the IC's often-publicized surface; the role of US intelligence at the national level; and the various IC components, capabilities, and current challenges.
- Topics 6-9 build on that foundation to examine some of the IC's non-traditional challenges and roles, including intelligence support to homeland security issues.
- Topics 10-12 focus on broader structural, legal, and ethical constraints, in addition to ways to think about intelligence as a core key element of any long-term strategic approach to national security.

COURSE LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Weekly Seminar Objectives are tailored to each lesson, but students by the end of the course should be able to:

1. *Identify* the most significant organizational and functional “moving parts” and challenges confronting the US IC at the national strategic level.
2. *Explain* the various IC members' missions, capabilities, tools, methods, and processes as applied to achieving national security objectives.
3. *Describe* how intelligence serves as a set of tools for statecraft/foreign policy, and distinguish the appropriate roles of intelligence in national-level decision making.
4. *Evaluate* key elements in determining intelligence relative success and failure.
5. *Articulate* the range of challenges and constraints confronted by policymakers and intelligence practitioners in the interplay of the intelligence process and national security decision making.
6. *Analyze* the four fundamental roles of intelligence: defending the homeland; conducting activities abroad; providing support to military operations; and supporting policy makers.

ASSIGNMENTS AND GRADING POLICY

Final grades will be based on seminar performance/contribution/presentation, and one paper. Students must meet all stated course objectives to pass the course; any student who questions his/her own ability to meet all course objectives, regardless of compensatory work completed for absences, should ask the faculty lead for further remedial assistance.

- **Participation and Contribution: (60% of grade)** This is based on how effectively one engages in class discussions, individual or team exercises, and presentations, to which contributions advance the discourse, whether contributions reflect an understanding of the assigned materials, and one's participation in site visits.
- **Paper: (20% of grade)** Students will write a three-page unclassified memo analyzing key lessons learned from an intelligence success/failure and identifying related best practices for interacting with the IC when drafting national security strategy.
- **Briefing: (20% of grade)** Students will present a 5-minute unclassified powerpoint briefing that details an intelligence strategy for a current national security challenge. The strategy should leverage at least three distinct intelligence capabilities from at least three different IC components.

REQUIRED TEXT

- Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2019) [ISBN-10: 1544325061; ISBN-13: 978-1544325064] [*Student Issue*]

Topic 1

The Nature and Role of Intelligence in National Security

Tuesday, 15 September 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session begins our exploration of intelligence and its interplay with national security strategy and decision-making. We first consider the essence of “intelligence” as a foundation for understanding the larger IC, its organizations, and its processes. We then introduce the intersecting roles of US intelligence, strategy, and policy institutions that drive the intelligence process. Recognizing the convergent and divergent needs of civilian policymakers, strategists, and warfighters is key to understanding that process. We will connect these issues to other NDU core courses and revisit the issues in greater detail in later sessions of this course.

In February 2014, then-Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Jim Clapper highlighted two key developments in his unclassified opening remarks to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “unpredictable instability is the ‘new normal’” and “pervasive uncertainty makes it all the harder to predict the future...”¹ Today’s national security discourse, especially in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, reflects similar themes: threats are changing quickly and broadly; the nature and drivers of threats are increasingly ambiguous; and analytic, operational, and administrative processes must be continuously adapted to stay ahead of new developments.

Understanding organizational diagrams, process-focused flow charts, and general collection & analysis activity is insufficient for comprehending intelligence and its role within the broader suite of “instruments of national power.” National-level strategists must understand the IC’s key drivers and functions and be able to critically assess and evaluate their interrelationships.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Analyze* what “intelligence” means in today's global and technologically savvy world.
2. *Describe* the evolution of the IC and its “intelligence cycle.”
3. *Identify* the role of intelligence in national security discussions and decisions.
4. *Explain* the different intelligence roles in relation to policymakers (and policy support), strategists (and strategy), and warfighters (and military operations).

¹ DNI Clapper Opening Statement on the Worldwide Threat Assessment Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 2015. Accessed 6 July 2018 from <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2015/item/1175-dni-clapper-opening-statement-on-the-worldwide-threat-assessment-before-the-senate-armed-services-committee>.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What do we mean by “intelligence” in the traditional sense; why are there multiple definitions; and how does it differ from “information” in the typical sense?
- What is the purpose of intelligence (e.g., provide decision advantage, or elevate the level of discussion by strategic leaders)?
- How does intelligence work as an instrument of national power in its own right and as an enabler of other instruments?
- How is intelligence used at the national level, to include the roles of the DNI, NIMs, NIOs, etc.?
- What are the challenges facing the IC, to include resources, time, integration, etc.?

REQUIRED READINGS (47 pages plus 39 pages to skim)

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. “Chapter 1. What is ‘Intelligence’?” in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2014): 1-11. (11 pages)
- B) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, 2019* (Washington, DC, 2019). Accessed 20 May 2020 ([Weblink](#)): 5-17 (13 pages).
- C) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton). Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)):198-214 (17 pages).
- D) Moore, David T. “The Failure of Normal Intelligence” in *Sensemaking: A Structure for An Intelligence Revolution* (National Defense Intelligence College, March 2011). Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)): 11-16 (6 pages) [Optional: skim pp. 17-36].

SKIM

- E) Coates, Daniel. “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” 29 January 2019. Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 4-42 (39 pages).

Topic 2

Intelligence Community Evolution and Reform

Tuesday, 22 September 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

Having considered the broad aspects of US intelligence and national security decision making, we now focus on the IC, its history, and the current organizational structure among the 17 different IC components. We will see how, for example, notions of “tactical,” “operational,” and “national (strategic) intelligence” have evolved over time and become increasingly blurred. As a post-WWII concept, the IC is comparatively young and continues to evolve. We will examine the early days of the IC, discuss the changing role of the Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs), and review the post 9/11 reforms that led to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

The public personas of different IC components are based largely on their reputations in the media and can be misleading to outsiders. IC insiders also harbor their own biases based on personal experiences and institutional loyalties. We will aim to correct these perceptions and discuss the challenges of IC integration, with a focus on the specific missions and authorities of the CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, and FBI.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Differentiate* between “national intelligence” and “operational/tactical intelligence”
2. *Describe* the current IC organizational structure under the Director of National Intelligence and how the DNI structure is designed to more fully integrate the IC.
3. *Explain* the historical context for the IC’s current organizational structure, as well as the associated pros and cons.
4. *Present* an argument on whether the evolution of national intelligence since 9/11 has improved the ability of national security decision-makers to understand the problems, mysteries, and complexities.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What is the DNI’s role; how does it differ from the original Director of Central Intelligence?
- How has the IC changed since 9/11; have those changes improved the flow of all-source intelligence information to decision makers?
- What issues do you see with the various elements’ missions and activities; redundancies, conflicting interests, gaps, etc.?

REQUIRED READINGS (76 pages)

- A) DeVine, Michael E. *In Focus: The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 May 2019). 1-2 (2 pages).

- B) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017): 13-58, 466-472 [*Student Issue*]. (53 pages).
- C) DeVine, Michael E. *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Background and Selected Options for Further Reform*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 December 2018). 9-15 (7 pages).
- D) White House. *Executive Order 12333* (with 2003, 2004, and 2008 amendments). Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)): parts I and II (~14 pages). [*Parts of this EO are used in multiple weeks.*]

OPTIONAL

- A) US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, Subtitles A, B, and F. Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)): pp. 7-36, 36-40, and 48-52 (40 pages).
- B) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Members of the IC” (Online). Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)). [*Review the descriptions of each IC element’s mission; these will look familiar from other readings, so just skim for gap-filling details.*]

Topic 3
Collection Capabilities and Challenges: the “-INTs”
Tuesday, 29 September 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

In this session, we examine the capabilities and challenges of the IC’s core collection functions, also known as “intelligence disciplines” or “INTS.” We discuss the basic “tradecraft” of each function and review its role in supporting national security strategy and policy implementation. We cover the conceptual and real-life aspects of human intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), and of the technical collection “disciplines” of signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Changing technologies, mission requirements, and strategic national priorities pose continuous challenges for orchestrating the “INTS” and balancing investments in them to stay ahead of our competitors.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Describe* specific capabilities, contributions, advantages, and challenges related to the primary collection disciplines.
2. *Explain* the opportunities and risks these collection disciplines present in the broader national security strategy context.
3. *Analyze* the challenges presented by the IC's ability to increasingly acquire a mass quantity of digital information (i.e., big data).
4. *Illustrate* how the collection efforts in one INT can support and drive collection in the others.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What are the roles and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various technical collection methods; how has technology enabled this collection?
- What challenges do you perceive in maintaining quality control of raw HUMINT reporting; how can these be best managed?
- What should consumers consider regarding the quality of intelligence products?
- How should strategists think about the moral/ethical issues related to collection activities; do ultimate national security objectives adequately mitigate concerns?
- What do you consider the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline, and why?_

REQUIRED READINGS (78 pages); student assigned readings by INT

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017): 73-82, 91-158 [*Student Issue*] (78 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) Norton, R.A. "Guide to Open Source Intelligence: A Growing Window into the World." AFIO *The Intelligencer, Journal of US Intelligence Studies*. Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2011). Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (3 pages).

Topic 4

Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination

Tuesday, 6 October 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session reviews the mission of intelligence analysts, detail the complexities and challenges of producing high quality analysis, and explore the rigor of analytic tradecraft as practiced in the IC today. Having covered the fundamentals of collection, we consider what happens to “raw intelligence” after it is gathered and processed. Many intelligence practitioners and scholars argue that analysis—although less exciting and storied than the spying and high-tech gadgetry necessary for collection—is the most important aspect of intelligence work. Individual pieces of raw intelligence can sometimes have strategic impact but more often require synthesis, evaluation, and interpretation to reveal insights, threats, uncertainties, and opportunities for busy policymakers who lack time to sift through mountains of data themselves.

Media commentators, politicians, scholars, and even intelligence professionals themselves sometimes criticize intelligence analysis for being “intuitive,” prone to bias, and failing to anticipate major events such as the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1979, the 9/11 attacks, and collapse of the Soviet empire. Since 9/11 and revelations of flawed analysis that contributed to miscalculations in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, IC components have sought to improve the rigor of their analysis. IC Directive (ICD) #203, originally issued by the ODNI in 2007, outlines the standards for producing and evaluating analytic intelligence products, with the intent of establishing consistent foundations for training, education, rigor, and excellence.² As one specialist stated, “...estimative prediction requires both critical and creative thinking, specifically: (1) formal analytic rigor and the explication of assumptions, and (2) perception and understanding across both the depth and the breadth of a problem domain, each of which imposes its own specific methodological and practical requirements.”³

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Outline* the relative capabilities, products, and biases of the primary national IC elements.
2. *Describe* what “all-source analysis” is and who produces it.
3. *Explain* how to seek, receive, and apply the best analysis for yourself or your principal.
4. *Evaluate* the challenges to good quality intelligence analysis, focusing on cognitive limitations. Gain familiarization with structured analytic techniques, the language of uncertainty, and confidence levels.

² Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ICD 203: Analytic Standards, (2 January 2015). DNI.gov. Accessed 1 June 2017 at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf>.

³ Timothy J. Smith, “Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific Method,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Georgetown University Press, 2008): 270.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What is “competitive analysis” and what are the pros and cons of analytic redundancy in the IC?
- What are some important standard questions to ask analysts about their analytic judgements in order to understand probability, certainty and confidence?
- What are cognitive biases and intelligence failures; are they unavoidable?

REQUIRED READINGS (78 pages)

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press (2017): 82-89, 163-217 [*Student Issue*] (63 pages).
- B) Lowenthal, Mark, and Marks, Ronald A. “Intelligence Analysis: Is It As Good As It Gets?” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, (2015) 28:4, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1051410. Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 662-665 (4 pages).
- C) Treverton, Greg. “What Should We Expect of Intelligence?” in *Ronald Reagan: Intelligence and the Cold War*, (CIA Historical Publications, 2011). Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 29-33 (5 pages).
- D) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Intelligence Community Directive 203*, 2 January 2015. Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (6 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) US Government. “A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, March 2009.” Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (45 pages).
- B) Artner, Stephen; Girven, Richard S.; Bruce, James B., Assessing the Value of Structured Analytic Techniques in the U.S. Intelligence Community.” *RAND Corporation*, 2016. Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (17 pages).

Topic 5

Covert Action and Other Sensitive Operations

Tuesday, 13 October 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session examines the role of covert action as a tool of US statecraft. Though often controversial and risky, covert action has remained a favored tool for advancing US security and foreign policy goals in every US presidential administration since the Second World War. Covert actions range from simple propaganda and agent of influence operations to large-scale paramilitary programs. Often inaccurate and overly dramatized depictions of covert action in the news, literature, and film have fueled conspiracy theories and contributed to erroneous assumptions that intelligence work is mostly about causing mischief through deception, sabotage, and lethal operations. In fact, only a small portion of intelligence falls into the category of “covert action.” Federal statute defines covert action as an activity or activities of the US government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the US role will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.⁴ In this session, we will consider the practical, legal, and oversight aspects of covert action and explore broader implications and sensitivities inherent in America’s use of it. We will discuss the distinctions between covert action and other programs (such as DoD special operations), and address questions about authorities, oversight, and the coordination of covert action with diplomacy, military action, and other overt policy actions.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify and describe* the difference between covert and clandestine operations in terms of legal definition and practical application.
2. *Understand* the rules governing the employment of covert action, and how these differ from the rules for traditional military operations.
3. *Consider and evaluate* the range of implications for national security strategy in a presidential decision to utilize covert action to advance national security policy.
4. *Explain* the challenge that covert action presents in terms of oversight and accountability.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What is covert action, and how does it differ from other activities, such as clandestine operations?

⁴ *Executive Order 12333* (as amended), Accessed 9 May 2017, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/executive-order-12333>.

- How did the current policy on covert actions evolve?
- Can covert action remain undisclosed forever; how should that consideration influence decisions to employ it?
- What makes covert action so politically controversial?
- Who recommends, manages, conducts, and oversees covert action?
- What are the tensions between covert action and governmental accountability? How should these be factored into national security strategy?

REQUIRED READINGS (35 Pages)

- A) Pasquale, Charles and Johnson, Laura. “Covert Action as an Intelligence Subcomponent of the Information Instrument” in *National Defense University’s Joint Forces Quarterly* 93, 7 May 2019. Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) 32-36 (5 pages).
- B) DeVine, Michael E. *Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements in Brief*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2019). Summary, 1-9 (9 pages).
- C) Lowenthal, Mark. “Chapter 8. Covert Action” in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2017): 256-273 [*Student Issue*] (18 pages).
- D) White House. *Executive Order 12333* (with 2003, 2004, and 2008 amendments), Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)): 1-2 (§1.2-1.3[b][3]), 8 (§1.7[a]), 14 (§2.13-3.1), 15 (§3.5[b]) (~3 pages). [*Parts of this EO are used in multiple weeks.*]

OPTIONAL

- A) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “Covert Action” in *Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community*, (Cambridge: Harvard Belfer Center, 2009). Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 32-35 (4 pages).

Topic 6
IC Integration and Collaboration
Tuesday, 20 October 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session examines the persistent challenges the IC faces in integrating and coordinating its resources and activities to serve US national security interests effectively and efficiently. It reviews the history of intelligence organization reform and considers the opportunities and obstacles for coordination, both internally and with external partners. We will assess the factors that led to the creation of the ODNI in 2005 and the ongoing challenges it faces in driving IC integration in the face of sometimes divergent priorities and authorities of individual IC agencies. This session will also explore the IC's role in military operations, law enforcement, and partnerships with the commercial and foreign counterparts. Our discussion will raise a wide range of issues such as resource management, IC use of cloud computing, and growing competition from the private and non-profit sectors.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify* the nature of the mandate within the IC to integrate and collaborate to optimize intelligence performance.
2. *Describe* the challenges that IC collaboration entails from the perspective of differing missions (law enforcement, military, civilian intelligence) and overall IC organization and authorities.
3. *Discuss* the potential impact and implications of evolving IC partnerships with domestic, private, and foreign partners.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What are the key challenges and obstacles to improving collaboration and integration in the IC; other organizations?
- What are the potential benefits of broader partnerships with less traditional governmental entities (e.g., local law enforcement)? Are there inherent risks as well?
- How should the IC think about its partnerships with foreign entities? Are intelligence relationships with foreign governments different than other types of bilateral or multilateral arrangements?
- Are there lessons to be learned from the range and types of partnerships the IC maintains with US private companies?

REQUIRED READINGS (39 pages, skim 28 pages)

- A) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Collaboration" DNI.gov (Online). Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (~2 pages).

- B) Clapper, James. "How 9/11 Transformed the Intelligence Community." *Wall Street Journal*. A15. (7 September 2011). ProQuest Database. Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)) (2 pages).
- C) Sims, Jennifer. *Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details*; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, (Volume 19, Number 2, 2006). Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 195-217 (23 pages).
- D) DeVine, Michael E. *United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships: Background, Policy and Legal Authorities*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2019). Summary, 12-23 (12 pages).

SKIM

- A) Treverton, Greg. *New Tools for Collaboration: The Experience of the U.S. Intelligence Community*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (January 2016) Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 1-28 (28 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "The Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) Intelligence Guide for First Responders." Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)).

Topic 7
Intelligence and Policy
Tuesday, 27 October 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session focuses on the constantly changing interplay between intelligence and policy formulation and implementation, particularly within the White House and National Security Staff. It examines the role of policymakers in driving collection and analysis, and the IC's role in supporting decision-making for POTUS and other policy makers, including senior military officers. We will review the full range of IC products, services, and roles including written assessments, in-person briefs, and IC participation in interagency meetings. In particular, we consider: how the IC's "flagship" intelligence product—the President's Daily Brief (PDB)—is delivered to and used by POTUS; the IC role in Principals Committee (PC), Deputies Committee (DC), and Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) meetings; and IC interactions with senior-level (i.e., Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary) policymakers.

This topic requires you to watch a brief CSPAN presentation by former Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) and Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) General (Ret.) Michael Hayden. The metaphor of policymakers and intelligence officers being in the same room but having entered by very different doors is especially relevant to our discussion.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify* at least three different ways that the IC intersects with and supports US national security decision making.
2. *Assess* how intelligence professionals and national-level decision makers function differently.
3. *Describe* the value of intelligence to policymakers in terms of expertise, objectivity, and nature of information.
4. *Compare* the risks for the intelligence process and for decision makers in the intersection between the two.
5. *Understand* what an "effective consumer of intelligence" means in theory and in practice.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What's the difference between “influencing” and “informing” policymakers?
- What is politicization, and can it happen on both sides of the relationship?
- What is the basis for tensions between policymakers/military leaders and the IC?
- What are the underlying reasons for the relative optimism among policymakers and military leaders compared to the relative pessimism within the IC?
- What elements are needed for analysis to successfully inform policy and military leaders?

REQUIRED READINGS (66 pages)

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. “Ch 9: The Role of the Policy Maker” in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2017): 277-301 [*Student Issue*] (25 pages).
- B) Walcott, John. “‘Willful Ignorance.’ Inside President Trump's Troubled Intelligence Briefings.” *Time Magazine*, 5 February 2019. Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (5 pages).
- C) Petersen, Martin. “What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers,” *Studies in Intelligence*, (CIA, 2011). Accessed 6 July 2018 ([Weblink](#)) (8 pages).
- D) Jervis, Robert. “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” *Political Science Quarterly* (125:2) (Summer 2010). pp. 185-204, Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (20 pages).
- E) Miscik, Jami. "Intelligence and the Presidency." *Foreign Affairs*. 11 May 2017. Web. 11 May 2017. Accessed 17 July 2019 Online via the NDU Library ([NDU Permalink](#)) (8 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) Katz, Brian. “Intelligence and You: A Guide for Policymakers.” *War on The Rocks*, 14 November 2018. Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)).

Topic 8
IC Support to the Military
Tuesday, 3 November 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session focuses on intelligence support for the military, a primary IC function that we have already discussed throughout the course. We will discuss the military's role as both a consumer and producer of intelligence. We will also consider the military's needs for national (strategic) and tactical intelligence and how the distinction between these two forms of intelligence has blurred since 9/11. The military components of the IC (DIA, NGA, NSA, and the service elements) are by far the largest producers of finished intelligence products for policymakers, war fighters, and the acquisition community. The military itself has also become increasingly involved in intelligence collection activities—both in response to military intelligence requirements and broader national intelligence priorities. We will consider how the IC supports and interacts with military consumers at a tactical, operational, and strategic level.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify* the evolving nature of the relationship between national intelligence and the US military from the perspectives of national-level analysis and collection.
2. *Describe* the ways in which national intelligence supports the US military and, conversely, how US military elements within the IC advance national intelligence requirements.
3. *Understand* how the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is organized to address its responsibilities within the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program.
4. *Consider* the impact that US military activities since 9/11 have had on the prioritization and functioning of US military intelligence entities within the IC.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What are the challenges confronting intelligence elements within the IC as they work to satisfy requirements within the military and national intelligence structures?
- The DIA has been reorganizing itself in to better meet its mission goals. In what ways does its structure reflect broader developments we've discussed in this course regarding US intelligence and its support to national security policy & strategy?
- Are we in a transition period in the relationship and independent functioning of defense intelligence entities and civilian intelligence organizations; has a 'tipping point' occurred in the IC's efforts at broader community integration and collaboration? Why do you think so?

REQUIRED READINGS (42 pages)

- A) DeVine, Michael E. *Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 29 January 2020). 1-2 (2 pages).
- B) Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication 2-01* (Washington, DC, 2017). JCS.mil. Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): ix-xix, I-4, II-4, II-7-II - 10, III-16 - III-17 (17 pages).
- C) Wolfberg, Adrian. “When Generals Consume Intelligence: The Problems That Arise and How They Solve Them,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 32:4. Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 460-478 (19 pages).
- D) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence; From Secrets to Policy* 6th Edition, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2014: 427-430 [*Student Issue*] (4 pages).

Topic 9
The Broader Intelligence World
Tuesday, 10 November 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

As we discussed in previous weeks, America is not alone in its intelligence efforts. This session will expand on earlier points to look at how other countries' intelligence services are structured, and also how they compare and contrast to our own foreign and domestic components. We will consider the role of history, culture, and national security interests play in shaping the intelligence profession and institutions.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify* the differences between US and foreign intelligence services.
2. *Assess* the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these differences.
3. *Describe* the current structure of domestically focused intelligence components.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- How would you describe the various roles and missions of the domestically focused intelligence components?
- How has DHS's and FBI's role in the IC changed since 9/11?
- Have those changes improved the flow of all-source intelligence information to national-level decision makers?
- How do US homeland intelligence activities compare to those of other nations?_

REQUIRED READINGS (23 pages, plus student assigned readings by country)

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2017): 490-498 (UK), 499-504 (CH), 504-510 (FR), 510-516 (IS), 516-524 (RS), 524-528 (AS), 528-531 (CA), 531-534 (GR), 534-536 (IN), 536-538 (NZ), 538-539 (CU), 539-540 (PK), 540-541 (KS), 541-547 (all students) [*Student Issue*].
- B) Burch, James. "Intelligence and Homeland Security," in *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, Fourth Edition*, ed. Loch Johnson & James Wirtz (Oxford University Press, 2015): 505-518 [*PDF on Blackboard*] (14 pages).
- C) Jackson, Van. "Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing Has Failed to Combat White Nationalist Terrorism." *Council on Foreign Relations*, 18 March 2019. Accessed on 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (2 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) Wills, Aidan. “Guidebook: Understanding Intelligence Oversight,” *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, 2010. Accessed 17 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)).

Topic 10

Domestic Influences on Intelligence: Budgets, Opinions, and Oversight

Tuesday, 17 November 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

National security strategy is as much an outcome of domestic factors as it is a response to the international context. The same can be said for intelligence. In this session, we examine how the domestic context shapes the intelligence business. We will focus heavily on the role of Congress in setting the IC's legal parameters and authorities, funding its mission, and overseeing its activities. We will also discuss how other components of the US Government and the American public affect IC activities and decisions.

Effective oversight is a key component to intelligence activities. By taking a closer look at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) we will examine what is and what should be the role of congress in overseeing the IC. Starting from an organizational and process perspective, we will learn how congressional oversight of the IC is organized and designed. From there, we will consider real-world oversight challenges facing Congress.

Budgets are another critical element of intelligence, but only the unclassified "top line" of funding for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) are public. We will review the budget planning, programming, and execution processes and the role of Congress in budget resolution, authorization and appropriation. Our discussion will inevitably include the implications of the current and probably growing budget constraints upon the IC.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Explain* the differences between the authorities of the DNI, the Secretary of Defense, and other cabinet-level officers regarding the major components of the intelligence budget.
2. *Assess* the potential impact and implications of budget reductions on the ability of the IC to continue to perform its missions in the foreseeable future.
3. *Relate* the roles of POTUS, Congress, the courts, the press, and the public in oversight of intelligence activities.
4. *Describe* how democratic institutions and our Constitutional system of checks and balances operate to provide oversight to the IC and its activities.
5. *Analyze* the key challenges confronting formal congressional IC oversight and the effectiveness of formal and informal oversight mechanisms.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- How does and/or should the DNI "control" or shape the NIP and MIP?
- Why do so many congressional committees have oversight over portions of the intelligence budget; should they be consolidated?

- What is the proper relationship between the IC and Congress; the public; the media? How should we think about the potential pitfalls?
- Is congressional IC oversight adequate; what other institutions in the US exert influence over US intelligence activities; what are the tradeoffs between secrecy and liberty?
- At a strategic level, how should POTUS and senior strategists factor congressional oversight into national security strategy and decisions?

REQUIRED READINGS (61 pages)

- A) DeVine, Michael E. *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Background and Selected Options for Further Reform*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 December 2018). 2-8 (7 pages).
- B) DeVine, Michael E. *Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) Process*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2019). 1- 2 (2 pages).
- C) Lowenthal, Mark. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2012): 65-70, 303-348 [*Student Issue*] (52 pages).

Topic 11
Intelligence Success and Failure
Tuesday, 1 December 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

This session probes the notion of intelligence “successes” and “failures” by looking at several specific cases and reviewing the factors behind their outcomes and the related consequences for the intelligence business. We will explore why “failures” tend to attract more publicity and discuss expectations of the IC’s capabilities and responsibilities for protecting America's national security, foreign policy interests, and the lives of its soldiers and citizens. In considering why failures occur, we will examine a range of challenges the IC has faced throughout its history: (1) cognitive challenges such as bias and mirror imaging (2) organizational challenges such as bureaucratic stove-piping, turf battles, and information hoarding (3) policy challenges such as politicization, leaks, and ineffective communication between the IC and policymakers.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Analyze* events for success or failure.
2. *Convey* the inherent difficulties of defining intelligence successes or failures.
3. *Explain* whether intelligence failures are inevitable and, if so, what are the implications for intelligence support to decision makers.
4. *Describe* the underlying causes, context, and attributes of intelligence successes and failures.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- Are intelligence failures inevitable? If so, why and what mitigation options are key?
- How should intelligence performance be judged and measured; can it be?
- Who decides whether intelligence fails or succeeds—intelligence professionals, customers, academics, the public, etc.?
- What are the pros/strengths and cons/weaknesses of intelligence reform?

REQUIRED READINGS (72 pages)

- A) Bar-Joseph, Uri. “A Heterodox Conclusion on Intelligence Failures in the Age of Cyberwarfare.” *War on the Rocks*, 3 January 2017. Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (3 pages).
- B) Ford, Harold P. “Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam,” *Studies in Intelligence*. (CIA, No. 1, 1997). Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 85-94 (10 pages).

- C) Ford, Harold P. “William Colby As Director of Central Intelligence: The Yom Kippur War of October 1973” in *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War*. CIA.gov (30 January 2013). Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): 15-23 (9 pages).
- D) Pillar, Paul. “Think Again: Intelligence,” *Foreign Policy*, 3 January 2012. Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (5 pages).
- E) US Government. “A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, March 2009.” Accessed 16 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (45 pages). Optional reading from Topic 4.

Topic 12
Strategic Views on Intelligence: The Coming Decade and Beyond

Tuesday, 8 December 2020, 0830-1030

OVERVIEW

We begin this session with each student presenting an intelligence strategy for a current national security challenge. Building on what has been learned thus far, the strategy should leverage at least three distinct intelligence capabilities and three IC components (which may have overlapping capabilities).

After the presentations, we will then close out the course with a discussion of the difficult tradeoffs our nation faces between the requirements for secrecy and national security and our commitment to civil liberties and transparent governance. We will also consider potential strategic challenges that might confront the IC in the future and how the IC's role in contributing to national security strategy might evolve.

SEMINAR OBJECTIVES

1. *Identify* the challenges that will face the US IC over the next decade and beyond.
2. *Understand* the role of wild cards, black swans and other unknowns.
3. *Assess* the appropriate balance between the competing interests of national security and civil liberties in the national security strategy context.
4. *Analyze* the evolving nature of national intelligence and potential new ways intelligence may be tasked to support policy makers, national security strategists and warfighters.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

- What are the most important issues for tomorrow's intelligence professionals, and how can or should the IC prepare?
- What are wild cards could change the IC's strategic trajectory?
- How should US national security strategists and policymakers factor civil liberties and futures thinking into their respective decisional processes?

REQUIRED READINGS (47 pages, *plus some skimming*)

- A) Lowenthal, Mark. "Chapter 13. Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence" in *Intelligence; From Secrets to Policy*, 8th Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2017): 449-452 [Student Issue] (3 pages).
- B) United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court website. Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (skim website).

- C) Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *SECTION 702 OVERVIEW*, Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) (10 pages).
- D) Weinbaum, Courtney and Shanahan, John N.T. “Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age” in *National Defense University’s Joint Forces Quarterly 90*, 3 July 2019. Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)) 4-9 (5 pages).
- E) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress*. January 2017, (NIC 2017-001). Accessed 18 July 2019 ([Weblink](#)): ix-xi, 6-27 (~25 pages).
- F) Watts, Clint, “Our New Terrorism Problem – The U.S. Should Use its Hard-Won Experience Against al Qaeda and the Islamic State to Fight Today’s Surge of Lethal White Supremacist Attacks,” *Wall Street Journal*, 10 August 2019. (4 pages).

OPTIONAL

- A) Weinbaum, Cortney; Parachini, John V.; Girven; Richard S.; Decker, Michael H.; Baffa, Richard C., “Perspectives and Opportunities in Intelligence for U.S. Leaders,” *RAND*, September 2018. Accessed on 26 July 2019, ([Weblink](#)).