ELECTIVE NWC 6017

MEMOIRS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Fall 2020, AY 2020-2021

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Course Schedule
NWC 6017: Memoirs in American Foreign Policy
Fall 2020, AY 2020-2021

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Course Overview

Background:
This course provides an opportunity to read and discuss the memoirs of presidents, national security advisors, secretaries of state, and other high-level foreign policy officials from the Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations. Unlike the third-person analytical pieces usually read in core and elective courses, these readings are classic primary sources that teach both process and substance from the authentic viewpoint of those who have “been there.” These first-person accounts allow students to examine the relationships, perspectives, actions, and policy goals of strategic leaders and policy makers over five administrations in peace and war. Class time is used exclusively for case presentations and structured discussion, and paper requirements are waived in favor of a reading load half again as much as the usual elective. Formal class presentations will be required. This course is particularly useful to supplement core courses in national security strategy and the interagency process.

This course is a continuation of a well-loved memoirs course designed by Dr. Terry Deibel of the National War College. Dr. Deibel retired in summer 2010 after teaching for over 25 years at the College. He died shortly thereafter, in October 2010.

Approach:
A typical reading load per week is 175 pages. Because of the heavy reading load, there is no paper for this course. Evaluation will be based on participation in class and the formal presentation. Additionally, students will be expected to write in the seminar blog (i.e., discussion thread in Blackboard) an insightful point they drew from each week's readings related to a foreign policy technique or the exercise of strategic leadership (see pages v-ix). Additionally, students will be assigned to prepare a briefing and co-lead a class discussion on one topic. For that topic, they will be expected to read additional outside materials and present what they have learned. Because the course makes use of a large collection of memoirs, the students will need to check out books from the NDU library. The library retains multiple copies of each book on reserve.

Course Learning Outcomes:
The course has three key objectives:
• To discover first-person viewpoints of key players during historic events, which will contribute to an understanding of history.
• To examine the roles played by leadership, personality, and decision-making structures in the making of contemporary diplomatic history.
• To provide an opportunity for students to apply strategic frameworks and concepts from the core courses appropriate to these historical case studies.

Absence Policy:
Regardless of absences, students must still meet all stated course objectives to pass the course. Students who have missed one or more class sessions may be required to complete
compensatory assignments at the course director's discretion. Additionally, any student who has missed one or more classes and questions his/her ability to meet the course objectives even after completing compensatory work should ask the course director for further remedial assistance.

With the exception of absences due to required International Student Management Office (ISMO) events for International Fellows, any student who misses four or more sessions of a course will meet a faculty board that will consider whether to recommend disenrollment to the NWC Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs and the Commandant. The Board will consider both extenuating circumstances and the student's potential to meet the course objectives. The Commandant will make the final decision on the student's status.

The above policies apply equally to U.S. students, International Fellows, and students from other NDU components.

**Original Work:**
As described in the NWC Student Catalog, and to avoid any ambiguity, the College has carefully defined “original work.” The term “original” within the NWC research and writing program means both “produced by the author: and “produced for the first time.” Thus, papers written to satisfy NWC writing requirements must be produced during your tenure at NWC, be submitted to satisfy only one writing requirement (excludes approved, expanded and long papers), and contain your own ideas and analysis except as documented by appropriate citations. Complying with the original work definition will avoid potential issues of plagiarism. When in doubt about options or requirements, consult a faculty advisor or the Associate Dean of Research and Outreach.

**Texts for this course:**
These texts will be issued to students. These are the texts we will use most extensively and which are still available from commercial sources.

You will check out the remainder of the books below from the library, which has multiple copies on reserve. A full list of books of memoirs to be used in the course follows:

**NIXON ADMINISTRATION**
CARTER ADMINISTRATION

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
** (This book is not in the library. A PDF of the required chapters will be available on Blackboard.)

BUSH 41 ADMINISTRATION

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

These books are hereafter referenced by author and book title only.
Examining Strategic Leadership

Lessons Learned from the Memoirs of Strategic Leaders and Policy Makers

In the development and implementation of foreign policy and national security strategies, our nation's senior-most policy makers must exercise strategic leadership. History records how effective national leaders were in dealing with great challenges; memoirs provide insights into their thoughts and intentions. The memoirs of these American leaders provide us with a unique opportunity to examine strategic leadership and the related decision-making process from the firsthand perspective of those who had ultimate responsibility for dealing with the great challenges and opportunities that have faced our nation.

When these strategic leaders are effective, they meet current challenges and set the foundation for longer-term success in protecting and promoting American interests. Those who seek to advise our policy makers, serve as foreign policy and national security strategists, or assist in the development and implementation of national policies and strategies will be more effective if they have a deep appreciation for the challenges and responsibilities of the strategic leaders they support. For students of strategic leadership, the study of memoirs can be of tremendous value, as it compliments a broader examination of the history and theory of foreign policy and the use of a nation's instruments of power.

The Challenge of Bias

Memoirs reflect the experiences and perspectives of their authors. Even those authors who are determined to write honestly about their role in historic events will have great difficulty in being objective. Some authors, to their credit, go to great lengths to cite supporting documentation to add to their credibility and demonstrate the accuracy of their writing. Nevertheless, memoirs often serve as a means to promote one's role in events and justify one's actions. Three methods we can use to gain better insight into the “truth” of historical events and the roles of strategic leaders include: comparing the memoirs of those involved (on many sides of the issue); studying source materials related to the event; and studying the events and players from the perspective of historians and credible journalists.

Additionally, with a little research it is possible to gain a better appreciation of the domestic and international context (the strategic environment) for a particular issue. Finally, time plays a role in adding objectivity by placing events in perspective, allowing related documents to become available, and giving historians, journalists, and participants the opportunity to research and write on the issues. For this reason we don't study memoirs related to events from the past two decades.

Strategic Leadership

The following diagram, drawn from a number of sources, succinctly notes many of the attributes of the strategic environment in which policy makers and strategic leaders must
operate. While not all-inclusive, it also highlights the roles and responsibilities of strategic leaders and the competencies and skills that contribute to success at the strategic level. When reading memoirs, it may be useful these elements.

### Strategic Environment

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<tr>
<td>- Climate</td>
<td>- Global</td>
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<td>- Culture</td>
<td>- Volatile</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Structure/Process</td>
<td>- Domestic Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adaptable / Learning Organization</td>
<td>- Uncertain</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Budget Constraints</td>
<td>- Complex</td>
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<td>- Ambiguous</td>
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<td>- Interagency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- High Risk</td>
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<td>- Multi-Cultural</td>
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### Strategic Leadership

#### Roles & Responsibilities
- Develop & Communicate a Vision
- Align Vision, Strategy, and Operations
- Shape Organizational Culture/Climate (includes ethics and values)
- Build and Shape Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National Relationships
- Build and Lead Effective Teams
- Lead Strategic Decision Making Process
- Promote Organizational Agility and Resilience
- Lead Organizational Change and Transformation
- Represent the Enterprise & Negotiate on its Behalf
- Develop Senior Leaders

#### Competencies & Skills
- Technical Skills:
  - Systems Thinking
  - Scanning
  - Joint, Interagency, Multinational Understanding
  - Leveraging Technology
- Conceptual Skills:
  - Frame of Reference Development
  - Critical & Creative Thinking
  - Visioning
  - Intellectual Openness
- Interpersonal Skills:
  - Listening / Communicating
  - Negotiating
  - Promoting Consensus & Collaboration
  - Leveraging Power and Politics
  - Self-assessing

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Although not always addressed in memoirs, biographies and autobiographies can be useful in gaining an appreciation for how strategic leaders developed their competencies and skills. Formal and informal education as well as personal and professional experience contributes to the competencies and skills of leaders and also to their perspectives and judgment. Important for the student of strategic leadership to examine is the ability to develop relationships and inspire others. In the highest form, this is often referred to as charisma.

### Strategic Leaders as Strategists

All successful strategic leaders are strategists, although most have never been formally trained and educated in the development and implementation of strategy. Nevertheless, their success is in part due to their ability to think strategically and apply strategic logic to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous problems. They have an appreciation of the depth, breadth and complexity of issues with which they must deal. They understand the importance of context and of understanding the nature of the threat or opportunity they face and its relationship to national interests. They clearly define and effectively communicate the strategic goals, or ends, that their policies and strategies seek to achieve. They recognize the need to use effectively the means and ways at their disposal. Finally, they understand that strategies involve some form of costs and risks that must be considered against the likelihood
of achieving their policy goals and the value of the benefits that would result from being successful.

Writing about leaders who achieve “high office,” Henry Kissinger noted how little time is available to them as they “are locked in an endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important.” Good strategy is the product of deep, critical, and creative thought. Lacking time, senior leaders depend upon their policy advisors and strategists to analyze issues, define the strategic challenges and provide options. Nevertheless, it is the strategic leader who should provide critical guidance and who makes the ultimate decisions on policies and strategies. Senior leaders may also have to expend energy to gain support and implement the policies or strategies they have approved.

You may use the National War College Primer to assess the context, overarching policy goal (political aim), subordinate policy objectives, means, and ways that senior leaders employ in the cases we will study. The Primer also encourages you to consider costs, risks, benefits, and viability of the policy goals you encounter in these readings. Of course, senior leaders will rarely be explicit about these elements of policy-making and strategizing. More often, leaders intuit these elements as they hurry through decision-making. The diagram below offers a linear, step-by-step approach to strategy-making. Of course, strategizing rarely follows such a clear path; it’s more often a messy process. Still, the image below may be helpful in considering the essential strategic logic of the cases in this Memoirs course.

![Strategic Planning Diagram](chart.png)

- **Strategic Environment**: (Domestic & International)
- **National Interests**: (Vital, Important, & Peripheral)
- **Assess & Adjust**
- **Coordinate & Implementation**
- **Test/Compare/Select**
  - Suitability
  - Acceptability
  - Desirability
  - Feasibility
  - Adaptability
  - Sustainability
- **Cost – Risk – Benefit Analysis**

* The strategic environment is dynamic and therefore this process is iterative, requiring constant assessment.

The elements of strategic analysis should also be considered from the perspective of other actors.
The diagrams above on strategic leadership and strategizing plus *The Primer* will likely prompt you to consider these questions:

**Regarding leadership...**
-- Was a clear vision communicated?
-- How effective was the leader at influencing key individuals and strategic audiences?
-- Were his/her policies and strategies internally coherent and did they reflect national values?
-- How effectively were teams or key advisors used?
-- Was the leader open to different perspectives and did s/he seek opposing views and recommendations?
-- How effectively did leaders interact with one another? Were they successful in developing a rapport and working through the competing interests and perspectives of key players? Why or why not?
-- What processes were established to support strategic decision making? Were they effective?

**Regarding strategy-making (*The Primer*)...**
-- Were the domestic and international contexts and root causes of the problems considered when developing strategies? Were critical assumptions identified?
-- Were strategic goals and priorities clearly defined and communicated?
-- Were multiple options (ways) considered and compared in terms of resources (means), costs and risks?
-- Was the policy/strategy option considered in terms of its potential to undermine or complement other interests?
-- Did leaders consider and effectively take actions to gain consensus domestically for the policy/strategy and ensure its effective implementation?
-- Did they gain necessary international consensus/support?
-- Once implemented, were policies/strategies objectively assessed to determine if they should be adjusted?
BLOCK I: PRESIDENTS STARTING OUT

TOPICS 1-2: TAKING OFFICE – NIXON, CARTER, REAGAN, BUSH 41, CLINTON

The key figures in any administration come to office with a set of beliefs that guide their approach to foreign policy. This “intellectual capital,” as Henry Kissinger calls it, usually includes a sense of history and of the American experience in foreign affairs, a critique of earlier administrations’ policies (especially the administration against which the president just campaigned), a mental image of the international political system and how it operates, and a set of broad priorities or policy goals. These beliefs, interacting with the critical issues faced by each administration as it assumes office, shape the new administration’s foreign affairs strategy.

Also of vital importance are the personalities of key decision-makers and the processes through which they interact. The selection of key executives may have been done carefully, as seems to have been the case in the Carter transition, or almost impetuously, as Richard Nixon confesses was the case in his choice of Henry Kissinger. The blend of personalities and competencies will play a large role in determining success or failure. We will see in these memoirs that the decision-making process is a mix of rational thinking, personal prerogatives, and positioning oneself for power. The results are often less than satisfactory. In the selections that follow, the authors discuss their own policy views as they took office and look back on each other’s leadership styles, negotiating positions, and skills at bureaucratic infighting.

Block I Objectives:

- To understand the range of structures used by Presidents to support their national security decision-making.
- To consider (within each President's team) which personalities and philosophical differences were evident at the start and became important later in the administration.
- To consider (within each President's team) which issues were considered to be most important at the outset of the administration.

Questions to consider for this block of topics:

1) Compare each decision-maker's view of the world and the international system of the day. Were those differences important for the making of policy? Were the differences from one administration to another fundamentally different? If so, in which cases and in which ways?

2) How would you define the essential policy problem faced by each president as he took office? What were the essential elements of the administration’s approach to that overall policy problem?
3) What role do personalities play in an administration's foreign policy making success and failure? How important is personal or intellectual compatibility?

4) What is the peculiar perspective of the National Security Advisor (NSA) on the national security decision-making process? Of the Secretary of State? Is conflict between them inevitable?

5) Who should be the spokesperson for the President on foreign affairs?
**Topic 1: Nixon & Carter**

As you begin reading, note the structure of each reading assignment. It begins with the book, and then the chapter and pages. The phrases that follow in italics should help you sort out and remember the most important things you should glean from your reading. If you are familiar with each of these things, and have read and considered the discussion questions, you will be prepared for classroom discussion.

Please be sure to upload your discussion thread in Blackboard at least an hour before class, so the instructors can review what you wrote.

**Readings (Total: 159 pages)**

**A. The Nixon Administration (60 pages)**


*The intellectual capital of a statesman; U.S. experience in foreign affairs and resulting habits of thought; the structure of world politics in 1969*


*Cabinet choices; presidential decision-making process; the choice of Henry Kissinger; “many priorities, moving in tandem”; rationale for triangular geopolitics; ending the war in Vietnam; the Kissinger/ Rogers/ Laird problem*


*The Nixon decision to appoint Kissinger; Kissinger's decision to accept*

Chapter II: “Period of Innocence: The Transition,” pp. 19-20; 24-31; 39-47

*The mentality of the Nixon White House staff; Rogers, the State Department, and Kissinger's power; requirements of the NSC decision process; NSDM 2; the battle over the SIG; Nixon's style*

(Optional: Chapter X: *Years of Upheaval*, “Becoming Secretary of State,” pp. 414-423; 432-446)

**B. The Carter Administration (79 pages)**


*The Inaugural Address and the idea of limits; de-imperializing the presidency*

“We Lining Up My Team,” pp. 50-57

*Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski; role of the NSC and State in the policy process; Harold Brown; the President's daily schedule and workload*
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (45 pages) “Prologue,” pp. 5-15
  Getting to know Carter and getting himself picked as NSA
Chapter 1: “Relating to Key Players,” pp. 17-23; 36-44
  The Carter-Brzezinski relationship; portrait of Carter; Cyrus Vance and the State-
  NSC relationship
Chapter 2: “Power and Policy,” pp. 48 -50, 53-60, 63-66
  Principle and morality in Carter's outlook; Brzezinski's view of the goals book; 10
  goals of the Carter presidency; origin of the PRC and SCC and their responsibilities;
  NSC process

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (19 pages) “Author's preface” pp. 13-15
  Responsibilities of the Secretary of State
  Four principles of a successful U.S. foreign policy; meeting Carter and exchanging
  foreign policy view; the NSC structure; Brzezinski as spokesman and recorder;
  organizing at State

The National Security Council (20 pages)

  Enterprise, Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., Georgetown University Press, 2011.
  (20 pages) (available on blackboard)

Questions for Discussion:

1) How would you compare Kissinger's retrospective with Vance's portrait of
   Kissinger's actions and relationship to earlier American foreign policy?
2) What are the differences of organizational perspective between the presidents (Nixon,
   Carter), their national security advisors (Kissinger, Brzezinski) and their Secretaries
   of State (Rogers and Kissinger, Vance)? Why?
3) Do you agree with the various criticisms of the State Department and Foreign Service
   put forward by Kissinger? What is Vance's view of State? Which is most accurate?
4) What does Nixon's selection of Kissinger reveal about both men?
5) What did you learn from the battle over the Senior Interdepartmental Group about
   Kissinger, the State Department, and Nixon?
6) How important was Carter's idea of limits and his determination to end the imperial
   presidency to the success or failure of his administration?
Topic 2: Reagan, Bush & Clinton

As you continue with today's readings, you will note that sometimes the same book recurs (with another reading or two in between). Try to read the excerpts in the order they are presented below; the excerpts have been chosen to respond to each other. As before, the phrases that follow in italics should help you sort out and remember the most important things from your reading. If you are familiar with each of these things, and have read and considered the discussion questions, you will be prepared for classroom discussion.

Readings (Total: 173 pages):

A. The Reagan Administration (70 pages)

Alexander Haig, Caveat, (29 pages)
Chapter 1: “Be My Secretary of State,” pp. 11-13
Being asked to be Secretary of State
State of the Union after Carter; USSR threat and weakness; the need for U.S. leadership
Chapter 4: “A Strong Ring of Professionals,” pp. 56-58:
First policy meetings and the structure of the foreign policy machinery
Chapter 5: “Al, It's Just Newspaper Talk,” pp. 74-76; 82-85
Giving NSSD-1 to Meese; the Cabinet Council system; NS SD-1 disappears
Chapter 8: “As of Now, I Am in Control Here,” pp. 141-149
Dispute over crisis management; “dictating a draft of the letter of resignation”

Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (12 pages)
Reasons for running for president
Part Two: “The First Year. A New Beginning,” pp. 249-250; 254- 256:
The daily routine
Part Three: “Staying the Course,” pp. 360-361; 393-394:
Haig's resignation; an actor as president and the press

George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, (11 pages)
Chapter 1: “The World in Turmoil,” pp. 3-10
Accepting Reagan's call; the world scene in 1982; a meeting at Camp David
A sense of strategy

Donald T. Regan, For the Record, (17 pages)
Chapter 8: “The Guesswork Presidency” pp. 142-144 (paperback 159-161)
His public persona was his real persona
The President and his aides; “the supreme anchorman”; programming Ronald Reagan and repairing the damage when Reagan was himself
Regan’s plan for an activist presidency; Reagan’s schedule and temperament

Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (2 pages) Chapter 59, p. 448
Bud MacFarlane replaces Bill Clark at NSC
Chapter 64, p. 488
Regan and Baker switch jobs

B. The Bush Administration (48 pages)

George Bush & Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, (22 pages)
Chapter 1: “Past and Prologue,” pp. 16-25
Guiding principles and contrasts with Reagan; thoughts about the foreign policy machinery; picking Baker and Scowcroft; relationship with Bush and Baker; being asked to be NSA; picking Webster and Tower, then Cheney and Powell; relationship with Cheney and Powell; Larry Eagleburger, Robert Gates, and the NSC staff
Chapter 2: “From Theory to Practice,” pp. 29-36
Presidential and NSC procedures; sleeping through NSC meetings; keeping people informed
Chapter 3: “Leading the Alliance,” pp. 60-63
The importance of personal diplomacy; PM Mulroney as a part of Bush's policy process

James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (22 pages)
Preface, pp. xiv-xv
The importance of politics in statecraft
The Baker-Bush relationship; ties to Dick Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell; “the Building” and “the Service”; contrast with the Shultz era at State; concentrating power at the top; the first inner circle - Ross, Zoellick, Tutweiler; the second inner circle - Eagleburger, Kimmit, Mullins; going for results
From the law to politics; politics over substance, action over reflection; assisting the Soviet empire in a soft landing; concentric circles working from the inside out; in Congress - Central America, South Africa, Middle East; the allies - reforming NATO; the EC and Bonn; Japan and China; building international institutions; tripartite approach to Soviet policy - Moscow, Eastern Europe, regional conflicts

Colin Powell, My American Journey, (4 pages)
Rules for a CJCS at the office
C. The Clinton Administration (55 pages)

Bill Clinton, My Life (4 pages)
Chapter 30, p. 472
  Three pillars of a Clinton foreign policy
Chapter 32, p. 502
  “Foreign policy was always there”
Chapter 47, pp. 737-738
  Sandy Berger and the second-term national security team

Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime (19 pages)
Chapter 8, “The Search for a Running Mate,” pp. 143-144, 147, 149-150, 153-156
  Meeting Bill Clinton; Clinton's approach to the problem; Al Gore rises to the top
Chapter 9, “Building a Cabinet,” pp. 175-176
  Christopher becomes Secretary of State
Chapter 10, “A New Kind of Life,” pp. 182-189
  Preparing for Situation Room meetings; receiving foreign leaders in the Oval Office;
  the reserved Mr. Christopher meets the press

Madeline Albright, Madame Secretary (13 pages)
Chapter 14, “I Want You to Be My Secretary of State,” pp. 216-223, 229-231
  Candidates after Christopher; Albright's non-campaign for the job; men and women
  in Washington; the Hillary factor; interviewing with Gore and Clinton; awaiting and
  getting the call; Albright's goals as Secretary
Chapter 21, “As the World Tums,” pp. 348-349
  The informal policy process in Clinton's administration

Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (3 pages)
Chapter 1. “The Hedgehog and the Bear,” p. 11
  Clinton and Talbott as Rhodes scholars
  Talbott gets a job in the administration

Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (4 pages)
Chapter 3, “Rabin, Presidential Transition, the Syrian Pocket, and Oslo,” pp. 95-98
  Ross becomes Clinton's top Arab-Israeli negotiator

Robert E. Rubin, In An Uncertain World (12 pages)
Chapter 4, “A Political Education,” pp. 110, 114-115
  How to make the NEC effective
  Clinton's characteristics as a leader; Clinton, McLarty and the policy process
Questions for discussion:

1) How would you compare Haig's, Shultz's and Reagan's views of Carter?
2) How does the Kissinger view of State differ from Haig's or Baker's? Which is most accurate?
3) Did any of the three administrations have a strategic approach to U.S. foreign relations? What were their overarching political aims and subordinate objectives?
4) In your opinion, what would be an ideal NSC-State-Defense policy structure? Note that Kissinger and Brzezinski arrive at opposite conclusions regarding the predominance of State vs. the NSC. In your ideal structure, define the role each department and principal would play.
5) What do their criteria for and style of choosing advisors and Cabinet officers say about these top decision makers, especially about the presidents?
6) How would you compare the Nixon-Kissinger White House, the Carter-Brzezinski White House, the Reagan White House, the Bush 41 White House and the Clinton White House? Which seemed to serve its president and the country better? What is your evidence?
7) How do top policymakers deal with adversity? How should they?
BLOCK 2: PRESIDENTS IN TROUBLE

TOPICS 3-5: NIXON-WATERGATE; CARTER-FALL OF THE SHAH; REAGAN-IRAN-CONTRA

Each presidency faces substantial challenges. These three worked through their crises with a particular set of assumptions about the use of presidential power and the role of Congress in foreign policy. In each case, certain failures of leadership - at the presidential level or at a lower level - created a crisis which significantly hindered the administration.

Objectives for this block:

- To examine how well-known crises appeared to those closest to the decisions.
- To consider assumptions of each administration about presidential power and the appropriate role of Congress.
- To compare how each administration dealt with an unexpected crisis caused (at least in part) by failures of leadership.

Questions to consider for this block of topics:

1) What was the impact of Watergate on subsequent crises? What was the impact of Watergate on subsequent administrations?
2) What was the impact of the fall of the Shah on subsequent administrations' thinking about loyalty to particular leaders and fading dictatorships?
3) Which past presidential actions most influenced the leaders’ actions in these crises? Why? Did they draw the right lessons?
4) What did the authors think about their colleagues under stress? What did you learn about the personality of the author himself?
TOPIC 3: WATERGATE AND THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

Watergate was a domestic scandal, one of the most dramatic events in American constitutional history. It also had an impact on American foreign policy. The story of the scandal offers glimpses of the leadership qualities of key players and how their relationships were tested by the events.

Readings (Total: 152 pages):

Richard Nixon, RN (23 pages)
“Passed the Watergate Break-in,” pp. 625-646, 650
A story in the Miami Herald; James McCord identified from the Committee to Re-elect the President; Howard Hunt tied to the plot; Gordon Liddy emerges as a major character in Watergate; how much did John Mitchell know?; Ehrlichman suggests Liddy should take the rap; Nixon agrees to have the CIA turn off the FBI investigation; “the first steps down the road... to the end of my presidency”; the FBI protests White House interference

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (87 pages)
Leonard Garment’s revelations; Agnew’s relation to Nixon and Watergate; Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Watergate; the Germans resign; Haig becomes Chief of Staff; significance of the Watergate tapes; impact of Watergate on foreign policy; Kissinger’s new role
Chapter XXIV: “The Last Hurrah,” pp. 1111-1123, 1178
Charges of Kissinger’s perjury - plumbers and wiretaps; the Salzburg press conference; Kissinger decides Nixon must go
Chapter XXV: “The End of the Administration.” pp. 1179-1187, 1193-1214
The character of Richard Nixon; Supreme Court and the tapes; “How long can this go on?”; House votes impeachment articles; the tapes are released; final Cabinet meeting; Kissinger urges Nixon to resign; last meetings with the President; resignation and departure

Richard Nixon, RN (42 pages)
“Lowest point in the Presidency,” “The Decision to Resign,” “The Last Days,” pp. 1049-1090
Supreme Court decision on the tapes; impact of the June 23 tape; pros and cons of resigning; Nixon decides to await reaction to tapes; meeting with the Cabinet; Haldeman requests a pardon; dealing with “the family,” recommending Kissinger to Ford; hails and farewells
Questions for Discussion:

1) In Kissinger's view, what effects did the Watergate debacle have on U.S. foreign policy? Does the evidence appear to support Kissinger's fears?
2) What do the Nixon memoirs reveal about the causes of Watergate? Was the destruction of his presidency merely due to bad judgment and stupidity on Nixon's part, or were the causes more profound? What does Kissinger think were Watergate's real causes?
3) What does Watergate show about relations between the White House staff and the President? Between Kissinger and Nixon? Between Nixon and his family, friends and political associates?
4) How did Kissinger's handling of his own Watergate charges differ from Nixon's approach? Was the Salzburg press conference a wise or foolish tactic?
5) What was the impact of Watergate within the U.S. government? What was the impact on foreign governments?
TOPIC 4: THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

The Carter administration is often faulted—even by historians who admire its aims—for erratic execution and poor judgment in the handling of crises. An “arc of crises” (as Zbigniew Brzezinski said) challenged the administration. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian hostage crisis intersected and forced the administration to confront its disunity on foreign policy and national security strategy.

Readings (Total 97 pages):

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (8 pages)
Chapter XXIX, “Summit Aftermath,” pp. 1258-1265
A visit to the Shah of Iran

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (22 pages)
“Iran,” pp. 433-454
The Shah visits Washington, Nov 1977; crisis builds in Iran; Ambassador Sullivan loses control; the Shah leaves Iran; Carter tells off the State Department; Khomeini and Bazargan replace Bakhtiar; the campaign to bring the Shah to the United States; Khomeini vs. the Iranian government regarding relations with the United States

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (25 pages)
Iran begins to disintegrate; Vance confronts Brzezinski on back-channel communications; Vance argues against the U.S.’s giving strong advice to the Shah; opposes military solution
Chapter 15, “The Storm Breaks,” pp. 334-348
The United States advises the Shah to leave; Bakhtiar government is installed; Carter refuses Vance's request to contact Khomeini; Shah leaves Iran; United States approaches Khomeini through Yazdi in Paris; Khomeini returns to Iran and appoints Bazargan; retrospective on the Shah's fall and U.S. policy

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (45 pages)
Chapter 10, The Fall of the Shah,” pp. 354-398
Differences over handling the crisis; significance of the loss of Iran; U.S. slowness to recognize the crisis; dinner with Zahedi; encouraging the Shah to act forcefully; the Shah appoints a military government; poor U.S. intelligence; Soviet message to Carter; Zahedi returns to Iran; George Ball's role; the debate over coalition government vs. iron fist; Gen. Huyser is sent to Iran; Brzezinski pushes for an early coup; Huyser's reports and the state of Iran's military; Brzezinski urges Carter to give a signal; Feb 11. SCC- too late for action; how could Iran have been saved?
Questions for Discussion:

1) What was the effect of the Carter human rights and arms transfer policies on Iran? Were they wisely handled?
2) How would you characterize the role of Ambassador Sullivan in late 1978 and early 1979? Was he doing what a U.S. ambassador ought to do in such circumstances?
3) How significant were divisions in the USG over how to deal with the crisis in Iran? What could have been done about them?
4) Should the United States have provided more clear-cut advice to the Shah in late 1978 or early 1979 on how to deal with the crisis he faced? If so, what should that advice have been? Should the United States have encouraged a military coup?
5) Did U.S. intelligence failures contribute to poor handling of the crisis? How could matters in this area have been improved?
The Iran-Contra affair revealed and reinforced deep divisions among President Reagan’s leadership team, though it was not a fatal blow to the Reagan presidency. The scandal caused severe damage to the President's personal popularity and his reputation for straight dealing.

**Readings (Total: 179 pages):**

Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (23 pages)
Chapter XII. “Iran and the Hostages,” pp. 353-354; 360-380
“The one serious mistake during seven years”; “a man of evident limitations”; the Israeli-Iranian connection; repeated Weinberger and Shultz protests; profits to the Contras; the Reagan bible inscription; Rafsanjani makes public the deal

George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (59 pages)
Chapter 37, “Revelation: Arms Sales to Iran,” pp. 783-791
Echoes of Watergate; Rafsanjani spills the beans; Poindexter decides to carry on the trades; Shultz decides to go into battle to save the Reagan presidency
Chapter 38, “A Battle Royal,” pp. 808 -840
Strange statements by the Vice President; Poindexter and North persevere; a meeting with the President (Nov 10); Guatemala - Shultz prepares his argument; looking for allies; Reagan's November 13 TV speech; Reagan opposes Shultz on a Chilean World Bank loan (Nov 14); Shultz appears on “Face the Nation” (Nov 16); Reagan responds - no more arms sales to Iran: a lawyers' meeting at the White House; Reagan's Nov 19 press conference; Shultz tries to convince Reagan he has a problem – and fails (Nov 20); lies in Casey's testimony led to Meese's investigation; Armacost points to a possible connection with the Contras; Reagan and Meese announce the Iran-contra scandal
The Carlucci-Powell team takes over the NSC; Shultz discovers his Beirut ambassador works for the NSC; Casey tries to keep control; Dunbar and Cave meet with Mehdi-Najat; Shultz goes to the President and Congress again; Casey is stricken; the 9-p o in t agenda

Chapter 63, pp. 484-487
Getting things done for the Contras without anyone doing them; Casey and North roles; presidential responsibility
Chapter 66, pp. 504-507, 511-513
First Israeli-brokered deal, procuring missiles for Iranian moderates; hostage Ben Weir is released; Shultz, Weinberger and McFarlane argue against it; Reagan's reasons for going ahead
Chapter 67, pp. 516-517, 520-521
A deep division within the Cabinet; McFarlane's secret mission to Iran

Chapter 68-69, pp. 522-543

Jenco release proves plan is working; Shultz wants to resign over Poindexter;
hostage David Jacobsen is released; Beirut newspaper blows cover; Shultz demands
Poindexter resign; Reagan asks Meese to investigate; Iran-contra connection
“discovered”; “people don't believe me”; possible and actual personnel changes:
what Reagan knew and when he knew it; what Reagan would have done differently;
“still ignorant of some of the things that went on”

Donald T. Regan, For the Record (60 pages)
Chapters 2-3 “In the Kingdom of the Blind” and “Blood in the Water,” pp. 19-21, 23-45
(paperback: 21-23, 25-49)

McFarlane meets Reagan in the Bethesda Naval Hospital; Al Shiraa blows the
whistle; keeping quiet for the hostages' sake; Reagan's speech and news conference;
Meese's revelations; Poindexter and North fired; the Tower Board appointed

Chapter 4-5 “The Beginning of the End” and “The Conscience of the President,” pp. 68-98
(paperback: 75-109)

The President's prostate operation; Nancy's “friend” keeps Reagan out of action;
Nancy fires Bill Casey; Reagan testifies before the Tower Board; the press predicts
Regan's resignation; hanging up on Nancy; the Donatelli and Kohler appointments;
Regan agrees to resign

Questions for Discussion:

1) In Ronald Reagan's view, how did the Iran-Contra affair happen? Was it a one-time
deviation that simply caught the president and his key advisors unaware, or was it a
predictable situation resulting from the nature of the administration (as revealed in
other issues we have examined)? How could it have been handled better?

2) Do you accept Reagan's assurance that he was not trading arms for hostages? Was the
administration's relationship with Iran a proper, if risky, initiative under the
circumstances, or was it beyond the bounds of presidential propriety?

3) Was Ronald Reagan right or wrong to act against the advice of Shultz and
Weinberger in dealing with the Iranians? As Reagan describes his understanding of
the connection to the Iranians, should he have gone as far as he did?

4) How would you describe the roles played by McFarlane and Poindexter? Was Reagan
responsible for having been used by his staff? Was Chief of Staff Donald Regan
responsible for the affair?

5) Did Secretary Shultz act properly during the crisis? First, he invited others to cut him
out of the details when he knew disaster might be brewing—proper or improper?
Then he disassociated himself publicly from the President when Reagan refused to act
decisively—proper or improper? Then he chose to fight a “battle royal” to change the
policy rather than resign on principle—proper or improper?
BLOCK 3: THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

TOPICS 6-7: TRIANGULAR GEOPOLITICS AND CHINA (NIXON); CHINA FOR CARTER, REAGAN AND BUSH 41

Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to explore a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC under Carter were perhaps the most significant changes in the structure of international politics during the Cold War years. The opening to China created great opportunities and many challenges. The nature of the relationship changed over time and with different administrations. The impact of this new relationship on geopolitics and the balance of power can hardly be overstated.

Objectives for this Block:

- To examine the circumstances and significance of the opening to and re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and PRC.
- To consider the role of vision, risk, and opportunity in developing U.S.-China relations.
- To compare how each administration dealt with the challenges and opportunities related to this new relationship.

Questions to consider for this block of topics:

1) What was the impact on the Cold War of the U.S.’s initiating formal relations with China?
2) What were the broad U.S. interests involved in the development of relations with China and how did U.S. leaders prioritize and balance these interests? What foreign policy goals were involved?
3) What risks were recognized by U.S. strategic leaders in developing relations with the PRC? What risks were not recognized? What measures were taken to mitigate risks?
4) How did the administrations differ in their approach to China? Did these differences reflect changing strategic context or the personalities and vision of the various leaders involved?
TOPIC 6: TRIANGULAR GEOPOLITICS AND CHINA—THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The Nixon administration began a “normalization” initiative to end two decades of hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The dramatic secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Peking in July 1971 and the historic visit of President Nixon in 1972, culminating in the Shanghai Communique, began a new era of relations between the two great powers.

Readings (Total: 145 pages):

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (82 pages)
Chapter VI, “First Steps towards China,” pp. 171-194
  Initial border clashes between PRC and USSR; Nixon administration makes effort to contact Peking; Kissinger fears Soviet attack on PRC; United States ends Taiwan Straits patrols and sends other signals; regular Warsaw talks with China resume

Chapter XVIII, “An Invitation to Peking,” pp. 698-728
  Chou En-lai invites U.S. emissary to China through a Pakistan channel; Chinese receive U.S. ping pong team; Chou invites the U.S. President to Peking; Kissinger chosen to make a secret trip

Chapter XIX, “The Journey to Peking,” pp. 738-753, 763-768, 780-784
  Polo I: journey from Pakistan to Peking; portrait of Chou En-lai; Kissinger-Chou discussions in Peking; characteristics and requisites of triangular politics; Soviet reactions to the U.S.-PRC rapprochement; Polo II: negotiating the Shanghai Communique

Richard Nixon, RN (26 pages)
  The Nixon trip to China; meeting Mao, Chou, Chiang Ching, Marshall Yeh; the Shanghai Communique

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (37 pages)
Chapter XXIV, “Nixon's Trip to China,” pp. 1054-1066, 1070-1091
  Nixon's arrival in Peking; the Chinese style of negotiating; meeting Mao: the irony of the ultimate revolutionary; organization of the summit; the Chou-Nixon dialogues; negotiating the Shanghai Communique; the meaning of the opening to China

Supplemental Reading:
Questions for Discussion:

1) To what extent did the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China reflect a carefully thought-out plan or an improvisation based on opportunities discerned in the international system? What events alerted the Nixon team to the possibilities of rapprochement?

2) Was the elaborate minuet between the United States and China in the 1969-71 period with all its attendant secrecy necessary? How did Kissinger decide which of Beijing's moves were important signals of its intentions and which were irrelevant or done for other reasons? What about the rough treatment of other allies on the issue, e.g., Japan?

3) What was unique about the Shanghai Communiqué, both in its drafting and content? What was the characteristic Chinese negotiating style, and how did it differ from other states’ styles (say, the USSR’s)?

4) How did the State Department relate to the Nixon opening to the PRC? What was the Chinese reaction to the bureaucratic politics of the Nixon administration?

5) After reading these accounts, how important do you think Taiwan is to China's leadership? What was the role of the Taiwan issue in initial U.S.-PRC exchanges? In later U.S.-China relations?
TOPIC 7: U.S. AND CHINA UNDER THE CARTER, REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS

While President Nixon decided to open nation-to-nation contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and met with PRC leaders after decades of hostility between the two countries, it was President Carter who finalized the opening to China by establishing full diplomatic relations. Diplomat Leonard Woodcock in Beijing negotiated the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with PRC officials during the summer and fall of 1979. Both U.S. administrations acted for reasons of strategic geopolitics (balancing or counteracting the power and influence of the Soviet Union in international relations), although the way in which they exploited the relationship with China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union differed considerably.

Ronald Reagan, coming to office with the then-typical, “old right” approach toward both the PRC and Taiwan, seemed at first not to understand the reasoning behind the Nixon-Carter policies. Eventually, he came around to seeing democratic possibilities in the giant communist state. George H.W. Bush, perhaps overqualified on China policy as a former envoy to the country, found it difficult and politically costly to maintain close ties with Beijing after the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. The end of the Cold War had removed much of the geopolitical, balance-against-the-USSR rationale for the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement.

Whether collaborative or competitive, relations with the PRC have remained second in importance only to those with the Soviet Union and then with Russia. International relations are not a realm of impersonal, mechanistic forces at play. The readings below will give you a sense of the human drama of modern international relations. They highlight the primacy of the very human beings involved in foreign affairs.

Readings (Total: 154 pages):

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION (77 pages)

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (9 pages)
“Normalizing Relations with the PRC,” pp. 75-83
*PRM-24 debates; Vance's trip to Peking (1977)*

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (45 pages)
*Brzezinski engineers his own trip to Peking; meeting Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiao-ping, and Huang Hua; a fight with Vance over preeminence; the recognition negotiations: Woodcock in Peking; Brzezinski in Washington; Holbrooke in New York; the December 15 announcement; informing Dobrynin*

Chapter 11: “Toward a Strategic Relationship,” pp. 403-414
Brzezinski’s differences with Vance over the scope of U.S.-PRC ties; Deng's visit to the United States; China teaches Vietnam a lesson

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (13 pages)
“Normalization with China: Completing the Process,” pp. 113-123
  U.S. and allied arms sales to China; recognizing the PRC; China's attack on Vietnam; the issue of relations with Vietnam
  Opposing Brown's trip to Peking

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (10 pages)
“China,” pp. 202-211
  Deng Xiao-ping's visit to Washington

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (33 pages)

Alexander Haig, Caveat (22 pages)
  Reagan's different view of China; the Three Disappointments; Reagan's attitudes on Taiwan; Haig's earlier contacts with PRC; first meetings with the Chinese ambassador; Haig's trip to China; arms sales to Taiwan

George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (5 pages)
“China: Dealing Across Ideologies,” pp. 381-385
  Shultz's philosophy of U.S.-China relations; solving the Taiwan arms sales crisis

Ronald Reagan, An American Life (6 pages)
Chapter 54, pp. 368-373
  1984 visit to the PRC

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (44 pages)

George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (19 pages)
Chapter 4: “Untying a Knot,” pp. 86-90, 98-111
  The bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square; Bush’s reasons for the mild U.S. response; Fang Lizhi gets asylum at the U.S. Embassy; Bush writes a personal letter to Deng; the secret Scowcroft-Eagleburger trip to China; discussions with Deng and Le on Tiananmen

James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy (14 pages)
Chapter 7: “China: A Great Leap Backward,” pp. 100-114
The President as desk officer for China; hopes and a strategy for a deeper relationship; the “CNN factor” rears its ugly head; designing a balanced response to the slaughter; Congressional pressure for tougher sanctions; the secret Scowcroft-Eagleburger trip; Baker's meetings with Chinese officials

George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (6 pages)
Chapter 7: “Ends and Beginnings,” pp. 174-179
Scowcroft and Eagleburger return to Beijing: normalization of U.S.-PRC relations is nots sustained

James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy (5 pages)
Chapter 31: “Entering a New Era,” pp. 590-594
Beijing's mixed responses to U.S. demarches; Baker decides to go to Beijing anyway; Chinese leaders display their intransigence; Baker gets just enough to avoid failure

Questions for Discussion:

1) How would you compare the Carter administration's thinking about triangular geopolitics with that of Nixon and Kissinger? In particular, how would you compare Brzezinski's approach with Kissinger's? Which do you believe was the more useful conception of world order and of strategy?

2) Why did it take the Carter administration two years to secure recognition of the PRC? How had Chinese diplomacy changed from the era of Mao and Chou En-lai to that of Deng Xiao-ping? What changes were required of the United States?

3) What does the episode of Deng's Vietnam diplomacy during his visit to the United States in 1979 say about the U.S.-China relationship? Was the United States exploited by the Chinese?

4) How did Haig's view of the PRC differ from that of Reagan and his White House? What continuities and differences do you see in the Reagan administration’s handling of Taiwan, compared to its predecessors?

5) What exactly did the Bush administration do to respond to the Tiananmen massacre of June 4, 1989? Why did it act as it did? Could the U.S. administration have done more during the buildup to the crisis to deter violent action by Beijing? What was the reaction in Congress to Tiananmen? Was it a representation of popular revulsion, a different yet plausible approach to foreign policy, and/or were members of Congress solely pursuing their political interests?

6) Should Secretary Baker have gone to China in November 1991? What did his trip reveal about China's policy towards the United States? About U.S. policy towards the PRC?
BLOCK 4: INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

TOPICS 8-9: CIENFUEGOS & CHILE; EL SALVADOR & NICARAGUA

Latin America (especially the Caribbean and Central America on our southern border) has played a paradoxical role in American foreign affairs. On the one hand, its location in our hemisphere (which in the 19th and much of the 20th century the U.S. felt “belonged” to its sphere of influence) means that developments in the hemisphere affect the United States well beyond what occurs in the rest of the world. During the Cold War, it provided a base for Soviet military and ideological challenges. Its military dictatorships and more recently its anti-American authoritarians have offended the U.S. value of democracy and periodic efforts to “make the world safe for democracy.” Its halting development, pockets of poverty, and natural disasters continue to tug at American heartstrings and foreign aid budgets. Transnational criminal networks that traffic drugs, launder money, enslave victims of trafficking, safeguard supporters of terrorist groups, strengthen criminal gangs, and move illicit materials and contraband through commercial trade all concern U.S. law enforcement. Refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants seeking a better life arrive in the U.S. through Mexico. One might think that such an extensive impact on the day-to-day life of many Americans would ensure Latin America a key, if not a predominant, role in American foreign policy.

And yet, Latin America is more often ignored than central to American leaders in foreign affairs. Despite high-profile programs like the Alliance for Progress or Plan Colombia, and regardless of economic prosperity that accrues to the U.S. from NAFTA, CAFTA, and the recently signed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the region is regularly upstaged by threats from the Middle East, Russia, or North Korea. Often, new presidents have promised early in their terms that they would pay more attention to Latin America. Then the White House turns its attention to geopolitics, Europe, and East Asia, where U.S. attention more typically focuses. During the Cold War, the threat of Soviet encroachment in “our neighborhood” prompted U.S. involvement in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Central America, sometimes using the military tool and sometimes covert assistance. During the 1990s, U.S. attention to the hemisphere took the form of trade agreements, transitions to democracy in previously dictatorial regimes, migration crises from Cuba and Haiti, and the evolution of the long-confictive relationship with Mexico.

Topics 8 and 9 provide snapshots of the U.S.-Latin American relationship during the Cold War, with U.S. efforts to stop the spread of Soviet power and ideological Communist influence. Nixon's and Reagan’s covert interventions in Chile and Central America and Reagan's efforts in El Salvador and Nicaragua highlight the U.S. interests in security and in defending the values of democracy and human rights in the face of a totalitarian power. These crises also show the spillover effects from the region on U.S. domestic politics. We see that the “colossus of the North” or the regional hegemon (the United States) tends to ignore developments in its “back yard” until it perceived a loss in the competition with the
Soviet Union. Then, the U.S. was prompted to use its diplomatic, military, economic, and informational tools to compel change in the region.

Objectives for this Block:

- To compare the responses by various administrations to problems in Latin America that appeared to threaten U.S. interests, including how various administrations orchestrated instruments of power in their responses.
- To examine how the Cold War shaped U.S. perception of its interests in Latin America and how the Cold War shaped Latin American leaders’ interests.
- To understand the tensions between the executive and legislative branches on U.S. foreign policy toward Latin American during the Cold War.

Questions to Consider for this Block of Topics:

1) What was the U.S. political aim (overarching policy goal) in each instance? How were the threats and opportunities defined, and what ways and means were used to pursue a desired outcome?
2) Which were the desired, subordinate policy objectives? In which incidents did the administration at that time achieve its desired objectives?
3) What were the unintended consequences for Latin America of each U.S. intervention? When historians criticize that intervention, what is the focus of that critique?
4) How did each administration view the interventions by previous administrations? What lessons did each administration draw from those previous interventions?
5) What commonalities do you spot across administrations in Latin American interventions? What striking differences emerge? What accounts for the variation?
TOPIC 8: CIENFUEGOS & CHILE: NIXON ERA INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The Nixon administration faced two crises in the region nearly simultaneously: (1) evidence of the Soviets’ building a submarine base on a small island just off the coast of Cuba; and (2) the growing popularity of a Communist block of parties in Chile. Both came to the attention of the administration in fall 1970.

Examination of these events together reveals commonalities and contrasts. While Cienfuegos was treated entirely as a U.S.-Soviet faceoff, the response to Chile took into account the domestic dynamics of Chile as well as the ideological contest between Communism and democracy playing out during the Cold War.

Readings (Total: 84 pages):

CIENFUEGOS (26 pages)

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (21 pages)

- Vorontsov requests reaffirmation of the 1962 understandings; Nixon’s feelings on Cuba; United States reaffirms 1962 understandings; Soviets build base at Cienfuegos in September 1970; Nixon decides to wait until after elections to confront the Soviets; a Pentagon briefer blows the story; Nixon agrees to pursue an active strategy; Soviets reaffirm understanding and move ships; United States and Soviets exchange notes elaborating understanding; further alarms and excursions

Richard Nixon, RN (5 pages)
“Crisis in Cuba,” pp. 485-489
- U-2 reveals submarine base at Cienfuegos; Nixon's views on JFK’s 1962 actions; Rogers urges delay until after elections; Kissinger delivers private Soviet ultimatum; the Soviets yield

INTERVENTION IN CHILE (58 pages)

Richard Nixon, RN (2 pages)
pp. 489-490
- Allende's election: morality of support for opposition forces

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (26 pages)
Chapter XVIII: “The Autumn of Crises: Chile,” pp. 653-678
Allende’s minority election; character and program of Allende’s party and government; U.S. covert actions; U.S. policy before 1970; factionalization of Chilean politics; agency differences that prevent U.S. action; the Rube Goldberg gambit; the plot to kidnap GEN Schneider

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (30 pages)
Chapter IX: “Chile: The Fall of Salvador Allende,” pp. 378-389, 396-413
United States decides on “correct but cool” posture; Allende moves to stifle the opposition; John Connally at Treasury; the Paris debt renegotiations and U.S. strategy; Allende’s struggles with opposition intensify; abortive coup of June 29, 1973; Allende overthrown by Pinochet; United States cautiously reestablishes relations with the junta; human rights issues emerge

Questions to Consider for Cienfuegos:

1) Why did Vorontsov approach Kissinger to clarify the 1962 understandings before the Soviet move on Cienfuegos? What does this incident reveal about the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy?
2) Why was Kissinger so insistent that the United States act at once on evidence that the Soviets were building a submarine base in Cuba? Why did State and Nixon differ? What was the DOD/JCS view?
3) When they did act, what were the essential features of their strategy? Was it a wise way to handle the problem?
4) What did the crisis and its aftermath reveal about dealing with the Soviets? About the U.S. ability to respond to ambiguous Soviet moves?

Questions to Consider for Chile:

1) What were the U.S. interests at stake? What was the overarching policy goal and which were the subordinate goals involved?
2) What does Kissinger mean by a “nonaggression treaty” among the agencies of government? What effect did it have in the Chilean case?
3) What were Tracks I & II of U.S. policy in Chile before Allende’s inauguration? Should the United States have encouraged plans to kidnap Gen. Rene Schneider?
4) What was the goal of U.S. covert operations in Chile after Allende’s inauguration? Were they designed to preserve a democratic system or destabilize a democratically elected government?
5) Do you agree with Kissinger that Allende brought himself down without any American encouragement?
6) Is Kissinger right to condemn the “exceptional severity” of U.S. policy towards Pinochet? What does he mean by characterizing the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam U.S. mood as pretending “that we could prevail through righteousness rather than power?”
TOPIC 9: EL SALVADOR & NICARAGUA: REAGAN-ERA INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America was one of the foreign policy realms with significant disagreement among senior leaders in the Reagan administration. An examination of memoirs about El Salvador and Nicaragua in this period reveals deep divisions among lead policy-makers over not only what should be done, but also over what was done, by whom, and what the President wanted.

Readings (Total: 118 pages):

Alexander M. Haig, Jr, Caveat (16 pages)
Chapter 7: “Central America: The Will to Disbelieve,” pp. 122-137
- Haig's desire to go to the source; the stakes in Central America; policy on El Salvador: two camps in the NSC (Haig vs. everyone else); pressure on Cuba and its results; meetings with Rodriguez and Castro

George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (57 pages)
Chapter 8: “The Soviet Union: First Efforts,” p. 121
- Laying down a marker with Gromyko

Chapter 19: “The Intensity of Central America,” pp. 285-297; 305-322 (Entire chapter recommended)
- The crisis in Suriname - lack of U.S. options; a portrait of Bill Clark; Shultz threatens to resign - fires Enders; NSC decides to mine Nicaraguan harbors; who will name the new ambassador to El Salvador?; setting up the Kissinger commission; Big Pine II kills Contra aid in Congress; Shultz threatens to resign again; NSC-Defense collusion to undercut Shultz; Clark hangs himself politically; the choice of Bud McFarlane as NSA; “Central American policy was a swamp”

Chapter 23: “The Strength and Struggle to Negotiate in Central America,” pp. 402-426
- Shultz reasons for negotiating in Contadora; Kissinger commission report; Bill Casey throws a monkey wrench- mining the Nicaraguan harbors; Shultz goes secretly to Managua; the importance of Contra pressure; objections from the White House NSC staff; the first Manzanilla meeting; NSC and CIA maneuver to stop the talks; moving from Manzanilla to action; MIGs turn into helicopters; Shultz terminates the Manzanilla process.

Constantine C. Menges, Inside the National Security Council (31 pages)
Chapter 3: “Central America: Misserving the President,” pp. 93-96, 104-130
- How George Shultz subverted Reagan's policies; 7 State Department end runs; Tony Motley and Dick Stone; the Mexican persuasion campaign; McFarlane's passivity; Shultz opens negotiations without NSC approval

(Optional) Chapter 5: “Election Eve Surprise,” pp. 146-166

James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (14 pages)
Chapter 4: “Rebuilding Bipartisanship: Lancing the Central American Boil,” pp. 47-60
The Vietnam of the 1980s; the need to remove Nicaragua from the domestic political agenda; from Abrams to Aronson; getting the U.S. behind the Esquipulas accord; refocusing from military solutions to democratic principles and from ideological rigidity to a workable plan; 40 hours of negotiating in Congress gets a deal; offering the Soviets a role in Central America on U.S. terms; the Sandinistas lose the election

Questions to Consider:

1) What was George Shultz's strategy for dealing with Central America? Were Shultz's policy goals fundamentally different than those of the White House conservatives, or did he understand differently the political efforts that would be required to accomplish the conservatives’ agenda?

2) Where did Reagan stand on Central America? What was his policy goal? What was he willing and not willing to do? Given the state of public opinion on this issue, did he lead responsibly?

3) Do you agree with Menges that Shultz subverted Reagan's policies on Central America? Did Menges’ actions advance or hinder Reagan’s policy goals?

4) How do you react to Shultz’s repeated threats to resign on this and other issues? Should he have in fact left the administration?

5) Should the administration have agreed to negotiate with Managua? Was the objective of democratizing the regime there likely to work with the military tool (use of force)? What tools or combination of tools do you think would have worked best to achieve the policy goal? Were the Contras simply a way to get the Managua government to negotiate with the U.S.? Should they have been used only to overthrow the government?

6) What elements of strategy (political aim, subordinate objectives, means, ways, costs, risks, viability) and of domestic politics had changed by the time of Baker's account? What elements remained the same?

7) Whose account of events do you find most persuasive? Why? To what do you attribute the many differences of opinion and memory?
BLOCK 5: WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

TOPICS 10-12:

Most commentators on U.S. relations with the Middle East during the Cold War divide American policy goals there into two: (1) support for Israel, a reflection of the desires of a good number of American citizens as translated through U.S. domestic politics into foreign policy; and (2) access to oil at reasonable prices, a “geopolitical” interest (in the National War College Primer this might be categorized as a “prosperity” interest) defined by U.S. leaders in the national security enterprise. Since 9/11, of course, the goal of fighting terrorism moved to the center of U.S. relations with the Middle East.

The first set of readings below cover about four months in the winter of 1973-74. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy during the Yom Kippur War and the Sinai disengagement “shuttle” negotiations brought Egypt into a search for peace with Israel. That peace process with Egypt (if not with the Syrians and other antagonists of Israel and supporters of the Palestinians) concluded in the second set of readings on the Carter administration. The Carter administration readings cover Egyptian President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David accords, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Together Kissinger and Carter describe a multi-year, multi-administration diplomatic effort which, like the opening to China, changed the shape of the world at that time.

By contrast, the Reagan administration found nothing but costly detours from its desire to bring peace to the Middle East through “strategic cooperation” with Israel against the Soviets. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and terrorism became a major items on the Reagan agenda. President Reagan and Secretary Baker recognized the participation of domestic political players in policy toward the Middle East. They were unable to overcome political roadblocks in Israel. It was not until the Clinton administration that the Oslo peace process enabled the United States again to take an active role as mediator between Arabs and Israelis, leading to summits at the Wye River Plantation in Shepherdstown, Maryland, and Camp David. Though they did not succeed in ending the conflict, their diplomacy was the first serious effort at American engagement since the Nixon-Carter years.

Objectives for this Block:

- To examine the evolution of U.S. interests and policy objectives in the Middle East.
- To consider consistency and change in strategic, international and domestic context over this time period.
- To compare the leadership styles and approaches taken by the strategic leaders as they engaged the Middle East and its conflicts.
Questions for this Block:

1) What were the overarching foreign policy goals and subordinate objectives of the various administrations?
2) In what ways do choices of previous U.S. administrations shape the options available to subsequent administrations in negotiations?
3) How did the U.S. domestic context shape the policy goals and implementation approaches of the various U.S. administrations?
4) Describe Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, and Barak as Israeli leaders and negotiators. Did their differing approaches make a difference in the peace process?
5) From these accounts, what picture emerges of Egyptian (Sadat), Syrian (Assad), Jordanian (Hussein), and other Arab-state diplomacy?
Topic 10: Nixon in the Middle East: The Yom Kippur War

Both Golda Maier's administration in Israel and the Nixon administration in Washington were taken by surprise at the onset of the 1973 war. Israel's victory in 1967 had led to a belief that Arab states had no military option to impose a Palestinian state. In spite of evidence of troop buildups, the intelligence communities of both countries assumed that Egypt would not begin a war it could not win. Both Israel and the United States had underestimated Syrian and Egyptian capabilities. In contrast to the brief 1956 and 1967 wars between Israel and Arab states, the Yom Kippur war lasted almost three weeks, with thousands of Israeli casualties.

Launched in October 1973, the Yom Kippur War unfolded at the height of the Watergate scandal. The simultaneous crises at home and abroad posed a great challenge to American diplomacy. As the memoirs show, both Kissinger and Nixon understood the war as another front in the Cold War with Moscow. They believed that the prestige and status-boost of gaining a lead mediating role for the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict would be part of their definition of victory.

Part 1: The Yom Kippur War, Ceasefire, and Alert (142)

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (116)
Chapter VI: “Middle East in Ferment,” pp. 195-205, 297-299
Components of the Middle East impasse, 1967-1973; Kissinger's strategy vs. State Department approach; Nixon-Kissinger partnership on Middle East policy; Brezhnev Plan at San Clemente (June 1973)
Yom Kippur War begins - U.S. and Israeli surprise (6 Oct 1973); Sadat's strategy and U.S. response; U.S. strategy; U.S. and Israeli confidence in victory; limited American resupply effort; Israel panics and requests urgent resupply (9 Oct); the American airlift (12 Oct); Soviets invite Kissinger to Moscow (19 Oct)
Chapter XII: “Moscow, the Cease Fire, and the Alert,” pp. 545-554, 559-568, 575-599
Kissinger given full powers en route to Moscow; Nixon sends new instructions; quick Soviet agreement on cease-fire; UN Res. 338; a visit to Israel; Meir, Elazar, Dayan; the change in Israel’s position after the war; the cease-fire unravels; Egypt's 3rd Army in peril; Sadat requests Soviet and American troops; Soviets decide to move in, threaten unilateral action; superpower confrontation and U.S. Defcon III+ alert; Soviets decide not to proceed

Richard Nixon, RN (26)
Egypt and Syria attack Israel; the resupply effort - overcoming DOD obstacles; Brezhnev invites Kissinger to Moscow; Soviets threaten to send military force to the Middle East; U.S. military alert; reflections on detente, Soviet behavior, and the crisis; Golda Meir thanks Nixon

[Watergate developments: skim throughout]

Part 2: The Sinai Disengagement Shuttle (65)

Richard Nixon, RN (2)
pp. 981-982 (paperback: 1, pp. 552-553).

Geneva Conference and shuttle disengagement

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (63)
Chapter XIII: “First Middle East Breakthrough,” pp. 632-643, 646-654
Meeting Sadat; 6-point plan to rescue Egypt’s 3rd Army; portrait and eulogy of Anwar Sadat; Israeli acceptance of the 6-point plan

Sadat on the USSR


Washington: Dayan's first disengagement plan
Aswan: Sadat's disengagement plan;
Jerusalem: Israel floats a tougher plan than Dayan’s SAM 86970
Aswan: Sadat decides to go ahead, sets the framework for agreement
Jerusalem: Israel accepts Sadat's sine qua nons
Aswan: Sadat decides to sign
Jerusalem: The Cabinet accepts the agreement
Aswan: Sadat takes off his uniform

SUPPLEMENTAL READING:

Victor Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

Questions to Consider:

1) What motivated Sadat to attack Israel in October 1973?
2) What was Kissinger's strategy before and during the ensuing war? What were Kissinger’s policy objectives?
3) Why was the U.S. so confident in a rapid Israeli victory? What factors led the U.S. to make that assumption?
4) How did the Watergate crisis at home shape the Nixon-Kissinger approach to the crisis?
5) Why did the Nixon administration resupply Israel? Why did it consider the Soviet demand for joint intervention so unacceptable as to be resisted at the cost of a major superpower confrontation?

6) Why did the Soviets eventually agree to a cease-fire? Who was responsible for twice breaking it?

7) Why did the United States continue to support Israel diplomatically and militarily throughout?

8) How and why did Kissinger maneuver to exclude the Soviets from the step-by-step disengagement negotiations?

9) Whose idea was shuttle diplomacy? How did it differ from ordinary diplomacy? What were its strengths and weaknesses?
TOPIC 11: THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CAMP DAVID DIPLOMACY

Part 1: Carter's Pre-Camp David Diplomacy (47)

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (26)

Carter-Vance goals and staff work on the U.S. approach; U.S.-Soviet October 1 statement; Geneva aborted; Sadat visits Jerusalem

Chapter 10, “The Middle East: Camp David,” pp. 196-210

Vance’s December 1977 trip; Begin's response to Sadat; Begin's December 1977 visit; Sinai and home-rule proposals; Jerusalem/Ismalia political talks break off; Sadat’s February 1978 visit - pushes United States for peace plan; Dayan’s February 1978 visit - a divided cabinet; Israel invades Lebanon with U.S. equipment; Begin's March 1978 visit - no evidence of movement

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (21)
Chapter 7, “Uphill to Camp David,” pp. 234-254

U.S. policy and its results in 1977; Israeli/Egyptian/U.S. negotiating teams and tactics; U.S. secret strategy to pressure Israel via Egypt (early 1978); Sadat and Begin visit United States separately; a costly victory on fighter sales to the Saudis; Carter decides on a summit at Camp David

Part 2: Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty (139)

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (91)
“Thirteen Days,” pp. 313-403

Pressures on Carter to stay out of the Middle East; the decision to go to Camp David; inadequate advance preparation for the summit; Begin and Sadat arrive; the two sides’ opening positions; first Sadat-Begin meeting; Sadat's unacceptable statement; Carter confronts the Israelis; two more Sadat-Begin meetings; deadlock on Sinai settlements; Carter decides to mediate individually between the two; U.S. side drafts a comprehensive framework proposal; Carter presents the draft to Israel, then Egypt; Carter drafts a parallel Israel-Egypt peace treaty agreement; Sadat fears to sign a framework unacceptable to the Arabs; Begin refuses to sign the U.S. framework; Carter renegotiates the framework with el-Baz and Barak; progress halts on the Sinai settlements issue; Carter decides to end the negotiations; Sadat packs to leave; Carter persuades him to stay; termination discussions lead to Sinai settlement deal; the signing ceremony at the White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (16)
Chapter 7, “Uphill to Camp David,” pp. 273-288

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Begin undercuts the accords the treaty negotiations stall; Carter's decision to go to the Middle East Brzezinski's trip to Cairo; Carter’s Middle East shuttle succeeds

Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (21)  
Treaty negotiations at Blair House and Camp Madison; Vance attempts shuttle mediation; ministerial discussions at Camp David lead to a Begin visit to Washington; Carter decides to go to the Middle East; Cairo - Sadat comes close to the U.S. position; Jerusalem – Begin finally yields  
Cairo: Sadat signs onto the Jerusalem draft  
Washington: work on the MOA and final signing ceremonies

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (11)  
“After Camp David,” pp. 415-425  
Carter decides to go to Israel and Egypt Cairo; Sadat accepts U.S. draft; Jerusalem - victory from the jaws of defeat

SUPPLEMENTAL READING:  

Questions to Consider:

1) What were the Carter administration’s and Nixon administration’s overarching and subordinate policy goals?  
2) Kissinger had maneuvered to exclude the Soviets from the negotiations. Why did Vance and Carter agree to a U.S.-Soviet statement on Middle East negotiations on October 1, 1977?  
3) How did Carter's version of shuttle diplomacy differ from Kissinger’s, both in conception and in execution?  
4) What was Carter’s attitude towards the Geneva conference? Towards “step-by-step” diplomacy? Towards linkage between an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and an overall settlement?  
5) How would you characterize Jimmy Carter's two most important decisions on the Middle East: to convene the Camp David summit and to undertake the Middle East shuttle?  
6) Was Camp David essentially a failure masking as success or was it a breakthrough of historic dimensions? How do you measure success, against which policy goals?
TOPIC 12. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS

The George H.W. Bush administration (Bush 41) was frustrated repeatedly in its efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace with its negotiator, Dennis Ross. The Clinton administration recognized that Dennis Ross had played and could continue to play an important role in moving the peace agenda forward. Clinton gave him the role of chief negotiator for Middle East peace, in spite of Ross’s political support for Bush 41.

The Clinton administration is generally credited with laying the foundation for Palestinian self-rule. Clinton came into office believing that a diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinians was unlikely. However, the administration learned that secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians had begun in Oslo in December 1992, and decided to offer significant resources to help implement an agreement. The Oslo Accord, signed in September 1993 at the White House by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (for Israel) and PLO Negotiator Mahmoud Abbas (for the Palestinians), accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in exchange for a renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace. The agreement established a Palestinian Authority that would govern the West Bank and Gaza for five years while permanent status talks were conducted.

Rabin's assassination in 1995 prompted the Clinton administration to become more involved in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Hebron Protocol was signed in January 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998. Israeli officials fought internally about the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum; this infighting led to a no confidence vote in the Israeli Knesset (legislature) and an abrupt end to the Netanyahu government in January 1999.

PART 1: THE PALESTINIAN TRACK

Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (16)
Chapter 3: “Rabin, Presidential Transition, the Syrian Pocket, and Oslo,” pp. 89-94, 98-100, 115-121

Rabin decides it's time to make peace; a portrait of Yitzhak Rabin; the Clinton Administration's mindset on the Middle East Holst and Peres reveal the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP); Clinton gets Arafat and Rabin to commit in Washington.

Bill Clinton, My Life (5)
Chapter 35, pp. 541-545.

Getting Rabin and Arafat to attend the Oslo signing ceremony orchestrating the handshake; Rabin and Arafat speak; why Rabin decided to make peace
Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (28)
Chapter 4, “From Oslo to the Palestinian Authority,” pp. 122-125, 133-136
  Israeli vs. Palestinian views of autonomy; Arafat tries to bully Christopher;
  concluding the May 4 agreement in Cairo; the PA is born
Chapter 7, “The Interim Agreement,” pp. 188-190, 198, 201, 207-208
  Complexities of setting up and empowering the PA; the impact of terror on the
  process; parties agree to 3 security areas (A, B, C) in the West Bank; Peres and
  Arafat agree to 3 further redeployments (FRDs); the Interim Agreement is signed at
  the White House (9/29/95)
Chapter 8, “The Rabin Assassination,” pp. 209-210
  An unthinkable act of violence takes a peacemaker
  The Israeli election campaign; Peres loses despite Clinton's support; Ross reassures;
  Arafat; Bibi lectures Clinton on the realities of the Middle East
Chapter 14, “From Breakthrough to Stalemate,” pp. 324-325.
  Ross offers Bibi a creative way to give Arafat a 10% FRD
Chapter 15, “The Thirteen Percent Solution,” p. 374
  Ross offers Molho and Erekat a 13% FRD solution
Chapter 16, “Prelude to Wye,” pp. 398-402
  Ross makes progress on 13% with Bibi and security with Dahlan; pressure from
  Washington for a summit deal

Bill Clinton, My Life (6)
Chapter 49, pp. 814-819
  Clinton decides to “risk a failure in a worthy effort” at Wye River Plantation; Clinton
  spends time with all delegations' members; a visit by King Hussein; Clinton agrees to
  address the Palestinian National Council; the release of Palestinian prisoners and of
  Jonathan Pollard; a deal is struck and announced.

Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (44)
Chapter 16, “Prelude to Wye,” pp. 413-414
  Ross sells Clinton on a building block approach
  Day 1: Clinton works to get the leaders comfortable
  Day 2: Bibi reveals his trophy desires; committees work on economic issues and safe
  passage
  Day 3: The Palestinians edge towards the security work plan; Clinton gets in his
  pocket from Bibi the 14.2% land transfer from B to A
  Day 6: The United States decides to present the text to Israel
  Day 7: The Israelis pretend they are leaving
  Day 8: Tenet goes to the mat on Pollard; Bibi gives Clinton his bottom lines; the
  Israelis and Palestinians meet alone; breakthrough! as language is finalized; a sober
  visit from King Hussein
  Day 9: Netanyahu suggests Arafat rub out his Gaza police chief; Har Homa again
  raises its ugly head; Ross splits three final issues down the middle; a
misunderstanding on Pollard's release imperils the deal; Wye succeeds, hiding a misunderstanding on prisoner release


Netanyahu hesitates in taking Wye to his cabinet; Clinton agrees to tenders for Har Homa; Barak and Labor defeat the Netanyahu government; reflections on Netanyahu's contradictions

Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (8)
Chapter 28: “The Fruitless Quest,” pp. 482-489

Barak urges a comprehensive summit with the Palestinians; bad karma as Camp David begins; working through borders, refugees, and Jerusalem; Barak reveals his bottom lines

Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (39)
Chapter 23: “From Stalemate to Camp David,” pp. 626-629, 647-649

The IDF leaves Lebanon; Arafat demands Israeli action; Barak demands Clinton hold a summit; Clinton decides to go to Camp David


Discussing summit strategy with Clinton; Ross presses Barak to get serious; Clinton erupts at Palestinian intransigence over borders; Arafat's negotiators stonewall overnight, while Barak’s stretch; Clinton confronts Arafat with the need to move; Barak writes a letter on national suicide; Barak reveals his bottom lines and Clinton presents them to Arafat; Ross is cut out of overnight negotiations by his own team; Arafat refuses Barak's bottom lines as the basis for agreement a misunderstanding about negotiating terms while Clinton is in Asia; Clinton presents a final position on Jerusalem to Arafat; Arafat says no again; the U.S. decides the summit is over; Barak demands post-summit support from Ross; Clinton, Barak, and Arafat hold a trilateral closure meeting; Clinton praises Barak at the closing press conference; reflections on the significance of the Camp David summit

Chapter 54, pp. 911-916

Reasons Barak and Arafat came to the Camp David summit; atmospherics and personalities at Camp David; Arafat refuses to meet Barak on the final status issues; the summit crashes on sovereignty over Jerusalem

Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (5)
Chapter 28: “The Fruitless Quest,” pp. 494-496

Ariel Sharon touches off the second Intifada; Clinton asks Arafat to commit to a comprehensive deal in 10 weeks; the United States proposes a core agreement

Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (11)
Chapter 25: “The Denouement-From Camp David to the Intifada to the Clinton Ideas,” pp. 748-758
Deadlock at Bolling AFB leads to the Clinton ideas; Clinton presents a take it or leave it ultimatum; Barak accepts, while Arafat equivocates; having to take the Palestinian “no” for a final answer

Optional Reading:

Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (13)
Chapter 19: “Palestinians and Israelis Coming Together,” pp. 306-318

PART 2: THE JORDANIAN TRACK

Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime (5)
Chapter 12: “Middle East Antipodes,” pp. 212-216
King Hussein faces the prospect of a Palestinian state Hussein negotiates an end of belligerency and a peace treaty with Rabin

Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece (21)
Chapter 6: “King Hussein Fulfills His Grandfather's Legacy,” pp. 164-170, 174-187
The history of secret Israeli-Jordanian cooperation; how Oslo and the creation of the PA forced Hussein's hand; Israel and Jordan agree to move rapidly to peace; Clinton tries to persuade Hussein to meet Rabin publicly; Washington insists on a Clinton-Hussein-Rabin summit; Israel and Jordan negotiate the Washington Declaration; Hussein and Rabin make the tradeoffs necessary for peace; the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace is signed (October 1994)

Questions to Consider:

1) What were the overarching and subordinate policy goals of the Clinton Administration with regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process? Did they change over time?
2) Dennis Ross argues that “never before had the United States put a comprehensive set of proposals on the table designed to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians” (p. 4, The Missing Peace). Based on your reading of previous negotiations, why not? Was it an appropriate role for the United States in this instance?
3) Why was the administration optimistic about the prospects for peace with Syria, and why did they expect it to precede an agreement between Israel and Lebanon?
4) What were President Clinton’s strengths and weaknesses as a negotiator? Was Dennis Ross an effective negotiator, and if so, why? Did the two work together effectively?
5) Was Ross’s past experience an advantage, a liability, or both?
6) What did you learn about negotiating from the accounts of the Wye River and Shepherdstown meetings? For what reasons did Wye River succeed, but Shepherdstown fail?