

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE



Elective Course: China

SYLLABUS

AY 2021

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China

National War College AY 21

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Course Description: China has changed dramatically from the backward, closed society where Richard Nixon disembarked in late February 1972, hoping to develop a bilateral relationship which would threaten the Soviet Union. Today China is vibrant, an economic draw for many companies, and a modernizing nation in every sense. U.S. strategists ignore its influence in Asia and across the world at their peril. This course will discuss China's role in the world along with its own internal challenges, offering the strategist an opportunity to weigh unknowns in charting a strategy for the future yet one with potential hazard for the international system.

Course Learning Outcomes: Course has four learning objectives:

- A. Evaluate the strategic environment to evaluate potential or actual national security challenges which China affects.
- B. Evaluate the domestic challenges that Beijing confronts as it plows through the twenty-first century.
- C. Analyze how to weigh China's modernization presents national security challenges for the United States.
- D. Develop policy options which advance U.S. interests in addressing China's role in the contemporary era.

Topic Schedule:

Course will meet 11 times beginning Monday, 14 September and ending Monday, 7 December 2020. We will meet on Mondays for the first 11 topics from 1330-1530. When we reconvene after Winter break, we will meet on Thursdays. Topics are listed below by date:

September 14, 2020 Topic 1: Introduction and China's evolution before 1949
September 21, 2020 Topic 2: China's evolution, 1949 through today

September 28, 2020 Topic 3: Economic Transformation: Now Where?
October 5, 2020 Topic 4: China's governance challenges I
October 19, 2020 Topic 5: China's governance challenges II
October 26, 2020 Topic 6: Disputes: SCS, ECS, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
November 2, 2020 Topic 7: China's new instruments I
November 9, 2020 Topic 8: China's new instruments II-PLA modernization
November 16, 2020 Topic 9: China and the global system
November 30, 2020 Topic 10: China and the United States
December 7, 2020 Topic 11: paper critique presentations

Reading Materials: Two assigned books will be distributed to students in this course. A series of articles, research papers and book chapters are posted in Blackboard as links to other readings and materials. The books are:

- Hendrik Schulte Nordholt, *China and the Barbarians: Resisting the Western World Order* (Amsterdam: Leiden University Press, 2015), cited as Nordholt
- Karl Mühlhahn, *Making China Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), cited as Mühlhahn

The newspapers with strong international journalist commitments are an essential manner for understanding the evolving Chinese environment.

Deliverables due dates:

Governance challenge presentation: 5 or 19 October (25%)
Policy paper to senior official: 30 November (25%)
Critique of policy paper—written: 3 December (15%)
Critique of policy paper—verbal: 7 December (10%)

Additional course deliverable: Participation (25%)

Each student will write a two page policy paper to either a senior Department of State or Combatant Commander on the Belt & Road Initiative. The paper should have three pages of back up material to support the arguments but the two pages are the heart of the assignment. The paper is due on 30 November at the close of business. More details will follow in class. The paper will be worth 25% of the overall course grade.

Each student will critique a peer's Belt & Road Initiative paper. A written critique of the peer's policy analysis is due at COB on 3 December for 15% of the course grade. An oral critique of no more than 5 minutes of the same paper is due in class on 7 December for 10% of the grade

Consult the Student Catalogue for guidance and policies on the following topics:

- Essay and Research Paper Format

- Assessment Policy
- NDU Grading Scale
- Original Work
- Absence Policy

COURSE China

Topic 1: 6600 National Security Strategy Research and Practicum Course Introduction September 14, 2020

Overview

China proudly notes its civilization dates back five thousand years, with *Zhongguo* known as the Middle Kingdom. For most of that period, China had the most developed economy and a strong political system putting it at the fore of Asia, if not the globe. Most of that period China's emperors resisted outside pressures by using the vast size of China, whether in land mass or population, to pressure other states to bend to China's will. China's leaders tried various methods to maintain its economic control over outside interlocutors over almost all of its final two millennia, including insisting on the "tributary system" whereby sustained relations with other nations under diplomatic and economic norms highlighted by offering "tribute" to the emperor.

The national mythology notes the flow of dynasties yet halts with the "Century of Humiliation" between 1842 and 1949, conveniently ending with the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) under the Communists. Under the "humiliation," foreigner governments refused to pay tribute to the Qing emperors while demanding foreign traders and diplomats operate under extraterritoriality instead of under Chinese sovereignty. British, U.S., French, German, Japanese, Russian, Italian, and other non-Han Chinese governments humiliated China by ignoring Beijing's views, a situation unknown in the Middle Kingdom. As the Qing dynasty (1664-1911) increasingly decayed, the futility of the regime in satisfying its traditional role became most obvious when Japan defeated the Qing in 1895 and took Taiwan under its sovereignty, amputating a portion of the nation. The Qing dynasty ended sixteen years later.

The "Century of Humiliation" ends as a period of dramatic instability overcomes China between 1911 and 1949. First a democracy under western-educated Sun Yat-sen from the south, followed by a decade of warlord powers, leading to Sun's *Guomindang* ("Nationals' Party") to ally with and ultimately persecute the Communist Party in an emerging civil war. World War II in China, beginning with the Japanese subjugation of the three northeastern provinces in 1931, delayed the civil war but it ultimately ended in 1949 with Mao Zedong's declaration of the PRC on 1 October 1949.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Understand course structure, requirements, assignments, core syllabus content and student roles and responsibilities.
- Understand the historic experience of China through the pre-CCP era.

Issues for Consideration:

- What are the key deliverables for course?

- Why is China considered a great power competitor?
- Are China's leaders using history to increase concern about the United States while distracting from internal issues?

Required Reading: (70+ pages)

1. "The Slippery Slope of US-China Competition: A Conversation with Wu Xinbo," China Power Project, 4 January 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/the-slippery-slope-of-us-china-competition/>
2. Hendrik Schulte Nordholt, *China and the Barbarians: Resisting the Western World Order* (henceforth as *Barbarians*) (Amsterdam: Leiden University, 2015): 1-35.
3. Klaus Mühlhahn, *Making China Great: From the Great Ching to Xi Jinping* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019): 25-62.

Supplemental reading:

Stephen Platt, *Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age* (New York: Vintage, 2018)

Neil Thomas, "The Politics of History: Why Anniversaries Matter in China," MacroPolo, 18 June 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/commentary/>

Topic 2: China's Evolution, 1949 through today
September 21, 2020

Overview

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed governance over a broken nation reeling from decades of Qing collapse, then upheaval on all sides. Mao Zedong asserted himself as the first among equals after the Long March of 1934-35 and arose to public prominence in the years after the United States assisted in defeating Japan by 1945. Mao proclaimed the founding of a new China under CCP control on 1 October 1949, stating the period of violating China's sovereignty was over. He set forth to consolidate CCP power over a twenty-five year period through a series of contradictory fits and starts for the Chinese people. The misguided programs led to tens of millions of deaths under the "Great Leap Forward" in the late 1950s and subsequent "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" six years later. By the time of Mao's death in September 1976, China was isolated and even more backward relative to the world than it was when the Qing fell in 1911.

Second generation leader, Deng Xiaoping, led an effort to reverse the quarter of a century of isolation through adopting "the Four Modernizations": agriculture, industry, science and technology and defense. Most relevant, Deng and the modernizers within the Party acknowledged China needed to reverse their course by opening the door to outside knowledge. To acquire that knowledge, China also welcomed foreign investment, undermining the basis of the CCP's role in society. The resulting changes in China lifted four hundred million citizens out of poverty over the following four decades. This occurred, however, with significant disruption to Chinese society, the CCP's ideological basis, and the post-world War II global economy. These changes lead to dramatic questions about China's future and its interactions with other states which this course will ponder.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Analyze the changes China has undergone since the Communists seized power
- Analyze the forces at work in contemporary China

Issues for Consideration:

- Are China's aspirations those of the Party or those of Chinese citizens? How do we answer that question?
- Does the past seventy year evolution guarantee China will proceed in the same manner in the future? What is the basis to your assessment?
- The CCP is roughly 90 million members out of a population greater than a billion. Does this have long term implications? Why do you assess it this way?
- How do these transformations affect the U.S. interests directly?

Required Reading: (83 pages)

1. Mühlhahn, 203-247

2. Nordholdt, 91-142.

Supplemental Reading:

Frank Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-1957* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2013)

-----, *Mao's Great Famine: the History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962* (London: Bloomsbury USA, 2010)

-----, *The Cultural Revolution: a People's History, 1962-1976* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2016)

John Pomfret, *The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present* (New York: Henry Holt, 2016)

Topic 3: Economic Transformation: Now Where? **September 28, 2020**

Overview

The “Four Modernizations” opened the country to outside investment and a loosening of CCP centralized control over the economy because China desperately needed to put millions of agricultural workers into more productive work. The standard of living for all Chinese improved but the urbanization of a significant population substantially increased the gap in the standard of living between those living within seventy-five miles of the coast and those further inland.

Foreign investment allowed the expansion of factories to produce products more cheaply than the costs of producing them in traditional locations, usually the home of the investors. Taiwanese, South Korean, U.S. and European investment fueled both dramatic urbanization numbers and the PRC’s skyrocketing gross domestic product growth between 1977 and 2008. This growth depended on an increasing population to sustain China’s cheap labor but that began declining after 2010. Additionally, the international marketplace slowed demand for these manufactured goods substantially after the 2008 global financial crisis. China’s environment and resource/energy base were undermined by the callous overuse of both.

China and the United States are wary trading partners at best. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership in 2017, followed by a decision to impose tariffs on Chinese goods in the subsequent years threw the traditional *laissez-faire* approach of the post-World War II economic system into shock. The future of the bilateral economic relationship is far less predictable than at any point since Nixon’s reopening in 1972.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Understand the depth of China’s economic slowdown.
- Analyze the interplay between China’s “Four Modernizations” model and the CCP leadership in the country.
- Analyze how China’s growth over forty years allows it to play into the international trade system in 2020.

Issues for Consideration:

- Can China’s economic model ride out the reduced population challenge? Why?
- What strengths does China bring to the trade war with the United States? Weaknesses?
- Did China really create a freer market under the Modernizations or was this wishful thinking by outside investors?

Required Readings:

1. Yao Yang, in David Dollar, Yiping Huang, and Yang Yao, editors, *China 2049: Economics Challenges of a Rising Global Power* (Washington: the Brookings Institution, 2020): 3-29,

and Miaojie Yu and Tenglong Zhong, "China's Opening Up Policies: Achievements and Prospects", 283-304.

2. "Dexter Roberts on the 'Myth of Chinese Capitalism'", SupChina podcast, 26 March 2020, retrieved at <http://supchina.com>
3. Orvell Schell, "A Chinese Puzzle: Economic 'reform' in Xi's China has more meanings than market liberalization", Macropolo.org, 18 February 2018, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/analysis/chinese-puzzle-economic-reform-xis-china-meanings-market-liberalization/>

Supplemental Readings:

1. Houze Song, "Peking Under the Hood: The Debt Behind Beijing's Glitz," MacroPolo, 3 June 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/commentary/#post-13643>
2. MacroPolo Project, The Paulsen Institute at <http://www.macropolo.org>
3. Wayne Morrison, "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States," Congressional Research Service, 25 June 2019, retrieved at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33534> (most recent version)

Topic 4: Governance Challenges I: environment, energy, intellectual property, corruption
October 5, 2020

Overview

No one finds China easy to govern. Energy usage far outstripped resources twenty years ago. The environment was the first and arguably biggest victim of the Four Modernizations, leaving China a terrible future. Intellectual property is a major source of friction as China's reputation is that of thievery from foreign businesses. Corruption seems endemic.

Today's topic will be YOU presenting reports on these topics.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Understand the range of domestic challenges which any regime in China will confront
- Analyze the relative importance of each of these challenges in topic 4 and 5

Issues for Consideration:

- Does China have institutions able to survive the global challenges of the market elasticities?
- How are China's increasing desires for energy resources affecting their role globally?
- Is intellectual property theft worth the strain it imposes on the bilateral U.S.-PRC ties?

Required Reading:

Energy

1. "China's Growing Energy and Geopolitical Impact in Xi Jinping's New Era," Panel Discussion at National Bureau of Asian Research, 5 December 2017, retrieved at <http://www.nbr.org>
2. "Carbon, Climate, and China: A Conversation with Barbara Finamore," China Power Project, 6 June 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/carbon-climate-and-china/>

Corruption

3. "How does corruption hinder China's development?," China Power Project, 4 February 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-corruption-development/>
4. Carl Minzner, *End of An Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining its Rise* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 37-66.
5. TBD

Environment

6. "Water Challenges Inside and Outside of China's Borders: A Conversation with Scott Moore", ChinaPowerProject, 12 February 2020, accessible at <http://chinapower.csis.org>
7. "How does water security affect China's development?," ChinaPowerProject, no date, retrieved at <http://chinapower.csis.org>
8. "Will China save the planet? A climatic conversation with NRDC's Barbara Finamore",

SupChina podcast, 9 April 2020, retrieved at <http://supchina.com>

8. "How is China managing its greenhouse gas emissions?", ChinaPowerProject, no date, retrieved at <http://chinapower.csis.org>

8. Jiameizi Jia, "On tap: Seeking a Game Changer to Stop China's River Pollution," *NewSecurityBeat*, 21 February 2019, retrieved at <https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2019/02/tap-seeking-game-changer-stop-chinas-river-pollution/>

9. Zhuoshi Liu, "The People vs. Pollution: Empowering NGOs to Combat Pollution with Environmental Law," *NewSecurityBeat*, 23 August 2018, retrieved at <https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2018/08/people-vs-pollution-empowering-ngos-combat-pollution-environmental-law/>

Supplemental Readings:

1. Bonnie S. Glaser, "The Choice for Southeast Asia isn't between the US and China," *Singapore Straits Times*, 20 June 2019

2. Damien Ma, "China's War on Coal in Seven Charts: Peak Coal is Not a Blip but a Trend," *MacroPolo*, 24 June 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/china-peak-coal-energy-trend/>

Topic 5: Governance challenges II: demographics, minorities, and religion
October 19, 2020

Overview

China's domestic issues also include people-based issues such as religion, minority rights, and demographics. Because China's rise linked so clearly to the abundance of population in rural areas, the demographic composition matters a great deal. China prides itself on its 92% Han population but out of 1.3 billion, that means the remaining 8% constitutes multimillions citizens in the 56 minority groups of the country.

The Communist Party of Russia proved inept at addressing minority concerns as the Chinese counterpart organization is as well. Particularly worrisome for Beijing is the role of Islamic minorities. Uighur "reeducation camps," appearing similar to concentration camps, began appearing in Xinjiang Province around 2016. Today they include a substantial number of Uighurs and other Islamic adherents.

More generally, a religious awakening was underway in China but appears yet another aspect of society which Xi Jinping finds threatening. Crackdowns on various Christian communities along with Islamic adherents made China into a country where the Party seeks to be the religion of the people.

Topic Learning Objectives

To analyze the reasons religion, demographic shifts, and minorities appear to pose a significant worry to the CCP.

Issues for Consideration:

- Why would a population with 8% minorities out of a billion and a half citizens threaten the state's stability?
- What difference does it make if China needs more women? Is China somehow different from other societies?
- China views religion as a purely domestic issue but will this offer a perpetual challenge for those in the United States seeking to evangelize? How does that fit into the bilateral relationship?

Required Reading:

For all students

Mühlhahn, 560-614.

Minority unrest

1. David Tobin, "A 'Struggle of Life or Death': Han and Uyghur Insecurities on China's North-West Frontier," *China Quarterly*, 9 July 2019, retrieved at

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/ACA97E9682101081E35CFE46518C9111/S030574101900078Xa.pdf/struggle_of_life_or_death_han_and_uyghur_insecurities_on_chinas_northwest_frontier.pdf

2. Minzner, *End*: 67-112.

Religion

3. Michael Pompeo, retrieved at <https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-at-the-ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom>

4. Minzner, *End*: 113-142.

5. Ian Johnson, *The Souls of China: The Return of Religion after Mao* (hereafter: *Souls*; New York: Vintage, 2018): 1-67.

Demographics

6. “How Chinese Governance Fundamentals Impact health Care and National Security”, China Talk podcast, no date, retrieved at <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/how-chinese-governance-fundamentals-impact-health-care/id1289062927?i=1000468355719>

7. Wang, Feng, “China’s One-Child Policy,” University of Pennsylvania podcast, 19 February 2019, retrieved at <http://cscs.sas.upenn.edu>

Topic 6: Disputes and Tensions: SCS, ECS, Taiwan, and Hong Kong October 19, 2020

Overview

The rhetoric from Beijing invariably discusses “indisputable facts” about areas surrounding China that are in dispute. Beijing rejects the traditional international legal interpretations of who controls the land features in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), opposing various neighbors’ claims which create the potential for conflict as China becomes more assertive with its modernizing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and more nationalistic in its policies.

Hong Kong and Macau, both European colonies for well over a century, returned to Beijing’s control in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Macau today is a hotbed for Chinese gamblers but presents no governance challenges. Hong Kong, on the other hand, operates under the bilateral accord signed with the former colonizers in London. That agreement provides Hong Kong with a “special administrative status” for half a century after the turmoil but recent decisions by the Beijing-backed government in Hong Kong have engendered much popular discontent. One thing that no government in China tolerates is *luan*, or chaos, which creates anxiety in the mainland.

Taiwan remains a hot button issue for China, revealing the depth of the CCP’s insecurities about this remaining issue from the 1940s. Just over a dozen states on the planet recognize Taiwan’s government as sovereign yet Beijing finds this extremely disturbing, even though Washington does not have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Located just over a hundred miles off the Fujian coast, Taiwan’s status evokes strong commentary from any member of the CCP for fear its status will create doubts about CCP power. Taiwan’s odd relationship with the United States, covered under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, makes Washington the most important reason the island has not yet reunified with the mainland.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Analyze the dangers the current disputes pose for the government in Beijing.
- Analyze the differences between each of these cases for China in the future.
- Analyze the relative importance of ties with Taiwan versus those with the PRC for the United States.

Issues for Consideration:

- Is either the South China Sea or the East China Sea as important for the United States as it is for China? Why so?
- What role should the international community play in preserving Hong Kong as a special administrative region through 2047?
- Taiwan will always be a hundred miles off the coast of China so what realistic hope does it have for ever establishing genuine sovereignty? Should Washington do that in

perpetuity?

Required Readings:

1. Ralph Jennings, "Will US First Class Treatment of Visiting Taiwan President Rattle China?," Voice of America, 17 July 2019, retrieved at <https://www.voanews.com/usa/will-us-first-class-treatment-visiting-taiwan-president-rattle-china>
2. "China's South China Sea Strategy: A Conversation with Bill Hayton," China Power Project, 5 July 2018, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/chinas-south-china-sea-strategy/>
3. "Taiwan: Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, 30 October 2017, retrieved at https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171030_R44996_4e50b5ab9e0883daa117ef5220cbcd060caf022.pdf
4. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "Hong Kong's Crisis and Prospects for the Pro-Democracy Movement," *ChinaBrief*, 19:2 (26 June 2019), retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/hong-kongs-crisis-and-prospects-for-the-pro-democracy-movement/>
5. Jonathan Dixon, "East China Sea or South China Sea, they are all China's Seas: comparing nationalism among China's maritime irredentist claims," *Nationalities Papers*, 42:6 (2014): 1053-1071, retrieved at <https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&sid=7f8d5980-c7f6-4b48-84bc-1bca45c356c2%40sessionmgr102>

Supplemental Readings:

1. Mark Manyin, "The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treat Obligations," *Congressional Research Service*, 21 February 2019, retrieved at https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170221_R42761_2ca255915046151588d267da7f502d03981f3828.pdf

Topic 7 : China uses instruments I
October 26, 2020

Overview

China under Xi Jinping, the 5th Generation leader of the CCP, consolidated power as an individual and as a Party with great alacrity since assuming his position in November 2012. Xi's CCP has dramatically limited transparency into the Party decision-making (which was never open in a western sense) while using new instruments to achieve its foreign and domestic objectives. Xi appears dedicated to returning the CCP to a position as dominant in China in a ways not true during the "modernization" period when outsiders played an important role in that process.

Internal control over society, whether the ubiquitous CCTV system throughout largest cities or monitoring the internet or surveillance throughout the society on the streets, is a method of protecting against *luan*. The Party's ability to protect its central role in this vast country explains the greater expenditure for domestic security than for the People's Liberation Army in national external defense.

Additional instruments China is using today include cyber, aid, lawfare, domestic regulations, and sanctions. Less formal pressures include pushing Chinese tourists to avoid countries where China's leaders seek to persuade another country to alter its international behavior. China actively seeks to change other states' behavior when its interests are under threat.

Topic Learning Objective

Analyze how China uses various instruments in its new position as a global power to alter other states' behavior.

Issues for Consideration:

- Is China's use of instruments really different from those of traditional western powers?
- Frequently, analysts note the CCP leadership does not need worry about public opinion as it governs. Do you see this as true? If so, why or why not?
- Do China's relatively new laws really seem destined to undermine western businesses and NGOs?

Required Reading:

1. James Kitfield, "Adm. Davidson: China Assaults International Order," *BreakingDefense*, 18 July 2019, retrieved at breakingdefense.com
2. Neil Thomas, "How Beijing Embraces Public Opinion to govern and control," 7 May 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/commentary/#post-13657>
2. Yun Sun, "Taiwan Arms Sales: Chinese Sanctions on US Firms," *Pacific Forum, PacNet#39*, 15 July 2019, retrieved at <https://www.stimson.org/content/taiwan-arms-sales-chinese-sanctions-us-firms>

3. Matt Sheehan, "Much Ado About Data: How America and China Stack Up," MacroPolo.org, 16 July 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/ai-data-us-china/>
4. -----, "Chinese AI Talent in Six Charts," MacroPolo.org, 28 May 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/commentary/#post-13657>
5. "CNA: Supervision Chinese Officials Impose over NGOs Is the Toughest in the Past 20 Years," Central News Agency, 17 July 2019, retrieved at <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201907170199.aspx>
6. John Dotson, "Xi Jinping's Summer Foreign Policy Tour Displays 'Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics'," *China Brief*, 16 July 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinpings-summer-foreign-policy-tour-displays-great-power-diplomacy-with-chinese-characteristics/>
7. Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore," *ChinaBrief*, 16 July 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-singapore/>
8. -----, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan," *ChinaBrief* (19:12), 26 June 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-japan/>
9. April A. Herlevi, "China's New Foreign Investment Law: Quick Passage after a Long Wait," *ChinaBrief*, 19:6, 22 March 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-foreign-investment-law-quick-passage-after-a-long-wait/>
10. John Dotson, "Dramas Must Feature Goodness": The CCP Launches Renewed Efforts to Control Themes in Popular Culture," *ChinaBrief*, 5 March 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/dramas-must-feature-goodness-the-ccp-launches-renewed-efforts-to-control-themes-in-popular-culture/>
11. Brent Eastwood, "A Smarter Battlefield?: PLA concepts for 'Intelligent Operations' Begin to Take Shape," *ChinaBrief*, 19:4, 15 February 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/a-smarter-battlefield-pla-concepts-for-intelligent-operations-begin-to-take-shape/>
12. Hiddai Segey, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, "My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G Dominance," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 16 July 2019

Topic 8: New instruments II- PLA modernization

November 9, 2020

Overview

The fourth of the modernizations of the 1970s was the military, an institution which proved unable to defeat the Vietnamese in early 1979. Discussion in Washington or at Indo-Pacom today rarely hints that China has ever been anything other than a highly successful, modernized military able to roll back the United States and any foreign militaries anywhere in Asia.

Xi Jinping began his term worried about corruption across China, not the least in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Since November 2012, thousands of PLA officers faced cashiering for their massive corruption, leaving many in prison for life—and unable to oppose Xi's actions within the CCP.

Along with trying to purge corruption, Xi initiated steps to reform the PLA to make it more joint and more effective. This modernization continues but the PLA is most definitely not your father's military for China; instead, it is one which deploys task forces for extended periods of time and is moving towards a far more coherently powerful role in Asia.

Topic Learning Objectives

Analyze the role of the PLA as an instrument of China's regime at present

Issues for Consideration

- Is there evidence China has been able to deter the United States and its allies over issues of major importance to them?
- Is China's northern strategy evidence of a fundamental shift in power globally?
- China is traditionally a ground-based force. Is evidence compelling that the CCP has moved to a maritime-based power?

Required Readings:

1. Tom Mahnken and Phil Saunders, "China's Responses to a Changing Security Environment," NBR Podcast, 27 June 2019, retrieved at <https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-responses-to-a-changing-security-environment/>
2. Hui Zhang, "China's Nuclear Security: Progress, Challenges, and Next Steps," *Project on Managing the Atom*, March 2016, retrieved at <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Chinas%20Nuclear%20Security-Web.pdf>
3. M. Taylor Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy," *International Security*, 42:3 (Winter 2017/18): 37-83, retrieved at <https://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=cfbebe93-2469-453f-876d-29e006636884%40sdc-v-sessmgr02>
4. Paul Goble, "China Moves Toward Becoming Dominant Player on Northern Sea Route," *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, 16:87, 12 June 2019, retrieved at <https://jamestown.org/program/china->

[moves-toward-becoming-dominant-player-on-northern-sea-route/](#)

Supplemental Reading:

Andrew Erickson, "Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China's Maritime Militia to Deter Its Use," *Nationalinterest.org*, 25 November 2018, retrieved at <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/shining-spotlight-revealing-china%E2%80%99s-maritime-militia-deter-its-use-36842>

Topic 9: China and the global system

November 16, 2020

Overview

China rejected engagement with Britain in 1792 because the Qing emperor could not envision someone as powerful as him. China today still rejects major portions of the global regime, such as the international arbitration tribunal on the United Nations' Commission on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China's desire to select its behavior is not completely isolated as the United States frequently receives similar criticism about selectivity, although Washington rejects the charge.

The CCP under Xi Jinping began expanding China's role in foreign lending and infrastructure development, particularly under the "Belt & Road Initiative" (BRI). Initially aimed at Central and Southeast Asian states, it now includes Chinese activities as far as Latin America and Canada, making it truly the global belt project. As Beijing observers said in 2018, the BRI is Xi's signature effort.

Many outside China doubt the massive investments of the PRC will in fact get to these countries because China traditionally has a tremendous problem with corruption. Xi claims to have a path towards remedying that problem, still a work in progress. Additionally, outsiders fear this program really amounts to attempts to capture the poorer states around the world, entrapping them in a "debt" relationship with China.

Topic Learning Objectives

- Analyze China's behavior towards the international regimes in place today and how it appears to address its goals.
- China's motives in moving investment overseas as its own economic model stalls
- Analyze the options available to other states in trying to obviate dependence on the PRC

Issues for Consideration:

- Is the critical or the supportive analysis on China's behavior more persuasive? Why?
- Since the United States and Europe don't appear interested in investing in a number of these states, what is the harm for China to invest in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other poorer places?
- China's involvement in Africa attracts the most attention because that investment is so pervasive. Yet a decade ago, China had been invested in Africa, only to withdraw when the global drop in natural resource prices occurred as a result of the international financial crisis. Is that probable again?

Required Reading:

1. Daisy Khalifa, "Grand Idea: China's Ambitious Belt and Road Initiative Also Has Its Hurdles," *SeaPower*, 1 November 2018, retrieved at

<https://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=eec86c78-1053-4bfd-9e91-4f55d57fe6b5%40sdc-v-sessmgr03>

2. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Beijing's 'Going Out' Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative in the Sahel: The Case of China's Growing Presence in Niger," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 28: 118 (July 2019): 592-613, retrieved at <https://portal.ndu.edu/dc/Meetings/Forms/AllItems.aspx>
3. Sagatom Saha, "China's Belt and Road Plan is Destroying the World," *NationalInterest.org*, 18 August 2019, retrieved at <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-belt-and-road-plan-destroying-world-74166>
4. Nikki Haley, "How to Confront an Advancing Threat from China," *Foreign Affairs*, 18 July 2019, retrieved at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-07-18/how-confront-advancing-threat-china>
5. Carla P. Freeman, "An Uncommon Approach to the Global Commons: Interpreting China's Divergent Positions on Maritime and Outer Space Governance," *China Quarterly*, 20 June 2019, retrieved at https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/329ABE106EC8913BE221F07732A93C3B/S0305741019000730a.pdf/an_uncommon_approach_to_the_global_commons_interpreting_chinas_divergent_positions_on_maritime_and_outer_space_governance.pdf
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6. "China and the World Trade Organization: A Conversation with Tu Xinquan," China Power Project, 17 July 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/china-and-the-world-trade-organization/>
7. "China's Evolving Role in the United Nations: A Conversation with Courtney Fung," China Power Project, 18 June 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/chinas-evolving-role-in-the-united-nations/>
8. "China's Push to Reform Global Governance," China Power Project, 12 April 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/chinas-push-to-reform-global-governance/>
9. "China's Relationship with the International Order" A Conversation with Timothy Heath," China Power Project, 15 February 2019, retrieved at <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/chinas-relationship-with-the-international-order/>

Supplemental Reading:

Damien Ma, "Development as Imitation: Can the East Asian Model Become the East African Model?," *Macropolo.org*, 14 May 2019, retrieved at <https://macropolo.org/china-africa-loan-development-investment/>

Topic 10: Sino-US relations

November 30, 2020

Relations between the United States and China suffer from dramatically different expectations on both sides. The two large countries have competing interests and impressions of their relative importance to the international system. China harkens to its historic role as the overwhelmingly dominant state in East Asia over millennia, reluctant to acknowledge that internal decay undermined its continued position as much as did foreigners during the 'Century of Humiliation'. The United States, rarely challenged during the three quarters of a century since the end of the Second World War, harbors intentions to retain its central role as guarantor of peace in the region. At the same time, Washington confronts a China more confident, aggressive, and determined to return to its prior position as the major voice around the world in places where Washington finds competition between the two states as increasingly challenging.

Many analysts assume this invariably will lead to conflict between the United States and China. Is this absolutely true? If not, why not?

Student policy papers on the Belt & Road Initiative are due today.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Is conflict inevitable between the United States and China? If not, how do the two states find common interests to incentive no conflict?
2. Is there a hierarchy to the aspects of relations between the United States and China?
3. Are China's priorities clear as it enters the third decade of the century and do they include ties with the United States?

Learning Objectives

1. Identify common national interests that might exist between China and the United States
2. Analyze the differences between U.S. and Chinese aspirations globally— are they automatically conflicting?

Required readings:

1. Wang, Jisi, "China-U.S. ties today worse than Soviet-U.S. relations during Cold War", June 2020, <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-06-18/wang-jisi-china-us-ties-today-worse-than-soviet-us-relations-during-cold-war-101569472.html>
2. Isaac Kardon, "China Can say 'No': analyzing China's Rejection of the South China Sea Arbitration," *University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review*, 13: 2 (2018): 1-44, retrieved at <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/1/>

More material as semester develops— TBD

Topic 11: Student critiques on presentations

Each student will offer a critique on a peer's paper on the Belt & Road Initiative.