Course Description

Southeast Asia includes the ten countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. It has a combined population of over 650 million. What is striking about the region is its diversity. It is home to a huge range of government types, from a theocratic sultanate (Brunei), to communist dictatorships (Vietnam and Laos) to autocracies (Thailand and Cambodia), to fragile democracies (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar). Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world, and the largest Muslim-majority democracy. Southeast Asia includes every major faith group: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism. It has the full range of economic systems, and has huge disparities of wealth that include amongst the wealthiest countries in the world (Singapore) and some of the poorest (Laos and Cambodia). But the region is economically thriving and part of the global supply chain. Collectively, ASEAN is America's third largest trading partner.

We see the diversity in the region's security environment, as well. Several Southeast Asian states have longstanding territorial disputes with their neighbors and irredentist claims over colonial-drawn borders. The region includes a host of secessionist insurgencies, including ongoing ones in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand. The longest running communist insurgency in the world. While Southeast Asia has not been at the core of Salafist terrorism since 9/11, both Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates in the region remain a persistent threat. Mid-2017 saw IS militants siege the Philippine city of Marawi, while members of the Abu Sayyaf continue to engage in terrorism and kidnapping for ransom, including in Malaysia.

Perhaps the most immediate threat to regional security is the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, where China has constructed six man made islands and militarized them. The US has carried out regular routine freedom of navigation operations to challenge China's excessive maritime claims, but those have been insufficient. China has effectively divided and neutralized ASEAN.

There remains a host of human security issues including political violence, the politicization of security forces, attacks on ethnic minorities (including wholesale ethnic cleansing), and threats posed by transnational criminal syndicates. The COVID-19 Pandemic has created new security challenges, altered civil-military ties, and exposed limitations in governance. Arguably the greatest security threat to the region comes from climate change which is already causing changes immigration patterns and impacting food security.
Southeast Asian states are keen to avoid being forced to choose between the United States and China, as competition between the two intensifies. Most states do see the United States as a benign superpower that has created the conditions for their growth and prosperity. But the United States is unable to compete with China on the economic front. China is the largest trading partner of every country in Southeast Asia, and its Belt and Road Initiative and new economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, carry weight in a region that is hungry for infrastructure development. Southeast Asia has now surpassed the United States, becoming China’s second-largest trading partner in the first half of 2019 with 4 percent growth to $291.8 billion. As a recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic looms, China will be the key to the region’s economic recovery.

More importantly, the United States, under the current administration, looks to be a very inconsistent and unreliable ally and partner, unwilling to provide collective goods. While this course will not focus on how great power competition between the United States and China will play out, it will be a leitmotif. The goal of this course is to give Southeast Asian states agency, and focus on their regional security concerns. To be sure, Southeast Asia is where the United States and China compete most actively.

Learning Outcomes

This course will give you a better understanding of:

• The theoretical and empirical literature on Southeast Asian security;
• The historical context that shape international security and politics in Southeast East Asia today;
• The national interests, strategies and foreign policy of Southeast Asia’s main actors;
• The challenges and security dynamics roiling Southeast Asia, and their implications for U.S. regional strategy and foreign policy;
• An examination of the range of traditional and non-traditional security concerns in Southeast Asia.

Course Requirements

Attendance

Students must attend every class session prepared to participate. This is a small class and your absence will be noticeable in how it alters the class dynamic. Since class discussion will go well beyond the readings, absence severely diminishes what you learn from this course. Lateness is also not acceptable: please attend class promptly every day. Absence and repeated tardiness will diminish your grade.

Requirements

• Paper 1: A 2-3 page 900-1,000 word policy paper on US policy options to support a regional partner's counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism options. The paper is due on the day of the 5th class. There will be an in-class exercise on South China Sea scenarios in class 9. You will prepare a 2,000 word brief addressing how your assigned state is likely to respond (politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically) for each of the scenarios.
• Paper 3: A 2,000 word paper that analyzes an aspect(s) of climate change on regional security. The paper is due on 5 May.

For all written work, use a 12-point font, leave a one-inch margin on all sides. Please single-space your papers, paginating on the bottom. Footnotes should be in a 10-point font and single-spaced. For footnote
format, use the Chicago Manual of Style. Documents should be submitted in Word or Pages format and in compliance with the guidelines described in this syllabus. No cover pages are required.

Standards for spelling and grammar will be high; grades will be significantly impacted for multiple errors.

Means of Assessment

No student can pass a course without completing all course assignments. Students are also responsible for retaining a copy of their assignment until they have received a grade. All assignments submitted late without my explicit pre-approval will be penalized two-thirds of a letter grade (e.g., from an A to a B+) for each full day late. Other than the final Policy Memo, all assignments must be submitted electronically to zachary.m.abuza.civ@msc.ndu.edu the email address listed above no later than 10:00pm the day prior to class. At 10:01 pm, the assignment will be considered late. Grades will be assigned according to the following grading scale:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
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<td>A</td>
<td>100-94</td>
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<td>A-</td>
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<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>86-84</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-</td>
<td>83-80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SSP has no C- or D; rather, grades go from C directly to F. See your student handbook for more on grading.

Writing Guidelines

Use a 12-point font, leave a one-inch margin on all sides. Please single-space your papers. Use 12-point font, use one-inch margins, and be paginated on the bottom. Footnotes should be in a 10-point font and single-spaced. For footnote format, use the Chicago Manual of Style. Documents should be submitted in Word format and in compliance with the guidelines described in this syllabus. No cover pages are required.

Standards for spelling and grammar will be high; grades will be significantly impacted for multiple, egregious errors.

Readings

Most of the readings are hyperlinked in the syllabus. Some are on PDFs which will be posted in Canvas.

Books for Purchase

Other Policies

Electronics
Phones and other small devices should be silenced and put away during class. Laptops will be permitted, but Internet access should be disabled during class. Problems may result in increasingly draconian and luddite policies.

Extensions
To receive an extension because of an absence requires notice from a doctor or your SSP academic advisor, preferably prior to the due date. Late assignments will be penalized as stated above, unless an excuse is provided a doctor or your SSP academic advisor.

Accommodations and Disability Services
Persons with documented disabilities requiring accommodations to meet the expectations of this course should contact the Academic Resource Center (ARC). All ARC forms must be submitted to me within the first two weeks of the course.

Canvas
All assignments will be posted on our course Canvas site. Students should check this site regularly for announcements and details on course assignments. To that end, the assignments listed on the syllabus may be subject to minor changes throughout the semester. If changes are made, they will be announced in class as well as posted on Canvas.

Instructional Continuity
As a New Englander, I have zero tolerance for the inagility of Washingtonians to deal with the "winter." In the event of inclement weather such as a 1/4" of snow, this semester that results in the University’s cancelation, we will hold class virtually through the zoom function on our Canvas site.
**Topic Guest Speakers**

Government officials and prominent academics will occasionally be invited to provide insights that augment our scholarly study of East Asian security issues. To encourage candor, their presentations and discussions will be conducted under Chatham House Rules (e.g., “participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity or the affiliation of the speaker, nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.”).

**About the Professor**

Dr. Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College, in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues, including governance, insurgencies, democratization and human rights, and maritime security.


Dr. Abuza has lectured at the Foreign Service Institute, the Joint Special Operations University, and other government entities. He has consulted widely to the US Government and corporations with interest in Southeast Asia. He has served as a Congressional witness on three occasions, most recently in May 2017. In 2004-05, he was a Senior Fellow at the US Institute of Peace and a recipient of a Fulbright Fellowship.

He received his B.A. from Trinity College (1991), and M.A.L.D. (1994) and Ph.D. (1998) from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is a frequent commentator in the press and has lived and traveled extensively throughout the region.
Decolonization & State Building in the Cold War

This seminar will introduce students to the geography, climate, ethnic tapestry, cultural influences, religions and the impact of Western colonialism (by Great Britain, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, and gasp, America) and its legacy. All exert a powerful influence on contemporary Southeast Asia.

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during WWII broke the notion of European invincibility. As the war wound down, the Japanese empowered and armed a number of nationalist movements to stave off the European re-annexation of their territories. But the seeds of independence had already been planted and fertilized by profound economic and social changes.

While the United States tried to lead by example, giving the Philippines independence in 1946, our European allies were more reluctant. The UK gave Burma independence in 1948, as part of their decolonization of India. Malay leaders concluded negotiations for independence with the British in 1957. The British bequeathed the remainder of their crown colonies — including Singapore — to the Malayan government in 1963, creating "Malaysia." Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965.

The Dutch recolonized Indonesia after WWII, but were quickly confronted by a large-scale nationalist rebellion. After five years of war, the Dutch granted Indonesia independence in 1949. But the new government was immediately confronted with secessionist and Islamist insurgencies, as well as the challenge of governing a culturally and geographically diverse archipelago.

Ho Chi Minh’s forces were the first Southeast Asians to declare independence, on 2 September 1945. The French ignored the move and re-colonized the country. Ho tried to negotiate “dominion” status in vain, and war broke out in 1946. The civil war culminated in 1954, with the Geneva Conference that divided the country in two. In 1953, the French granted Cambodia and Laos independence, assuming that they would remain loyal to the French state. Only Thailand was never formally colonized, though they ceded significant territory to the British and French.

The process of independence in each country was impacted by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party takeover of China in 1949. Thus independence movements were already seen in the context of Cold War dominos.

This class will focus on how the legacy of colonialism, the process of decolonization and state building, and how exogenous factors, such as the Cold War frames contemporary security - both internal and external - in Southeast Asia. We will focus on Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia & Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It will address the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 and its growth in 1995-98. The focus of the class will be on state-cohesion, internal security threats, communist insurgencies, and the role of external actors.

Required Readings

- Ali Moertopo, “The Dual Function of the Armed Forces,” 1972 [PDF]
Recommended Readings

- Ali Moertopo, “The Dual Function of the Armed Forces,” 1972 [PDF]
- Pancasila at http://www.bahasakita.com/pancasila/

Other Resources

There is so much to learn about colonialism, decolonization, wars of national independence, and nation building through arts and literature. Below are some of the most important.

- The most important historical novel is Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s *The Buru Quartet*.
- Christopher Koch’s 1978 novel *The Year of Living Dangerously* brilliantly captures the pre-1965 coup environment. I would be remiss not to recommend Peter Weir’s wonderful 1982 film adaptation. Hey, it’s a long winter, settle in with a movie one evening, and soak up the Southeast Asian atmosphere.
- There is a huge body of literature, memoirs and poetry from US military personnel who served in Vietnam. I would recommend Tim O’Brien’s *The Things They Carried* and *If I Die in a Combat Zone*. He has also written a few novels. There is also a body of poetry from US servicemen. I love the work of Phil Caputo. His *A Rumor of War* is one of the classic war memoirs.
- What is less known is the body of work by their Vietnamese counterparts that really infuriated the Vietnam Communist Party and pierced the veil of Socialist Realism. The first and arguably most important of this genre were Bao Ninh’s *The Sorrow of War* and *Duong Thu Huong’s Novel Without a Name*. These are absolute must reads and should be read together. They absolutely pierce the veil of the VCP’s narrative of the war. Bao Ninh’s work, is written in almost a stream of consciousness, as he clearly suffered from terrible PTSD, something that the government largely denied existed. He has written little since then.
- Duong Thu Huong’s *Paradise of the Blind* and *Memories of a Pure Spring* got her expelled from the Communist Party. She now resides in France. Her second to last book, *No Man’s Land*, is a real heartbreaker, a novel of love and obligation in a paternalistic and communist
society. I had to put it down the first time I started it; it was gut wrenching. Yet the conclusion has a wonderful and refreshing feminist perspective. Her most recent novel, Zenith, takes on the sacred cow of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, a man basically held captive and used by the Communist Party. Why she has not won the Nobel Prize for Literature, I do not know. She deserves it.

• My personal favorite novels about the early reform period and the break out from socialist realism are Ma Van Khang’s Against the Flood (2000) and Le Luu’s A Time Far Past.

• Vu Trung Phung’s Dumb Luck, written in 1936, is an absolutely hysterical take on the bourgeois elite in the French colonial era. It is scathing in its treatment of the petit bourgeoisie and the comprador capitalists. It was banned in Vietnam until 1986. I cry laughing every time I read it.

• And how could I pass up the classic by Graham Greene, The Quiet American? It all but predicted the American quagmire.

• The newest inclusion to this list is Viet Thanh Nguyen’s Pulitzer Prize winning debut novel, The Sympathizer. This is absolutely brilliant, and the best thing that I read in 2016, by far. It is absolutely scathing social commentary.

• I would recommend Christopher J. Koch’s Highways to a War about a journalist who disappears while covering the Khmer Rouge rebellion.

• The storied journalist Michael Swain’s autobiography (of The Killing Fields), A River of Time, is one of the most beautiful accounts of the tragic era, of the early to mid-1970s. This is one of my most favorite memoirs. You should read Haing Ngor’s autobiography, A Cambodian Odyssey, with Roger Warner. He was an obstetrician in Cambodia before the Khmer Rouge came to power, and is known for his portrayal of Dith Pran in the movie, The Killing Fields, which is certainly worth watching.

• The Burmese remark that three of George Orwell’s most famous books were all about Burma at various stages of its political development, Burmese Days (based on his experience as a colonial administrator), Animal Farm (life under Ne Win) and 1984 (life under the SLORC/SLPD).

• The most famous Burmese novel is Ma Ma Lay’s Not Out Of Hate: A Novel of Burma (1991).

• Tash Aw’s The Harmony Silk Factory (2005) follows the Akiho Kurasawa model of telling a bio story of post-colonial Malaysia from the point of view of three different protagonists.
Topic 2

2. Secessionist Insurgencies in Indonesia: East Timor, Malukus, Papua & Aceh

With over 17,000 islands, spread across 3,000 miles, with hundreds of ethnolinguistic groups and multi denominations, Indonesia is an artificial country. Nationalists, originally trained and armed by the Japanese, won independence in 1949 following a bloody war of independence against the Dutch. The process of state-building began in tandem with nation-building. Secessionist insurgencies erupted across the archipelago. This class will study the insurgencies in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, which Indonesia occupied in 1971 and legally incorporated in 1976; the long simmering insurgency in Aceh; and the brief CIA-backed insurgency in the Christian majority region of the Malukus. Though the United States pulled support, the Indonesians have never forgotten that, and maintain a degree of mistrust.

In 1971, Indonesia invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor, formally annexing the province in 1976. But a marxist-based ethno-nationalist insurgency, known as FRETELIN, emerged, and tied the TNI down for over two decades. Egregious human rights abuses, kept diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. Australia was the only Western Country to recognize Jakarta's annexation. The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize went to two East Timorese campaigners, further pressuring Jakarta. The insurgency did not come to an end until the fall of Suharto in May 1998, when his success B.J. Habibie paved the Way for a UN-run referendum, which the government inexplicably believed it would win. The vote was almost 90 percent in favor of independence. The TNI hastily armed supporters who sacked the capital city of Dili, before a UN PKO was deployed, led by Australia and Thailand. Indonesia grudgingly accepted the referendum, but withheld vital support and expertise. East Timor became a ward of the international community, and to date remains a very fragile and poor state.

In 1976, an insurgency broke out in the western-most province of Aceh. Attempts to negotiate with the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement, known as GAM, repeatedly broke down, as the TNI attempted to crush the rebellion. Much of GAM's leadership fled to northern Europe, where they were able to maintain a de facto diplomatic presence. GAM received external support from Libya as well. The fall of Suharto in 1998 gave hope that a diplomatic settlement could be reached. Gus Dur offered a very generous autonomy package, but was ousted before it could be implemented. And his policy was already under criticism from the TNI. His successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the country's founder, was politically weak, and tried to appeal to the military for support by rescinding the autonomy offer and resuming the war. President Yudhoyono, who came to office in October 2004, knew that the insurgency could not be defeated. He began secret talks with field commanders, bypassing the intransigent leadership in Scandinavia. The Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, devastated Aceh, leading to the death of 165,000 people and wiping out what little physical infrastructure there was. The international community's robust humanitarian assistance program, was really the first time in over a decade that the province had been open to outside observers. The outpouring of international support, the totality of the calamity, was the catalyst for a peace agreement to be brokered under the leadership of the former president of Finland. By August 2005, an autonomy agreement had been concluded. To date, it is one of the most successful peace processes in the world.

In the eastern-most province of Papua, which is home to the largest copper and gold mine in the world, there has likewise been a long-standing but lower level insurgency. Papua is the poorest part of the country, with very little infrastructure. Unlike East Timor and Aceh, there is no movement towards finding a political settlement with the Free Papua Movement (OPM). The insurgency in Papua, remains the last un-resolved conflict in Indonesia. Though low-level, it is a clear case of internal colonialism.

These conflicts lasted were all exacerbated by over-centralization, internal colonialism, and egregious human rights violations by the state and security forces. The insurgency in Papua, remains the last un-
resolved conflict in Indonesia. Though low-level, it is a clear case of internal colonialism, as Papua is rich with natural resources, including the largest copper and gold mine in the world. Human rights abuses by Indonesian security forces have perpetuated the conflict, but also limited US security cooperation. This seminar will focus on the drivers of conflict, whether they be over resources, ethnicity and religion, or external factors.

**Required Readings**

- Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting, Indonesia's Search for Stability (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 194-229. [PDF]

**Recommended Readings**


**Other Resources**

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Thailand prides itself on being the only country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized. While true, it ceded significant amounts of territory to the British in Burma and France in Laos and Cambodia. The roots of Thailand’s ongoing Malay insurgency go back to the 1909 Anglo-Thai border treaty, that was imposed on the Siamese court. Thailand always sought to assimilate the Malay population, the only of its minorities that has stubbornly resisted assimilation in exchange for citizenship. Armed insurgency erupted in the 1970s, but remained very low level. Indeed, the greater security threat was posed by the Malayan Communist Party that sought refuge in Thailand's deep south. By the early 1990s, the Thai government had quelled the Malay insurgency, which was divided on ideological and strategic grounds. But the insurgency resumed in 2004, this time far more Islamist, unified, and violent.

The Philippines is awash in insurgencies. With the US colonization of the Philippines in 1898, the US was drawn into the pacification of the Moros, (from the Spanish for Moors). When the US gave the Philippines independence in 1946, Moro leaders tried to negotiate their own independence for the muslim-majority southern Philippines. Armed insurgency began in the early 1970s and was one of the justifications for Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 1972. The Moro National Liberation Front received backing from Libya and Malaysian leaders. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front broke away following the MNLF’s failed peace agreement with the government in 1976 and grew after the MNLF’s second peace agreement with the government in 1996. By 1999 they were developing a proto state governed by Islamic law. The Abu Sayyaf was formed by Afghan veterans and al Qaeda seed money in the early 1990s, and has vacillated between jihadist violence and abject criminality. Strategic instability has led to an open-ended US security presence in the southern Philippines since 2002. Since 2014, the Islamic State has made inroads, grafting onto existing movements. The Philippines is also home to the longest running communist insurgency in the world, led by the New People's Army. In addition, the Philippines is beset by the longest running communist insurgency, led by the New People’s Army.

**Required Readings**


**Recommended Readings**


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Other Resources
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4. Terrorism in Southeast Asia: From Al Qaeda & Jemaah Islamiyah to the Islamic State

The 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the resort island of Bali exposed the global network of Al Qaeda and pulled many governments in Southeast Asia out of their complacency. The movement had deep roots, emerging from Kartosuwirjo’s Darul Islam struggle in Indonesia from 1949-62. The Bali bombing, also unleashed the genie from the bottle: it was the first suicide bombing in the region. Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, executed annual multi casualty attacks in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2009. While many of the attacks demonstrated sophisticated learning, Indonesian and regional security forces gradually took the network apart. Jemaah Islamiyah was plagued by factional schisms, divides over targeting and tactics, whether to continue following the Al Qaeda line of attacking the “Far Enemy,” or by returning to its pre-9/11 campaign of sectarian bloodletting. In 2010 a group tried to bridge the divide, but was largely rounded up in police operations. JI, as a militant organization, was defunct until the 2014 emergence of the Islamic State, which revitalized terrorist networks across the region. Many key leaders of JI declared *bai'at* to al-Baghdadi. Over 300 Southeast Asians joined the Islamic State forming a Bahasa language company, Khatiba Nusantara. Including wives and children, over 1,000 Southeast Asians traveled to Iraq and Syria. In mid-2017 pro-IS militants siege the Philippine city of Marawi, which they held for five months. The lone wolf nature of IS, simply encouraging attacks by supporters, has led to multiple, if not spectacular attacks. And unlike the pro-Al Qaeda groups, pro-IS cells are actively targeting Malaysia. But as IS cells have taken the brunt of the counter-terrorism efforts, Jemaah Islamiyah is poised to retake leadership. In his April 2019 video appearance, al-Baghdadi made no mention of the Islamic State in East Asia. Was it an oversight or a snub? And as the Islamic State shifts to a global insurgency model, what does this mean for terrorism in Southeast Asia?

**Required Readings**

- Ana P. Santos, "In Indonesia, 'Women Are Now a Permanent Part of the Jihadi Structure'," *World Politics Review*, 29 October 2019, at https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28302/in-indonesia-women-are-now-a-permanent-part-of-the-jihadi-structure

Recommended Readings

• Kevin Yeo, “Suicide Bombing: Is this the End of Filipino 'Warrior Culture'?,” The Diplomat, 12 July 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/suicide-bombing-is-this-the-end-of-filipino-warrior-culture/.

Other Resources
• The reports on JI from the International Crisis Group are an excellent resource (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia.aspx) as are from IPAC (http://understandingconflict.org/en.html).
• The Department of State’s annual country reports can be found here: https://www.state.gov/country-reports-on-terrorism/
Topic 5
Terrorism will remain a persistent but manageable threat in Southeast Asia. There are many reasons for this, including the establishment of Indonesia’s elite counterterrorism unit Densus-88, as well as very good inter-state cooperation. In the Philippines, where CT has been highly militarized, it has been far less successful; tied too, challenges of governance. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have all put in place CVE programs, though they differ in fundamental ways, based on different legal regimes, cultural practices, and political sensitivities. Indonesia and Malaysia have put in place some very effective and progressive CVE programs that would never be acceptable in the West, but which deserve study.

This seminar will discuss the Southeast Asian experience in counterterrorism, analyze what policies have worked, what have failed. We will address certain laws and policy debates, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. The class will compare the police and intelligence approaches in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and contrast them with the military-focused approach of the Philippines. Importantly, it will look at areas where inter-state cooperation has been institutionalized, and where and why there are still shortfalls. In addition we will look at CVE programs, including the role of civil society and NGOs, as well as disengagement programs in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Finally, we will address the spread of Salafism in the region and its implications.

Required Readings


**Recommended Readings**


• Sara Zeiger, "Counter-Narratives For Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) In South East Asia," Hedayah (UAE), May 2016, at http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-2792016102253.pdf.

• Sara Zeiger, "Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives In South East Asia


• Zachary Abuza, "Counterterrorism In Southeast Asia," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Counterterrorism Yearbook, 2019, Edited by Isaac Kfir and Georgia Grice (Canberra, ASPI, 2019), at https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/ASPI%20Counterterrorism%20YB2019_acc_1.pdf?VWypiCRC om4gXFvmBHvSn0NIDNOrM M.


**Other Resources**

How do insurgencies end? In some cases, including many in Myanmar, they don’t, they fester on. Though a new constitution has created regional assemblies to give the minorities a voice, politics in Myanmar remain highly centralized. In Cambodia, the stars aligned and the superpowers basically enforced a peace on their clients, in 1991-93. In Sri Lanka, the military was willing to engage in egregious human rights abuses, to militarily defeat the Tamil Tigers. But a durable political solution is the most sustainable. Southeast Asia offers a number of examples of peace processes between governments and secessionist rebels. These include longstanding conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines. Half-hearted negotiations have begun to resolve the conflict in southern Thailand.

This seminar will look at the requirements for a successful peace process, examine pitfalls, including spoilers, discuss the role of the international community and third party mediators, and discuss transitional justice and reconciliation efforts. It will look to how peace processes, to be really successful, tend to be tied to a larger shift in the national political economy.

Required Readings


Recommended Readings


Other Resources

Topic 7
The Strait of Malacca is one of the busiest strategic waterways in the world. Shallow, crowded, and controlled in part by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. For years it was one of the most pirate infested waters in the world. The Regional Maritime Security Initiatives was established in 2009 and has done much to police the waterway. The Singapore-based Changgi Fusion Center has become a model for international intelligence sharing and law-enforcement cooperation.

Trilateral maritime policing in the Sulu Sea, between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines began in 2018 following a spate of maritime kidnappings and ship jackings by the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf that threatened regional trade. While an important step, there are very clear limitations, including a dearth of maritime assets, bureaucratic politics, territorial disputes, and a lack of a fusion center. International partners including the Singaporeans, Australians and Americans have tried to augment the capabilities of the littoral states, some of which have resisted external assistance as a threat to their sovereignty.

This seminar will also address the critical Straits of Lombok and Sunda. The seminar will focus on a variety of policy solutions for piracy and maritime terrorism.

**Required Readings**


**Recommended Readings**


Other Resources
• International Maritime Bureau, for data on piracy and maritime crime, https://www.icc-ccs.org
• ReCAAP, http://www.recaap.org
• CSIS-AMTI is a really terrific resource: https://amti.csis.org.
South China Sea I: Who, What, Where, & Why

The South China Sea is claimed in whole by China (and Taiwan), and in part by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, a US treaty ally. Indonesia, though not a claimant to any features, has a territorial dispute with China.

China has tried to assert its claim via the construction and militarization of islands on low tide elevations, a massive investment in their military capabilities, the effective use of its coast guard and maritime militia, diplomatic and economic instruments to divide ASEAN, and a forceful campaign to get states to accept its interpretation of international law. At times, China has asserted that the SCS is a “core interest”, akin to Taiwan and Tibet, something it is willing to go to war over.

The other claimant states have been unable to present a united front. Though the Philippines launched a successful challenge to China’s excessive maritime claims in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the government of Rodrigo Duterte, shelved the ruling.

The United States Navy continues to engage in Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims, a necessary but insufficient, component of a strategy.

Required Readings

- Derek Grossman, "Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?" Asia Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2018), 113-134. [PDF]

If you have no background in FONOPs or Law of the Sea, then you are required to also read this primer. It's a great and easy to read refresher: Eleanor Freund, "Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide," Belfer Center Harvard University, June 2017, at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide.

Recommended Readings
• Derek Grossman, "Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?" Asia Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2018), 113–134. [PDF]
• The PCA Award can be found here: https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf
• This is the State Department's December 2014 legal opinion on China's 9-Dash Line claim: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.

If you have no background in FONOPs or Law of the Sea, then you are required to also read this primer. It's a great and easy to read refresher: Eleanor Freund, "Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A


Other Resources

Topic 99. South China Sea II: Scenarios

This seminar will be an in-class scenario-based exercise. Each student or pair of students will be assigned a country (claimants and key third parties) and will prepare a brief on four different (some hypothetical, some not so hypothetical) scenarios.

The forceful eviction of Philippine marines from the Sierra Madre.
1. An incident at sea, where IS and Chinese naval warships collide, causing significant damage and loss of life.
2. The Chinese embargo of a Vietnamese-held Island.
1. The start of Chinese reclamation on Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal.

Required Readings

• TBD

Recommended Readings

Other Resources

• CSIS-AMTI is a really terrific resource. https://amti.csis.org.
10. Contentious Politics: Political Violence & the Rule of Law

As we discussed in the first seminar, the primary responsibility of security forces in the region has always been internally-oriented. In many cases, this meant regime survival. As such, security forces tended to be highly politicized in Southeast Asia. While some countries have seen the professionalization of their security forces, others have seen sharp reversals. Indonesia, which has been held up as a model of democratic transition in the Muslim world, has seen a concerted effort by the military to claw back powers and authorities it ceded in 1998. Thailand has seen two coup d’stats since 2006, and the military has clung to power through a host of legal and extra-legal mechanisms despite having held “elections” in March 2019.

Southeast Asia is home to a huge range of government types from a theocratic sultanate (Brunei), to communist dictatorships (Vietnam and Laos) to autocracies (Thailand and Cambodia), to fragile democracies (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar). Political violence is commonplace in many countries. Thailand and Myanmar have seen a surge in ultra nationalist Buddhist Monks who have incited violence against Muslim communities. Vigilante and terrorist groups in Indonesia and Malaysia have targeted non-Muslim minorities, as well as Islamic sects, challenging the long-held norms of secular multi-ethnic tolerance and “unity in diversity.” In the Philippines, the democratically elected government of Rodrigo Duterte has undermined the rule of law through his campaign of extrajudicial killings against drug dealers and political activists.

Required Readings

  - Something on 212 Movement and post April 2019 elections.
  - Josh Kurlantzic, CFR report on Thailand elections.

Recommended Readings


Other Resources

Abuza/SEAsian Security 28 Fall 2020
The Union of Myanmar is comprised of over 100 ethnographies-linguistic groups, and the country has been in a state of war with various ethnic-based secessionist insurgencies since its founding in 1948. The Rohingya are a different case. The Myanmar Government passed a law in 1982 that said the Rohingya were not one of the recognized ethnic minorities in the country, instead illegal immigrants from neighboring Bengal. Interestingly, British census records denoted the ethnicity, Rohingya. As such, Myanmar claims they have no legal protections or citizenship rights. In 2012, Buddhist vigilantes provoked conflicts. Over 100,000 Rohingya were placed in "camps" with little access to aid, medicine, and unable to go outside to work. Hundreds of thousands took to rickety fishing boats to flee. Thousands made their way to Malaysia through human trafficking networks along the Thai-Malaysian border. The Rohingya were always poorly treated and marginalized, but ironically things got worse following the end of martial law and the democratic transition. Radical Buddhist monks began calling for pogroms. A 2017 attack by a ragtag movement known as the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army led to the death of Myanmarese border police. In August 2017, the Burmese military launched what has been described as a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing," driving over 800,000 people across the border into Bangladesh, the largest refugee crisis besides Syria. There is documented evidence of murder, the systematic arsons of villages, and rape by Burmese forces. The government of democracy icon and Nobel Price laureate Daw Aung Suu Kyi shocked the world by providing the military with diplomatic and political cover. The crisis continues without any end. In sight, and has been compounded by the trafficking of Rohingya through Southeast Asia, in cases abetted by corrupt security forces. The Rohingya crisis is one issue that has clearly divided ASEAN, and the diplomatic opprobrium of the Myanmar government has given China an opportunity its to reassert its traditional leverage.

This seminar will analyze the legal definitions of refugees, migrants, trafficked persons, and stateless peoples. Before delving into the crisis and possible outcomes.

Required Readings


Recommended Readings


Other Resources

Human Security III: Drugs & Thugs

The Golden Triangle in Myanmar, Laos, and northern Thailand is the second largest opium poppy processing region of the world. Though heroin remains an important product, it has been surpassed by the production of methamphetamine. But methamphetamine production is produced around the region, including in the Philippines and Indonesia. Drugs have created a host of problems: corruption of security forces and political leaders, HIV infections, violence, the breakdown in the rule of law, and diplomatic tensions. But illicit drugs are far from the only transitional criminal issue. Southeast Asia is at the epicenter of human trafficking, including of brides into China. The Thai seafood industry has been implicated in horrific scandals involving slave labor. The Philippine administration of Rodrigo Duterte's war on drugs has led to the extrajudicial killing of nearly 20,000 people. Southeast Asia has seen a surge of casino construction, in particular in Cambodia and Laos, prompting concerns of money laundering in states with little to no regulations or oversight.

Required Readings


Recommended Readings

- HRW report on EJKs in the Philippines
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The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) and Fortify Rights, "Sold Like Fish, Crimes Against Humanity, Mass Graves, and Human Trafficking from Myanmar and Bangladesh to Malaysia from 2012 to 2015," (March 2019) at https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Fortify%20Rights-SUHAKAM%20-%20Sold%20Like%20Fish.pdf
There is not a region in the world that is more susceptible to the effects of climate change. The populations of the Philippines (110 million) and Indonesia (265 million), both volcanic archipelagos, are concentrated on low lying plains. But so are the populations in most other Southeast Asian countries. The damming of the Mekong River by China and Laos has reduced the flow of water down the Mekong river, causing salt water intrusion into the Mekong Delta, the country’s rice basket. Changes in weather patterns are severely effecting agricultural production causing food insecurity. Already, few countries in Southeast Asia are food secure. Energy needs are skyrocketing in a region of such economic vitality. While some countries have offshore oil and gas deposits, they are often in contested waters, and are finite. Indonesia and the Philippines have failed to harness geothermal energy. Vietnam began to pursue nuclear energy, but has shelved that initiative. Indonesia is interested in nuclear energy, but there are legitimate concerns about nuclear safety in such a seismically active region. Even small Singapore has recently considered nuclear energy. Meanwhile, Jakarta and Bangkok are sinking, due to depletion of aquifers and sea level rise; Manila is not far behind.

Required Readings

- Please read the following International Energy Administration country reports/analyses for each of the filling countries:
  - Brunei: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.php?iso=BRN
  - Indonesia: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=IDN
  - Malaysia: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.php?iso=MYS
  - Philippines: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.php?iso=PHL
  - Singapore: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.php?iso=SGP
  - Thailand: https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/THA
  - Vietnam: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.php?iso=VNM


• Emirza Adi Syailendra, "In the name of food security," Inside Indonesia, 9 January 2017, at http://www.insideindonesia.org/in-the-name-of-food-security


Recommended Readings


• https://coastal.climatecentral.org/map/7/104.0006/-2.4842?theme=sea_level_rise&map_type=coastal_dem_comparison&elevation_model=coastal_dem&forecast_year=2050&pathway=rcp45&percentile=p50&return_level=return_level_1&slr_model=kopp_2014
Other Resources
1.
14. Topic 12
Conventional Security, Interstate Relations in Southeast Asia, Strategic Culture, Civil-Military Relations, and Cyber Security

Southeast Asia has seen steady increases in military spending in the past few decades, and now totals over $40 billion. Several states, such as Vietnam, are amongst the top arms importers in the world. While most countries remain inwardly focused in terms of security, several countries, Singapore and Vietnam, have clear offensive capabilities. Both have created forces that are effectively “scorpions” lethal enough to deter aggression against them. We have also seen a build up of naval forces in the region, and in particular submarine forces. Singapore has modernized its submarine force, Vietnam now has six Kilo class submarines from Russia, Indonesia is now producing South Korean-designed submarines under license, while Thailand has recently purchased one (and up to three) submarines from China.

This class will analyze the growth in conventional forces and force structures, understanding why states invest in their militaries the ways that they do. This will be an opportunity to revisit the concept of strategic culture. It will also be an opportunity to analyze state-on-state security issues, and include the role of the United States as an ally and security partner. We will also touch on cyber security, though few countries have done much in the region to harden themselves against cyber attacks, while even fewer have any offensive cyber capabilities.

Required Readings

Indonesia
- Evan Laksamana, "Indonesia's Modernizing Military," Foreign Affairs, 3 September 2015, at https://t.co/N8e9JJjrMF

Singapore
**Vietnam**

- Derek Grossman, "Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?" Asia Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2018), 113–134. [PDF]

**Malaysia**


**Thailand**


**Recommended Readings**

- Malaysian White Paper [PDF]
- Vietnamese White Paper [PDF].