News

The year 2024 marks the 100th anniversary of the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy.

This article explores the growing concerns about the U.S. military’s ability to deter or win a conflict with China in the Western Pacific, focusing on the role of logistics in future military success.

This article discusses the strategic importance of establishing an Arctic-focused subordinate unified command under USNORTHCOM to enhance the responsiveness and resilience of the U.S. Armed Forces.

By the time you read this, our national elections will be imminent. Our next President, regardless of whom that will be, must confront the world as it is, not as it could be. No one solution will fit all foreign conflicts, and none of these will necessarily fit our domestic needs.

Τhe United States is facing unprecedented challenges in the cognitive domain. While democracies struggle to develop frameworks that promote collective understanding, adversaries are employing gray zone tactics—those that never rise to the level of war—as a form of cognitive warfare against the United States and other democratic societies. François du Cluzel, head of innovative projects at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Allied Command Transformation Innovation Hub, describes the key distinctions of the emerging cognitive domain.

Ιn an era of geopolitical competition among major powers, a large-scale war could last longer and result in more casualties than anything the United States has experienced since World War II. It is unclear whether the all-volunteer force (AVF) that the United States has relied on for the past 50 years, with extraordinary and unexpected success, can meet the manpower requirements in quality and quantity and in time to win the large-scale combat operations that the Department of Defense (DOD) is preparing for.

Joint Force Quarterly recently moved the modern Web-based platform Digital Commons (https://digitalcommons. ndu.edu), to provide better access to its collection of cutting-edge and historical work on the joint force and more. Check out JFQ 114, and provide NDU Press with your feedback!

Ιn “Balancing Nonresident Joint Professional Military Education with Military Life,” Commander Doug Morea makes the salient point that the current joint professional military education (JPME) process fails the individual joint warfighter in preparing for the challenges of serving in combatant commands and other joint forces. As joint educators, we agree with Commander Morea’s premise and offer that the current JPME model not only fails the individual joint warfighter but is also wholly inadequate for what the joint force requires both today and in an uncertain future.